Similarly, Wieck’s investigation of possible specific links between Daniel Webster’s 1825 Bunker Hill speech, Parker’s Rights of Man sermon, and Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address is not completely unproblematic. One cannot help but wonder whether the use by Webster and Parker of (fairly) similar images of strength really merits mention in Wieck’s book: what can one learn from Webster referring to the country as a ‘monument’ and Parker to God as a ‘pyramid’ (171)? Moreover, what is the lesson to be derived from all three men referring to ‘our fathers,’ all three employing forms of the word ‘noble,’ not to speak of all three invoking God towards the end of their orations (in all fairness, Wieck notes that many orators of the time asked the blessing of God)? To be sure, Wieck does not draw many conclusions from these circumstances, nor from the fact that each of the three speakers used triple formulations toward the end of their speeches (170). So, too, we may add, does Wieck himself in closing his own argument, referring on the last page of his conclusion to ‘the dream Daniel Webster held high...; the dream to which Theodore Parker made such a powerful appeal...; the dream to which Lincoln himself was turning...’ (178). Finally, the circumstance that both Parker and Lincoln in ‘[s]eeking guidance with regard to the future... were harking back to the fathers as the best sources of direction in confronting the unknown (173),’ hardly establishes a particularly strong link between the two, besides their being Americans: in the words of Richard Hofstadter, after all, ‘the United States was the only country in the world that began with perfection and aspired to progress.’

These minor matters should not, however, detract from the importance of Wieck’s work: overall, he has successfully managed to ‘unlock a door that has effectively been sealed for almost a century and a half, in order to bring the reader face-to-face with a heretofore hidden Lincoln’ (11). As Wieck himself acknowledges, in this essay-like little book his has not been the task to fully open that door; in the future however, Wieck’s discovery of Lincoln’s sympathies for Parker’s thinking may well inspire full-scale reinterpretations of the relationship between Lincoln’s day-to-day pragmatism and his higher ideals.

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Professor Bjerre-Poulsen’s book on the emergence of the American Right could hardly have been better timed. The conservative political philosophy that has facilitated Republican triumphs since Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 seems to have become hegemonic. Despite Clinton’s victories in two presidential elections during the 1990s, there was no realignment, no clear shift back to a Democratic majority. Indeed, it could be argued that however personally successful Clinton may have been,
the Democratic Party as a whole suffered under his watch. Despite the turn-around of
the economy – a development popularly credited to Clinton but just as likely the
result of policies engineered by Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan – the
Democrats could not hold on to the White House in 2000. Even more disturbing to the
liberal forces was the loss of the Democratic majority in Congress. The Republicans
seized control of both houses of Congress in 1994 – for the first time since 1949, and
they have managed to hold on to their Congressional majority for two complete elec-
tion cycles (albeit with a brief loss in 2001-2003 of their majority in the Senate due to
Senator Jeffords switch in party affiliation). Furthermore since George W. Bush’s
election in 2000, we have been witness to an ever sharper Right turn, especially in
foreign policy as Bush has asserted American unilateralism in regard to policy issues
on everything from missile defense systems to the global warming treaty to the Inter-
national Court and, finally, to the war with Iraq.

Suddenly the media and journals of opinion across the western world are abuzz:
what’s happened to the USA? Alain Frachon, who writes about foreign affairs on the
editorial page of Le Monde, is fairly typical when he exclaims ‘No one told us that the
Republicans had moved this far to the right.’ The widespread ignorance on the part of
the European media to what have been the underlying realities of American politics
for some time is just one good reason for journalists and students of American life to
have a look at Professor Bjerre-Poulsen’s book. In fact, the rise of the American Right
has been far too little studied, even in the United States – an observation made ten
years ago by Professor Alan Brinkley.¹

In a sense Bjerre-Poulsen takes up Brinkley’s challenge – though Brinkley had called
for a major reassessment of conservatism and indeed of the intellectual and cultural
foundations of the American political tradition and beyond that of modernity itself. In
contrast, Bjerre-Poulsen’s key assumption is that the intellectual and cultural implica-
tions of conservative thought – which he rather dismissively lumps with its ‘social
psychology’ – can be separated from the issues and political organizing that made
possible the conservatives’ rise to power. One consequence of limiting the scope of
the study in this way is apparent in the author’s ambiguity regarding the origin and
prime motivations of conservative thought: Is it rooted in a reaction to the New Deal
or in vehement anti-communism? Is it a ‘real’ conservatism or 19th century laissez-
faire liberalism dressed up in new clothing? To these obvious questions, I would add
the following: Are the undeniable contradictions in American conservatism a con-
sequence of its particular nature, or in this respect does conservatism parallel a similar
tendency in American liberalism to live with and exploit contradiction?² Another
consequence of the author’s decision to avoid a wider discussion of the intellectual
foundations of the conservative movement is a manifest unwillingness to address the
logic and sentiment behind conservatism’s undeniable appeal to many American

1. Alan Brinkley, ‘The Problem of American Conservatism,’ American Historical Review, 99 (April,
1994), 409-429.

2. On the idea of contradiction in American politics, see Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The American Creed,’
voters. Surely this must be one of the most pressing of questions on the minds of readers – and addressing it might well provide the opportunity to comment on the current trajectory of liberalism.

Having said all this, one must say in defense of Professor Bjerre-Poulsen that no book can do everything. And judged on its own terms as an account of the ‘political mobilization’ of the conservative Right in the USA, Bjerre-Poulsen has given us a splendid book – one that is thoroughly researched and impressively learned. Right Face gathers, presents and synthesizes a vast array of conservative literature while recounting and analyzing on-going debates that characterized the movement between 1945 and 1965. By paying close attention to the actual debates among conservative political thinkers and journalists, Right Face yields a strong sense of immediacy. The book plunges us back into the world of the 1950s and 1960s, taking us back to a time when the ideas and values of New Deal liberalism still dominated American politics and when many, perhaps most, conservatives saw themselves as a saving remnant – people with a conscience unlikely ever to have power. On the whole and by contrast to the conservatives, Republicans positioned themselves as ‘moderates’ – moderate liberals that is: fiscally cautious but socially progressive. To anyone who has normalized the terms of American politics today – where New York State often votes in the minority, and a President could be elected in 2000 on the strength of electoral votes from the South and the Rocky Mountain states alone – the lost world of American politics will come as a shock. Bjerre-Poulsen brings that world to us, recounting a time when politicians from the big eastern and middle western states still dominated both political parties and the ideological conservatives were a distinct minority in the Republican Party. Barry Goldwater’s 1964 nomination is the culmination of the audacious thinking on the part of the conservative strategists who would re-write the rules and ideological boundaries of American politics. It also stands as the climactic episode of Bjerre-Poulsen’s narrative.

A conservative and rather undistinguished Senator from Arizona who was talked into running for president, Goldwater’s candidacy ultimately failed (he was overwhelmingly defeated by President Johnson in 1964). Yet by merely securing the Republican nomination, Goldwater’s candidacy was an enormous success. Party regulars were stunned by what they must have experienced as a coup d’etat brought off by the conservatives – a movement that had organized itself outside of the Republican Party and had been given little chance of success by the political pundits. Goldwater’s radical acceptance speech (in which he eschewed the usual practice of holding out an olive branch to the defeated Party faction), his choice of an ideological double as a running mate, and his refusal to tone down his right wing rhetoric as the election approached assured his defeat as many Republican politicians and voters abandoned the Party ticket and endorsed Johnson. Liberal and moderate Republicans were free to do so, of course, but the larger victory would come to the conservatives. Even at the time, in the wake of a crushing defeat that seemed to verify the moderate Republicans’ claim to the Party, astute observers understood the significance of the Goldwater movement. William Buckley, founder of the National Review, pointed out that without the
Goldwater candidacy ‘our opportunity to proselyte on a truly national scale would not exist.’ And Congressman Bob Dole felt liberated by the ascension of Goldwater, remarking that he could now evoke conservative principles openly. In a short time, tried and true liberal vote-getting phrases like ‘tax and spend’ would be turned by conservatives into slogans of reproach.

Bjerre-Poulsen shows us how the Goldwater nomination anticipated several underlying factors that were transforming American politics – and society – including a geographical shift of power away from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and West, the re-emergence of (the formerly left-oriented) populism as a right-wing tendency critical of the liberal welfare state, and the opening of the political party in the wake of extra-party organization – what many observers still call a ‘democratizing’ of the party that wrested control from party professionals in favor of well seasoned operatives from conservative organizations that knew how to raise money. Of these three factors, the geo-strategic shift in American politics is the most evident. F. Clifton White, who organized the Goldwater campaign for the nomination, was the first advocate of a southern strategy which wasn’t widely talked about until the 1968 Nixon campaign. It seems obvious enough now, but at the time the notion that you would focus on securing the southern states first seemed ridiculous; indeed up until 1968 it could be argued that almost every American election since Lincoln’s in 1860, had hinged on the Northeast-Midwest combination. Obviously the change came as population – and electoral votes – began shifting south and west, but it took a change in thinking to exploit the new situation.

The conservatives’ success also rested on new methods of political organizing based on a tactically sound decision to position their movement as independent of, and yet focused on, capturing the Republican Party. Commenting on the necessity of keeping an independent ideological and organizational profile, editor of the National Review William Rusher told a conservative gathering in 1960 that American political parties were ‘nothing more than vote gathering machines.’ Unlike DSOC (the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee), which linked itself to elements of the Democratic Party and a couple of trade unions, the conservatives were never dependent on the Republican Party – or any other mainstream organization. By inventing the by now well known direct mail fund-raising technique and maintaining a large contributor base, the conservatives re-invented American politics – and this, coming just as the organizing effectiveness of the Democratic party was falling, helps explain the rise of the American Right. This is one of the most useful discussions in Bjerre-Poulsen’s story.

Finally, the study of a political ideology should always raise the question of the suitability of that ideology for the tasks of governance – given the historical and institutional restraints on the success of that ideology. The mechanisms of the modern state – the relation between corporate and state power, the development of liberal interest-group politics, the structure of cooperative federalism – were all subject to critique by the growing conservative movement which, as Bjerre-Poulsen points out, was itself
divided between radical reactionaries whose backward vision often drew on the principles of the old republic and an adaptive libertarian wing that privileged the ‘free market.’ As Bjerre-Poulsen explains, both elements were necessary to the growth of the conservative movement – though the contradictions between them were so severe for many years that the leading journal of the movement, the National Review, sponsored a semi-official ‘fusionist’ position designed to hold the movement together. The National Review became the voice of a self-appointed ‘sane’ and respectable conservatism, effectively purging the movement of its most extreme elements – those like Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society, who saw a communist conspiracy deep inside the ranks of the American political class. In effect, what Bjerre-Poulsen’s work points the way toward is a larger study of precisely how the conservative movement prepared itself for taking power. Bjerre-Poulsen has given us one part of that narrative of preparation – as the politically and institutionally dysfunctional elements of conservatism were weeded out to produce an ideology that, despite being contradictory and unpalatable to many, could in fact permit its adherents to govern.

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In the Preface to his book Daniel Ellsberg states that ‘the focus of this memoir’ (viii) was the background of his decision to copy and make public the top secret study later known as The Pentagon Papers (hereafter The Papers). The focus, however, has a wide lens and captures three subjects: the personal story; the case of The Papers; and the system of secrecy and lying at the top of the executive branch of government.

I

In describing the events, atmospheres, and analyses that resulted in his fateful decision, Ellsberg narrates his transformation from a cold-war warrior to a Vietnam dove, becoming perhaps the 20th century’s most famous American whistle blower. Millions of Americans experienced the same transformation, many of them earlier and more quickly, but few if any had Ellsberg’s wealth of first-hand information.

Ellsberg’s decision to copy and give to the New York Times the seven thousand-page study of decision-making regarding Vietnam led to a federal court-order to stop publication. The court order was the first-ever under the constitution. David Rudenstine documents well that story’s importance in his The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case (1996). Within the White House, Ellsberg’s decision to leak to the press led to illegal wiretaps and to the creation of a secret team, later known as the Plumbers, to prevent future leaks. In an attempt to discredit Ellsberg and discourage would-be whistle blowers, the Plumbers burglarized the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist. On June 17, 1972 police arrested some of the Plumbers in the