clear that a vision of the future free of the oppressive conditions of white supremacy and settler colonialism was something some Indian people were invested in thinking about. This is a clear statement on race in the United States, which Andersson (like other scholars of the ghost dance) seems to overlook.

Another concern pertains to the fact that there are very few women in this book. Is it possible to provide a comprehensive overview of Lakota perspectives on the Ghost Dance that does not include the perspectives of Native American women? To his credit, Andersson acknowledges this absence, though justifies it by explaining that “only a few women have left written accounts of the Ghost Dance” (31). Historians can surely sympathize with the problem of limitations to sources, but gender-blind interpretations like Andersson’s tend to be less an issue of absence than of not knowing where to look. The danger of stating that Native women simply did not leave written accounts is the potential that readers may simply accept the idea that female voices are mute and inaccessible in the historical record.

Despite these shortcomings, Andersson has given readers an unprecedented collection of published and unpublished material on the Ghost Dance among Lakotas. This contribution is sure to inspire more historical investigation and analysis of a movement that scholars have only begun to understand on its own terms.

Tiffany Hale


This book attempts to explain how Trump’s 2016 victory could happen in spite of several anti-Trump narratives that formed during the campaign, focusing on Trump voters’ worldview(s), conservative media, and the transformation of the Republican Party since the late 1960s. It is essayistic and polemic, written by an author who shares the widespread concern about the consequences of the Trump presidency for liberal democracy.

While the author draws on lots of relevant previous work, his discussion of Trump’s victory centers on familiar themes and arguments. The book
does not offer any unique, new perspectives, as far as I am able to tell. It is short and, in my view, superficial in its treatment of the hypothesized causal factors. Much of the text consists of summaries of and references to the work of others. In that sense, it is very referential and descriptive. I was unable to identify Kivisto’s *own* argument; an argument that makes a novel contribution to the public discourse and/or the existing literature on the Trump phenomenon, the 2016 election, the far right in the U.S., its worldview(s) and role in and impact on American politics. So much has already been written on the social and cultural forces that made Trump possible, for instance by Christopher S. Parker and Matt A. Barreto in their insightful book *Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America*, which is not cited in the book. Moreover, given the emphasis on populism in the book title, I was surprised by how little attention the author devoted to the concept of populism – whether one considers it an ideology, a communicative style, or a form of leader-centered political mobilization/political strategy (see e.g. Gidron and Bonikowski), populism in American politics, and the explanations of populism from the vast literature on it. Populism is a defining feature of American political culture, and I would have liked to see Trump discussed within the context of other populist leaders and movements in American political history, from Andrew Jackson, the Know Nothing Party, The Populist Party (of the 1890s), William Jennings Bryan, Huey Long (whom the author does mention), George Wallace, Ross Perot to Sarah Palin.

I also believe much of the public discussion about Trump’s victory is premised on an unrealistic belief in Habermasian deliberative democracy. After all, much political science research has shown that people rarely change their views; emotions come before facts, in many instances. Moreover, party identification is a very powerful predictor of voter behavior. I co-authored an op-ed in 2013 predicting the GOP’s victory in 2016 (Grendstad and Mjelde). Since World War II, the 1980 election is the only time when a party did not get two consecutive terms in the White House (when Bush 41 lost in 1992, the GOP had been in power since 1980). In electoral forecasting, we disregard campaigns and predict outcomes based on the state of the economy and the number of years the incumbent party has held the White House. Campaign events tend to cancel each other out. To the extent that campaigns shape the outcomes of presidential elections, the “time for change” message is particularly powerful after a party has held the White House for eight years. For these reasons, I expected Trump to win
in 2016, and in my assessment, Kivisto’s discussion would have benefited from a consideration of these dynamics. After all, Trump was the Republican nominee, benefiting from voters’ familiarity and identification with the GOP party brand. Put differently, many voted for Trump simply because he was the Republican nominee in the U.S. two-party system.

Furthermore, in an August 2015 op-ed in the Norwegian broadsheet *Aftenposten*, I argued that Trump could very well become president (Mjelde). His name recognition, media savviness, and financial resources ensured his viability. The importance of these factors is stressed in any textbook on American presidential campaigns (see e.g. Polsby et al.) and received insufficient attention in the assessments of Trump’s chances. Moreover, within the mediatization of politics literature, the sub-literature on media populism offers many insights that suggested that Trump would be a force to be reckoned with in the 2016 campaign (Mazzoleni).

Finally, I believe fears about Trump are often exaggerated, and the warnings overstated. To be sure, he has emboldened the far right and cheapened and coarsened public discourse with his often uncivil rhetoric. This is a legitimate cause for concern. But the U.S. political system, with its separation of powers and checks and balances, is an extremely robust one designed to withstand demagogues like Trump. Even if he tried to abolish elections or ban the media – which he has not, he wouldn’t have been able to. The U.S. is still a country of democratic institutions and norms. Although I worry a lot about the polarization of the electorate along ideological, ethnic, cultural, religious, and economic lines, particularly in a country with hundreds of millions of firearms in the hands of ordinary people, I believe both the presidency and the U.S. democracy can handle Trump.

References

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