not almost all sciences be classified as half-art? The object of historical research is clear. It is the past. But if this object is clear, it is, on the other hand, very extensive. It should be added that there are other sciences whose object is also the past. Historical research has its own methods, but other sciences can use the methods developed in the sphere of historical research. Conversely, historical research uses methods developed by scholars in other fields. Ultimately, it may be that the borders of historical research are no more unclear than for most sciences. And although it is very natural for historical research to attempt to be an independent, separate branch of scholarship, it is probably inappropriate to draw lines which would be, in Hvidt's words, "sharp and clear." Such lines are mechanical and contrived.

History vs. Literature: Facts vs. Fictions?
Or Factual Fictions vs. Fictional Facts?
Or, Help, I Want to Get off

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Daughter: Daddy, do you mean that Sir Isaac Newton thought that all hypotheses were just made up like stories?
Father: Yes — precisely that.
Daughter: But didn't he discover gravity? With the apple?
Father: No, dear. He invented it.

Father: All right. Then I evidently do not know what the word "sort of" means. But I do know that the whole of fantasy, poetry, ballet, and art in general owes its meaning and importance to the relationship which I refer to when I say that the swan figure [of Swan Lake] is a "sort of" swan — or a "pretend" swan.
Daughter: Then we shall never know why the dancer is a swan or a [Petrouchka] puppet or whatever, and shall never be able to say what art or poetry is until someone says what is really meant by "sort of.

Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind

Reading our facts-vs-fiction debate, including my own notes for this contribution, I am somehow reminded of a Doonesbury cartoon from the early 1970s, in which one American says to the other as they are trudging through a Vietnamese landscape of tall weeds: "Hear of the bombing raid last night? 2,300 tons!" to which the other replies, "That wasn't a bombing raid! It was a Protective Reaction Strike!" This exchange illustrates two crucial aspects of human studies in general and the study of history in particular: first, that most historical "facts" represent problems of interpretation long before they reach history.
books, and second, that problems of language are always involved as well. Language inevitably seems to make man into what Roger Fowler calls "a fiction-making animal": "We understand our universe by naming its parts — or so we like to think. Of course what we really do is partition our universe fictionally by an imposed grid of language." This is poignantly obvious in the expressions above, where the "bombing raid" and the "Protective Reaction Strike" conjure up, as it were, two different worlds, in both of which there are 2,300 tons of hard "facts." One may indeed ask which world makes the "facts" most "fictional," or whose "fictions" are the most "factual."

In order to exist by themselves, "facts" would, it appears, have to stay outside language — the moment they enter it, they become part of a particular reality. They enter a specific emotional context as well: when the cartoon character above says that "they drop bombs in both cases. There's no difference," the other one exclaims, "There's a big difference, fellah! A Protective Reaction Strike means not to say you're sorry." Thus our emotional reactions and attitudes are inextricably interwoven into the very words we use — into the web of our "facts" and "fictions."

Out of "facts," then, and indeed into "facts," we build our own constructions of "reality." However social or cultural (i.e. collectively shared) these constructions often may be, they are nevertheless a kind of "fictions" — stories which we spin out of the chronicles of the world and the biography of our own lives. In his introduction to Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity, biologist/anthropologist Gregory Bateson tells the story of a man who asked his computer, "Do you compute that you will ever think like a human being?" to which the computer finally printed out its answer: "THAT REMINDS ME OF A STORY." In Greek and Latin the word for history and story was of course the same, meaning a narrative, a tale (originally designating both real and imaginary ones!) — and the two words are still identical in for instance modern French (histoire), German (Geschichte), and Scandinavian (hjstorie). If we all view the world in terms of stories, then the problems of interpretation in historical and cultural studies do not become essentially different from those in literary scholarship.

Of course historical and literary sources are also different somehow. The trouble, however, lies with the word somehow: the question becomes whether the differences actually make much of a difference for the systematic interpretation of historical and literary sources. Kristian Hvidt insists that they do: the border line between the disciplines of history and literary criticism goes "between fact and fiction," and that line is clear and sharp." Later, however, Hvidt admits as a potentially legitimate discipline — "complementary" to the history of hard "facts" — "the area of feelings, of psychological effects, of environment etc. which is "the playground for scholars in literature" and which he had previously kept strictly but somewhat regretfully apart from the study of history proper. I almost wish he had stuck to his original heavy guns when patrolling his border between fact and fiction. To dismiss fictive "facts" while paying attention to fictive feelings is somewhat inconsistent: if "Ellis Island" in an immigrant novel is not a "fact," then neither, surely, is for instance a feeling of "uprootedness" in the novel. According to such a literal view, in literature even "facts," however referential they may be (like bombs in Vietnam), are "fictional," whereas in historical sources even "fictions," however far-fetched they may be (like "Protective Reaction Strikes") are "factual" because they historically "exist."

My phrasing of these distinctions is indicative of my own sense of their precariousness. However well they appeal to our penchant for departmentalization, they end up becoming untenable. The term "fiction" may of course be reserved exclusively for "imaginative literature," but then everything else becomes a "fact," which would represent too extreme a break with ordinary usage. On the other hand, if "fiction" is to be used to indicate something that is part of both literature and life, then "fact" becomes an awkward counterpart, since "fact" and literary fantasy seem almost a contradiction in terms. What we need is therefore a set of terms connoting a framework of interrelations instead of radical differences. The most pervasive common denominator between literary and "ordinary" communication is of course that of language itself. As has already been pointed out, however, language is a figurative means of expression; it inevitably constructs, as much as it reflects, our world. Words are "signs" for things, and must not be confused with the things themselves. That language is figurative means that it is always both referential and non-referential, that it has both a "real-life" and a "make-believe" dimension at the same time. In order to make us see the interconnections between literature and history more clearly — or more precisely, the interrelations between literary and "ordinary" language — I tentatively suggest that the terms "factual" vs. "fictional" be replaced by the pair referential vs. visionaL, as long as it is clearly understood that both terms describe both "ordinary" and "literary" uses of language. "Visional" may sound like an awkward and strange term, but it is chosen in order to avoid phrases like "imaginative" or "creative," which connote too much besides "fantasy." Visional is not part of ordinary usage and is here specifically used to
signify that which is produced by imaginative visions; that which is not simply made, but made up; that which is a matter of fantasy and make-believe. It is perhaps hard to keep constantly in mind this figurative, *ambivalent* function of language. The only instance in which we seem to be familiar with this referential non-referentiality is in connection with conventional poetic metaphors. Thus, when the historian of “The Song of Solomon” says that “I am a rose of Sharon, a lily of the valleys,” we do not mistake her for a flower; and when the bridegroom says to her that “Your lips distil nectar, honey and milk are under your tongue,” we are not liable to think that, upon kissing her, he discovers that she has just eaten breakfast — despite the fact that rose, lily, honey, and milk are all bona fide references. And what is true of such metaphors is also true of the language of an ordinary conversation or an imaginative work of fiction. Language never seems to be able to pin down, so to speak, some “reality” that is one-dimensional and still; instead it constantly flickers ambiguously between that which is made and that which it makes up.

All this may serve to remind us that an important field of study is absent from Kristian Hvidt’s *Humanities* fable, historically a grandchild of the archetypal Humanities Mother, I suppose, but so intimately bound up with the two oldest children, the studies of Literature and History, that rumors of incest abound. This progeny, called Linguistics, has during the last couple of decades become a true problem child for the whole Humanities family. More than both social sciences and Marxism, which Hvidt considers responsible for the breakdown of traditional disciplinary boundaries, linguistics has tended to venture into large areas of the Humaniora world, primarily in terms of its recent concern with structuralism and semiotics. The most radical semiotic theories in fact do away with history altogether. Here texts, whether literary or historical, are regarded not to refer to a world “out there”; instead, the words of any written source are regarded as signs in an autonomous linguistic system continually commenting upon itself. Any historical-minded critic must of course reject this extreme position and insist on the mutual interplay and interdependence of language and history. But semiotics has nevertheless served to make some historians more aware of the extensive role of language in what we may describe as our figurative constructions of “reality.” It has also served to make the historical study of literature less mechanically referential.

The “fact-minded” historian and the exclusively “fiction-minded” literary critic may, however, retrench and dig themselves in in the last ditch by objecting that, no matter how figurative historical sources may

be, I am nonetheless mixing up two kinds of “fictionality”: the visional dimension of historical sources is of a different character from that of literature. Be it far from me to suggest otherwise. Most of the experiences presented in historical sources, although figurative, are written or read as referring to something that has “really,” “actually,” taken place (for instance “Protective Reaction Strikes”), whereas those of literature are usually read as make-believe, i.e. as having not happened. Yet the differences involved are quite relative and highly amorphous. Our conventions of reading make us after all often regard the experiences presented in literary works as being closely related to those of “real life”; and life, we say, imitates fiction. What is more, the language of “fictional” discourse is always referential at the same time, and the language of “real-life” discourse also functions in the imaginative manner of “poetic” means of expression. Again it is crucial to emphasize that the belief in a specific “reality” is a matter of cultural conditioning: to people of one culture or sub-culture, the beliefs of radically different cultural groups often seem “fictional.” Unconventionally speaking, “real” worlds are simply myths — stories — within which there are, conventionally speaking, worlds of make-believe (like those of dreams, fables, games, or imaginative literature).

My point in this essay is not that the fictions of literary make-believe and cultural beliefs are functionally identical; all I want to argue is that, since both historical and literary source materials are linguistic, figurative ones, they must be interpreted in similar ways — i.e. that the nature of linguistic expression inevitably imposes upon them the same interpretative problems. Thus whether events have taken place or not is not pertinent for the way in which we semiotically and structurally study their meaning, i.e. their expression, within the sources themselves. There can be no essential difference involved when it comes to our analysis of the “fiction” they construct, the “figure” they make, the “story” they tell.

Although my references so far have been mainly to anthropologists, linguists, and literary critics, I may point out that Carl Becker, for instance, held similar views (although much less extensive) already by the 1930s. As he saw it in a paper entitled “What Are Historical Facts?” from 1926, historical sources always involve re-presented events, hence something that is inescapably emblematic rather than merely “real” or “factual.” Thus the study of history deals only with symbols of events: “In truth the actual past is gone; and the world of history is an intangible world, re-created imaginatively, and present in our minds.” A passage from Becker’s seminal Presidential Address to the American Historical...
Association in 1931 actually combines the concept of history as an "imaginative reconstruction" of the past with the idea of history as a linguistic means of expression — hence history, like literature, becomes not a reflection of some "objective" "truth," but rather a production of the subjective vision of the writer himself:

Left to themselves, the facts do not speak; left to themselves they do not exist, not really, since for all practical purposes there is no fact until some one affirms it... the form and substance of historical facts, having a negotiable existence only in literary discourse, vary with the words employed to convey them. Since history is not part of the external material world, but an imaginative reconstruction of vanished events, its form and substance are inseparable: in the realm of literary discourse substance, being an idea, is form; and form, conveying the idea, is substance. It is thus not the undiscriminated fact, but the perceiving mind of the historian that speaks... 7

Among the historians debating in this issue of American Studies in Scandinavia, Skårdal seems to be the one most consistently concerned with the way in which historical writings (primary as well as secondary sources) are linguistic "constructions" of the past, whereas Hvindt more often uses phrases that seem to connote some conception of the existence of absolute substances, like "mirroring the truth," "reconstruct facts," and "illustration of reality." As Gene Wise suggests in his book American Historical Explanations, we should perhaps talk "not of 'reality' and of 'truth' vis-à-vis that reality, but of 'experience' and of 'explanations' vis-à-vis that experience." 8 Such formulations serve to bring out the interpretive frame of mind which guides the work of the literary scholar as well.

It is important to be aware of what, precisely, I am arguing here, and what I am not arguing. I am not arguing that the studies of history and literature should be considered similar in all important senses. They are most certainly separate disciplines with different cognitive concerns. A good deal of historical scholarship involves types of analysis and generalization that are not usually part of literary studies. The study of history frequently comprises an enormous amount of sources; literary criticism usually only one or a few texts. History often studies sources for their presentation of one, or a few, specific issues, and does not discuss the rest of the thematic implications within the individual source; literary analysis usually focuses on the totality, the over-all interplay, of numerous elements within the single text. History is concerned with sifting out inconsistencies and implausibilities caused by bias and subjectivity (not least by constantly checking sources against other sources); the study of literature involves by necessity the subjective textual features themselves. The generalizations of history are often supra-textual, i.e. constructions of collective issues (economic, social, cultural) that may not be fully present and developed in any one text; the generalizations of literary studies are by necessity intra-textual, i.e. constructions of the intrinsic characteristics of one specific text. In short, historical studies and literary studies are different from each other in the sense that the concern in the former is often a collective or representative one, whereas in the latter it tends to be an individual or particular one.

What I am arguing, however, is that the dichotomy of "fact" vs. "fiction" is inept, unproductive, and even downright misleading when used to characterize historical vs. literary sources, and consequently historical vs. literary studies. Such a distinction reduces the interpretative potentiality of both disciplines, since both kinds of sources and studies are both referential and "fictional." Involved here is more than a mere squabble over terms: the disagreement marks two distinct attitudes to life, and to human studies as well. The "fact vs. fiction" attitude implies that life can be analyzed literally, so to speak: that "facts" can be separated from values, description (information) from interpretation, thought from ideology, "reality" from myth, and life from literature. In short, it reflects a belief in the existence of some sort of "objective" knowledge. My position, on the other hand, is that life must be analyzed figuratively: that "facts" do not exist apart from our valuations, that description is interpretation, that thought is ideology, that "reality" is a myth, and that life is, in an empirical sense, a story. It is essential for scholars within the human studies to realize that substance and fantasy are intimately bound up with each other — that social life is always a mixture of the referential and the imaginary, and that indeed cultural myths, however well founded or unfounded, help form our behavior, and vice versa. Understanding — whether scientific or not — is part of this process: our world is not there, apart from us, waiting to be understood; we construct it in the very act of trying to understand it. Historical or literary knowledge is therefore not something that we merely find "in" texts and which lie there independently from us; it is something which we actively make in the act of reading them.9 Thus it is also impossible to distinguish radically between the ways in which we interpret our beliefs, and the ways in which we interpret our make-believe, like literature: they are part and parcel of each other.

That all experience is subjective, however, does not mean that it is all random, or that it cannot be studied systematically. It simply means that we have to substitute the opposition "objective" vs. subjective with oppositions like collective vs. individual, and representative vs. particular.
Obviously, some types of experiences, ideas, and values are representative of, and even collectively shared by, people of a society or a specific social group, and these may be analytically distinguished from those of a more individual or particular nature. This does not mean, however, that what Hvidt calls "the vexed question of representativity" can serve as a criterion for dividing historical from literary sources. The single source, interpreted in isolation — be it literary or historical — is simply expressive of a single, particular point of view. "Representativeness" is not some quality inherent in historical or other sources. The hypothesis we frame, the problem we investigate, the questions we ask, are what in each case determines the representative status of a source. We make sources representative, or particularly parts of them, on the basis of our interpretation of our selection of source materials. Representativeness remains an abstract construct, an invention of the analyst — a "fiction," if you will.

Like other human activities, literature is an historical phenomenon; consequently literary texts must be regarded as potentially representative, in historical terms, as any other kinds of sources. Its historical representativeness may fall into two interrelated classes, one more directly "cultural," and one more directly "formal." Literature may in the first place involve both an imaginative reflection of, and response to, the culture in which it is written, i.e. the representative or collective ideas, values, and feelings prevalent at a specific time. What is more, general characteristics of literary form and conventions may be representative of particular historical conditions as well: what we call "Romantic" literature or "Victorian" fiction or "modernist" poetry signify specific historical changes. Both the "cultural" and the "formal" types of literary representativeness are a major concern for the student of literature using an historical approach to the analysis of literary works, and may of course be the object of systematic scientific study. Literary studies (in contradistinction to historical ones) are too often mistakenly regarded as impressionistic and hence non-empirical. It is important to point out that Skårdal's characterization of the historian is equally applicable to the student of literature: a scholar "who uses words like an author, but who is bound to source materials by methods that approach those of science in the evaluation of evidence and the construction and testing of hypotheses in order to reach logical conclusions." In the case of the literary critic, however, it is the imaginative works of literature which represent the sources submitted to a painstakingly close, systematic analysis. Thus both historical and literary studies may be as rigidly empirical as they are consistently non-positivistic.

As far as the study of complex historical problems is concerned, however, it is obvious that they involve numerous questions of generalization and representativeness that no single type of sources can provide a satisfactory answer to. A great number of various kinds of sources are required to analyze the interplay of different historical forces, to evaluate their respective importance, and to interpret their significance. As a more general observation, however, we may say that to use only literature as a source, or nothing but newspaper reports, or exclusively diaries and letters, carries its own risk of distortion and one-sidedness. The crux of the matter may be that we can never be quite sure that the common denominators within one kind of sources do not spring from their intrinsic character as a specific type of source material, rather than from that which is shared by a whole culture. Thus we always have to make cross-checks with other kinds of sources as well. In retrospect, of course, some of these sources, including literary ones, may be found to be perfect embodiments of collective and representative issues.

Of course the historian may or may not make use of literary source material, as the student of literature may or may not make use of "ordinary" historical sources in order to help him interpret literary works. The rest of this essay, however, is specifically concerned with the interaction between historical and literary studies, and is directed at those historians and literary critics who are dealing with (or want to deal with) the problems of such interdisciplinary work. The central question here, then, is no longer whether imaginative literature may embody representative experiences and ideas, but in what way it does so. The widespread scepticism among historians toward using literature as a source springs, I believe, primarily from an analytical and methodological insecurity vis-à-vis this question of how we interpret material that is avowedly a matter of make-believe, and thus, as a whole, wilfully figurative.

The starting point for any type of literary study is not to read literature literally as if, say, the characters or the setting of a novel were merely representative of people or places. No literary element has a definite, historical meaning only "in itself." It receives its complete significance in terms of its figurative status — that is, as a combination of referentiality and fictionality. Per Hansa in Røsvag's novel both is, and is not, a Norwegian-American immigrant; his Dakota both is, and is not, a territory by that name in America. What Per, or Dakota, "is not" simply indicates what they are as well, namely deliberate constructions, poetic elements played out against each other in the imaginative vision of the work of art, where they all (characters, events, plots, etc.) mutually
develop and qualify each other. The lesson of this is two-fold: first, that the significance of a literary work is emblematic and requires an imaginative translation rather than a paraphrase, and second, that one literary element (like “character”) acquires its full meaning in terms of its relations to the other means of expression in the work of literature. In literature, the social environment is “setting,” people are “characters,” and objects serve as “images” or even “symbols”: these are terms literary students employ to indicate that they must be studied as a combination of signs which are also expressive of literary conventions.

This does not mean that these literary inventions/conventions are without historical significance. It merely means that we cannot proceed directly with referential interpretations when confronted with a literary work — that we must interpret these literary figures of speech before we proceed to translate the work into historical terms. Consequently any scholar who wants to use literature as an historical source must be familiar with literary theory and methods, with literary history and conventions, and with the close reading of specific texts. Without this basic training, the interpreter of a literary work will too easily fail to deal with the cultural translation of its literary form, which is synonymous with the historical significance of its vision of the world.

But, if the historical study of literature consists of a translation of literary means of expression into historical terms, then these historical terms must be given equal attention. One cannot make a good translation from one language to another without being thoroughly familiar with both. Thus I disagree with Hvidt’s statement that literary students “tend to read too much history in their mistaken attempt to see whether fictive literature reproduces a true picture of the scene.” On the contrary, most studies of literature — even those which purport to be historical — bear witness to superficial and slipshod historical work. They abound with hackneyed cultural observations which lack particularity and substantiation: a work is simply said to express “the spirit of the period,” its “rampant materialism” or perhaps its “deep social concern,” “the values of the small town” or “the urban way of life” — or whatever. If significant interdisciplinary work is to be done, however, assertions about the relationship between a literary work and history must be empirically sound. Therefore the literary student must be familiar with historiography and historical methods, with problems of social and cultural representativeness, and with the interpretation of historical source material. Familiarity with both major and minor events and issues of a given period will make him catch historical references and associations in a literary work that would otherwise pass him by; and a firm grasp of the central ideological conflicts of that time is the prerequisite for recognizing their imaginative transformation into literary form.

Thus both a literary and an historical competence are required in order to perceive how a literary “language” (of character and setting as well as symbols and style) can be translated into a cultural statement. In my opinion, Skårdaal downplays the difficulties involved in this type of interpretation when she speaks of how authors use their understanding of their time “for artistic and didactic ends that the historian must take into account”: “These are seldom difficult to identify by one trained in literary criticism.” On the contrary, I find it an extremely complicated matter to analyze this interplay between literature and society, between the individual and the cultural, between the subjective and the collective. As Skårdaal points out, the general consciousness of an author’s time “molds his interpretations, his attitudes, and his use of language.” What complicates this process immensely, however, is that the author’s individual style and subjective vision also mold his figurative expression of “the general consciousness” of his time. To put it more simply, a literary work does not only represent a reflection of, but also a reaction to, a specific period, and this reaction is imbedded in the very texture of the literary work itself. It is only in the last few decades that historical-sociological studies of literature have begun to pay attention to this formative nature of literary works, through which they are seen not merely to reproduce, but also to produce, historical meaning. This cutting both ways is an equivocal and complicated matter, the study of which must still be said to be in its infancy: many steps within this translation of literary texture into cultural ideas must be said to represent “black boxes” waiting to be filled with demonstrable analytical procedures.

When faced with the complexity of these interpretive problems, the historian may feel justified in his scepticism towards literary sources and may scuttle happily back to his purely historical material. Yet everything I have tried to argue in this essay is intended to embitter his reaction of happy belief. I have tried to suggest that all written or oral sources are imaginative constructions, referential and imaginary at the same time, and inevitably expressive of a subjective point of view. Thus not even sources whose languages are traditionally considered relatively “hard” are exempt from this — for instance that of official documents rather than personal diaries. The historian pursues an illusion if he regards the meaning of such sources as directly “paraphrasable,” i.e. if he thinks that they simply “contain” historical “information” that can be directly “transferred” as “facts” to his own study. Of course the use and perception of figurativeness vary from source to
source and reader to reader: it may be quite deliberately practiced and read as such, like for instance in poetry ("Your lips distil nectar"); it may be part-consciously employed and understood, as in various types of political "languages" ("bombing raids" or "Protective Reaction Strikes"); or it may be by and large unconsciously presented and perceived, as often in everyday speech or in what we regularly regard as "referential language" (e.g., "the vexed question of representativity"). No source presents pure "information", imbedded in the very language of which it is made, is always a particular figurative and didactic response. The historian is at every turn confronted with things both being, and being historical and literary studies, let me presents pure "information"; imbedded in the source and in what we regularly regard as "referential language." This inescapable ambiguity may not make him happy but — c'est la vie.

In order to underscore the interpretive interconnections between historical and literary studies, let me close with a small anecdote — a story — from "real life," or rather from my dream life, slightly heightened, perhaps, through poetic licence. Some weeks ago I had this nightmare about taking an English oral exam on the podium of some enormous auditorium with two examiners seated before me. One of them seemed to be a professor of linguistics who kept hissing into a microphone with an unmistakably Norwegian accent: "He's made THREE concord mistakes in one hour and ten minutes! He's made THREE concord mistakes in one hour and ten minutes!" The other examiner was a woman professor of literature in a black dress and shawl who seemed singularly unimpressed with my discussion. She was not listening any more; I knew I had not made it but continued talking. Suddenly, however, she looked up from her black knitting: "All right, then — what do you mean when you keep saying that literature is imaginative?" Everything grew quiet; even the linguistics professor stopped hissing. Imaginative literature ... IMAGINATIVE ... Finally I stuttered to break the silence: "It is sort of ... well, like my wife. When I say that I love her, she says that it isn't really her I love." All at once the examiners and the whole auditorium burst into laughter. And then, like a silly puppet, I started laughing as well, although it felt more like crying.

Such laughter may have grown steadily more shrill in the last few decades as linguists, anthropologists, and psychologists have started to deprive us of the stability of our "facts." Our laughter is also in many ways a particularly Western one, engendered by a deep-rooted positivistic tradition from which we have great difficulties of freeing ourselves. Ironically, the theories of the so-called hard sciences have long since shorn their positivistic chains. But as long as we, historians and literary students alike, departmentalize wives or literature (or dreams or husbands or bombs or Per Hansas or Ronald Reagans) into a world of either "fact" or "fiction," the studies of the humanities remain at a standstill.

NOTES
5. The view of traditional literary criticism, as held for instance by the Russian Formalists and the Anglo-American New Critics, has been that literary language is essentially different from language outside of literature. Jan Mukarovsky distinguished for instance between "standard language" and "poetic language," and I.A. Richards between "scientific" and "emotive" language. Many contemporary linguists and critics would argue, however, that there is no difference in kind between literary and for instance everyday language, and that the latter also displays foregrounding and defamiliarization, implication and indirection. See for instance Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Univ. Press, 1977), and the work on illocutionary speech acts, as for example John P. Searle's "What Is a Speech Act?" in Pier Paolo Giglioli, ed., Language and Social Context (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 136-154; Paul H. Grice's "Logic and Conversation" and John P. Searle's "Indirect Speech Acts," both in Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, eds., Syntax and Semantics, vol. III: Speech Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 41-58 and 39-82 respectively.
6. Carl Becker, "What Are Historical Facts?" Western Political Quarterly, 9, no. 3 (September, 1955), 333.
7. Carl Becker, "Everyman His Own Historian," American Historical Review, 37, no. 2 (January, 1932), 234-23B.
9. For similar views, see for instance Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), for example the essay "How Ordinary is Ordinary Language," pp. 97-110, especially pp. 94, 97. Such views are also implicit in Bateson's two works quoted earlier — Steps to an Ecology of Mind and Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity.