Gretlund calls 'The Lagniappe,' but the chapter might as well have been placed in the previous section in that the writers mentioned here share the thematic concerns that Gretlund labels 'existential.' 'New Frames of Southern Mind' offers an overview of some fifteen Southern writers of fiction currently publishing. The essay takes the form of a status report, and Gretlund likes what he sees: 'The writers referred to in this chapter exemplify the continuity, change, and excellence of Southern fiction in the 1980s, and their output was impressive' (261).

The last essay in the collection Gretlund calls 'Frames of Southern History, Biography, and Fiction.' Here Gretlund addresses the growing awareness in the academic community of the collapse of genre boundaries between historiography, biography and fiction. In the first part of the essay he rehearsed, and supports, the view of Hayden White et al. that a writer of history of necessity has to make use of the narrative strategies of fiction to make readerly sense, historiographers' insistence on non-fictional 'objectivity' notwithstanding. The second part provides good illustrations of how a writer of biographical autobiography – in casu Eudora Welty in One Writer's Beginning – does the same. These viewpoints are well established in the literature by now and will raise few objections. However, the last part of the essay, where Gretlund seeks to demonstrate why 'without pleasure, [he has] found that modern fiction is (auto)biography' (274), he is a little less convincing. His views here seem somewhat sweeping and are less cogently argued and illustrated than in the first two parts of the essay.

Each of Gretlund's seventeen chapters has a small preface which explains the circumstances that produced the text in question; read together these prefaces constitute a form of autobiography of the author as Southern scholar and tell of a varied activity as researcher, speaker and commentator, editor, and conference organizer. Frames of Southern Mind is only one of the many fruits of that labor. The book suffers here and there from repetitions and overlap, which must be ascribed to the fact that these essays were written over a long period of time, for a number of disparate occasions. Some minor misgivings noted along the way notwithstanding, this remains a highly stimulating book. Gretlund has an impressive grasp of his materials. He convinces both in his close readings and in his ability to survey the larger field. The fact that he is never afraid of taking a strong stance vis-à-vis writers and issues should be productive of fruitful debate.

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Historian Walter L. Hixson, author of a study of cold war diplomat and ideologue George F. Kennan, argues in this book that information and culture played a decisive role in bringing down the Soviet Union and its satellites. 'Infiltration' – Hixson curiously insists on keeping the cold-war term – of American ideology and culture into the USSR and Eastern Europe during the Cold War has been neglected by traditional diplomatic histories of the Cold War, he suggests. Hixson acknowledges that such comparative neglect of the
contribution of American culture to the collapse of Soviet communism reflects the fact that State Department diplomats and functionaries took a dim view of the political significance of cultural contacts with the Soviet Union during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The maintenance of the economic and military superiority of the United States was the primary objective and all dealings with the Soviets should proceed on the basis that the Soviets understood and accepted that fact.

Propaganda conducted especially by radio grew out of war-time experience, when it was known as 'psychological warfare.' The outgoing Truman administration had requisitioned a report from MIT and Harvard on how to 'wage total cold war.' Appropriately entitled 'Project Troy,' this collaboration between the elite universities and the national security bureaucracy was seen as exemplary by State Department officials. On the basis of the scholarly recommendations a Psychology Strategy Board was set up in 1951 with the task of uniting the national security bureaucracy in a campaign of psychological warfare. The Board, manned by personnel from the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was to submit recommendations to the National Security Council. The underlying assumption of 'psychological warfare' strategies was that the peoples of Eastern Europe were discontented with Soviet rule, and the goal was to stir up disaffection and ultimately rebellion against Communist oppression. Anti-Communist propaganda was beamed into the Soviet zone by the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Liberation (RL) and Radio Free Europe (RFE). Each country was targeted separately in its own national language spoken by refugees, escapees and others, often fanatically anti-Communist. Some of the more vulgar and vituperative propaganda was conducted not by VOA but by the Munich-based stations RL and RFE; officially 'private' stations but funded by the CIA and with boards answerable to the State Department.

On Eisenhower's initiative a United States Information Agency (now USIS) was created in 1953. Hixson argues that its creation was somewhat against the wishes of the State Department. However, although the director would report directly to the president and the National Security Council, the new agency would be subject to policy guidance by the State Department. In a classic example of Orwellian Newspeak the mission of the USIA was stated as that of persuading 'foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are also consistent with the national objectives of the United States' (26). The de facto subordination of USIA was indicated by its continual complaints about inadequate funding and its submission to demands that it maintain an Index of 'subversive' literature during the height of the McCarthy rampage. Thus USIA libraries were asked to remove such highly esteemed novels as Mailer's The Naked and the Dead, Jones' From Here to Eternity, and Ellison's Invisible Man.

Hixson's central argument is that aggressive psychological 'warfare' broadcasts were exposed as so much irresponsible hot air in 1956 when both the US and NATO passively stood by as Soviet troops 'drowned the Budapest uprising in blood,' as the headmaster at my school memorably put it to us in his morning address. In Hixson's scenario control over RFE and VOA subsequently tightened, as when the US began to encourage national communism particularly in Poland. The anti-Polish programs of the 'private' RFE radio station were summarily transformed into pro-Gomulka broadcasts. VOA turned to exclusive English-language broadcasts of news and entertainment. Its famous 'Music
USA' program was actually launched as early as 1955. Emceed by Willis Conover, it became one of the most popular VOA programs.'

Hixson wants to document a movement in American cold war propaganda away from strident anti-communist rhetoric towards an emphasis upon the enviable American Way of Life as something that ought to and could be made available to all people in the world once they committed themselves to liberal democracy and a capitalist economy. He attaches particular importance to the American contribution to the 1958 Brussels World Fair, to the 1958 cultural agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and to the subsequent American National Exhibition in Moscow the following year. For the Brussels Exhibition Hixson relies on Robert Rydell's World of fairs (1993) as well as archival material containing USIA officials' reports. Hixson argues that in both exhibitions the Americans were anxious to counter Soviet criticism of class exploitation and the disfranchisement of African-Americans. Thus in Brussels the American show was sold as 'People's Capitalism' (in the United States there is only one class: the Middle Class). Hixson deals extensively with the 'American Negro' exhibit, which in his words tried to present the issue of race with 'unprecedented honesty and integrity.' Both the Soviet and European press had circulated the Little Rock, Arkansas images and news of the previous year, and the Americans evidently felt that they could not ignore the issue. Whether the presentation was as courageous as Hixson claims is not clear on the evidence offered here. Perhaps he ascribes 'integrity' to the USIA because this section of the exhibition in particular aroused the anger of Southern congressmen: protests, however, that led the honorable USIA organizers to remove offending photos of 'mixed' couples or groups from the exhibition. The analysis of the US exhibition in 1959 in Moscow that secured the world's headlines because of Nixon and Khrushchev's carefully staged 'kitchen debate' rests on Hixson's own archival research both in the US and Russia. Here the People's Capitalism – the American Way of Life – was translated into an orgy of exhibited consumer goods, 'labor-saving' house appliances, cosmetics and hygienic products and, of course, automobiles. Carefully vetted young Americans served as guides to the various exhibits and personally sifted and fielded questions from the many visitors. Hixson reports USIA officials' self-congratulatory reports on this effective pedagogical strategy. They may well have picked up the idea from the communists. Any visitor to the USSR in those years will recall how hard it was to sneak out or see anything 'unaccompanied.'

Hixson doesn't have much to say about American 'high' culture as propaganda, but mentions in passing that the Americans worried about Soviet criticism of vulgar American mass entertainment (including rock'n'roll). Accordingly both in Brussels and Moscow 'modern' American art (e.g. abstract expressionist painting) was exhibited. There is some indication that the selection of 'modernist' art worried American organizers because of its potentially disturbing effects on the overall impression of the exhibition. Conservative Congressmen and corporate business executives tended to argue that there was little point in spending money on showing America's dirty linen abroad. Rather, they wanted American art which conveyed deep spiritual and national truths. Intermittently, Hixson's book offers fascinating snippets such as the above, the successful tour of Leonard

1. As far as I remember the signature tune of his regular 'Jazz Club USA' was 'Take the A-Train.'
Bernstein and the New York Philharmonic, the earlier impact of the frequently-toured *Porgy and Bess* (presumably because of its large African-American cast), or pianist Van Cliburn's surprising, and apparently cult-like, success. But the thesis of his book, that with better funding and hence more clout the USIA could have even more successfully 'penetrated' the Iron Curtain, and thus, perhaps, have ended the Cold War sooner and more cheaply, is not really persuasive. The USIA comes across as totally subservient to the State Department.

But perhaps this is not what his book is really about. To a great extent, and as his concluding chapters also suggest, he intends a contribution to the rehabilitation of Eisenhower, who is presented as a man of good will and common-sense about how to serve US national interests best – but, unfortunately, also a weak man who let hard-liner Secretary of State John Foster Dulles have his way and who disastrously agreed to one last, fatal, U-2 spy plane flight. In Hixson's scenario Eisenhower blew the chance to go down in history as the statesman who initiated a détente between East and West. Isn't this expecting a bit too much from the man who cowardly refused to stop the execution of the Rosenbergs?

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Poul Houe and Sven Hakon Rossel deserve credit for giving us a timely and useful book that places itself in a tradition of scholarly study of the impact of the United States on Europe. This is a tradition where Scandinavian contributions have been of major significance, beginning with Halvdan Koht's *The American Spirit in Europe* in 1949. Much groundwork remains to be done, however, and scholars working in this fascinating yet problematic field are faced with the conflicting demands of making synthesizing and interpretive use of what has already been done and digging up the many basic yet still unknown pieces of information that are needed for an improved interpretation. The contributors demonstrate different approaches to this complex field of study.

The volume is carefully designed. Tasks have been set and contributors selected. There are two articles each on Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; one on the impact of American literature and one on more general cultural and political responses to the United States. In addition Sven Rossel has written an introductory article on the image of the United States in Danish literature (with some comments on Denmark and Norway) and Poul Houe has written a concluding essay on three American novelists, Willa Cather, Ole Rolvaag, and Sophus Keith Winther, and the Swedish Vilhelm Moberg. Some of his readings are valuable contributions, but his article is necessarily an appendix to the central theme. Iceland and Finland have not been included even though these countries would have provided fascinating perspectives given their different histories. What we have is an account of how Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes have looked at themselves in the American mirror.