middle. President Truman put all his prestige on the line to pass a new civil rights law which would better look after the interests of the black population. This was vehemently opposed by many Southern Democrats, the so-called Dixiecrats, who were worried that racial conditions would change in the South. Lyndon Johnson entered into a kind of alliance with the Truman wing in exchange for their support in the legal imbroglio that arose out of the senatorial election. Unfortunately it is only at the end of the book that we are clued into this broader political strife, which obviously bears heavily on our judgment of the players involved.

Something else the book lacks, in my opinion, is a critical discussion of the problems of source reliability. Much of the substance of Caro’s book is based on interviews with key persons. But these events took place in the distant past, and it is easy to imagine that various later opinions about the central course of events have had their effect on these people’s memories. One would have wished the author had addressed this problem.

Robert Caro has by no means solved or laid to rest the problems of power in the books he has published to date (he has also written a brilliant study of New York developer Robert Moses, The Power Broker, 1974). But he has placed them under the loupe in the most intriguing manner by so thoroughly penetrating the way in which a full-blooded politician reached the temples of power. In subsequent volumes Caro will be turning the spotlight on Washington, D.C., the Senate, and the White House. It is with great expectations one awaits the completion of this magnum opus.

Erik Åsard

Uppsala University


McCarthyism remains a controversial issue in postwar American history, first of all because the basic political and cultural conflicts which were highlighted in the McCarthy era by no means vaporized overnight with the fall of the notorious Wisconsin senator. McCarthyism continued to be a straitjacket on intellectual life in America for years after, and repercussions can still be sensed in American politics to this day. With Nightmare in Red, Professor Richard M. Fried, who is Associate Professor of History at the University of
Illinois at Chicago and author of *Men Against McCarthy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), has written one of the most valuable and comprehensive books yet on the McCarthy era.

The author adheres to what might best be described as a "political" interpretation of McCarthyism. Arguing along the same lines as historians such as Robert Griffith (*The Politics of Fear* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970), Fried traces McCarthyism back to the 1930s and presents it as a delayed reaction to New Deal liberalism, reinforced by the development of the Cold War, the growing frustrations of the American Right and the bitter partisan struggle in the late 1940s.

In contrast, early works on "McCarthyism," such as Richard H. Rovere's, *Senator Joe McCarthy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), tended to emphasize Joe McCarthy's demagogic personality and his skillful use of the media as major contributing factors to his political influence. Another group of historians and social scientists, among them Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Daniel Bell, were inspired by theories of mass psychology, and searched for an explanation of the profound impact of McCarthyism in various forms of social strains affecting the senator's supporters. While many of these works provided valuable insights into the cultural basis of the Red Scare, they have generally not been able to withstand empirical testing, which is probably best demonstrated by Michael Paul Rogin in his *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967).

In accordance with Professor Fried's adherence to the "political" tradition, it is the loyalty issue as a focal point for the cultural and political struggle at mid-century, rather than McCarthy's personality and reckless schemes that has his interest. Thus, the book is not intended as a rival to the two major biographies of Joe McCarthy, David M. Oshinsky's *A Conspiracy So Immense* (New York: The Free Press, 1983), and Thomas Reeves' *The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy* (New York: Stein and Day, 1982). Indeed, the political career of the Wisconsin senator is only touched upon briefly. As the author notes with regard to civil liberties, "the anxieties of the Cold War, culminating in the Korean crisis, and the pressures building at all levels of politics and in the life of the nation's political major institutions would guarantee that this period—with or without McCarthy—would be a grim one."

Professor Fried covers the well-known cases against Alger Hiss, Owen Lattimore, the Hollywood Ten, etc., but he also draws upon a vast number of episodes at the state and local levels in order to show the multiple layers of McCarthyism and the extent to which anti-communism affected most branches of public life in America. In addition to the more direct results of the Red Scare, the author accounts for the influence that red baiting had on the labor movement and on the struggle for racial equality, as well as the indirect consequences that it had for feminism, sexual tolerance, artistic expression, etc.
Nightmare in Red does not offer any bold new interpretations, and most of the material used by Fried can be found in a number of more narrowly focused studies, such as Ellen W. Schrecker's No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York, 1986). However, for anyone interested in a general introduction to “McCarthyism” and its political origins, Richard M. Fried's book is an excellent choice.

Niels Bjerre-Poulsen

Copenhagen Business School


In his introduction, Michael Goldfield poses the question: Why are unions in such trouble today? What are the reasons behind the dramatic losses in union membership, particularly in the private sector? The book is an attempt to answer the question. Goldfield summarizes his arguments in the following way: Three factors, in the context of the changing relations of class forces, have contributed to union problems.

1. A growing offensive of United States capitalists that has enjoyed increased success in defeating attempts at new union organizing.
2. Changes in public policy tending to favor the employers.
3. An inability, and even an unwillingness, of American labor unions to devote the energies and resources necessary to combat effectively declines in their membership or in their general influence.

The author offers his explanation for why these three factors are important. His thesis is that the decline should be sought in the weaknesses that were inherent in the last great upsurge of American labor, from the late thirties to the mid-fifties.

First of all he points out that union strength in the United States is regional. There are strong union traditions in the Northeast, the Midwest, and the West Coast. But the other side of this coin is the South and the Southwest. The trade unions' lack of political strength on the national level is a reflection of this situation. He points to the failure of "Operation Dixie," the organizing drive in the immediate post-World War II era, as the most important cause of this. Among reasons for the failure, he cites the internal divisions in the labor