

Populism, Democracy and Paradigm Shift¹

By James M. Youngdale

In American culture, terms like populism and democracy, are often used with great contradiction and confusion; and these two in particular are often used interchangeably. At the same time, the term, capitalism, is also used interchangeably with democracy, especially in cold war circles with rhetoric about defense of democracy, and used as a euphemism for Western capitalism. The effort of this essay is dedicated toward disentangling confusion of this kind with special attention to the linkage of populism and democracy as a problematic matter; and throughout this essay, it will be understood that "ism" terms, like capitalism, socialism, or populism, are descriptive of an ideologically defined social structure whereas democracy will be conceived as a method in terms of which power conflicts are negotiated and hence a method which varies in its implications with each of the ideological "isms."

Taking populism as a starting point, the term is used in popular discourse in reference to any mass movement or about any political leader who enlists mass enthusiasts; and in this context, one can find allusions to such disparate persons as Harry Truman, Jimmy Carter, George Wallace, Huey Long and even Ronald Reagan as populists, making for great confusion. Discussion about populism among academic historians has been more precise even though vastly different points of view have emerged. In a famous text from the 1930s, John Hicks in *The Populist Revolt* presented populists as aggrieved Jeffersonians, a view reinforced by Vernon Parrington with his overview of American history as an eternal conflict between Hamiltonian autocracy and Jeffersonian democracy. This perception of populism prevailed until the publication of Richard Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform* in which he argued that populists were frustrated petty capitalists who were nostalgic for a lost golden age of egalitarian individualism and who turned angry, hateful and undemocratic with the inability to restore their utopia. In *The Populist Response to Industrialism*, Norman Pollack responded that populists

were really the true democrats of American history and forward looking protosocialists as well. Since the publication of these two books, a host of scholars have examined the populist past and have fallen somewhere on the spectrum between Hofstadter and Pollack. It is not the purpose of this essay to review this scholarship but rather to make an independent statement about this debate with incidents from upper midwestern populist experience for supportive evidence.

It is a matter of elementary logic that texts are explicated within a broader context and that a given interpretation of a text is related to assumptions about its context. The text here, of course, is populism; and the context is my view of the sweep of American history which I call "history as overlapping paradigms." In this framework there have been a succession of world views which compete for cultural hegemony, one replacing another in a process called paradigm revolution.

Priefly, a paradigm is a hegemonic intellectual synthesis expressed with both myths and theories in terms of which a consensus view of social reality emerges as the "common sense" of an age. A paradigm revolution occurs with a long range shift in social outlook, a shift which implies a new "common sense" to fit a changed reality. In this short essay, it is not possible to elaborate upon the complexity of paradigm revolutions other than the following notations to set the stage for an interpretation of populism. A paradigm revolution represents a philosophical shift over perhaps fifty or even a hundred years and is not to be confused with the concept of revolution as *coup d'état*. Furthermore, ideological revolutions overlap in time as gravitation toward a new paradigm is uneven among persons in differing class or status levels, making for much cultural conflict and dissonance in society at large. Finally, paradigm shift involves not just two competing world views for ascendancy. Usually, several possible alternatives emerge to vie for support to become the new reigning paradigm when an old one shows "decay" or a mismatch between theory and reality. There is much ambivalence and vacillation among people involved in paradigm shift as they are torn between commitment to old values (theories, myths) and a necessity to change values in consonance with a changed social reality. Thus, there is always a tendency to look both forward toward a new radicalism and backward to a past golden age as a reactionary dream, often both tendencies internalized within a given person or movement to make for a contradictory eclecticism.

The cryptic observations in the previous paragraph about the complexity of paradigm revolution set the stage for further discussion of populism in American history. The populists of the late 19th century

and the early 20th century were a pivotal part of the larger paradigm revolution from *laissez-faire* liberalism to progressivism. Representing the "underdogs" of society, the populists were more explicit and more insistent upon reformist intervention; and thus they pushed the progressive "upperdogs" "to the left," so to speak. However, to the extent that progressive reformers like the two Roosevelts and Woodrow Wilson responded to populist pressures, they, by the same token, often co-opted populist initiatives and, at times, employed repressive tactics with "big red scares" when co-optation failed. Thus, as is often observed about Franklin Roosevelt, the progressives "saved capitalism" with limited reforms.

While, in general, populism served as a pressure point upon the emerging progressive outlook, a more careful examination of populist movements reveals much internal contradictory eclecticism which has made for vacillation on the part of individuals and schisms within specific movements, often viewed as "left" vs. "right" splits. These tendencies deserve examination in order to resolve the opposing views about populism from such historians as Hofstadter and Pollack.

In American experience, the cooperative idea from Robert Owen has eclipsed notions from Karl Marx for ideological hegemony over reformism. Within circles committed to cooperatives, however, there has often been a polarization between those who view coops as a path to democratic socialism under the rubric of the cooperative commonwealth idea and those who see coops only as a profitsharing device to shore up the petty capitalist reality being undermined by trustification. Thus, the coop movement itself has reflected the tensions involved with the breakdown of the *laissez-faire* liberal paradigm of the 19th century.

While Robert Owen promoted an ill-fated attempt to found a communal society at New Harmony, Indiana, prior to the Civil War, it was not until the 1870s that the Patrons of Husbandry (the Grangers) under Oliver Hudson Kelley systematically began to organize cooperatives. They organized both consumer coops as state buying clubs, including mail order buying through Montgomery Ward, and producer coops in the form of manufacturing plants for plows, reapers and threshers. There is no evidence that the early Grangers imagined building a cooperative commonwealth. Rather, all indications point to support for cooperatives resting on a desire to sustain petty capitalism among hard-pressed farmers. The various producer coops failed in rather short order, both from undercapitalization and also from an inability to keep abreast of technological innovations being 'rapidly introduced by such private farm equipment makers as Cyrus McCor-

mick. The "radicalization" of the Granger's occurred around their demand for railroad regulation, not around their cooperative movement. Oliver Hudson Kelley, who dreamed of Jeffersonian agrarianism uncorrupted by a market economy, sulked in Minnesota while leaders in other states, employing militant language about railroad abuses, built the Grange to half a million members in just a few years time. Once some political victories were won for railroad and warehouse regulatory commissions in several midwestern states, the *raison d'etre* for the Grange melted away as did the membership, which was anyway poorly organized and hardly aware of a role by Kelley and the national leadership.

As the Grange disintegrated in the 1880s, a new organization took root, at first in the South, the Farmers Alliance, about which much has been written, notably Lawrence Goodwyn's *Democratic Promise*. The Alliance worked on two fronts: cooperatives and political action. Its political program departed from *laissez-faire* doctrine, raising demands for strong federal intervention in the economic system toward social justice. The Alliance platform included such proposals as nationalization of railroads, the eight-hour day and a support system for farm prices. (The farm pricing plan became the centerpiece of the New Deal farm legislation in the 1930s.) Out of the Alliance, there sprang the People's Party in 1892, a third party which registered strong gains both in 1892 and again in 1894. This party, better known as the populists, finally failed when it confronted the American electoral system which gravitates against minority parties, contrary to European parliamentary systems. Also, it failed over internal tension between "left" and "right," especially in that many of these populists were satisfied with supporting William Jennings Bryan on the Democratic ticket around the inconsequential issue of Bryan's call for coinage of silver as well as gold toward monetary inflation as a panacea for "hard times." The People's Party is remembered for the stirring preamble to its platform written by Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota, which says in part: "... we meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot box, the Congress and even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized. ... From the same prolific womb of governmental injustices we breed two great classes - tramps and millionaires. ... We believe that the powers of government - in other words, of the people - should be expanded as far as the good sense of an intelligent people and the teaching of experience shall justify, to the end that oppression, injustice and poverty shall eventually cease in the land." Donnelly, himself, was ambivalent about his own radicalism, always

looking back to the Jeffersonian Dream and refusing to join with the emerging socialist movement before he died in 1900.

The cooperative idea played an important role again after the organization of the Society of Equity in Indianapolis in 1904. The Equity movement at first stressed the need for a support system for farm prices; but by 1910, it began building a chain of coop elevators through which farmers could sell their grain without fear of being cheated in the grading or the weighing process. The movement in North Dakota and Minnesota also endorsed and fought for state-owned terminal elevators to which the local could deliver grain for sale to domestic millers or to foreign buyers, a plan designed to benefit farmers by eliminating middleman's profiteering. The demand for a state-owned terminal elevator sparked the formation of the Nonpartisan League in North Dakota in 1914 after farmers were allegedly told to "go home and slop your hogs" at a legislative hearing in Bismarck in 1914. In 1916, they elected the Governor of North Dakota along with the lower House of the Legislature as dissident Republicans (the subject of the award winning film, "Northern Lights"), and in 1918 in the midst of wartime hysteria about radicals and "Hun lovers," they also won control of the State Senate and Supreme Court around a much broader quasi-socialist platform than simply the terminal elevator plank, again as nominal Republicans.

Out of the Equity movement and the Nonpartisan League arose the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota. After electing Henrik Shipstead to the U.S. Senate along with two Congressmen in 1922, the Farmer Laborites also elected Magnus Johnson, former Equity manager for Minnesota, to the U.S. Senate in 1923, who was defeated in the regular election in 1924. However, Shipstead and the two Congressmen remained in office during the remainder of the 1920s. In 1930, with the Great Depression gathering force, the Farmer-Labor Party captured the Governor's seat with the election of Floyd Olson. Under Olson's dynamic leadership, the party became a grass roots movement around an adjunct movement known as the Farmer Labor Association which published a newspaper and carried on radical political education. The influence of the Association was so marked that Olson himself spoke with confidence in 1934, "I am not a liberal. I am what I want to be - a radical." Taking a cue from the Governor, the party platform committee, headed by Howard Y. Williams, a Social Gospel minded Congregational minister, wrote the following preamble for the party platform which was adopted by the convention:

At this time when all of us could live in prosperity and happiness, we find there are millions of working men and women in poverty ... also hundreds of thousands of farmers, business and professional people who have become poverty stricken and bankrupt ... Palliative measures will continue to fail. Only a complete reorganization of our social structure into a cooperative commonwealth will bring economic security and prevent a prolonged period of further suffering among the people. ... We, therefore, declare that capitalism has failed and immediate steps must be taken to abolish capitalism in a peaceful and lawful manner and that a new, sane and just society must be established, a system where all natural resources, machinery of production, transportation and communication shall be owned by the government and operated democratically for the benefit of the people and not for the benefit of the few.²

Although Governor Olson toned down the rhetoric, interpreting this statement as an endorsement of the Swedish "middle way," he did not repudiate the plank; and he was reelected in 1934 by a sizable margin, the only example in U.S. history of a statewide victory around a cooperative commonwealth platform. In subsequent campaigns, the Farmer-Laborites were more circumspect in regard to their declarations about the capitalistic system, but still radicalism remained implicit in their planks as they gravitated toward being a left wing of the New Deal.

When the Social Democratic Party (socialist) was organized in 1901, several midwestern figures played a key role. There was Eugene Debs, of course, and also Victor Berger, long time socialist Congressman from Milwaukee, and the Reverend George Herron, Professor of Applied Theology at Grinnell College in Iowa. This Socialist Party was sufficiently eclectic that it embraced many socialist tendencies, including the foregoing cooperative commonwealth approach as well as liaisons with the militant IWW when it was first organized. The larger contribution of the Debsian socialists to American radicalism has been well documented, but the special role of these socialists in rural America and within midwestern populism has been too much ignored.

Prior to World War One, the socialists became a grass roots movement in many rural areas. In this short essay, it is not possible to fully explore the role of the socialists as a "left wing" current within the larger populist movements which emerged in the upper midwest. It is quite clear that the Nonpartisan League spread like a "political prairie fire," quoting from the title of a book by J.L. Morlan, because the socialist clubs of North Dakota voted to transform themselves into League clubs, not without some debate about "selling-out" their principles. A.C. Townley, himself the charismatic leader of the League, had for a time been the agricultural director for the Socialist Party until he was expelled for lacking knowledge about socialism; but he, nevertheless, worked closely with several socialist farmers in launching the League in 1914.

In Minnesota, the socialists likewise gravitated to support the Farmers Nonpartisan League, which in this state, like North Dakota, sponsored radical candidates within the Republican Party primaries from 1916 until 1922, at which time they elected Shipstead as a Farmer-Labor independent. Socialist sentiment also flourished within the labor movement as evidenced by the election of Thomas Van Lear, an officer of the Machinists Union, as Mayor of Minneapolis. William Mahoney, a socialist labor official from St. Paul, was instrumental in organizing a Workingman's Nonpartisan League as a counterpart to the farmer's organization and in uniting the two Leagues finally into the Farmer-Labor Party after failing to win elections in Republican primaries as had been the case in North Dakota.

Of special interest in Minnesota was the role of the Finnish socialists on the iron ranges in the northeastern part of the state. After being locked out of the mines following a strike in 1907, the Finns transformed their Prohibition movement into socialist clubs and proceeded to organize cooperatives and to found community halls for lectures and entertainment. The Finns divided sharply at the time of the Russian Revolution. Some, with memories of hated czarist rule in Finland, became staunch supporters of the Workers Party and later Communist Party while others adhered to a social democratic outlook at odds with those committed to the third international. This division between "Red Finns" and "Church Finns" colored political developments on the iron range for several decades. By and large, neither faction among the Finns became involved with the Nonpartisan Leagues or the forming Farmer-Labor Party until the Popular Front period beginning in 1936. At this time, the communists began to play an active role in Farmer-Labor politics and in the election of John Bernard to Congress, who won immediate fame for his lone vote against the Neutrality Act of 1937, an act which hamstrung aid to Republican Spain to the advantage of Francisco Franco.

The socialist movement provided an important ideological current, namely: anti-imperialism, which in turn pervaded the populist movements generally. The Anti-Imperialist League had significant adherents in Minnesota prior to the formation of the Social Democratic Party. Governor John Lind of Minnesota and Governor Andrew Lee of South Dakota were both vigorous opponents of the Spanish-American War. As a matter of fact, Governor Lee won a court suit forcing the U.S. Army to bring South Dakota volunteers home from the Phillipines on grounds that they were there illegally, contrary to the agreement under which they had volunteered. But the socialists developed a near-Marxist

critique of imperialism, which was evident in their 1917 statement opposing our involvement in World War One:

Modern wars as a rule are caused by the commercial and financial rivalries and intrigues of the capitalist interests of different countries. Whether they have been frankly waged as wars of aggression or have been hypocritically represented as wars of "defense:" they have always been made by the classes and fought by the masses. ... They [wars] breed a sinister spirit of passion, unreason, race hatred and false patriotism. They obscure the struggles of the workers for life, liberty and social justice.³

Not all socialists concurred with these sentiments and some dropped out of the Socialist Party, among them Carl Sandburg who had worked for the socialists in Milwaukee and Mayor Van Lear of Minneapolis.

The socialist version of anti-imperialism was popularized as a sort of leftwing isolationism during the 1930s, a point of view which was bolstered by the findings of the committee headed by North Dakota's Senator Nye who investigated the role of the banking and munitions industries in propelling the United States into World War One. Anti-war sentiment influenced, at times, the character of populist coalitions; for example, Germans and Scandinavians with deep reservations about "fighting Europe's wars" flocked to the Farmers Nonpartisan League in 1917 and 1918 when League leaders expressed cautious reservations about the war with such slogans as "draft capital as well as men," which in turn provoked vigilante (tar and feathering) action against some League members and resulted in several League leaders being jailed for sedition in Minnesota. It is of further interest that an important contributory factor for the defeat of the Farmer-Labor Party under Governor Elmer Benson in 1938 was the defection of German voters who preferred the right wing, almost pro-Hitler, isolationism of the America Firsters to the anti-Hitler views of Benson and his friends in the leadership of the Party.

At the opposite pole from the coop commonwealth/socialist current within populist movements was an outlook I have called tory populism, reflecting a view which lays predominant stress upon nostalgia for a society based on idealized petty capitalism yet which also endorses social reform requiring governmental intervention. The tory populists, by themselves, preferred those reforms which imply the least governmental intervention, such as money tinkering, for example, the silver crusade of the late 19th century, and anti-trust measures designed to restore a truly competitive economy. Tory populists were different from free enterprise liberals only in their willingness to participate in broader populist movements which stood for more far-reaching reforms. By virtue of their

basic commitment to the individualistic syndrome, they were most prone to vacillate out of the populist orbit altogether and sometimes to engage in hate campaigns or conspiracy theories of history, as well, and even to flirt with a fascist outlook as they moved from left to right on the political spectrum.

The matter of vacillation is a complex one which deserves more attention than heretofore. The shift on the part of tory populists to the "right" is essentially the process described by Hofstadter in *The Age of Reform*. Others besides the tory populists made this same shift, for example, Algie Simons, a socialist who joined with the loyalty campaigns during World War One as an informer about his former socialist friends. Contrary to Hofstadter, there was also vacillation from right to left, from Teddy Roosevelt progressivism to a more radical socialist outlook. There was Charles Lindbergh, Sr., a Republican Congressman who joined with the emerging Minnesota Farmer-Labor movement as an anti-war gubernatorial candidate in 1918; and there was Richard Pettigrew, maverick Republican U.S. Senator from South Dakota 1894-1900 who later turned radical, denouncing the capitalistic system from a socialist perspective. On the other hand, Farmer-Labor Senator Shipstead, elected as a presumed radical in 1922, turned to the rightist American Firsters and Franklin Roosevelt hating in the late 1930s and back to the Republican Party in the 1940 election: Townley of Non-partisan League fame drifted off into right wing McCarthyism in the 1950s. Examples of various kinds of vacillation can be cited in abundance as people made ideological shifts within the populist movements and sometimes out of the movements altogether, shifts which are explicable in the context of paradigm/revolutions.

Populist movements were never able to define a centered world view of their own as a vision for a "good society"?and hence the movements tended to be unstable between a socialist left and a tory populist right, always with tendencies for internal divisions and personality clashes based on these divisions. But at those times when, under pressure from adversity or an unpopular foreign policy, there was a good deal of unity between the contending currents in the movements, there were spectacular successes, most notably the North Dakota Nonpartisan League from 1916-20 and the Minnesota Farmer Labor Party 1930-38, both cases of winning control of state governments. It is this central position within populism which incorporates both the "left" and the "right" which I call radical neomercantilism or radical progressivism, an outlook in which one can find both the negative tendencies observed by Hofstadter and the positive ones noted by Norman Pollack if one looks

selectively for evidence. On balance, both men were wrong and both were right and both lacked a wide enough field of vision about the populist movements.

As a footnote to the Hofstadter position, there is a special flaw in ideology of classical liberalism which views society as a loose collectivity of atomistic individuals and hence not in terms of social forces, which can be called American Innocence. In history, the innocent American has been a person who can only react with anger and even violence, like a child having a temper tantrum, when experiencing frustration with the social system. Temper tantrums in the adult world take the form of bigotry toward religious or racial minorities, leading at times to lynching of Negroes or Indians. It is a veritable paradox that classical liberalism in America is often idealized as Jeffersonian democracy and yet that this same classical liberalism bears within it the seeds of bigotry and violence. This same point about the defect of capitalistic individualism as an ideology was made about Germany by Erich Fromm in *Escape from Freedom* in which Fromm traces one strand in the rise of fascism into Protestant individualism.

The foregoing argument about the fragility and limitations of democracy (often confused with individualism), within the context of the *laissez faire*, liberal paradigm is not to suggest that democracy as a method for social interaction would flourish like a spring flower under either an idealized progressive or socialist paradigm with commitments to group process and citizen participation. A progressive or socialist paradigm does not obliterate but certainly changes the contours of powerfulness and powerlessness; and there is hardly need to elaborate upon the suggestion that power elites have ways of co-opting and/or subverting the democratic process largely through control by bureaucratic structures related to the existing power configuration. While democracy conceived as group process may often be flawed in all forms of society, it has been stifled, largely with McCarthyite anti-communist tactics, in the United States to discourage radical or populist critiques of the social system dominated by the military-industrial complex. A certain amount of democratic populism has always existed in America in reference to local issues, like parks, street conditions or garbage collection, a populism recently promoted by followers of Saul Alinsky; however, these community-based movements rarely ask big questions about national and international issues. When groups begin to ask the big questions, democracy becomes suspect by the American elite who see such questions as unwanted interference from "below," the point made

explicitly in Samuel Huntington's *The Crisis of Democracy*, a book sponsored by the Trilateral Commission.

Up to this point, populism has been discussed as a political response to the failure of the 19th century liberal paradigm which was unable to deal with the rise of corporate industrialism toward a "good" and stable society. The failure of *laissez faire* liberalism became most fully apparent in the 1930s. At this time, the Roosevelt New Deal came to represent "upperdog" progressivism which co-opted many proposals from "underdog" populism. However, since World War II, the progressive paradigm has shown signs of its own failure to deal with an expanded industrialism dominated by multi-national corporations. Gradually, the dream of a New Deal "welfare state" has been replaced by the vision of the "warfare state," sustained by old dreams of Manifest Destiny linked with cold war ideology. By this token, Keynesian pump priming has shifted from the civilian sector to military spending, a form of pump priming which has been inherently inflationary in that it puts dollars into circulation without putting goods on the civilian market. This shift has amounted to a paradigm revolution, the implications of which have not yet been fully realized. It is not possible here to provide in any detail the full range of implications. A leading one is the deindustrialization of America, making for mass unemployment in key industries. This, in turn, has transferred employment within the United States from blue-collar unionized jobs to so-called service industries, usually non-unionized and with lower pay scales. American agriculture and its supportive small towns have been caught in a squeeze between high costs and low prices, a squeeze which is depopulating both farms and towns through a process of bankruptcy and outmigration of people. The human impact of these various shifts has been to create a new class of "haves" who have been able to capitalize on inflation and a wider than ever class of "have-nots" who have lost both status and income security, many of whom become a new underclass which is essentially frozen out of the work-a-day world. Among the "have-nots," there is deep resentment and anger along with disillusionment with the political and social system.

The political responses among those harboring disillusionment have been various. In the 1960s, a New Left arose, largely in protest against the war in Vietnam; but, by and large, this New Left raised few questions about the legitimacy of the social system. Rather, it stressed existential individualism ("doing your own thing") as the central focus of protest and a reversion to moral indignation so common to the 19th

century liberal paradigm. It should come as no surprise that some leaders of the New Left shifted to the New Right, among them the former editors of *Ramparts Magazine* and David Stockman, former Reagan Budget director, who was a Vietnam protester while a college divinity student. But, by far, the most important response among the disillusioned has been the turn to religious fundamentalism to find a "haven in a heartless world" to quote a book title by Christopher Lasch about the American family. These fundamentalists are organized under the rubric of the Moral Majority, a view about morality linked with 19th century liberal values and a view which paradoxically links these people with the New Right with its nostalgia for a mythical past "when America was great." A commitment to a Jeffersonian world of free individualism and minimal government leads a fringe of this Moral Majority to join with movements which might fairly be called neo-Nazi and which engage in gunfights with police and tax collectors in the name of defeating "big government." The most noted of these on the fringe are The Aryan Nation and the Posse Comitatus movements, both of which look upon Adolph Hitler as a hero!

Whether the Moral Majority movements deserve to be considered under the rubric of populism is a matter of semantics. The larger point should not be lost that these Moral Majority "populists" perceive themselves to be in rebellion against the New Deal tradition, not fully realizing that the New Deal has already been transformed by the Warfare State; whereas the old populists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were in rebellion against the liberal *laissez-faire* paradigm and finally helped create New Deal progressivism. Functionally, the two kinds of populism are quite opposite one another.

The attempt of the Moral Majority to wear the mantle of populism is not going without some challenge. There is a proliferation of movements in America calling for jobs, peace, women's equality, farm price supports, civil rights, saving our ecological system and more. Even though these movements are poorly reported in the mainstream press in America, they make for an important undercurrent which may yet surface in important ways. Even these movements display some ambivalence between whether to veer left or veer right; and they are poorly equipped to deal with this dilemma in view of the fear in America of thinking about social theory.

Fear of theory runs deep in American popular culture, which tends to reflect simultaneously a concern with down-to-earth pragmatic concerns and flowery idealism as transcendentalism leaving out the mediating role of myth and theory as commonly perceived in the various

academic disciplines, Thus, most Americans are only dimly aware that Keynesian economic theory functions in the 1980s as military Keynesianism as a replacement for the social Keynesianism of the New Deal. This is a fundamental shift as a part of a larger paradigm revolution, a shift over which popular movements are very much divided between "old" populists and the Moral Majority variety. My own bias is with the "old" populists, but my concern with them is that they also reflect the typical down-to-earth pragmatism in American culture and hence fail to project a new vision for a "good society" along with appropriate social theories to match. This bodes not well for confronting the Moral Majority types of the far right.

NOTES

1. This article is a revised version of a paper delivered by Dr. Youngdale at a panel on American History and Politics at the Nordic Association for American Studies held in Bergen, Norway, May 11-15, 1985. Youngdale has published *Third Party Footprints* and *Populism: A Psychohistorical Perspective*.
2. *The Fanner Labor Leader* issue of March 30, 1934 on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota.
3. Gilbert C. Fite and H.C. Peterson, *Opponents of War, 1917-1918* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 50.