

From Defiance to Defence: Swedish-Canadian Ethnic Awareness during the Two World Wars

Eva St. Jean

Malaspina University College, Canada

In a 1980s Canadian conference on ethnicity and war, Harold Troper remarked that Canadian historiography contained few studies on the survival of ethnic consciousness during times of war.¹ There are several texts on Japanese Canadians during World War II² and some on how German and Ukrainian communities survived when wartime hysteria threatened the culture of "enemy aliens" in Canada,³ but we have little insight into how the world wars affected other immigrant groups. This article will discuss ethnic consciousness and Swedish nationalism among Swedish immigrants in western Canada during the First and the Second World Wars. Swedish-Canadians led a rich cultural life throughout the period, and even though a plethora of various organizations suggests a

1. Mary Halloran, "Ethnicity, the State and War: Canada and Its Ethnic Minorities, 1939-45," *International Migration Review* 21.1 (1987), 167.

2. For example, F. E. La Violette, *The Canadian Japanese and World War II: A Social and Psychological Account* (Toronto, 1948); Ken Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was* (Toronto, 1976); Barry Broadfoot, *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame* (Toronto, 1977); and J.L. Granatstein et al., *Mutual Hostages: Canadian and Japanese During the Second World War* (Toronto, 1990).

3. For examples other than discussed in the text, see Frances Swyripa and John Herd Thompson, eds., *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War* (Edmonton, 1983); and Thomas M. Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians During the Second World War* (Toronto, 1988).

division among Swedish immigrants, it also points to a persistent search for ethnic belonging.⁴ Between the First and the Second World War, however, Swedish Canadians moved from a state of ethnic consciousness to ethnic awareness.⁵ That is, in the 1910s, many Swedish immigrants who wrote to newspapers or belonged to Swedish organisations identified themselves foremost as Swedes who lived in Canada. Moreover, they developed what James Barrett calls an ethnocultural class formation, where they created a working-class culture with distinct ideas and strategies that were based on Old World experiences but adapted to the host country.⁶ During the 1940s, working-class Swedish-Canadians still valued their heritage and supported ethnic groups and newspapers, but by this time their Canadian identity was as important as their Swedish one, and any ethnocultural class formation is difficult to distinguish from Canadian working-class strategies. Nationalistic expressions also changed between the two wars. During the First World War, Swedes frequently responded to criticism by attacking both Canada's and Britain's sense of morality and war strategies. This defiance expressed itself as pro-German sympathy, but evidence suggests that it stemmed rather from a grievance with conditions in Canada. Such aggressive Swedish nationalism was not in evidence in the 1940s when the Swedish community identified with the Allies.

Since the majority of Swedish immigrants settled in the western provinces, this study concentrates mainly on the two largest Swedish settlements, Winnipeg in Manitoba and Vancouver in British Columbia. For both provinces the Swedish-Canadian press is an important tool by which

4. Ljungmark and Åkerman suggest that the Swedish Canadian habit of "over organizing" in a great variety of clubs and organisations hampered their level of ethnic consciousness by preventing them from "concentrat[ing] on one or two common ethnic manifestations." Ljungmark and Åkerman, "The Unknown Emigration - Swedes in Canada 1870-1970," *Arkiv i Norrland* 16 (1998), 110.

5. Ethnicity and ethnic consciousness are slippery subjects to define. James McKay and Frank Lewins differ between ethnic awareness and ethnic consciousness. For the former the ethnic trait "is no more meaningful than his or her other ... characteristics, individuals who possess ethnic consciousness have "ethnic trait(s) which assumes considerable importance *vis-à-vis* other personal characteristics to the extent that ethnic identification can be *the* mode of identification." James McKay and Frank Lewins, "Ethnicity and the Ethnic Group: A Conceptual Analysis and Reformulation," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1.4 (October 1978), 418.

6. James R. Barrett, "Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880-1930," *Journal of American History* (December 1992), 999.

to determine the viewpoint of Swedish immigrants since few documents and letters that could provide insight have survived from the First World War period. Swedes in British Columbia did not produce a lasting Swedish-language newspaper until 1929,⁷ but judging from letters to *Svenska Canada Tidningen (SCT)* in Winnipeg it was available in British Columbia in the 1910s.⁸ Like most Swedish-Canadian publications, *SCT* was largely conservative in its editorial comments. Swedish socialists in Canada were never numerous enough or sufficiently organized to manage a long-lasting paper,⁹ but it is clear that they voiced their opinion through the Swedish press that existed. That it allowed the publication of blatantly socialistic articles and letters from readers reflected the economic tightrope on which its survival balanced.

Most Swedish-Canadian newspapers struggled to stay alive. In 1915, *Svenska Canada Tidningen* pleaded with its readers to pay their subscription so that the paper could pay pressing debts.¹⁰ In the 1910s, British Columbia managed to support a Swedish-language newspaper for only one year, and the more successful *Svenska Pressen (SP)* fought for its survival from its inception in 1929.¹¹ After a 1940 subscription drive in

7. In 1913, O. L. Sundborg published a Swedish newspaper, *Vancouver Posten*, but there are no surviving issues in local archives, and it is unclear when it expired. The first issue of *Svenska Pressen* came out in 1929, and this paper is still being published in 2001. For a history of Swedish newspapers in British Columbia, see Matthew Lindfors Fonds [hereafter MLF], "Fem minuter - Vancouver, B.C.," September 23, 1948, University of British Columbia, Special Collection [hereafter UBC-SC].

8. For example, see *SCT*, "Från Castledale, B.C.," February 17, 1915. Swedish publishers went on tours to Swedish communities in order to raise subscribers. In 1921, the Swedish-language *Forum* from Manitoba visited Silver Hill and Matsqui in British Columbia on a subscription drive. *Forum*, "En färd i British Columbia," March 15, 1921. Clipping kept by Karin Edberg-Lee, Silver Hill, British Columbia.

9. Lars Ljungmark notes that Swedes in Manitoba published a few short-lived radical papers. These consisted of the weekly farmer-labor publication *Forum; Frihetsvännerna* that was closely connected with a Lutheran minister; and the monthly *Frihet* that was organized by the Scandinavian Workers and Farmers League of Canada. Ljungmark and Åkerman, "The Unknown Emigration," 119. Fifty percent of all Swedish socialist publications in North America folded within a year, and only three Swedish-American socialist papers survived more than a decade. Ulf Jonas Björk, "Swedish Ethnicity and Labor Socialism in the Work of Nils F:son Brown, 1919-1928," *The Historian* (Summer 1997), 760.

10. *SCT*, "Editorial," September 22, 1915. In 1946 the *Svenska Canada Tidningen* had approximately one thousand subscribers while the Norwegian paper *Norröna* had three thousand subscribers. Both papers were for sale that year due to financial difficulties. Arthur Anderson to Matthew Lindfors, October 19, 1945, MLF, Box 2, UBC-SC.

11. It had continuous drives for subscribers, and in the 1940s the Swedish community put on bingo nights in order to raise money. Sture Sträng [pseud.], interview with Eva St. Jean, December 1999.

western Canada, its editor, Matthew Lindfors, raged over "how hopeless the situation [was] for Swedish newspapers in Canada, [and] how underserving the Swedes [were] of having someone to work in their interest."¹² He attempted to attract new subscribers in 1944 by creating an English-language newspaper for English-speaking Scandinavians and Finnish Canadians. The *Scandinavian Post*, a biweekly publication, lasted just over a year, and in the summer of 1945, Scandinavians in British Columbia were again left with only one newspaper, *Svenska Pressen*.

Considering Swedish newspapers' low subscription rate, it is difficult to judge just how important the ethnic press was to Swedish-Canadians or how accurately it represented their community. This situation was not peculiar to Swedes in Canada. While noting the importance of the ethnic press when evaluating the mood of Swedish immigrants, Sture Lindmark cautions, "it is impossible to determine to what extent the newspapers did reflect the opinion of the entire Swedish-American community."¹³ Still, the ethnic press allowed immigrant groups to express political and cultural views that would not have been acceptable or relevant in mainstream newspapers. Ulf Beijbom believes that in the nineteenth century, the Swedish American press was "the leading informant on political activity" of Swedish immigrants in Chicago.¹⁴ Likewise, a study done on modern-day ethnic groups in Canada concludes that although the ethnic press plays a complicated role, it "facilitates the political adaptation of a large number of new arrivals."¹⁵ In view of the pressing need of Swedish-Canadian papers to retain as many subscribers as possible, they reflected a wide range of opinions by the Swedish Canadian community and thus

12. Matthew Lindfors to Rudolf Manson, December 14, 1940, MLF, Box 2, UBC-SC. Lindfors expressed frustration with readers who borrowed issues from regular subscribers rather than paying for their own, likening it with theft of income that rightfully belonged to the paper. *SP*, "Ord från prenumeranter," November 20, 1941.

13. Sture Lindmark, *Swedish America, 1914-1932: Studies in Ethnicity with Emphasis on Illinois and Minnesota* (Uppsala, Sweden, 1971), 70.

14. Ulf Beijbom, "The Printed Word in a Nineteenth Century Immigrant Colony: The Role of the Ethnic Press in Chicago's Swede Town," *Swedish Pioneer Historical Quarterly* 28 (April 1977), 90.

15. Jerome H. Black and Christian Leithner, "Immigrants and Political Involvement in Canada: The Role of the Ethnic Media," *Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada* 20.1 (1988), 17.

provide an insight into how a spectrum of Swedish immigrants reacted to the pressures of war.¹⁶

Although both labor historians and contemporary readers consider *Svenska Canada Tidningen* to have been "non-labor" and "bourgeois,"¹⁷ its editor between 1912-1919, Nils F. Brown (1886-1960), was a member of the Socialist Labor Party. Brown downplayed his socialistic sympathies during the first years of the war,¹⁸ but as Canadian labor grew increasingly stronger, Brown became more direct in his political comments.¹⁹ In 1919, he overstepped the line and was fired by *SCT*'s owner, M. Dahl, a turn which convinced Brown to start the socialistic paper *Forum*.²⁰ It, however, had financial difficulties from the start, and Brown did not receive sufficient support from either subscribers or advertisers. In desperation, he embezzled money in order to keep the magazine afloat, and was only saved from serving jail time when the Swedish community in Winnipeg raised money to pay back his creditors.²¹

During the war years, however, Nils F. Brown attempted to stay neutral, and noting that the Swedish-Canadian community was divided between pro-German and pro-British sympathies, he allowed each camp room in *Svenska Canada Tidningen*.²² Rudolf Einhardt voiced the most

16. While I have not been able to locate any studies on Swedish-Canadian publications, for insight into the Finnish press in Canada, see Varpu Lindström-Best and Allen Seager, "Toveritar and Finnish Canadian Women, 1900-1930," in *The Press of Labor Migrants in Europe and North America, 1880s to 1930s*, (Bremen: Zentraldruckerei der Universität Bremen, 1985), 243-264; and Gregory S. Kealey, "The State, the Foreign-Language Press, and the Canadian Labor Revolt of 1917-1920," in Harzig and Hoerder (1985), 311-348.

17. One reader expressed his gratitude that the paper, "which one considers conservative" [trans.] allowed socialist opinions. *SCT*, February 14, 1917. For further comments on the political sway of the Swedish-Canadian press, see Eva St. Jean, "The Myth of the Big Swede Logger: An *Arbetskarl* in the Vancouver Island Forests, 1920-1948" (unpublished MA thesis, University of Victoria, 1999), 90-93. See also Björk, "Swedish Ethnicity and Labor Socialism in the Work of Nils F. Brown, 1919-1928," 762.

18. For instance, in 1915 Brown supported the Liberal Party, asking all Swedes, including social democrats, "to do honour to the Swedish name and stand behind the Liberal party program" [trans.]. *SCT*, "Afgångsbetyg åt Roblinregeringen," August 4, 1915.

19. In the most comprehensive study thus far of Swedes in Canada, Lars Ljungmark concluded that the political involvement of Swedes in Winnipeg was nearly non-existing. Lars Ljungmark, "Swedes in Winnipeg up to 1940s. Inter-Ethnic Relations," in *Swedish Life in American Cities*, ed. Dag Blanck and Harald Runblom (Uppsala: Center of Multiethnic Research, 1991), 71.

20. Ljungmark and Åkerman, "The Unknown Emigration," 119.

21. Björk, "Swedish Ethnicity and Labor Socialism in the Work of Nils F. Brown, 1919-1928," 764-766.

22. *SCT*, "I skottlinjen," May 12, 1915.

blatantly pro-German sentiment in a series of articles written in Swedish for the paper.²³ Although Brown cautioned that the newspaper did not always share Einhardt's opinions,²⁴ his were only a stronger version of those offered by readers who frequently expressed their agreement with his viewpoints.²⁵ Einhardt was a confirmed socialist and a regular correspondent for *SCT* from 1916.²⁶ He reminded Swedish-Canadian socialists that Germany was the birthplace of socialism, and combined his defense with a critique of England, which he considered exploitative and imperialistic. As an example of British oppression he mentioned their involvement in South Africa where "all the bullying, all the insolence, all the lies, like one link precedes another led to the Boer war." As for Canada, he urged the readers to:

look at the 'patriotic' interjections that the populace utters in this country. ... Does this idiotic mob really believe that it can drive the Germans out of France by for instance forcing Henri Bourassa to wave the Union Jack in Montreal? ... To be able to keep up this eagerness for war they have been forced to 'paint the devil on the wall' by emphasizing the 'German danger' as opposed to the blessings from the English civilization, and a whole lot of other more or less ridiculous blathering.²⁷

In a later *SCT* issue, Einhardt referred to British "imperialists," suggesting that "an instinct towards privatizing" stood behind British colonization. He ended with the warning, "what is happening to Germany today could happen to us tomorrow."²⁸

23. Rudolf Einhardt was born in Skåne and completed a degree in history at Lund University in 1896. He immigrated to Canada in 1906 where he settled in Saskatchewan. *SCT*, "Farmare och Filosof," April 26, 1916. After Nils F:son Brown left Canada in disgrace, Einhardt became the editor of *Forum* until its demise in 1924. Michael Brook, "Radical Literature in Swedish-America: A Narrative Survey," in *Essays on the Scandinavian-North American Radical Press 1880s-1930s*, Dirk Hoerder, ed. (Bremen: Zentraldruckerei der Universität Bremen, 1984), 49; and Björk, "Swedish Ethnicity and Labor Socialism in the Work of Nils F:son Brown, 1919-1928," 766.

24. In "Farmare och Filosof," Brown notes that it has been with deep regret that he has refused to publish some of Einhardt's "more dangerous" articles about the war. *SCT*, April 26, 1916. See also, "Ett svar till Rudolf Einhardt," April 18, 1917, and postscript note in "Ordet är fritt," July 21, 1915.

25. Open admiration for Einhardt was at times accompanied by a plea for restraint. Signature Helmer Johnson feared Einhardt's polemic would "induce a storm of dislike and hatred" over Swedish Canadians. *SCT*, "Till Mr. Rudolf Einhardt," August 11, 1915.

26. Einhardt's first full-length article was "Socialismen och kriget," April 26, 1916.

27. *SCT*, Feb 21, 1917. All translations from Swedish are my own and are marked as [trans.] in the footnote. Other quotes were originally written in English.

28. "Situationen just nu," [trans.] *SCT*, March 24, 1917.

The blend of socialistic rhetoric and pro-German sentiment is an apparent contradiction, but other Swedish writers on the political left were strongly critical of Britain and the British. Olof S. Nelson defended Rudolf Einhardt and thanked him for his "valuable contributions."²⁹ Nelson also mixed anti-British sentiment with a socialistic vocabulary, reserving particular contempt for the Conservative Party led by Robert Borden. He cited economic and political agreements between Canada and Britain, and argued that these stifled Canada's independence. Nelson likened Canada's domestic autonomy to a smokescreen that "flattered the vanity of the imperialistic mob" in order to allow financing of the British war debt. He compared the Liberal and the Conservative parties with "rotten apples" but maintained, "despite all their faults and wants the liberals [were Canada's] only hope." The Liberal Party thus was the lesser of two evils, and he most certainly connected the conservative government with "reactionary" and "imperialistic" forces in Britain.³⁰

Svenska Canada Tidningen's critique of the Canadian government sometimes borrowed language from anti-German propaganda, although the paper directed its derogatory remarks towards Canada. In "Incident of Canadian Prussianism" it charged that a recent Swedish immigrant, Fritz Kilman, was unfairly accused and imprisoned for pro-German sympathies.³¹ Shortly after joining the 38th Battalion in 1914, a "drunken" army doctor "forcefully" injected him with an unnamed substance, which left Kilman partly paralyzed. Three weeks later, he was arrested without explanation, interned, and informed that he was under suspicion of being a German spy. He was only rescued from this "barbaric treatment" after spending six months in internment and following intervention from the Swedish and Danish consulates. The critique against Canada was particularly strong in this article, perhaps because a Swedish immigrant – and

29. "Är Canada ett lydrike?" *SCT*, April 4, 1917 [trans.] .

30. Another writer in the same issue railed against the Conservative government's warmongering, charging that together with church institutions and a biased press, it persecuted pacifists. "If only the canons are fed, the people may starve, and sowing and cultivating of the [farmers'] fields gain lesser importance" [trans.]. Thus, this writer tied together several socialistic philosophies, such as pacifism and anti-religion, using it as a critique of the Canadian government. *SCT*, "Några reflektioner," April 4, 1917.

31. The article was subtitled: "Swedish soldier who wished to fight for 'king and country' brutalised: Victim of spy hysteria" [trans.] See, "Utslag af canadensiskt prusseri. Svensk soldat som ville kämpa för 'kung och land', brutaliseras. Spionskräckens offer," *SCT*, March 28, 1917.

with him the entire Swedish community – was directly threatened, and *SCT* added emphasis by dressing the censure in the customary language of anti-German propaganda. The anti-British sentiment expressed by Swedish-Canadian socialists was, however, at variance with both Canadian and Swedish contemporary socialistic organizations.

Although North-American socialists also were pacifists, they mostly avoided siding with either Germany or Britain, claiming instead that all wars were based on capitalistic greed that transcended national barriers.³² Martin Robin notes that even militant socialists in Canada refused to take sides, arguing, “it was a matter of indifference which side won.”³³ Likewise, Swedish anti-war spokesmen in the United States suggested that wars fed industrialists while the masses paid the price, but there are no signs of the vehement dislike of the domestic and British governments that we see in Canada.³⁴

The Swedish-Canadian reaction on the left was thus distinct from that of Anglo-Canadian socialists, and it also contradicted political lines in Sweden.³⁵ From the mid-1800s, the fear of a possible Russian invasion combined with ideological affinity drew Sweden closer to Germany, but towards the end of the century, the Swedish political left rejected pan-Germanism. By the time of the First World War, liberals and socialists were strongly pro-British while the Conservative Party, the military elite and Swedish Royalty were vehemently pro-German.³⁶ Socialists in

32. See for instance an anti-conscription meeting that was held by the Socialist Party of Canada in Vancouver. The speaker, Jack Kavanaugh, insisted that they were “neither anti-British or anti-German ... [but] anti-capitalist.” *Vancouver Sun*, “Socialist ‘Antis’ Met Behind Locked Doors in Theatre,” July 12, 1917.

33. Martin Robin, “Registration, Conscription, and Independent Labor Politics, 1916-1917,” in *Conscription 1917*, A. M. Willms et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 61.

34. See Dag Blanck, “Swedish Americans and the 1918 Gubernatorial Campaign in Minnesota,” in *Swedes in the Twin Cities: Immigrant Life and Urban Frontier*, eds. Philip J. Anderson and Dag Blanck (Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2001) 317-330.

35. Sture Lindmark suggests that Swedish-American sympathy for Germany grew from a religious and nationalistic perspective; as Martin Luther’s homeland, it was strongly defended by the Swedish-American Lutheran Church. Lindmark 71. Swedish-Americans also differed from Swedish-Canadian immigrants by, as Lindmark maintains, “affirming their loyalty to the United States” when war became unavoidable. Lindmark 77. Note, however, that the *Svenska Canada Tidningen* believed that most Swedish Americans detested President Wilson, and despite the careful wording in Swedish-American newspapers, “were more German than they were Swedish and American” [trans.] *SCT*, “Ett svar till Rudolf Einhardt,” April 18, 1917.

36. Lars-Arne Norborg, *Sveriges historia under 1800- och 1900-talen. Svensk samhällsutveckling 1809-1992* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1993), 251-259.

Sweden were clearly aware of the Swedish-Canadian stand, and gently reproached their brethren by explaining the Swedish left's pro-British position. In a letter to the editor, their spokesperson maintained that supporting Britain was a question of democracy and fairness, pointing out that the Swedish right wing's defense of Germany only confirmed that the Swedish left had chosen correctly.³⁷ Thus, Swedish-Canadian socialists differed from Anglo-Canadian, Swedish-American and Swedish socialists by conducting a strong anti-British and pro-German campaign.

Although *Svenska Canada Tidningen* was vigilant about evidence of official discrimination against Swedes in Canada, the Canadian government only considered Swedes a marginal threat.³⁸ When Canada censored an imported Swedish journal, *Svenska Canada Tidningen* claimed the censorship was unjustified, and noted that possession of the journal was punishable with a fine of \$5,000.00 and up to five years in jail.³⁹ The paper admitted, however, that Canadian censorship was lax in comparison with that in the United States. It noted that foreign and Anglo-Canadian publications were under similar strict conditions, while French Canadian newspapers were allowed "to sing its heartfelt opinions even in war questions." Accordingly, the situation was worse in the United States where even foreign newspapers that "shout[ed] themselves hoarse" with American loyalist sentiment were muffled by "Prussianism" executed by a "Wilsonian reign of terror."⁴⁰ Although the Canadian government censored several foreign language papers in 1918, it allowed the Canadian-

37. SCT, "Från Västmanland, Sverige," February 14, 1917.

38. The Canadian press seemed unconcerned about Swedish immigrants. Even Agnes Laut, whose articles regarding German Canadians skirted on fear-mongering, ignored Swedish immigrants. See for example, "German Plotting in America To-day," *Maclean's* October 1917, 20-21 and 67; and "The Treason of German-American Newspapers," *Maclean's*, September 1917, 56-57. The *Family Herald*, on the other hand, warned that Swedes in Canada might present a danger should Sweden decide to join forces with Germany. Moreover, in a far-fetched flight of fantasy the paper insinuated that Sweden might invade Canada since the Swedish royal line originated from Marshall Bonaparte, a French officer in Napoleon's army, who allegedly suggested an attack on British North America in order to distract Britain. *Family Herald*, "Will Sweden Plunge into Vortex of War?" October 10, 1917.

39. SCT, "Förbjuden svensk tidskrift," November 14, 1918.

40. This is another example where the editor used anti-German vocabulary to describe the Entente and its allies. SCT, "Värre än i Canada," October 10, 1917 [trans.]. For a closer description of American repression of the foreign press, see Lindmark, *Swedish America, 1914-1932*; and James R. Mock, *Censorship 1917* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972).

published Swedish press to continue printing in the Swedish language.⁴¹ Thus, although somewhat restricted, *Svenska Canada Tidningen* admitted that it was not under any greater censorship than was the mainstream Canadian press.

A couple of incidents in Halifax in the fall of 1917 were more serious. Swedish diplomatic mail was censored when the Swedish steamship, *Stockholm*, was kept under guard between February 18 and March 12, 1917.⁴² Moreover, in the same period *SCT* complained bitterly that the Canadian government had confiscated regular Swedish mail, an incident that the correspondent believed occurred regularly. The paper alleged that Swedish mail was scrutinized more closely than mail from Norwegian residents and at times confiscated without a word of explanation or apology.⁴³ This incident occurred before "the Luxburg Affair" became public knowledge,⁴⁴ which might explain the self-righteous outrage on part of the Swedish-Canadian press; on the other hand, Britain had been aware of Sweden's previous act of diplomatic indiscretion since 1916, which explains its vigilance.

The Swedish press was mistaken, however, when it concluded that Swedish correspondence was treated differently from other mail. According to the 1916 and 1917 Neutral Censorship Acts, Canada censored mail to the United States and to twenty-four other neutral countries. For instance, during one month Canadian officials examined 183 pounds of mail to Sweden, 238 pounds to Norway, and 2,536 pounds of mail

41. Among others, the Finnish language was outlawed in print. Jeffrey A. Keshen, *Propaganda and Censorship During Canada's Great War* (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1996), 67.

42. *SCT*, "Stockholm i fångenskap i Halifax," April 7, 1917. The censure of Swedish diplomatic mail was in direct violation of the 1917 Neutral Censorship regulation that exempted correspondence from diplomatic representatives of neutral countries. Due to the Luxburg affair, however, Britain had strong reasons to suspect Swedish mail. Allan I. Steinhart, *Civil Censorship in Canada During World War I* (Toronto: the Unirade Press, 1986), 24.

43. *SCT*, "Svensk post beslagtagen i Halifax," March 21, 1917.

44. The "Luxburg Affair" refers to an incident where a German diplomat, Count Karl von Luxburg, used the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transmit sensitive data from Argentina to Germany. Steven Koblik maintains that the British government refrained from making the affair public knowledge for nearly a year in order to time the release of the scandal with a Swedish election. The disclosure was intended to injure the Conservative pro-German Swedish government and ensure an election victory by the Swedish left. Steven Koblik, "Wartime Diplomacy and the Democratization of Sweden in September - October 1917," *Journal of Modern History* 41 (March 1969), 35. The *SCT* was cautious after the incident became public, expressing hope that Sweden would soon be cleared of wrongdoing. *SCT*, "På de anklagades bänk," September 12, 1917.

addressed to Japan.⁴⁵ If the weight of the mail indicated quantity, Swedish correspondences were scrutinized less closely than were those addressed to other Scandinavian countries and not nearly as closely as mail to Asia.

All in all, the Canadian government's concern that Swedes might constitute a security risk seems minimal. Letters and memos that circulated in the Department of Immigration during the First World War suggest that any occasional distrust of Swedish immigrants were manifestations of xenophobia among individual officials rather than governmental policy. The Canadian government had attempted to increase Scandinavian immigration prior to 1914,⁴⁶ but as the fighting dragged on and public tension increased officials became more wary of Swedish immigration. In 1916, Bruce Walker, the Commissioner of Immigration, noted that he wished Scandinavians would encourage their relatives and friends to emigrate, but he conceded that the war years were "not the most prudent moment to commence an effort."⁴⁷ Other officers were less positive about Swedish immigration, and four months later the Superintendent of Immigration, W. D. Scott, found it necessary to issue a memo denying that the department had "issued any circular or letter prohibiting the entry of Swedes" into Canada. He noted, however, "it was considered advisable not to make any specific relaxation of [the wartime immigration code] in favor of Swedes:"

It has been reported by many who are in a position to know, that the Swedish people are very sympathetic towards Germany. This, of course, is their own business and we are not interfering with them or bringing any pressure to change their sentiments in this regard. It would, however, be unwise on our part, knowing what we do, to make a special concession to these people ...

45. Steinhart 7 and 45-46. In 1921, there were 27,700 Swedish born in Canada compared to 23,127 Norwegians and 11,650 Japanese Canadians. This indicates that the censors scrutinized Norwegian and Japanese mail more closely than Swedish mail. Census of Canada, 1921, Population, Table 7, "Numerical distribution of the immigrant population by birthplace, sex and year of arrival in Canada, by provinces, 1921."

46. In 1913 and 1914 officials demanded increased funds in order to encourage prospective Scandinavian immigrants more aggressively. See for instance W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, to J. Bruce Walker, Commissioner of Immigration, Manitoba, Dec 22, 1913, Department of Immigration Records (hereafter DImm), B-715, Vol. 13, File 77 (3), British Columbia Archives (hereafter BCA); and W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, to W. G. Annable, General Passenger Agent, C.P.R., July 29, 1914, DImm, B-715, Vol. 13, File 77 (3), BCA.

47. Bruce Walker, Commissioner of Immigration, to W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, Nov. 28, 1916, DImm, B-715, Vol. 13, File 77 (3), BCA.

If, however, a Swede was coming in to engage in any other occupation than farming, the concession could not be made on the border, but would have to be made here, and as a matter of policy, is not being made at the present time.⁴⁸

Clearly, some immigration officials were unsure about whether or not to allow Swedes entry into Canada, and a tightening of policy is also clear in the stricter restriction on occupation: Swedes were welcome only as farmers and agricultural workers.⁴⁹

Swedes were never maltreated in Canada during the First World War despite their perceived pro-German predilection. Fritz Kilman's unfortunate experience was an exception.⁵⁰ In comparison, Anglo-Canadian hostility, indiscriminate firings from work places,⁵¹ and the threat of internment forced the German community in Winnipeg into a defensive-submissive position where it curtailed club activities and concealed its national identity.⁵² Likewise, despite the long history of German-Canadians in Nova Scotia, many of these pretended to be of Dutch origin.⁵³ While Newfoundland did not join Canada until 1949, it identified closely with Britain and Canada and interned and deported aliens, particularly those of German extraction.⁵⁴ Hence, although Germans, Ukrainians and other "enemy aliens" rightly feared internment and limitation of their civil rights, Swedes were never seriously restricted in Canada.

The Swedish community, however, perceived itself to be under attack,

48. W. D. Scott, Superintendent of Immigration, to Percy Reid, Acting Commissioner of Immigration, March 22, 1917, DImm, B-715, Vol. 13, File 77 (3), BCA.

49. This selected desire for only "bona fide agriculturists" also included other Scandinavians. Unsigned letter to J. N. K. Macalister, Asst. Commissioner, Department of Colonization and Development, Canadian Pacific Railway Company, March 29, 1928, DImm, B-715, Vol. 13, File 77 (6), BCA.

50. A total of 7,762 residents of Canada were interned between 1914 and 1919. Of those, 5,954 were Austro-Hungarians and 1,192 Germans. John Herd Thompson, *Ethnic Minorities During Two World Wars* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 7. See also Bill Waiser, *Park Prisoners: The Untold Story of Western Canada's National Parks, 1915-1946* (Calgary: Fifth House Publishers, 1995), 6-14.

51. The University of Toronto fired three German-born professors, and miners in Fernie, British Columbia, struck to protest working alongside Germans. Thompson 6.

52. Art Grenke, "The German Community of Winnipeg and the English-Canadian Response to World War I," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 20.1 (1988), 25 and 28-29.

53. For instance, wartime hysteria caused the citizens of Berlin, Ontario, to change its name to Kitchener. Alvin Finkel and Margaret Conrad, *History of the Canadian Peoples: 1867 to the Present* (Toronto: Copp Clark Ltd., 1998), 210-212.

54. Gerhard P. Bassler, "The Enemy Alien Experience in Newfoundland 1914-1918," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 20.3 (1988), 42-62.

which may have increased its nationalistic fervor. Some historians suggest that ethnic groups under pressure in a dominant society develop stronger ethnic roots. Art Grenke notes that the hostility towards the German community in Winnipeg increased its sense of loyalty towards Germany.⁵⁵ The reverse was also the case since groups who were seen as “Canadian” lost their sense of ethnic consciousness. In a historiographic review article, J.M. Bumsted remarks that Lebanese immigrants on Prince Edward Island and Jews in Newfoundland lost their sense of distinctiveness because of the acceptance they received from the surrounding community.⁵⁶ Thus, the retention of ethnic consciousness is not simply an internal choice but also depends on external forces, such as the degree to which the dominant society accepts the ethnic group. While there is no strong evidence suggesting that Canada seriously considered Swedish immigrants as a danger to Canada’s peace and safety during the First World War, there are, however, signs that Swedish-Canadians experienced social discrimination.

Swedes responded swiftly and aggressively when English readers accused them of disloyalty, but rejoinders often swung away from the war and focused on perceived discrimination in other areas.⁵⁷ In British Columbia, a woman remembers the anger and humiliation in the Swedish settlement of Silver Hill when a school inspector asked, “Don’t you have any white children here? Are they all Swedes?”⁵⁸ Likewise, when *The Family Herald* printed an anti-Swedish letter from an anonymous writer in British Columbia, it received a swift rebuttal in *SCT*. The writer ranked Swedes “as the most objectionable Alien, for he truly hates the Briton, while living in snug comfort in our midst,” and urged Canadians to “start in earnest right now, to make Canada ... a country where everything must be British.”⁵⁹ One respondent maintained that:

55. Grenke, “The German Community of Winnipeg,” 30.

56. J.M. Bumsted, “Ethnic Studies in Atlantic Canada: Or, Some Ethnics are More Ethnic than Others,” *Acadiensis* (Fall 1989), 198-201.

57. For instance, when the signature “Mrs. Auleen” criticized Swedish immigrants the paper received such an indignant response from the readers that it declared twice that the discussion must come to an end. *SCT*, “Ordet är fritt,” March 7, 1917.

58. Note, however, that just as the school inspector’s equalisation of “British” and “white” was discriminatory so does the humiliation in the Swedish community suggest its racist beliefs. Interview with Emma Wennergren [pseud.], Silver Hill, British Columbia, December 1999.

59. The letter was reprinted in *SCT*, April 11, 1917.

Swedish workers in Canada have the best grounds for loathing the English. Putting aside all talk about the war, Swedes still have their reasons. The English bullying and conceit, by which they act as if they were superior to the Swedish race, has a bad influence on the Swedes. And the recurring declaration that Britons are the only white people can only be met with scorn. On the other hand, the English in Canada hate the Swedes, because the words 'I am a Swede' are passwords for employment, and the English do not, of course, enjoy being turned down when a Swede is hired.⁶⁰

Sjögren did not seem particularly upset by accusations of disloyalty, but concentrated instead on rectifying British-Canadian attitudes toward Swedish immigrants. The writer relied on the Swedish reputation for being "good workers" which he felt contrasted against a British unreliability. Certainly Sjögren reacted against a perceived discrimination that he considered both insulting and unfair. As for the war, he admitted that Swedes objected to Canada's participation in the war, and praised the Swedish-Canadian press "for its position in these bitter times, when one runs the risk of being labelled 'traitor' if one holds other views than those prescribed by Canada's leading heroes".

In another instance, Nils F. Brown threatened that discrimination in the work place might lead to insurrection if Swedes and other foreigners used the war as an excuse to turn against English-Canadians. According to *SCT*, the *Evening Tribune* – which "always has been openly xenophobic" – printed a highly derogatory letter from a reader who advocated segregating British and "foreign" workers. The signature "One of the boys" noted that many unemployed Britons were forced to seek work in lumber camps and sewer construction, but that they:

detest[ed] the idea of having, perhaps, to be mixed with so much foreign element. ... I suggest when making up gangs, or squads, to keep all Britishers [sic] by themselves. ... It is only when a man has good surroundings that you get the best results. And I have no doubt that it would prove whether or not that Britishers [sic] stand in a class by themselves.⁶¹

This writer voiced several common concerns and prejudices among Anglo-Canadians. Not only did he resent having to work alongside people he distrusted and felt alienated from, but he also reacted against an

60. *SCT* March 28, 1917 [trans.].

61. Reprinted in *SCT*, "Främlingshat," January 27, 1915.

implied accusation that Britons were less efficient workers than other immigrants.

Nils F. Brown's acrimonious response attacked both the writer and the Canadian government. Brown dismissed "One of the boys" as "a narrow-minded person with an educational level well below that of Swedes or Norwegians," but agreed that any Englishman would hesitate to work beside a "big strong Swede" since it was obvious that the Briton would lose against such competition. He suggested, however, that the Canadian government should have made clear in pamphlets that "lure emigrants" to the country that Anglo-Canadians discriminated against non-British immigrants. According to Brown, Swedes were neither used to nor deserved contempt and if Canadian attitudes were better known in Sweden it would have a negative impact on Swedish immigration to Canada. He ended by the warning that "it may be dangerous in these times to show contempt since many immigrants who side with Germany might turn against the English."⁶² The force of Brown's reply suggested that the criticism stung, and his suggestions to the Canadian government contained veiled threats. Unless discrimination against immigrants ceased, Canada might not only lose its future supply of Swedish workers, but Swedish Canadians and other immigrants who favored the Central Powers might engage in an active revolt against Anglo Canadians.

Nonetheless, not all Swedes resented Canada or disagreed with the war effort. Scandinavians in Canada even created their own battalion. The first attempt, the 197th Battalion, "the Vikings," received little support from the Scandinavian community, allegedly because of a distrust of its high command, and was dissolved by January 1917.⁶³ The second attempt was more successful. In March 1916, Scandinavians in Western Canada organized the 223rd Overseas Battalion (Canadian Scandinavian) in the hope that they would prove themselves worthy of Canada. The formation of a special ethnic unit was by no means unusual. In 1915, the Minister of Militia, Sam Hughes, announced that anyone could form a battalion in Canada.⁶⁴ By 1917, the *Vancouver Sun* listed seventeen battalions in

62. Ibid.

63. SCT, "Canadas skandinaver och kriget," March 7, 1917.

64. As a result Canada was deluged with not only ethnic battalions but also with those who catered to miscellaneous oddities, such as unusually short soldiers or prohibitionists. Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990), 136.

Vancouver that each had recruited numbers ranging from 257 to 1914 men, bringing the total to nearly 32,000; the Scandinavian Battalion, however, was too insignificant to merit mention and was lumped with other miscellaneous smaller units.⁶⁵ While the recruiting campaign for the 223rd was fairly successful in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, collecting between 700 – 800 Scandinavian soldiers for overseas fighting, it slowed down further west. To correct this trend, in the fall of 1916 the Battalion conducted a recruiting campaign in Vancouver that detailed the style of the uniform and stressed the Viking heritage.⁶⁶ More important, promotional write-ups urged Scandinavians to seize the chance to prove that they were not pro-German.⁶⁷ The success rate is questionable, however, and in February 1917 the commanding officer, H.M. Hannesson, wrote an open letter to Scandinavians in western Canada pleading for recruits since Scandinavians did not sign up in the hoped for numbers.⁶⁸

While the Scandinavian Battalion embodied four nationalities, Swedes seemed particularly reluctant to enlist.⁶⁹ *Svenska Canada Tidningen* complained that it was a disgrace that so few Swedes were promoted to be officers. Not until February 1917 was the first Swede promoted, followed by two more a month later.⁷⁰ Since Swedes constituted the largest group among Scandinavians in Canada, the lack of Swedish officers points to a severe under-representation of Swedes in the Scandinavian Battalion.⁷¹

65. *Vancouver Sun*, "Vancouver sends 32,000 men to front since war started," July 18, 1917.

66. For instance, the shield on the hat depicted a Norse Viking. *Canada Skandinaven*, "Den Candinavisk-Skandinaviske Bataljon," October 31, 1916.

67. *Canada Skandinaven*, "Skandinaverne skal trække i khaki," October 31, 1916.

68. *SCT*, "Öppet bref till skandinaverna i västra Canada," February 14, 1917. In 1916, one recruiting agent spoke in dismay of the many sons of Swedish farmers who hid from sight in order to avoid enlistment. *SCT*, "Från mitt rekryterinsarbete för 223rd Scandinavian Overseas Battalion," April 26, 1916.

69. As a comparison, Icelandic men enlisted in equal numbers as "any national group" and "Icelandic women joined in the frenzy of knitting, bandage-making, and fund-raising." John Herd Thompson, *The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), 82. As a whole, immigrants were over-represented in the Canadian army, many of whom were British born. While 77 percent of Canada's population in 1911 was native born, only 47 percent of overseas soldiers were born in Canada. Desmond Morton, *When your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War* (Toronto: Random House, 1993), 278.

70. *SCT*, "Den förste svensken," February 21, 1917, and "Två nya svenska officerare," March 7, 1917.

71. In 1921, there were 27,700 Swedish born in Canada compared to 23,127 Norwegians, 7,192 Danes, and 776 Icelanders. Although strictly speaking Finland does not belong to Scandinavia, Canada had 12,156 Finnish born immigrants. Census of Canada, 1921, Population, Table 7, "Numerical distribution of the immigrant population by birthplace, sex and year of arrival in Canada, by provinces, 1921."

Swedes in British Columbia certainly did not flock to the Canadian Army. The editor of *Svenska Pressen* in Vancouver, Matthew Lindfors, noted that World War I completely "disorganized" Swedes in B.C., with only a few volunteering to fight for their adopted country. The majority left the cities and "dispersed like chaff before the wind" to avoid the draft. Lindfors maintains that this Swedish escape was significant enough to cause the depopulation and even demise of some Swedish organizations in British Columbia.⁷² This was in contrast to the absolutely reverse reaction of the British population in B.C. Historian Jean Barman argues that Britain's declaration of war against Germany fundamentally altered all aspects of life in British Columbia since its residents contributed to the war effort in such numbers that the social and economic structures of some small communities were irrevocably weakened.⁷³

Since they did not publish their own newspaper and few Swedish records remain from the First World War period in British Columbia, it is difficult to establish the magnitude of the Swedish resistance.⁷⁴ Interviews with children of early Swedish immigrants suggest that it was a political and moral choice, where those who had left Sweden in protest against its universal military training also refused to enlist in Canada. For instance, the Swedes in Silver Hill, British Columbia, were pacifists and socialists who abhorred war, considering it only to benefit capitalists.⁷⁵

In some families, where the immigrant generation belonged to this first wave of Swedish socialism, the dedication to pacifism created tension when Canadian-born sons wished to enlist during the Second World

72. MLF, "Radio Rapport den 15 april 1948," UBC-SP, and MLF, "Svenskt i British Columbia," 1938, UBC-SP.

73. Jean Barman, *The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia* (Toronto, 1996).

74. The minute books of the Swedish International Order of Good Templars, the Linnéa Lodge in Vancouver, is in one of the rare records from this period. These, however, do not mention the war but concentrate on the membership's adherence to the I.O.G.T. regulations. See, International Order of Good Templars, Lodge Linnéa No.76 fonds, "Minute Books 1912-1916," UBC-SC.

75. The original families in this community left Sweden after the Great Strike and lockout of 1909. Many of the men had been blacklisted as "agitators" in Sweden and belonged to the first-wave Swedish socialists. Interview with Emma Wennergren [pseud.], Silver Hill, British Columbia, Dec. 14, 1999, and Signe Gran [pseud.], Mission, British Columbia, Dec. 14, 1999. See also Karin Edberg-Lee, *Recollections of Silverhill: An Informal History of an Immigrant Settlement* (self-published book, no year), Eva St. Jean, Private Collection, and the Swedish Institute of Emigration, Växjö, Sweden.

War.⁷⁶ Arne Lind, for instance, first immigrated to Two Harbors, Minnesota, in 1913, but re-migrated to Sweden in 1917 in order to avoid conscription when the United States declared war against Germany.⁷⁷ After his return to Sweden, Arne trained as an electrician, but in 1921, when he was ordered to attend compulsory Swedish military training, he emigrated once more. This time he chose Canada, where he settled in Kimberley, British Columbia. Arne followed the pattern of a dedicated socialist and respectable worker. He was a staunch pacifist and a member of the International Order of Good Templars, and other workers viewed him as a leader both in the workplace and in the community.⁷⁸ Arne clearly valued his reputation as a “good worker,” and saved letters of recommendation from Sweden and British Columbia that stressed his technical ability, reliability, sobriety and “good character.”⁷⁹ It is likely that his attention to duties grew from a defensive urge to prove he was not a “slacker” who avoided military duty either in the US or in Sweden for any other reason than strictly ideological.

Arne Lind’s uncompromising character brought him into conflict with his oldest son, Hans Lind, as Canada became involved in World War II. Although Hans was a member first of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and later the New Democratic Party (NDP), he lacked the hallmarks of the early socialist generation, such as a commitment to pacifism and abstinence from alcohol. Hans joined the Canadian Army in 1942, but only after a bitter argument with his father, who remained true to his pacifist beliefs.⁸⁰ Thus, even when the second gener-

76. Barrett notes the importance of studying intergenerational relations when discussing ethnic consciousness and class relations. Barrett, “Americanization from the Bottom Up,” 1000.

77. Interview with Hans Lind [pseud.], Victoria, B.C., 1999. Franklin D. Scott remarks that many Swedish-American pacifists were deported from the United States when refusing to register for the draft. See Franklin D. Scott, “Literature in Periodicals of Protest of Swedish America,” in *Essays on the Scandinavian-North American Radical Press 1880s-1930s*, Dirk Hoerder, ed. (Bremen, Germany: Zentraldruckerei der Universität Bremen, 1984), 15.

78. “Arne” saved his membership card from the Swedish Iodge, “Friskt Mod” in Two Harbors, Minnesota, January 1914, and from Lodge No. 26, the Scandinavian Grand Lodge of Minnesota, June 1916. Due to Canadian privacy laws, the name cannot be disclosed, but “Arne” collected documents and letters throughout his life. “Arne Lind [pseud.] Manuscript Collection,” Eva St. Jean, Private Collection. See also Gunnel Hedqvist [pseud.], interview with Eva St. Jean, 1999, and Hans Lind [pseud.], interview with Eva St. Jean, 1999.

79. Arne saved five letters of recommendation from Skellefteå and Ulriksdal, Sweden, and one from the Consolidated Mining and Smelter Company in Kimberley, B.C. “Arne Lind [pseud.] Manuscript Collection.”

80. Interview with Hans Lind [pseud.].

ation Swedish-Canadians sympathized with the political left, they seemed much more eager to defend Canada when it once again went to war.

Both conservative and socialist Swedish-Canadians reacted in a strikingly different manner in the Second World War. Missing was the pro-German sentiment and resentment against the host country that was so noticeable 1914-1918. It is, however, difficult to measure patriotism by the degree of military service, since many Swedes worked in primary industries such as logging and mining that were declared essential service.⁸¹ Thus, for some, merely remaining on the job might have signified patriotism, although others might have found "essential services" a convenient way to escape the draft. Even if Scandinavians did not have their own regiment in this war, Hans Lind was by no means alone in volunteering for the Canadian services. Harald Wennergren joined the merchant marine,⁸² and interviewees from Silver Hill declare that most sons of Swedish immigrant families enlisted.⁸³ Likewise, Otto Nordling, who emigrated from Luleå, Sweden, with his parents in 1914, joined the Canadian Army in 1940 and remained an army officer until his retirement. Nordling was a staunch conservative who to his regret was unable to run for the Progressive Conservative Party in 1956 since it collided with his army commission.⁸⁴ Clearly, the second time around the Swedish community showed no signs of siding with Germany: conservative Swedes supported Canada's participation in the war, and with some reservation, the same was true for Swedish and Scandinavian socialists.

Scandinavian clubs were generally positive towards Canada's participation in the war despite an evident political tension between different Scandinavian groups. As early as September 1939, the Scandinavian

81. *Vancouver Sun*, "B.C. Loggers to Get Military Exemptions," September 1, 1942.

82. Although "Harold Wennergren" now lives in Silver Hill, as a child he emigrated from Piteå, Norrbotten, to Campbell River, Vancouver Island, where he grew up. Harold's father was self-employed in Sweden and deeply regretted his decision to emigrate since he only found work as a logger in Canada. "Harold" has no memories of that his father resented his enlistment in the merchant marines. Harold Wennergren [pseud.], interview with Eva St. Jean, 1999.

83. Interview with Signe Gran [pseud.] and Emma Wennergren [pseud.]. See also *Recollections of Silverhill*, 22, 38, and especially 56.

84. City of Vancouver Archives, Otto Nordling Fonds, Add. MSS. 383.

Central Committee⁸⁵ went on record to “stand behind Canada in fighting for democratic ideals, and ... [to] be ready when called.”⁸⁶ The Committee’s polarization between a radical and conservative faction, however, caused differences of opinion as to how the group should respond to political questions. In most issues, such as in the support of Victory Loans, minutes from the meetings are laconic and non-informative regarding possible arguments or comments from the delegates, but at other times conflicting opinions are apparent. In 1943, the Central Committee invited speakers such as Harold Pritchett and Nigel Morgan, both Communist labor organizers, while the motion to invite a speaker from the Board of Trade failed.⁸⁷ The political tension came to a head when the Committee motioned to forward a resolution to the Committee of the Defense of Canada Regulation to legalize the Finnish Organizations of Canada Inc. and return all of its properties.⁸⁸ The minutes abandoned their customary neutral tone, revealing that “a heated discussion took place” with the resulting compromise that the request would only refer to individually affiliated organizations of the Scandinavian Central Committee rather than to the umbrella organization.⁸⁹

The matter did not end there. In November 1943, the Swedish Club⁹⁰ sent an open letter to all individual Scandinavian organizations accusing the Scandinavian Central Committee of not fulfilling its stated purpose. The Swedish Club blamed this failure on a lack of “necessary initiative

85. The Scandinavian Central Committee was in existence between 1936 and 1947. It consisted of fourteen clubs and organisations from five countries: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Finland. Olof Seaholm Collection—A7B1/3 [hereafter OSC], “Records of Scandinavian Central Committee Meetings,” Box 6, UBC-SC.

86. *Svenska Pressen*, “Skandinaviska Centralkommittén antager resolution om lojalitet,” September 21, 1939. During the war years much of its activity involved collecting money for the war effort. Already in 1940 it collected \$1,000 for the Red Cross, and added another \$1,500 in 1942. *Svenska Pressen*, November 26, 1942.

87. OSC, “Records of Scandinavian Central Committee Meetings,” Box 1, May 25, 1942, and January 11, 1943. Carl Gravell and Matthew Lindfors signed the letter. An interview with “Sture Sträng” reveals that although Lindfors was respected for his community involvement, continuous tension existed between him and more radical Swedish immigrants. “Sträng” believes that Lindfors was at least partly responsible for giving Swedish socialists a communistic label, something Sträng considers highly exaggerated in view of their social democratic roots. Interview with Sture Sträng [pseud.], Burnaby, December 1999.

88. This motion originated in the Scandinavian Workers’ Club. See Minutes, July 4, 1943, *Scandinavian Workers’ Club* SA-144, Swenson Swedish Immigration Research Center, Augustana College, Illinois (hereafter *SSIRC*).

89. OSC, “Records of Scandinavian Central Committee Meetings,” Box 1, July 12, 1943.

on the part of the Committee," but also on "tendencies and actions by the Committee not generally approved" by its membership. The letter noted further that the Central Committee "had been used in certain political interests ... contrary to the best interests of the affiliated organisations ... [and] detrimental [to] Scandinavian co-operation since the membership ... naturally embraces different political opinions."⁹¹ While the letter neglected to name the type of politics that it accused the Committee of having indulged in, the implications were clear that the Swedish Club resented being identified with left-wing politics.

The matter received serious attention by the Central Committee. While the executive was disturbed by the possibility of a schism within the ranks, the letter from the Swedish Club also provoked hostility. The elected investigating committee called it "a piece of dirty work" that required immediate attention, but the chairman, Sid Seaholm – also the chairman of the Scandinavian Workers' Club – expressed a desire for continued relations with the Swedish Club and suggested that the opinions in the letter were "based on doubtful foundation or facts."⁹² Over the objections of the Swedish Club, the Committee decided to investigate and respond to the complaint. Shortly after a closed special meeting between the Committee and the Swedish Club, the Swedish Club moved that the Scandinavian Central Committee would "keep politics out of the meetings" and only discuss purely Scandinavian issues.⁹³ When the motion was defeated, delegates from the Swedish Club walked out in protest, followed by the Icelandic society Isafold, the Danish Brotherhood, and the Norwegian Male Chorus. A few weeks later, the Committee accepted the Swedish Club's letter of withdrawal from the Scandinavian Central Committee.⁹⁴ It is clear that although all clubs agreed on

90. The Swedish Club (founded in 1931 by Consul Axel Stahl) catered to Swedish professionals and business persons. Its main function was to organize banquets for visiting Swedish dignitaries. See OSC, Box 6; and *SP*, "Svenska klubben firar 15-års-fest," February 7, 1946.

91. OSC, Box 1, "The Swedish Club to the Scandinavian Organizations," November 12, 1943. This controversy clearly was not new. In 1941 the Central Committee noted that "[i]t is sometimes argued that cultural and benefit organisations such as ours, should not take part in issues that could be termed political." *SP*, "An Open Letter," October 9, 1941.

92. OSC, "Records of Scandinavian Central Committee Meetings," Box 1, January 10, 1944.

93. Note that the constitutions of the Central Committee expressively state that it was "not a political or a religious organisation." OSC, Box 1, "Constitution for Joint Activities of the Scandinavian Organizations."

94. OSC, "Records of Scandinavian Central Committee Meetings," Box 1, March 13, 1944.

aiding the war effort, they were sharply divided on the question of the best way to accomplish this, and radical and conservative factions within the Committee were ideologically irreconcilable.

One of the clubs under the Central Committee was *Skandinaviska Arbetarklubben* (SAK).⁹⁵ It was labor oriented with an executive that clearly sympathized with the left, although several news clippings indicate they felt a need to distance the club from politics and union involvement in order to attract and hold new members.⁹⁶ Its mixed male and female membership in the late 1930s and early 1940s hovered around 100 with 50 percent regarded as “active” and a maximum of 20 persons attending regular meetings.⁹⁷ As with the umbrella organization, the minutes from the SAK point to some ambivalence about the Second World War. The minutes expressed the strongest protest against wars in general during the mid-1930s, but the target was fascism as much as war itself. “Health and economic betterment,” it claimed, “is not enough.”

What good will it all do us; how can we enjoy our cultural activities, if we are not allowed to live in peace – if we have to fight and go to war? Anybody knows that war leaves little or no time for anything else; that war is something terrible, which hits the workers most of all. For that reason we are against all wars for the oppression of any people, no matter what race or nationality, and against fascism, which has proven itself all too well to be an enemy of peace. The fascist governments are daily practicing violence, and preparing for more, in the form of war against their neighbors.⁹⁸

Considering this strong statement, the club minutes were surprisingly silent on the subject throughout the fall of 1939. In September 1939, a member spoke on “the critical times in Europe and the possible cancellation of the coming Federal election” but the minutes remain neutral and also avoid the question of the Central Committee’s advertised support of the Canadian war effort. Still, that November, the members approved to

95. It later went under the English translation, the Scandinavian Workers’ Club.

96. Two different newspaper cuttings commemorating its 5th anniversary stress the club’s distancing from political activities. One suggests that SAK’s earlier difficulties in attracting members stemmed from “a lack in experience” that led the club to “attempting” to work according to radical lines. “It became mixed up in union work and such thing. [However,] work in these types of clubs should be such that it attract interest from persons of varied tradition” [trans.]. “Skandinaviska Arbetarklubben i Vancouver firar 5-års jubileum,” SAC, SA-144, SSIRC.

97. Minutes, throughout, SAC, SA-144, SSIRC.

98. “What is the Scandinavian Workers’ Club? What is it doing?” SAC, SA-144, SSIRC.

support the Canadian Defence League with a \$3.00 donation in order to help those arrested for distributing anti-war pamphlets.⁹⁹ As an indication of the club's vacillating responses, the next mention of the Canadian war effort was the election of two members to the Patriotic Debt for Victory Crusade.¹⁰⁰

While the majority of the club members seemed prepared to forget the war in favor of social activities, their energetic chairman, Sid Seaholm, occasionally managed to herd his flock further to the left on the political spectrum. Two weeks after the election, Seaholm convinced the members to withdraw the club's participation in the Victory Crusade.¹⁰¹ Although his time was mostly taken up with arranging and giving lectures on subjects ranging from the history of the Swedish labor movement to Canadian history, at times his political ideology sprang to the surface. In October 1941, he outlined "the works and aims" of the Scandinavian Anti-Fascist Committee and persuaded the club to endorse the work of the same. Nonetheless, he also supported the Central Committee's donation to the Red Cross and the Blood Donor drive, and a motion both to support the Memorial Fund and to purchase a war bond.¹⁰² Apart from occasional twitches of socialist conscience, tickled into action by Sid Seaholm, the club itself remained happy to organize dances, theatrical events and public-speaking classes.

While the minutes indicate that Seaholm was a driving force and more politically motivated than other members, there is little to suggest that he resented Canada's involvement with anything approaching the fervor felt by Swedish socialists during the First World War. In fact, neither Seaholm nor the SAK expressed a similar degree of pacifism as did leaders of the social-democratic Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in British Columbia. According to J.L. Granatstein, CCF's leaders in BC were the only ones militant enough in Canada to argue against the war. As a result, the government sent spies to CCF meetings while Premier Pattullo issued a warning that in the future public pacifist endorsements

99. Minutes, November 26, 1939, SAC, SA-144, SSIRC.

100. Minutes, March 3, 1940, SAC, SA-144, SSIRC.

101. Minutes, March 17, 1940, SAC, SA-144, SSIRC.

102. Minutes, November 9, 1941, and October 18, 1942, SAC, SA-144, SSIRC.

would result in prosecution.¹⁰³ SAK, dominated by a Swedish membership in numbers and leadership and the most labor-oriented of all Scandinavian groups in Vancouver, was not willing to join ranks with CCF. Either truly torn in his position on the war question or just mindful of his vulnerable position as 'ethnic', Seaholm refrained from voicing a condemnation of Canada's involvement in the Second World War.

Likewise, Swedish-language newspapers refrained from criticizing Canada during these troubled times. Rather than engaging in probing political commentaries, *Svenska Pressen* in British Columbia concentrated on defending Sweden, while simultaneously stressing the Swedish-Canadian community's loyalty to Canada. *Svenska Pressen* was clearly on the Allied side from early on in the war, and there are no signs that it censored anti-British letters or articles. Although notices about the war were rare at first,¹⁰⁴ by the end of 1940, Sweden and Swedish-Canadians declared themselves pro-England. By March 1940, the paper stated that Sweden was "definitely pro-English," and it predicted that Sweden would respond with armed resistance against any attack from Germany.¹⁰⁵ Despite initial Axis victories, *Svenska Pressen* remained convinced that England would eventually win the battle "for democracy in the world."¹⁰⁶

Even though articles did not criticize Allied actions, they defended Sweden's right to neutrality. Many stressed similarities between Sweden and the United States and Canada, albeit few compared Swedish culture or politics with those of England.¹⁰⁷ A preferred tactic was to translate an English-language article that praised Sweden, as if the fact that it was originally published in a mainstream newspaper gave greater credence to the argument. In 1941, *Svenska Pressen* translated an editorial column

103. J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto, 1975).

104. In August of 1939 *SP* noted without comments that Sweden had prohibited what was considered an inflammatory anti-Nazi film made by Warner Bros. *SP*, "'Nazi Spy' förbjuden i Sverige," August 24, 1939.

105. *SP*, "Sweden's Side of the Story," March 21, 1940. See also *SP*, "Sweden has helped and is now helping her stricken neighbours," February 6, 1941.

106. *SP*, "Sverigenytt i amerikansk press," June 27, 1940.

107. For instance, *Svenska Pressen* published for several weeks instalments of a longer comparative article between Canada and Scandinavia written by Paul Malles, a "well-known European correspondent" who was the Canadian reporter for the Swedish newspaper *Social Demokraten* in 1942. Malles. See *SP*, "Scandinavia and the War: Canadas [sic] Stake in Northern Europe," April 16, 1942, and February to March 1943.

from the *Washington Times Herald* that suggested that the Allies' criticism of Sweden was undeserved, and favorably compared the Swedish humanitarian aid efforts with those of Britain and the United States.¹⁰⁸ In other instances, Alvar Anderson first noted several geographical similarities between Canada and Sweden before he paid tribute to Swedes, who as "good Canadians . . . have joined the Canadian Armed Forces and gone out to help defeat Hitlerism."¹⁰⁹ In a later article, Anderson defended Sweden's political position, noting that "many complicated factors" were behind the Swedish policy of neutrality but that sympathy for Germany was not a consideration. On the contrary, he noted that "Nazi leaders are constantly showing how thoroughly annoyed they are with the only country in the north which could not be forced into becoming a satellite of the 'New Order.'"¹¹⁰

Svenska Pressen and Swedes in North America responded with particular alertness when Swedish neutrality was under attack or when Sweden was accused of pro-German actions.¹¹¹ When the *Globe* in Toronto criticized Sweden's neutrality policy, the respondent, Albin Widen,¹¹² suggested that self-serving business objectives in Canada motivated the critique.¹¹³ The Norwegian correspondent for a Minneapolis newspaper, who alleged that Sweden had helped Germany's war effort more than any other collaborator, also provoked a detailed response. After first having

108. *SP*, "Finland kämpar nu mot hunger och köld," January 23, 1941. Other American press releases that favoured Sweden can be found in *Svenska Pressen*, "The Case of Sweden," July 15, 1943, and "Sveriges ställning i Amerika har förbättras," February 10, 1944.

109. "Sweden – Surrounded, but Still Independent," *Svenska Pressen*, November 25, 1943. The paper stressed any connection between Sweden and Canada, however slim. For other examples, see "Swedish Paper Hails Canada as Great Power of the Future," September 9, 1943; "Scandinavia and the War," February 11, 1943; "Svenskarna äro våra vänner," *Svenska Pressen*, October 5, 1944; "Canadensiska flygare relatera erfarenheter i Sverige," January 4, 1945; and "Sweden Pays Tribute to Canadians," January 11, 1945.

110. *Svenska Pressen*, December 30, 1943. See also Signe Toksvig's series of articles, "How Neutral is Sweden?" April 1, 8, 15, 22, 25 and 29, 1943; and Albin Widen, "Har Sverige slagit in på en ny kurs?" April 29, 1943.

111. Whenever possible, the paper emphasised Germany's irritation with Sweden's foreign policy. For example, see *SP*, "Tysk kritik för svensk filmval," October 23, 1941; or "Swedes United in Determination to Defend Their Land," December 15, 1941.

112. Albin Widen wrote for the Swedish Information Bureau in Minneapolis, but his column appeared regularly in *SP*. In an earlier column, Widen explained that his refusal to write about Norway and Norwegians was because of their persistent vilification of Sweden that Swedes – out of sympathy with Norway's cause – found impossible to counter effectively. See *SP*, "Vad kan Sverige göra för norrmanen?" July 15, 1943.

113. *SP*, "Finns det någon ideologisk neutralitet?" October 12, 1944.

attested to Sweden's friendship with Norway, Widen compared Sweden to Norway and the United States before these nations were forced into the war: "Sweden [was] neutral because it [had] not been attacked". Moreover, Widen pointed out that if Sweden's strict neutrality policy had not prevented France and Britain from sending troops when the Soviets attacked Finland in 1939, it might have moved the Soviet Union from a passive to an active alliance with Germany. Thus, "Sweden's neutrality saved both England and democracy."¹¹⁴ These explanations insisted that Sweden was on the side of the Allies despite its neutrality.

There are, however, indications that despite the press and Swedish organizations, most Swedes did not consider the war their concern. In 1941, the Scandinavian Central Committee regretted that some free-standing Scandinavian organizations had failed to respond to "the life and death issue that our country is today helping to decide."¹¹⁵ Similarly, Matthew Lindfors noted that individual Scandinavian donations to the Canadian Red Cross were far from satisfactory. He reminded readers that their national honor was at stake and urged them to protect their reputation as a loyal ethnic group.¹¹⁶ Ads for Victory Loans emphasized Sweden rather than leaning on Canadian nationalism, maintaining that by lending financial support to Canada, Swedish-Canadians also helped their motherland. One ad beseeched Swedes to recognize that "deep inside their hearts" they knew that an Allied victory was the only thing that could bring the Swedish economy back on its feet.¹¹⁷ Despite its Swedish focus, the campaign had limited success, and in 1943, the Chairman of the Victory Loans Committee complained that Scandinavians did not buy their share, which caused the Scandinavian Central Committee to "advertise more forcefully both in the language press as well as in the daily press."¹¹⁸ Thus, it is possible that there was a discrepancy between

114. *SP*, "Vilken sida har haft största nyttan av Sveriges neutralitetspolitik?" October 7, 1943 [trans.]. This was a common argument in the defence of Swedish neutrality. See *SP*, "The Swedes are out to get the business," November 8, 1945.

115. *Svenska Pressen*, "An Open Letter," October 9, 1941.

116. *SP*, "Skandinavernas kampanj för Röda Korset," August 22, 1940.

117. *SP*, "Svenskar i Canada," June 5, 1941 [trans.]. In other editorials, Lindfors voiced the hope that Swedes in Canada would be "as loyal to this cause [Victory Bonds] as any national group." *SP*, "Let us do our part," February 6, 1941; and "'Du Gamla, Du Fria,' or 'Deutschland Uber Alles'?" June 12, 1941.

118. OSC, "Records of Scandinavian Central Committee Meetings," Box 6, April 26, 1943, and May 10, 1943.

Swedish club activities and the general Swedish immigrant community, in that the clubs felt a stronger need to prove their loyalty to Canada.

When Matthew Lindfors created a separate English-language newspaper in 1944, the tone in the Victory Bond advertisement was quite different. It anticipated that its English-language readers were more loyal to Canada than to Sweden or any other Scandinavian country. One ad spoke to "Canadians of Scandinavian origin," rather than to "Swedes in Canada" and reminded the reader of their many "husbands or sons [who were] discharging their own duty on the battlefield."¹¹⁹ Hence, Lindfors anticipated that readers of the English-language *Scandinavian Post* were second or third generation Canadians who could be expected to be more loyal to Canada than readers of the Swedish-language *Svenska Pressen*.

Swedes, therefore, began to clamor more openly for Canadian rather than Swedish nationalism. Somewhat misguidedly, the Swedish-born Liberal MP, Olof Hanson, maintained that the United States had no hyphenated citizens. He suggested that Swedes and other immigrants in Canada do the same, viewing themselves as foremost Canadians in order to create a united Canada.¹²⁰ Already in 1939, Swedes in British Columbia debated whether a Swedish culture in Canada was desirable. Swedish organizations increasingly switched to English in order to attract members, and clubs began to commence meetings by singing "O Canada" rather than "Du Gamla Du Fria."¹²¹ According to "Ex-kulturell," Swedish language, art and literature were irrelevant in an English-language country where artists such as Anders Zorn and Bruno Liljefors were unknown.¹²² The letter provoked discussions both for and against a Swedish culture. In his editorial comment, Matthew Lindfors labelled 'Ex-kulturell' "un-Swedish," but the reader "Svensk Canadian" agreed with 'Ex-kulturell', and argued for a pragmatic approach to immigration that involved a joint effort with other ethnic groups to improve conditions for workers.¹²³ The letter also provoked a discussion in the Scandinavian

119. *Scandinavian Post*, "A Privilege and a Duty," April 15, 1944.

120. *Scandinavian Post*, "Olof Hanson Voices Plea for United Canada," May 11, 1944.

121. As did many other clubs around this time, the Scandinavian Workers' Club changed its official language from Swedish to English in January 1940. *SP*, "Skand. Arbetarklubben höll sitt årsmöte," January 11, 1940; and *SP*, "Port Alberni Scandinavians hold banquet," March 1, 1945.

122. *SP*, "Ska kultur serveras varm eller kall?" October 26, 1939.

123. *SP*, "Från läsekretsen: Red. M. M. Lindfors," November 2, 1939. See also, "Du Gamla, Du Fria ...", November 9, 1939. *SP*, "Är Skandinavisk Nationalism i Canada berättigad?" November 9, 1939.

Workers' Club.¹²⁴ Its leader Sid Seaholm argued against the need for a Swedish culture, while Matthew Lindfors defended Swedish-Canadian culture. Thus, Lindfors, who represented the conservative side of the Swedish community, saw the need to maintain a Swedish culture in Canada, while left-wing elements suggested a more definite form of assimilation. Certainly, the ethnocultural class formation that was evident in the First World War was missing in these discussions.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly how the change in mood occurred, but the Swedes seem to have adjusted to Canada with a minimum transition period. In 1935, a Scandinavian communist organization, the Scandinavian Workers Club in Edmonton, called for a conference including all Scandinavian clubs in Alberta to discuss a possible upcoming war in Europe. With a mocking reference to Ludvig Holberg's comedy *The Political Thinker*, the Swedish club *Nordstjärnan* declined to participate in the meeting, making it clear that it wished to distance itself from the Workers Club's left-wing politics.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, although the letters indicate a concern by the Scandinavian communists – likely influenced by Comintern policies – the hostility towards Canada and Britain that was obvious in 1914-1918 is missing also from this correspondence. Lars Ljungmark notes a similar trend in Winnipeg. In the 1930s, *SCT* still reacted against “the British arrogance” and several articles decried the alleged widespread intolerance and frequent deportation of unemployed immigrants.¹²⁶ Ljungmark, however, suggests that these ill feelings were missing from the rhetoric when war broke out again. He claims that the most remarkable difference is the lack of public suspicion toward Swedish immigrants and, when 1939 came along, the loyalty the Swedish community showed for the Canadian war effort. Ljungmark suggests that a growing Canadian nationalism put the Swedish critique of Britain more

124. Minutes, October 29, 1939, SAC, SA-144, SSIRC.

125. “*Nordstjärnan*, 1929-1979,” manuscript collection held by Rune Anderson, Edmonton, Alberta. I am indebted to Carina Rönnqvist for sharing these documents. This reference to a seventeenth-century Danish playwright sheds light on the literacy among Scandinavian groups, and the outraged response from the Workers Club indicates the sting of political sarcasm. While the letter only refers to the play by its title, one of the last stanzas in *The Political Thinker* reads: “Each working man should recognize/From watching this diversion/Though he may leaders criticize/He knows not how to govern.” See Ludvig Holberg, *Jeppe of the hill and other comedies*, trans. Gerald S. Argetsinger and Sven H. Rossel (Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 53.

126. See for example, *SCT*, August 24, 1933, and May 13, 1937.

in step with native-born Canadians, who advocated a retreat from British involvement in Canadian affairs. This in turn allowed Swedish-Canadians to blend Swedish with Canadian nationalism.¹²⁷

This alone, however, does not fully explain the dramatic switch, and a number of other factors, such as time of arrival and remigration seem to have also had an impact. The Swedish population in Canada grew dramatically between 1901 and 1911, and thus most of the complainants in *SCT* were fairly new arrivals who had not yet had time to set down roots in Canada.¹²⁸ In British Columbia, on the other hand, Swedish immigration peaked in the 1920s, with waves arriving in 1923 and 1928. Many Swedes had only lived in British Columbia for little over a decade when the war broke out, but the brief period of adjustment is not sufficient to allow for the differences in loyalties. Remigration from Canada to Sweden increased dramatically during the 1930s, at the same time that immigration from Sweden came to a grinding halt.¹²⁹ This suggests that many of the immigrants who found it difficult to adjust to the new country had time to return home, and no newcomers took their place. Swedish immigrants who remained in British Columbia were those who, for various reasons, were able to compete in a difficult job market.

The community was divided during both wars, but the dominant trend from the one period differed from that manifested in the other. Some Swedes participated in the Scandinavian Overseas Battalion in the First World War, but passive resistance and even vigorous rejection of Britain and Canada were more conspicuous inclinations. Conversely, during the Second World War, there were Swedes who believed that the war was not their concern, while the official voices of their community, the press and the Scandinavian organizations spoke fervently for the war effort. By the

127. Lars Ljungmark, *Svenskarna i Winnipeg: porten till prärien 1872-1940* (Växjö: Emigrantsinstitutets vänner, 1994), 205-207.

128. The Swedish-born population in Canada grew from 3,965 in 1900 to 12,940 in 1910. By 1921, 27,700 Swedish-born men and women had made Canada their home. Census of Canada, 1921, Population, Table 7, "Numerical distribution of the immigrant population by birthplace, sex and year of arrival in Canada, by provinces."

129. The Swedish-born population in British Columbia grew from 5,735 in 1921 to 9,333 in 1931; however, it dove to 7,729 persons in 1941. See Census of Canada, 1921, Vol 2, Table 52; Census of Canada, 1931, Vol 2, Table 46; and Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. 2, Table 43. For information on remigration to Sweden, see *Historisk Statistik för Sverige*, Vol. 1, "Befolkningen 1720-1950, Tab. B 30 (Stockholm: Statistiska Centralbyrån, 1955).

1940s, Swedish-Canadians had moved from an *ethnic consciousness* where a “we’ versus ‘them’ mentality” set them apart from other ethnic groups in Canada, to the less vibrant position of *ethnic awareness* where participation in ethnic organizations did not exclude a sense of Canadian identity. Likewise, the ethnic consciousness of the 1910s was characterized by a strong Swedish nationalism while in the 1940s, affinity for Sweden did not supersede Canadian nationalistic feelings.¹³⁰

Moreover, in the 1910s, Swedes in Canada felt betrayed by a society that invited them as “preferred immigrants” while still treating them in a discriminatory manner. John Herd Thompson maintains that English-Canadian hostility against foreigners had always been present, but that it escalated in 1917 and 1918.¹³¹ That in all probability neither the Canadian government nor the public singled out Swedes in particular is not of utmost importance in this discussion. Anglo-Canadians disdained immigrants in general, but for various reasons Swedes found this xenophobia difficult to accept, and it is their antagonistic response to the discriminatory Canadian society that is significant. In the late 1910s, Swedish-Canadian socialists often responded by mixing their pacifist ideology with an anti-British and anti-Canadian sentiment that expressed itself through support of Germany. It is revealing that this support was rarely articulated with political arguments relating to the war; rather, these critics seemed to have identified with Germany’s position as an underdog. This socialistic rhetoric thus differed from that expressed by moderate and radical socialists in Canada and Sweden.¹³²

Swedes did not experience the same degree of alienation in Canada in the 1940s. Even in British Columbia where Swedish immigration was fairly recent with one of its greatest peaks in 1928, Swedes seemed more willing to identify with the host country and its British heritage. Consequently, time of arrival alone is not a sufficient explanation for the diminished ethnic consciousness; a growing flexibility among Anglo-Can-

130. For a good account of “complementary rather than competing” Swedish and Canadian nationalism as expressed by Swedes in Alberta, see Carina Rönnqvist, “Scattered Swedes and Single Settlers. On Ethnic Identity Reflected in Nationalistic Sentiments, Gender and Class in 20th Century Canada,” in *Swedishness Reconsidered. Three Centuries of Swedish-American Identities*, Daniel Lindmark, ed. (Umeå, 2000).

131. Thompson, *The Harvests of War*, 85-87.

132. McKay and Lewins maintain that ethnically conscious groups “are *most likely* to be involved in conflict situations” (emphasis McKay and Lewins), 424.

dians also allowed Swedish immigrants to explore their dual loyalties. Still, even if Swedish-Canadians were well integrated in Canadian society during the Second World War, their many clubs and organizations and the survival of the Swedish-language newspaper, *Svenska Pressen*, pointed to a strong ethnic awareness and a lingering affection for their native land. During the Second World War, Swedes in Vancouver were joined by ethnicity and divided by class. The aggressive defiance of the First World War that caused them to lash out against Canada had settled into a defensive nationalism that incorporated both the old and the new homeland.