

John Gerard Ruggie, *Winning the Peace. America and World Order in the New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 222 pp. ISBN 0-231-10426-X. Cloth \$27.95

After the demise of the Soviet Union; America's leaders face an old American dilemma: how to interest an unconcerned country, the Congress as well as the public, in America's role in the world? Without the Soviet military threat and the anticommunist ideological fervor as driving impulses, the policymaking community has become confused and deeply divided by disagreements about how best to frame the calculation of U.S. interests and how most effectively to pursue them. Should the U.S. pursue enlargement of what President Clinton terms "the family of free-market democracies" and consolidate "the democratic peace", should it pursue an isolationist foreign policy, or should it follow a doctrine of *realpolitik*, i.e., simply pursue America's interests in international power politics?

John Rerald Ruggie, a professor at Columbia University, has written a lucid and compact book about America's problems as it is facing the post-Cold war era. After a short review of America's prominent role in building the post-World War II multilateral order and during the Cold War, Ruggie considers more closely two aspects of the problems facing the United States: the security agenda and the economic agenda.

Concerning the security agenda, Ruggie focuses on America's dilemma as the leading country in NATO. What during the Cold War basically was a competitive security system has in the 1990's been translated into a system marred by cooperative security, and today the central issue is how to balance the two with regard to Central and Eastern Europe. If NATO is expanded to include countries from Central Europe it may enhance some aspects

of cooperative security in the area, primarily by dampening the resurgence of ethno-nationalism and intra-regional conflicts. Yet, any expansion of NATO, combined with whatever readiness to meet Russian security needs/nervousness/paranoia – pick your label – means that elements of competitive security will also have a clear role in the post-Cold War security order in Europe. The critical problem, however, is that a development towards a more cooperative security system in Europe is not solely a matter of NATO displaying and opting for a distinctly cooperative policy. As NATO displays readiness to meet Central European countries' security needs/nervousness/paranoia – again, pick your label – about residual threats of Russian aggressiveness, it is tempting – but shallow – when opting for a policy to present it as obviously *the* correct one.

To some observers the most delicate question concerns the credibility of NATO's commitments to the new members from eastern Europe. Throughout the cold war era there ran a debate about the credibility of the American commitment to Western Europe, and this problem might become more urgent in relation to Eastern Europe. However, U.S. policymakers are right to stress a far broader set of objectives than the credibility of the defense commitment, namely projecting stability by strengthening fragile democracies and economic reforms, and promoting civil as opposed to ethnic nationalism, crisis management, and peacekeeping, thereby fostering peaceful change within and among the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. For the new members joining NATO, expansion is less an issue of security than of identity politics, an affirmation that they belong to "the West". Focusing on the credibility issue is missing the point of enlargement.

Concerning the economic agenda Ruggie turns his attention to, among other things, the multilateral trade regime and the dangers caused to it by the unilateral trend in America's trade policy since the 1970's, but he warns against exaggerating what his colleague from Columbia University, Jagdish Bhagwati, has termed America's "aggressive unilateralism". More attention should be paid to the potential danger of what Ruggie terms "society's vulnerability to increasingly disembedded market forces" (p. 135).

In the final chapter Ruggie contends that the widespread realist-inspired idea of always focusing on an emerging international power balance offers a poor guide to preparing U.S. post-cold war foreign policy. Another dangerous route is the rise of a populist and highly volatile pool of disaffected voters clamoring for "social protection" against globalization. This is potentially significant, particularly because the U.S. government does a poor job in helping the American workforce prepare for the new global economy.

Thus future neo-isolationist scenarios are elaborated as closely related to internal American developments concerning the strife over educational and health-care policies. Simply to "slash and trash", rather than review and redesign, social safety nets; would invite a populist upsurge of protectionism.

Ruggie's book is an incisive presentation and discussion of America's many troublesome and sometimes impalpable problems as it faces a "Third Try at World Order". Ruggie's own preferences are openly presented, but they never interfere with a perspicacious analysis of the issues.