



BOOK REVIEW:

Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall. *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2021. 464 pages.

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Modern international relations are in a transitional and unstable position. The collapse of bipolarity and later the failure of the “unipolar moment” occurred quickly. The rapid growth of authoritarian countries in the twenty-first century, the strengthening of China, the acquisition of relative independence in foreign policy, and the transition to the expansion of some regional powers are signs of the modern world. At the same time, the system of international relations has historically been established for quite a long period, and so sharp changes in paradigms and structures of international relations force scientists to return to the study of the historical bases that led to the current state. The history of the Cold War is an area of knowledge that has been studied in sufficient detail by scientists around the world.

The monograph *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* written by two brilliant international scholars and historians deserves particular attention. The book is published by Harvard University Press and

focuses on domestic political aspects in the United States in a global bipolar confrontation era. The study consists of nine chapters. Each one explores different stages and problem areas of the Cold War. In addition, the authors accompanied the book with an extensive introduction and conclusion, which contain the general conclusions of the study. The monograph is written using historical research methods and is a historical work that also uses IR studies methods.

The book's aim is “principal concern is the United States, the most powerful actor in the global system after 1945. In concentrating on the foreign policy of one nation, we are consciously bucking the historiographical trend toward international history.”(4) This research is based on such issues as the acceptance of US decisions regarding the Cold War, and it requires immersion in American sources and knowledge of American institutions, political culture, and social structure. This book highlights US actors and US actions to explain better America's external behavior

in the decades after World War II and understand whether this behavior was defined more by external or internal variables.

The beginning of the study confirms America's special political position in the world. At the end of World War II, the United States reached the most prominent world economy level. This was due to the absence of significant consequences of the war in all spheres, unlike Europe and East Asia. Moreover, the United States already had an atomic bomb at that time. The success of the United States in the Cold War was easy and complete, and for this, it was not necessary to defeat the USSR. At the same time, after 1991, the United States continued to invest in defense, expand its geopolitical influence and cooperate with military objects worldwide. By the beginning of the new century, America had become a leader in the unipolar world, and this should be seen as a total defeat of the idea of the Soviet state.

Definitely, in this book, as in any study of the Cold War, the legacy of George Kennan, the policy of Containment, regional conflicts in which the United States and the USSR participated, and the arms race are mentioned. Thus, the authors rightly note that Containment was based on the core insight, articulated most famously by George Kennan, that the Kremlin did not seek immediate military conquest and that if it were prevented from opportunistically expanding into key industrial areas, it would be effectively shackled. Kennan prophetically predicted over the long term. The USSR would be forced inward upon itself and eventually would implode.

Criticism of the overly expansionist policies of President Truman's period is also interesting. So the authors mention that Kennan's and Walter Lippmann's were afraid that US policy would become overly aggressive and unrestrained. The author claims that president Truman expanded the war in Korea when a much more limited intervention to preserve the status quo would have produced the same results. Thus Eisenhower undermined and helped topple legitimate regimes in Iran and Guatemala that posed no threat to the United States, sowing the seeds of long-term anti American resentment (357). American leaders adhered to a containment policy from any provocations leading to World War III. Deterrence was supposed to show the USSR that they had no chance of spreading their control using intrigue and intimidation. They will have to deal with the USA. And then, having reached a political balance, start negotiations with Moscow.

Surely, an essential role for the success of the United States in the Cold War was played by their attitude towards European allies and their willingness to enter into diplomatic relations, including with opponents. The US was ready to negotiate with the UK, France, and West Germany to achieve mutually beneficial results. This has served as significant achievements - the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift and the NATO Alliance. Given the bipolar nature of the Cold War, US leaders could have acted more unilaterally in this early period, imposing American policy on Western Europe, following the example of the USSR in Eastern Europe.

Little attention is paid to how US diplomacy managed to break up China and the USSR. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger used skillful triangular diplomacy in the early 1970s to reduce tensions between the United States and the two major communist states and to deepen the Sino-Soviet schism. To Kennan, this state of affairs seemed to suggest something rather radical about America's Cold War: that it had begun for necessary geopolitical reasons and had been waged effectively in its early years, but that it had been protracted for another thirty-five years for reasons mainly internal to the United States, rather than in response to external pressures and perils. The Soviet Union, he firmly believed, had long since ceased being a plausible threat to America and its allies. Nevertheless, political grandstanding and alarmist militarism dominated U.S. foreign policy.

The political balance had mainly been achieved by 1949. The scale tilted toward the United States and the West to the extent it had not. However, Washington declined to pursue a general political settlement at midcentury and still had not done so when Kennan took the stage at Grinnell College three and a half decades later. The Cold War raged on, and Europe remained divided into armed camps. Since 1950 America had repeatedly projected its military power into far-flung corners of the world, in the name of Cold War imperatives and at colossal material and human cost. Moreover, despite America's great advantage over the USSR in almost every geopolitical arena, Washington politicians and lobbyists warned of present dangers, of windows

of vulnerability, of imminent doom. What follows is a study of American foreign policy during the half-century between the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is not a study of American domestic politics per se, but rather of the shaping of America's Cold

There is much to admire in this week and internationalizing the study of the Cold War can have tremendous explanatory power. But it is not the only approach to studying post-1945 American foreign policy, or necessarily the most productive. However, as Kennan asserted and as the following chapters will demonstrate, America's response to these dangers does not comprise the whole of U.S. policymaking during the Cold War. No less a figure than President Dwight D. Eisenhower hinted at this reality in his extraordinary Farewell Address in January 1961, when he referred to the "military-industrial complex" already affecting America's Cold War in myriad and far-reaching ways. Composed of the military establishment, the arms industry, and the congressional backers of these two institutions, this "complex" became a power within itself, a vested interest largely outside the perimeter of democratic control, and arguably the single greatest factor in post-1941 economic life in the United States (7).

The book argues that the creation and maintenance of this armed establishment (which had its Soviet counterpart), together with the export of significant quantities of arms to other countries, provides a key part

of the answer to a question that is likely to loom large in Cold War historiography in the years to come: why did the conflict last so long? (8).

The authors emphasize that the US policy in the Cold War era eventually became justified not so much by an external threat and the need to fight the USSR and the communist threat but by internal political reasons. The authors mention the term “intermestic” (international-domestic), which in their opinion reflects the decision-making process in that era. Policy, in Kenneth Waltz’s acute formulation, became capricious. The book by Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall is unique for its novelty and a fresh look at the Cold War issue. The study deserves the attention of scientists interested in the current confrontation between the United States and Russia and the impending confrontation between Washington and Beijing.

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