South Carolina and External Authority

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Abstract: The essay traces the often thorny relationship between the political entity of South Carolina (as colony and state) with external authority from the 17th century to the 20th century. In the 20th century, although the state’s leadership continued to voice defiance, it sometimes cooperated—and managed to obtain a considerable share of federal funds. With the emergence of a viable two party system in the state, its politicians have broken with the past and openly allied themselves with their national counterparts.

Keywords: American Studies – Southern Studies – British Empire – American Revolution – American Civil War – New Deal – Republican Party – Democratic Party – Race Relations

This essay is at once thesis and story and makes the claim that almost from the first settlement in 1670 until the 1990s, South Carolinians have tended to be skeptical of external authority—unless it could be financially beneficial. In the 1920s, a black South Carolina expatriate, Kelly Miller wrote: “South Carolina is the stormy petrel of the Union. She arouses the nation’s wrath and rides upon the storm. There is no dull period in her history.” Miller was absolutely right on target in his analysis of the Palmetto State, but it was not just the reputation of South Carolinians as modern hotspurs that makes its history so fascinating. It was

1. Kelly Miller, “These ‘Colored’ United States: South Carolina,” Messenger 7, no. 11 (Dec. 1925): 376. Miller, the son of a slave woman and a free person of color, had to leave the state to obtain the education for which he thirsted. Walter B. Edgar, South Carolina in the Modern Age (Columbia, SC, 1992), 138.
2. Throughout this paper I will use the term “South Carolinians” and “Carolinians” interchangeably.
their three hundred year-old tradition of a love-hate relationship with outside authority, be that authority the Lords Proprietors, the British Empire, or the United States government.

Within the first generation after the founding of South Carolina as a proprietary colony in 1670, a faction within the colony assumed a confrontational attitude toward the proprietors, basing their opposition on (1) either the fact that the “Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina” had not been ratified by the colonists as required by royal charter and therefore had no legal status in the colony, or (2) citing provisions of the same non-ratified document as the legal justification for their opposition to particular proprietary initiatives. During the colony’s first forty years of existence, it was wracked by internal factional strife between those who opposed the Lords Proprietors’ efforts at governing and those who supported them. However, by 1709, the colonists began to quit fighting among themselves and the previously warring factions gradually joined forces to fight a common enemy: outside authority as represented by the Proprietors. It was truly a strange turn of events, but one that would be repeated down through the years.

In 1719, the colonists overthrew the proprietary regime in what has become known as the “Revolution of 1719.” This revolution differed from other colonial “rebellions” such as Bacon’s rebellion in Virginia and Culpepper’s rebellion in North Carolina. Those actions, while they did involve armed conflict, were merely internal factional disputes. South Carolina’s revolution, on the other hand, was a well-planned and well-executed coup against legally-established authority. And, it succeeded. Historian Lewis Jones wryly referred to it not as the Revolution of 1719, but as “Secession I.” The revolutionaries of 1719, in the best English tradition, claimed a precedent – the Glorious Revolution of 1689. The colonists defended their actions “to prevent the utter Ruin of this Government, if not the loss of the Province until his Majesties Pleasure be

known.” There were only a few die-hard proprietary supporters, but one of them wrote to an imperial official that if the revolution were not “Cropped in the Bud and example made of some of them they will set up for themselves against his Majesty as well as the Proprietors.” He was, of course, prescient. If 1689 were a legal precedent for 1719, then 1719 would become the precedent for separating the bonds of empire in 1776.

The story of the American Revolution (or “Secession II”) is well-known as are many of the reasons the various colonies gave for their actions. South Carolinians shared the views of their compatriots on general issues such as “no taxation without representation” and opposition to the Intolerable Acts. However, there were a series of local issues peculiar to South Carolina that were just as significant and fueled the fire of rebellion. One of these local issues, the Wilkes Fund Controversy, not only was an assertion by South Carolina’s colonial assembly of what it considered its prerogatives, but a pointed jab at external authority. John Wilkes was an unsavory British politician and newspaperman who ran afoul of the monarchy and the government. After he was jailed for attacking the King’s speech opening Parliament, a legal defense fund, the Society for the Support of the Bill of Rights in England was formed. South Carolina’s Commons House of Assembly appropriated £1,500 sterling for the defense fund. In London imperial officials were outraged and the political tug-of-war between empire and Carolinians resulted in the virtual shutdown of colonial government.

At the First Continental Congress in Philadelphia in 1774, delegates got a foretaste of what dealing with South Carolina would be like. Congress passed resolutions denouncing all sorts of British tyranny and the Carolinians fully supported them. However, when it came to economic measures to bully British merchants (as the colonists had success-

8. In 2006 dollars, this sum would be $161,712.
fully done so during the previous decade) by not only creating a non-importation agreement, but a non-exportation one as well, four of the five delegates from South Carolina threatened to bolt for home.\textsuperscript{10} Since the colony’s two major crops, rice and indigo, were enumerated products and had to be shipped to England, non-exportation would result in Carolina’s losing its major export market. Neither the New England nor middle colonies’ economies were as dependent upon enumerated products as was South Carolina’s. And the Carolinians were unwilling to make what they considered an unjust economic sacrifice. Eventually, there was a compromise by which the colony was allowed to export rice, but not indigo. South Carolina had threatened to derail the proceedings unless it got its way – and it did.

During the ensuing conflict, South Carolinians more than willingly shouldered their share of the costs of the Revolution, both in terms of treasure and blood. With a relatively small white population of some 70,000, South Carolina expended some $5.4 million in state funds ($108.2 million in 2005 dollars) for the war effort. The state regularly met the financial requisitions levied by Congress and in 1783 was the only state to meet its full obligation to the nation.\textsuperscript{11} In terms of casualties, the exact number will never be known because the Revolution in South Carolina was primarily a partisan war. In the last two years of the fighting (much of which was in South Carolina), 18 percent of all American deaths during the Revolution occurred in the Palmetto State – as did 31 percent of all Americans wounded.\textsuperscript{12} Nineteenth-century historian George Bancroft (a Bostonian) wrote: “Left mainly to her own resources, it was through bloodshed and devastation and the depths of wretchedness that her citizens were to bring her back to her place in the republic by their own heroic courage and self-devotion, having suffered more, and dared more, and achieved more than the men of any other state.”\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Weir, Colonial South Carolina, 315-16.
\textsuperscript{13} George Bancroft, \textit{History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent}, 10 vols. Reprint ed. (1841; Boston, 1874), 10:313.
Given its later history, it is interesting to note that South Carolinians were in the forefront of calling for a strengthening of the national government. In 1786, New Jersey considered withholding its financial support for the Articles of the Confederation Congress. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina was one of three members of Congress chosen to persuade New Jersey’s legislature to continue its financial support for the government. Instead of boycotting the Confederation Congress, Pinckney recommended that the legislators “urge the calling of a general convention of the states for the purpose of increasing the powers of the federal government and rendering it more adequate for the ends for which it was instituted.”

His remarks, it should be noted preceded the now famous “Annapolis Convention” that led to the historic conclave in Philadelphia.

When the Constitutional Convention opened in Philadelphia, South Carolina’s four delegates were fully prepared to work toward creating a strong central government. In analyzing the significance of the fifty-five men present, one study disperses them among eight categories – from “principals” to “inexplicable disappointments.” Only four men (including Washington and Madison) made the top rank; there were eleven delegates in the next category, influential. Three of them were South Carolinians. The state’s fourth delegate fell into the third tier. Although they were instrumental in helping to shape the final document, history has often focused on the challenge thrown down by John Rutledge when the issue of slavery came to the floor: “South Carolina and Georgia can not do without slaves,” he said. The issue was not just slavery, he declared, but “whether the southern states shall or shall not be parties to the Union.” Once again, just thirteen years after threatening to walk out of the First Continental Congress, South Carolinians were insisting on having their way. And, once again, their peers acquiesced.

Back home, the delegates worked hard to ensure that that state ratified the Constitution. It did, and the men who had been in Philadelphia were soon numbered among the elite of the Federalist Party. President Washington named Rutledge as associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was named Minister (ambassador) to France and was the party’s unsuccessful nominee for vice president in the year 1800 and for president in 1804 and 1808. William Loughton Smith who represented the Charleston area in the House of Representatives was Alexander Hamilton’s point man on the Secretary of the Treasury’s economic programs. Smith’s rewards came as minister to Turkey and Portugal and director of the First Bank of the United States.\(^\text{17}\)

By 1800 the state had abandoned the Federalists for the Jeffersonian-Republicans. For the first quarter of the 19th century, Carolinians in Washington displayed a strong nationalist streak — especially after the War of 1812. Among the state’s congressmen, no one had been as outspoken a “War Hawk” as John C. Calhoun. In Congress and later as Monroe’s Secretary of War he supported such nationalist programs as the tariff, the national bank, and internal improvements.\(^\text{18}\) While Calhoun was charting a nationalist course with presidential ambitions, back home Carolinians were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the federal government.

In 1819 the question of the admission of Missouri led to national debate over the issue of slavery. On the heels of that came the 1820 census that revealed that South Carolina once again had a black majority population. Two years later came the Denmark Vesey Plot in Charleston that unnerved the state’s white minority. In an attempt to eliminate the danger of out-of-state blacks’ subverting the slave population, the General Assembly passed the Seamen’s Acts which required that if a ship docked in Charleston with black seamen on board, they had to be housed in the local jail (at the ship’s expense) and a bond had to posted while the ship was in port (treaties and diplomatic protests be damned). Then, one


after another came a series of events, culminating in the Nat Turner Revolt in Virginia (1831), which kept the slavery question clearly in the forefront of the minds of white Carolinians.19

When the American Colonization Society presented a petition to Congress in 1827, South Carolinians were not willing to accept what they viewed as the first step toward abolition. They were abreast of events in England and they certainly had no intention of letting some American Wilberforce destroy their way of life. The state’s senators warned Congress to keep its hands off the slavery question. The state’s legislature resolved that if Congress did not heed that warning then to a man, Carolinians would unite “with a firm determination not to submit.”20 In his superb analysis of South Carolina and the nation during the 1820s, William Freehling observed: “South Carolina had long since discovered how minorities can make majorities abort experiments.21

It was not slavery, at least officially, that triggered the state’s direct challenge to the rest of the nation in the 1830s, but the tariff. Southerners in general were beginning to resent protective tariffs, which they felt cost them money since they had to import manufactured goods. The Tariff of 1824 was obviously protective in nature, but the Tariff of 1828 created outrageously high rates. In South Carolina, the press was full of editorials and essays condemning what was now termed the “Tariff of Abominations.”

Calhoun finally got the message that if he did not alter his positions, his political future was in doubt. In November 1828 an anonymously-authored document, the South Carolina Exposition and Protest appeared. There was little question, however, that Calhoun was the author. He condemned the tyranny of majority rule and declared that the supremacy of the federal government was contrary to the Constitution. He then outlined a plan for individual states to take on the federal government – the doctrine of nullification. If a state disagreed with a federal law, then a special convention of the people could be elected and it could decide to

declare a federal statute null and void and of no authority within its boundaries. Calhoun had just been reelected Vice President of the United States and was widely viewed as the possible successor to President Andrew Jackson. That political wish-dream lasted little more than a year. In 1830 at the annual Jefferson Day Dinner in the nation’s capital, Jackson rose and raised his glass to toast “Our Union – it must be preserved.” The Vice President traditionally gave the responding toast. A pale and shaken Calhoun stood and toasted “The Union. Next to our liberties most dear.” Jackson had thrown down the gauntlet and Calhoun had thrown it right back.22

In 1832 South Carolinians voted to challenge the power of the federal government. The legislature called for the election of a special convention. That convention quickly declared the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 to be “null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens.”23 The convention also announced that there could be no appeal of its decision to the federal courts and that if the federal government made any attempt to coerce South Carolina, then the state would secede from the union. President Jackson responded with a proclamation declaring secession to be treason. No other Southern state supported South Carolina. In fact, some were openly dismissive of what they saw as a rash action by hotheads. Tennesseans vowed that if Jackson gave the word, a large enough crowd could be assembled “to stand in the Saluda Mountains and piss enough ... to float the whole nullifying crew of South Carolina into the Atlantic Ocean.”24 The Nullification Controversy ended in the Compromise of 1833 with a reduced tariff and a force bill authorizing the president to use the nation’s military to enforce federal laws. Once again, South Carolina had forced the will of the majority to bow to its threats.

Between 1833 and 1860 there were other issues and even mutterings of secession, but no confrontation between the state and the federal government. The breakup of the Democrat Party’s convention over the issue of slavery in 1860 all but insured that a Republican would be elected in November. When the state’s legislators met to choose its presidential

electors, it remained in the capital city to await the election results. When it became known that Lincoln had been elected, the General Assembly issued a call for the election of a convention of the people to decide the state’s future.

On 20 December 1860, meeting in Charleston, South Carolina’s special convention voted unanimously to secede from the United States and go her own way as an independent nation. The state’s leaders hoped that other Southern states would follow South Carolina out of the Union, but if they did not the state was prepared to go it alone. “Secession III” led to bloody civil war. White Carolinians’ assertion of states’ rights had been defeated on the battlefield; however, the loss of men and treasure did not deter them from continuing to challenge the government in Washington.25

During Reconstruction organized resistance by white militias and the Ku Klux Klan led to President Grant’s invoking the KKK Act and declaring nine South Carolina counties in rebellion. The federal government’s action was half-hearted and ineffective. Once again white Carolinians had called Washington’s bluff. Federal troops were withdrawn in March 1877 and the old, pre-war elite regained control of the state.26

With the end of Reconstruction, organized, armed resistance to federal authority came to an end (except when makers of illegal whiskey assaulted federal tax officials – a form of resistance that continued throughout the 20th century). Resistance to and condemnation of Washington would take different forms over the next 125 years, even as the Carolinians began to reconcile themselves more and more to being a part of the United States, rather than a part from the United States. In a number of instances, the assaults on Washington were simply verbal abuse as politicians played to the voters. Among the best examples were United States senators Benjamin R. Tillman, Ellison D. Smith, James F.

25. With emancipation, nearly one-half of the state’s capital wealth disappeared. By 1867 land values had declined to 60 percent their pre-war value. It is estimated that between 31 and 35 percent of the state’s eligible white male population was killed in the war. Edgar, South Carolina: A History, 374-76. Compare South Carolina’s human losses to those of Germany (16%), France (16%), Russia (14%), and Great Britain (10%) during World War I. Encyclopaedia of the First World War: Statistics (www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWW-statistics.htm)

Byrnes, and J. Strom Thurmond. These men, however, also were willing at times to cozy up to the Washington establishment.

Tillman earned his now-famous nickname of “Pitchfork Ben” by attacking Grover Cleveland, his own party’s nominee for president in 1892. He said that the obese Cleveland was a “bag of beef” and averred that he would go to Washington and stick a pitchfork in him. Tillman was one of the first of South Carolina politicians to see that there were at least some benefits to be derived from Uncle Sam. As a member of the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate he managed to get sizable appropriations for the Charleston Navy Base. Later, when the Democrats gained control of the Senate, he chaired the committee. As chairman he teamed up with several other powerful Southern politicians in Washington and saw to it that the southeastern states got a large share of federal spending during the military build-up in the years around World War I.  

For several years, Tillman’s colleague in the Senate was Ellison D. Smith. Smith, a planter from Lee County, was a Southern orator of the old school. He frequently wore a boll of cotton as a boutonnière in the lapel of his coat and seldom missed an opportunity to sing the praises of “my sweetheart, Miss Cotton.” Like Tillman, Smith was a vitriolic racist, but unlike Tillman he did not come around to see that South Carolina could benefit from federal programs.

During the 1920s, South Carolina, like much of the rest of the South, was already in economic straits due to the collapse of cotton prices, the declining profitability of textile mills, and the collapse of innumerable rural banks. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 turned what was already a bad situation into something akin to economic desperation. Carolinians were early backers of Franklin D. Roosevelt and in 1932, South Carolina was the most solidly Democratic state in the nation. FDR received 98 percent of the votes cast. Although the President was wildly popular all across the state, Smith, the state’s senior senator was not an admirer. As

28. Daniel W. Hollis, “‘Cotton Ed’ Smith – Showman or Statesman?” South Carolina Historical Magazine, 71: 235, 242. There was one federal program that Smith did endorse and that was the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Otherwise, he opposed most New Deal programs from which Carolinians would have benefited. Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940 (New York, 1989), 174.
chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee, Smith was in a powerful position and used it on more than one occasion to either block appointments that President Roosevelt wished to make or held them up until he got concessions from the White House. In 1937 Smith was one of eleven anti-New Deal senators who issued the “Conservative Manifesto” in which they came down firmly in favor of “fiscal orthodoxy, tax revision, balanced budget, states’ rights, and respect for both private property and private enterprise.”

As a result of Smith’s obstructionism, FDR targeted him and several others for defeat in 1938. There were three candidates in the Democratic Primary that year: state senator Edgar Brown, a moderate New Dealer; Governor Olin D. Johnston, a true-blue New Dealer, and Smith. The President made a whistle-stop in Greenville and his remarks left no doubt that he was supporting Johnston. Smith was a clever debater and played the race card whenever he could. One of his favorites was to recount his walking out of the 1936 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia when an African American clergyman gave the opening invocation. The “Philadelfy” story was replayed at countless rallies across the state and helped Smith win re-election handily. While it would be easy to say that Smith’s triumph was a defeat for FDR that would not be accurate. There were portions of the New Deal with which various segments of the state’s population could take exception. However, if they had been given a choice of the New Deal or no deal, they would have opted for the former. And, an overwhelming number of Carolinians still loved the President; 95 percent of them voted for his third term in 1940, but they did not like any outsider, not even FDR, messing with their state’s politics.

During the New Deal, the state’s junior senator, James F. Byrnes, became one of a handful of senators to whom FDR turned for assistance.


31. Smith would relate how shocked he was to see a “slow-footed, blue-gummed, kinky-headed Senegambian” at the podium. And he added, “as he started praying, I started walking.” He concluded with “old John Calhoun leaned down from his mansion in the sky and whispered ... You did right, Ed.” Hollis, “Cotton Ed Smith,” 251.

in the passage of key pieces of legislation. When Byrnes ran for re-election in 1936, his opponent challenged him for supporting the New Deal. The senator’s response was that since 1933 South Carolina had sent $10 million in taxes to Washington, but received $240 million in return – a very good deal. The snappy response and willingness to get close to the President helped Byrnes win re-election handily. Although he began to distance himself from the President during his second term because of labor and anti-lynching legislation, he returned to the fold as war loomed. And, after Byrnes’ brief stint on the United States Supreme Court, FDR tapped him to be Director of War Mobilization – and the nation’s media dubbed him the “assistant president.”

The war years papered over the differences between Carolinians and Washington; especially as the state became home to numerous military bases. But, after the war, the tensions resurfaced and burst into the open in 1948. When President Truman and the national Democrat Party leadership pushed for strong civil rights planks in the party’s platform, white Carolinians rebelled. They joined the short-lived Dixiecrat movement and supported their Governor J. Strom Thurmond in the presidential election. The significance of the 1948 election is that for the first time since Reconstruction, it was politically acceptable for whites to vote for someone other than a Democrat. While the defection of white voters could be considered an intra-party problem, it could also be seen as the beginning of a major confrontation with the federal government. And, as had been the case since 1819, race was the catalyst.

The 1954 United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education shocked the state’s political establishment. Governor James F. Byrnes was certain that the Supreme Court would not go along with the argument that “Segregation in education can never produce equality .... Segregation is per se inequality.” However, the Supreme Court ruled

33. Hayes, South Carolina and the New Deal, 201.
that that was the case. In South Carolina a group of prominent business and civic leaders calling themselves the “Committee of 52,” publicly issued a declaration redolent in tone of Calhoun’s *Exposition and Protest* and of the two documents produced by the Secession Convention in 1860:36

1. That the South Carolina General Assembly be urged to declare, at its next convening, the intention of this State to maintain the sovereignty guaranteed to it by the Constitution of the United States, and that such declaration specifically affirm the determination of the State of South Carolina to maintain separate schools for those pupils wishing to attend such schools, and

2. That the General Assembly be urged likewise to take such steps as may be necessary or desirable to interpose the sovereignty of the State of South Carolina between Federal courts and local school officials with respect to any efforts of such courts to usurp state authority in the matter of public education, and

3. That the preservation of public education and domestic tranquility merits the grave concerns of both white and Negro citizens, and warrants their individual and collective opposition to outside forces and influences which would destroy both education and tranquility, and

4. That we, the undersigned individuals, in the conviction that a clear and present danger threatens the principles of constitutional government, racial integrity, and state sovereignty, do publicly declare our determination to resist that danger, without resort to physical strife, but without surrender of our position.37

“Interposition,” “resistance,” “state sovereignty,” and “opposition to outside forces” were all political terms with a long tradition in South Carolina. And, all Carolinians (black and white) knew what they meant.

And, just as Calhoun in the 1820s had heard the discontent of his constituents, so, too, did the state’s newest United States Senator, J. Strom Thurmond. Within a year Thurmond, led the movement in Congress that resulted in the “Southern Manifesto.” Initial drafts had included references to interposition and nullification, terms that John Edgerton

36. The two documents were “Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union” and “The Address of the People of South Carolina ... to the People of the Slave-holding States of the United States.”

described as “Calhounese for willful disobedience.” Although the final
document was not quite as bellicose, it fairly screamed defiance.38 And,
this time it was not just South Carolina, but all of the former Confederate
states.

The hard-line drawn by the segregationists led to the Civil Rights
Movement. In the late 1950s and early 1960s there was turmoil in South
Carolina as elsewhere in the South, but without the overt violence that
occurred in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and other states. However,
with the onset of demonstrations and the heating-up of political rhetoric,
something interesting happened in South Carolina. In 1961, a group of
prominent business and community leaders in Greenville decided that
segregation had to be dismantled. There were dozens of lawsuits as the
state National Association for the Advancement of Colored People took
to the courts to seek equal protection under the law. In 1963 as a case
involving the desegregation of Clemson College was wending its way
through the courts, Governor Ernest F. Hollings made a gutsy farewell
speech to the General Assembly: “As we meet, South Carolina is running
out of courts. If and when every legal remedy has been exhausted, this
General Assembly must make clear South Carolina’s choice, a govern­
ment of laws rather than a government of men. As determined as we are,
we of today must realize the lesson of one hundred years ago, and move
on for the good of South Carolina and our United States. This should be
done with dignity. It must be done with law and order.”39 Although the
General Assembly had created a committee to plan massive resistance to
desegregation, its chairman, state senator Marion Gressette of Calhoun
County quietly acquiesced to the ruling of the courts. Clemson College –
followed quickly by other state colleges and universities – desegregated
without incident.

The political and social changes that have transpired in South Carolina
since 1963 have been mind-boggling. Of particular significance has been
the change in political rhetoric. No longer do the state’s politicians of
either party distance themselves from Washington and the national polit-

Sproat, “‘Firm Flexibility’: Perspectives on Desegregation in South Carolina,” New Perspectives on Race and
ical establishment. After Senator Strom Thurmond helped Richard Nixon win the Republican presidential nomination in 1968, the state’s GOP has become increasingly tied to the national party. Carolinians received choice appointments in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations. South Carolinian Lee Atwater was the mastermind behind George Bush’s election in 1988 and shortly thereafter became chair of the Republican National Committee.

While Democrats did not always link themselves as closely to their national party as did Republicans, they were increasingly active in national party affairs. Only in 1976 did the Democrats carry South Carolina as the state became increasingly Republican. But, ironically, South Carolina Democrats received better rewards for their efforts than did South Carolina Republicans. And, South Carolinian Donald L. Fowler, Jr. served as chair of the Democratic National Committee.

For much of its history South Carolina and South Carolinians were at odds with outside authority. And, after 1819, race was the basis for the state’s confrontations with the federal government and the national political establishment. Race played a significant role in the creation of the modern Republican Party in the state — but since the 1960s, social and fiscal conservatives have moved into the party as well. With the movement into the mainstream of American politics, South Carolina’s voters no longer seem to want their representatives and senators in Washington to be as independent as they have been traditionally. In 2003, Senator J. Strom Thurmond retired from the Senate after forty-eight years of service. Two years later, Senator Ernest F. Hollings retired after thirty-eight years of service. Between them, these two independent-minded men, sometimes cantankerous and controversial, had a combined tenure of eighty-six years. Their replacements, Lindsey Graham and James DeMint are quite different — although Graham has, on occasion, been willing to challenge the Bush administration on a variety of issues.

40. Canada was the most visible ambassadorship awarded a Republican (David Wilkins appointed by George W. Bush in 2005). Democrats, on the other hand, received plum appointments to Saudi Arabia (John West appointed by Jimmy Carter) and the Court of St. James (Philip Lader appointed by Bill Clinton).


42. Graham and Moore, South Carolina Government and Politics, 78.
DeMint, however, has not. Thus far he has been a steadfast Republican Party loyalist without any indication that he would ever challenge the White House. 43

A survey of the state’s daily newspapers’ reactions to Senator Graham’s being one of the “Gang of 14” that helped stave off a national crisis over judicial nominations and senate rules on filibuster reveals that many viewed his independence and statesmanship as well-nigh to treason – treason to the Republican Party, that is. 44 Now, it appears that a majority of the state’s voters want South Carolina to be in lockstep with the national Republican Party – not at odds with Washington.

Political scientists Earl and Merle Black concluded their 1992 study of presidential politics with the following observation: “Today, one looks at the South and sees America. There is abundant reason to pay close attention to future political developments in the South, for it now shapes the trends and sets the pace of national political outcomes and processes. Above all, [the South is] ... once again at the center of struggles to define winners and losers in American politics.” 45 And right at the center, is South Carolina; the state that paved the way for the nominations of Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and George W. Bush. 46