group to support progressive and reform legislation: “cumulatively at least the Scandinavian Americans emerge as an easily identifiable force on the side of progressive reform” (240). In accounting for this, Brøndal notes that “the regional and the Scandinavian-American factors overlapped: many westerners were progressives, and many Scandinavian-American legislators were westerners” (241). In addition, western Scandinavian Americans were more progressive than both their neighboring legislators and fellow ethnics from other parts of Wisconsin. He then makes a case for factoring in the temperance movement into this progressive inclination, showing its widespread popularity particularly among western Scandinavian Americans. But he must again counsel caution when drawing conclusions about Scandinavian-American values as such, given that this was a regional phenomenon and because “neither was the coincidence between progressive inclinations and pro-temperance attitudes complete, nor was the connection simple and direct” (244).

To sum up, Jørn Brøndal has written an extremely well-researched, extensive, and path-breaking history of the Scandinavian-American political leadership in the years 1890 to 1914. Its great virtue lies in its comparative structure when examining the development of a Scandinavian-American identity, its analysis of the entrance of Scandinavian-American politicians into the associational political party framework in Wisconsin, and in showing the manner in which the Progressive Movement modified this framework and the participation of the Scandinavian-American community in it. If it is less successful in pinning down the connection between Scandinavian-American values and the Progressive Movement, it is not for lack of systematic effort, but rather because this is intrinsically such a difficult task. *Ethnic Leadership and Midwestern Politics. Scandinavian Americans and the Progressive Movement in Wisconsin, 1890-1914* richly deserves the 2005 Wisconsin Historical Society Book Award of Merit.

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I have a friend named Larry Belle. Larry plays a special role in my life. He’s the guy who brings me back to reality when I offer politically – or historically – unsupported opinions, which I do all the time. I praise the American medical system. He asks why Americans have the highest infant-mortality rates among industrial nations. He does that sort of thing with everything. I hate to admit it, but he’s usually right.

And that’s why I thought of Larry when I read Thomas Barnett’s *The Pentagon’s New Map.* In the area of military strategy, Barnett takes what most of us think we know and turns it on its head. He may not always be correct, but he offers the most creative and important critique of military policy that I’ve read in years.
Barnett, a naval analyst who spent a decade in the Pentagon before moving to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., argues that the way the US has prepared for past wars with its hugely expensive toys is no longer relevant. With the USSR now a fading bad dream, the Pentagon’s big-ship navy officers have been gearing up to fight China a decade or two from now. Wrong, says Barnett, the U.S. will never fight China. Pentagon planners are drafting contingency plans to fight the wrong enemy.

Nor, he argues, will Americans ever again fight any genuinely modern country with a powerful army and navy. What he means is that the world is increasingly divided into two main regions. One he calls the “functioning Core” (that’s mainly Europe, China, North America, and Brazil and Argentina in South America). Countries within the Core are what he calls the “includeds,” because they are indeed included in the framework of globalization. The rest of the world, comprising about two-thirds of its six-billion people, is the “non-integrating Gap,” what Barnett refers to as the “lesser-includeds.” These are the societies that remain unstable and hostile. The threat to modernity and to peace comes from this “Gap.” The Pentagon’s new map helps us to visualize the Core and the Gap.

What makes the Core into “the includeds” is not so much wealth (though wealth has a lot to do with it) as “connectedness.” The Core includes all those who are connected by trade and cyber-communications, and by certain values, including a respect for women. In fact, argues Barnett in one of his many insightful paragraphs, we can judge the modern world’s fault lines based less on the shape of a country’s political system than the degree to which it isolates its women from “everyday life,” especially economic life. How do we identify that isolation? In honor killings of women who commit adultery, in refusing to permit women to drive, or hold public office, or to get a decent education. With women non-producing (except for babies) and non-consuming, these Gap countries will be economically stagnant, and therefore increasingly disconnected from the global economy.

Well, yes and no. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was much more egalitarian and secular in its attitude toward women than most states in the Arab world, but Barnett is on target about the Taliban and sub-Saharan Africa and many other likely trouble spots. This book is nothing if not provocative.

Barnett, remember, is a military strategist, not a sociologist or historian. As a strategist, he views the U.S. for the foreseeable future as having not a key military role, but the key military role. Americans, he argues, should continue to be the world’s policemen. He sees this as inevitable. He is insistent (much too insistent, in my estimation) that the U.S. is not an imperial power. He argues that an empire enforces what he calls “maximum rule sets” which require other societies to do what they are told to do. Not so the U.S., he claims, where Washington enforces “minimum rule sets” which merely define what others cannot do, such as invade their neighbors or sponsor terrorist activity.
Because the U.S. should enforce order to promote connectivity, he argues that the Americans must construct—more accurately, reconstruct—a military that can respond flexibly in the Gap, not just to fight wars, but to maintain a truly just peace. He has little use for arms limitation agreements, for he believes that they are no longer relevant. They are unnecessary, he asserts, because he believes that there will be no more wars among Core states, while countries in the Gap, like Iran and North Korea, will simply ignore them. Barnett more or less updates John Cobden’s nineteenth-century free-trade theory by asserting that core-states can’t afford to fight (he is surprisingly persuasive in arguing that a U.S.-China clash is unlikely despite quarrels over everything from Taiwan to spy-planes). Reminding us that the U.S. and the USSR never exchanged nuclear missiles during the Cold War, he is insistent that core states are just not going to engage in self-destructive behavior.

On the other hand, in dealing with the Gap, the so-called lesser-includeds, he argues that the use of American military force (American, because no other states will have the means to apply military power effectively) will remain absolutely necessary in the foreseeable future. It will be necessary because the U.S. must, he believes, guarantee stability and the economic and social conditions that promote connectedness.

And it is here that we come back to the heart of Barnett’s book. What Barnett seeks is not American hegemony for its own sake, nor imperial privilege. What he wants is, in his words, a “future worth building,” by which he means a world in which the lesser-includeds are increasingly connected to the developed world in a way that increases their chances of living in peace, that increases their standard of living, that increases the life-expectancy of their citizens along with their mutual dependence and dignity. It is Barnett’s view of American goals, built firmly upon Enlightenment ideals of tolerance and individual rights, that separates his work from the garden variety apologists for American power. His idealism is palpable. It is also worth noting that Barnett rejects Samuel Huntington’s belief that civilizations will clash. Just the opposite, claims Barnett, because building connections between peoples will insure that they will not clash. The Pentagon’s new map outlines only two transnational systems, those states that are connected to each other, and those that are not. He virtually ignores racial, religious, and ethnic divisions.

Nor, he believes, will Gap states—and perhaps even individuals (like Bin Laden) in those states—dare to resist American force because the U.S. will apply force so effectively. He calls this “exporting security.” American power, he writes, “armed with moral principle, should equal a real grand strategy. America ultimately does not transform the Middle East to defeat terrorism, contain Islam, secure oil, or defend Israel. We seek to transform the region to end its disconnectedness, and if it is worth doing there, then it is worth doing everywhere it exists” (330-31).

Barnett is the quintessential American. His book paradoxically combines a lot of Wilsonian idealism with George Kennan realism. It is unfailingly optimistic. It contains freshness, clear-headedness, and a kind of simple honesty that makes it more
persuasive than it probably should be. During the very week that I write this review, Chinese demonstrators are shattering windows in Japanese-owned firms as the demonstrators protest Tokyo’s refusal to acknowledge adequately its World War II crimes in China. But Barnett would likely respond that despite the demonstrations, there will be no hostilities. He would point to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s apology for those crimes as evidence that while political and cultural differences linger, both governments understand that the connections are more powerful than historical animosity. And, he would argue, if that is true in the Far East, it is equally true in Scandinavia and Central Europe and elsewhere.

But, like most of us, Barnett is selective. Missing in this otherwise brilliant book advocating connectedness is the unilateralism that has characterized the recent policy of Barnett’s own government as expressed in the rejection of not just the Kyoto global warming treaty, but proposed international agreements regarding the International Criminal Court, landmines, children in war, nuclear testing, chemical and biological weapons, biodiversity, and much more. Missing, too, is the surge of American evangelical fervor that parallels the very fundamentalism that he believes helps to explain the disconnectedness in the Middle East. And missing is the real influence of the oil and other lobbyists that cynically undermine the idealism of writers like Barnett.

I just wished that I shared Barnett’s optimism. He would probably dismiss my anxiety as that of a historian, like those admirals, who are blinded by history. I hope he, like my friend Larry Belle, is right.

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The historiography of American slavery has expanded dramatically in recent decades. While Ulrich Bonnell Phillips’s *American Negro Slavery* (1918) almost single-handedly constituted the first phase of the field’s modern development, and Kenneth M. Stampp’s *The Peculiar Institution* (1956) and Stanley Elkins’s *Slavery* (1958) epitomized the second stage, the third phase — which began in the 1970s with the works of John W. Blassingame, Eugene D. Genovese, Robert William Fogel, Stanley L. Engerman, and Herbert Gutman — rolled into the twenty-first century on an impressive growth curve. Contributing to this development, Ira Berlin’s *Generations of Captivity* (2003) is an excellent up-to-date overview of the Peculiar Institution that both draws on and temporally expands the scope of his earlier prize-winning study *Many Thousands Gone* (1998).

Important as they were, the early works of the field’s third phase — for example, Genovese’s *Roll, Jordan, Roll* (1974), a massive compendium of the Southern way of