

Domestic Dimensions of China's Foreign Policy

MANORANJAN MOHANTY

We must firmly reject and criticize all the decadent bourgeois systems, ideologies and ways of life of foreign countries. But this should in no way prevent us from learning the advanced sciences and technologies of capitalist countries and whatever is scientific in the management in their enterprises.

Mao Zedong: "On the Ten Major Relationships"

Any part we want to play in world affairs depends entirely on the internal strength, unity and conditions of our country. Our views might create some impression on others for the moment, but they will attach importance to our voice only in proportion to the strength they know we have.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Speech in Lok Sabha

Leaders of all the historic movements are aware of the dynamics of the interaction between the internal and the external dimensions of the processes in which they were involved. In the social science writings, however, several mechanical notions regarding such relationship persist. In this essay, there is an attempt to explain the dynamics of the internal and the external in the light of the Chinese revolutionary experience. There are two objectives of this exercise which are taken up in the two parts of the paper. First, it is argued that rather than engage in the empiricist exercise of listing the roots or sources of a foreign policy, it is more fruitful to place a national or regional experience in the world process and discern the character of both the world process and the distinct process at the lower level. Secondly, we seek to identify the principal problems in China's development experience in terms of three contradictions in socialist construction. Handling of those contradictions has implications at several levels including foreign policy.

China in the world process

The literature on foreign policy generally presents a discussion on the roots

or sources of foreign policy listing a number of factors like culture, history, geopolitics, economic resources, and ideology. The importance of these factors cannot be doubted.¹ Cultural legacies have not only an influence on the outlook of the leaders of the state but may also contribute to the shaping of a worldview having significant consequences for foreign policy. As will be seen there is a continuing debate among China scholars on the validity of the hypothesis that China continues to have a Sino-centric worldview. Historical experience of suffering at the hands of colonialism and pursuing an anti-colonial struggle do have a serious bearing on the policies of the post-colonial state. The dominant ideology and strategy of the liberation movement and the nature of the social base of it are also significant. Some scholars consider India's policy of non-alignment an extension of the freedom struggle which under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership evolved in the direction of relatively peaceful struggle.² China's armed revolution is often linked to its periodically militant international behavior, and the latter with domestic militancy.³

Geopolitics of a region is another important dimension. Having a long border with a major country, large coastline and the overall physical character of a region do affect a country's foreign policy. So do the level of natural resources. Countries like China and India which are rich in minerals and other natural resources but backward in technology particularly look upon the advanced industrial countries for help.

Finally, ideology of the state leadership both in terms of broad orientation like liberalism or socialism and in its concrete formulation in terms of a political line operates through the process of decision-making. A foreign policy is a part of the international strategy which like all other strategies is a dialectical synthesis of ideological and environment factors.⁴ Therefore, ideology is one of the components of decision-making. If the foreign policy is totally derived from environmental pressures then it loses the capacity to achieve long-term goals. If it is mechanically formulated on the basis of ideological goals then it would be ineffective in the specific environment.

There are two problems in this kind of exercise. First, one can go on listing such factors and all of them are important elements in the making of foreign policy. However, there is an empirical fallacy in this approach. The list can never be exhausted. Nor does it indicate which factors are more important than others at a point of time. Secondly, each of these factors presents several options in foreign policy. As can be seen in the case of China, the same leadership may carry out significant changes in the foreign policy line.

Between culture and foreign policy, too, there is no direct correspondence. Therefore, it is desirable to seek alternative ways of explaining the linkages between the internal and the international dimension and identify a perspective of analysis.

Among China scholars there are three lines of thinking on explaining China's contemporary experience in world perspective. They are: (i) civilizational interaction; (ii) modernization process; and (iii) democratic and socialist transformation. Even though they are related, there still are significant differences in approach and consequently different policy implications.

On the civilizational plane, too, there are two views. One is a powerful view in the West which argues that Chinese civilization, as distinct from Western civilization, has certain specific characteristics emanating from Confucianism and Mandarin bureaucratic tradition. Despite several revolutionary movements during the past two centuries the basic features of the civilization persist.⁵ This view points at several instances of 'restoration' of earlier practices. It creates a prototype image of the Chinese people which Westerners carry with them. While some scholars consider this civilization inhospitable to Western-type development others regard it as vulnerable to revolution. The latter argue that in this civilization certain rigidity developed which made the elite incapable of adapting to the changing material conditions, thus paving the way for violent overthrow.⁶ The general assumption underlying this perspective is that the contact with the West has made little dent on the Chinese civilization.

On the same plane there is another view which takes into account multiple strands in the Chinese civilization. It sees Chinese civilization carrying continuing tension between the harmony ethics of Confucianism and the struggle ethics of Buddhism which had gone from India to China.⁷ Since the middle nineteenth century both the streams have been challenged by European values of the Industrial Revolution. The struggle involving these three streams was intensified during the May Fourth Movement. The Communist Party of China under Mao Zedong's leadership tried to resolve the conflict among these forces in the course of the new-democratic revolution. But Mao's later policies, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, overemphasized the struggle ethics and led to the breaking of the balance. According to this argument, Deng Xiaoping was engaged in restoring the balance. But there were limits to the application of the European development model to China, because that model was born out of the geopolitics of the small European states. Their experiences could not apply to

the countries of continental size like China. Therefore, the problem of development and democratization in China has to be tackled basically within the framework of harmony-conflict and absorbing the European influence to enrich it. This is what Deng seems to be doing though difficulties in practice produce moments of crisis. In this framework, too, the multiple value streams are not fully accounted for. Besides Confucianism and Buddhism there were other currents in the Chinese history which had no inconsiderable influence. In the modern times the intervention by Marxism does not figure prominently either, even though it is considered as reinforcing the conflict ethics. The CPC analysed the situation applying Marxist categories and in the process innovating forms of political and organizational practice. It gave nationalism a social content and mass character. To see the Chinese experience in terms of the harmony-conflict framework is helpful in the context of the recent debates on Maoist line; but it is incomplete without taking into account the various value movements in history.

The second perspective, the modernization perspective, is inspired by the Weberian approach which sees the evolution of societies in terms of their march on the path of industrialization and increasing rationality.

Much of Western social science accepted this approach until functionalism came under attack in the late 1960s. There is a revival of this perspective with the conscious proclamation of the "four modernization" program in post-Mao China. The transition from traditional agrarian society to modern industrial society that has advanced technology and productive capacity is regarded as the universal process. It first happened in the West and other countries are following suit at varying pace. Then the modernization argument branches off into two separate lines.

Some see the modernization process as having been successfully initiated by Mao's early new-democratic policies and after a long interruption resumed by Deng Xiaoping. But the fact that China is ruled by a communist party is seen as a stumbling block to this process, because it restricts free flow of information and operation of market forces.⁸ According to this framework, under the present system there is bound to be periodic suspension of "open door". A centralized leadership controlling the levers of modernization has the propensity to commit errors. Thus there is a necessary contradiction between modernization and the rule by a communist party. According to this line of thought, even though building a modern and powerful China has been the goal of all streams of the reformers during the past hundred years, the lack of a democratic framework has been a persistent constraint.

Others see roots of the modernization process in the Western cultural sphere. Transplantation in the Chinese or Indian culture areas does not work; they have very different views of life and society.⁹ Western contact has of course produced new value processes; but has not displaced their worldviews. Confucianism, for example, is seen as deeply embedded in the psyche of the Chinese people. According to this line of thought, Mao and Deng were trying to do the impossible by initiating alien processes. Many of the crisis points, twists and turns in policy thus can be attributed to the tension between modernization and the Chinese culture.

Both these lines of the modernization argument are based on a narrow view in the sense that they identify modernization with the particular Western experience in the period of the Industrial Revolution. That gave rise to a complete theory of modernization in terms of differentiation of roles, secularization of identities and politicization of a population into citizenship of a pluralist democratic state. Its ideological and cultural bias was built into the theory, though the theory itself was proclaimed as a trans-cultural process. Secondly, this approach in its latter line of argument has a static view of culture. It posits that China's culture got formed at a point of history and has been so frozen in the consciousness of the Chinese people that new elements could not creep into it. On the other hand, one can argue that alternative streams of value movement have persisted with new currents emerging and some declining all the time in history.

The civilizational and the modernization perspectives, however, alert us to the fact that cultural dimensions of change are extremely important and one must look deeper into the processes to understand them. Moreover, modernization or transition to an industrial society has Western roots and each country may have its specific experiences of transition. But the task for the social scientist is to define the world processes in such a way that it can sufficiently allow for the cultural, ideological and situational specificity in the various geographical areas. With that in view a perspective on transformation, democratic and socialist transformation, is proposed in this contribution.¹⁰

The Era of Democratic Transformation

To start with, it is assumed that history of the modern world is characterized by the rise of capitalism and challenges to it. During the phase of imperialism

it became a world process affecting the political economies all over the world. No doubt, different countries went through different experiences in responding to European expansion. The important point to note is that contradictions arose in this process challenging capitalism in some areas and imperialism in the colonies. This era of "imperialism and revolution" is the era of expanding democracy both in Europe and in the rest of the world. The growth of productive forces and libertarian ideas in Europe had accompanied the period of imperialist expansion. The struggle against colonialism accelerated the process of democratization in the Asian and African societies. Thus the modern era could be called the era of democratic transformation. After achieving freedom the former colonies made it their prime objective to realise full-scale democratic goals in social, economic, cultural and political spheres.

While the liberals take liberal democracy within a capitalist framework as the terminal phase in history symbolizing the attainment of the highest values, the socialists seek to advance it further towards socialist democracy and perhaps beyond. But with the hindsight of the experience of the socialist countries of the twentieth century it should be stressed that the agenda of democratic transformation is fairly long and it extends through the socialist revolution. Besides, the movement towards democracy in each country carries its stamp despite the fact that capitalist era and modern technology and communication have integrated the modern world far more than ever before. The situational specificity in a country and the particular ideological frame within which its leadership works have their impact on the operation of the world process in a particular country. Even though the transformation is generally regarded in two stages - democratic transition from feudalism to capitalism and socialist transition from capitalism to socialism (and further to communism) - modern world experience presents a more complex picture. In the developing countries of Asia and Africa one finds the persistence of feudal and semi-feudal social formations even in a situation of capitalist development. Even in the advanced industrial countries where capitalism has matured there are serious shortfalls in democratic performance. The elitist monopoly of power and resources which has made participative democracy a remote ideal has been a subject of interesting debate. And in the socialist states the centralization of political power in the communist party leadership among other things has created a gap between the people and the party. There are new arenas of centralized power in both types of countries. In the context of the new industrial revolution, the micro-electronic one, the

instruments of manipulation and control have been multiplied. Individuals, groups, deprived classes and cultural identities today seek democratic self-determination everywhere. Therefore the current world process is still mainly one of completing democratic transformation and moving towards socialist objectives.

It is interesting to note that the CPC had characterized the revolutionary process since 1919 as new democratic revolution or people's democratic revolution. Mao defined it as an intermediate stage between bourgeois democratic and socialist revolutions. After several trials and errors the Chinese leadership at the Thirteenth Congress of the CPC defined the current stage of their development as "primary stage of socialism". Even though this notion has not been propounded in full by the Chinese theorists, it also shows the incomplete dimensions of democratic transformation. It not only involves democratic political practice, but also appropriate economic conditions for it. The necessary democratic climate in culture to promote moral and aesthetic fulfilment among all identity groups is another dimension. This means that ethnic domination embedded in certain systems even covertly in the normal structure has to be curbed. Thus the agenda of democratic transformation is more than what it is usually conceived as. Those systems which pride in democratic practice have a long way to go just as the socialist countries which often boasted of having completed the democratic revolution also must realize their deficiencies now. The latter have only to prove that they are better equipped to fulfill the democratic goals. Thus the present world process of democratic transformation very much reflects itself in China which, however, presents its peculiar features.

In the particular context of socialist countries like the Soviet Union and China there are certain common problems arising out of their post-revolutionary practice. These are at three levels: politics, economy, and the world environment affecting practically all arenas of society. They are the three contradictions in the dialectics of socialist construction.

Three Contradictions in Socialism

The first contradiction is between people and the state and it relates to the phenomenon of rising mass consciousness. The second contradiction is between political economy and technology which responds to the need for

higher productivity. The third at the level of the world environment is the contradiction between socialism and world capitalism. It relates to the pressures of self-adjusting capitalism in the West. All three contradictions arise from forces whose magnitude was not sufficiently anticipated at the time of the foundation of the socialist states. Handling of these contradictions involves a range of possibilities for reconciling conflicting demands. Therefore, perspective of a leadership bears its own stamp on policy. Mao Zedong did begin to notice these problems and the Cultural Revolution perspective was his response to them. In practice, however, it led to large-scale anarchy. The Deng Xiaoping leadership has evolved an alternative approach to handling these problems. The modernization line of the post-Mao leadership is thus located also in the dynamics of the internal and the external and leaves many possibilities open to the prevailing leadership.¹¹

People and the State

Every victorious party in a revolution had assumed that the state power that it had seized was on behalf of the people. A communist party like the CPC which had mobilized vast masses of the peasantry and had carried the banner of Chinese nationalism had even more reason to believe that it had indeed set up a people's democratic dictatorship. This was the four class united front of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie which consisted of 95 percent of the population, as Mao put it. After 1956-58 there were further attempts to transform the character of the state into a socialist state of dictatorship of the proletariat. This process was accentuated during the period of the Cultural Revolution with an all-out campaign against the bourgeoisie. But it was never realized that the people's state with its centralized organs of power, coercive apparatus of the army, and militia and police may actually have contradictions with the people.

What a revolutionary seizure of state power accomplishes is a *possibility* of building a people's democratic state; but its actualization is a process that involves building participatory institutions, curbing sources of alienation and evolving structures of socialist legitimacy. In socialist states in their various forms centralization, elitism, and bureaucratic control became the norm. This was at a time when the rise of mass consciousness was a worldwide phenomenon. In the twentieth century, if one were to identify one single item of political development, it is the growth of popular consciousness. The demand for political participation acquired additional meaning in the context of ethnic consciousness. A Han-dominated Chinese state had to guarantee

practical methods of effective involvement in the affairs of the state to the non-Han minority nationalities. Being ruled from a distant centre in a large state was resented by all. Bureaucratic mode of functioning both in the government and the communist party was accompanied by nepotism and corruption. Hence a process of alienation set in. Gradually the store of goodwill inherited by the ruling party from the revolution began to shrink. The claim that the party alone could ensure national pride for the citizen did not any longer appeal in the same way as it did in the past. Human rights became a live issue. The belief that all these democratic promises could be realized better in socialism than in capitalism needed to be vindicated in practice.

To this demand for democracy, Mao's answer was Cultural Revolution. A package of measures consisting of ideological education in socialist values, mass participation as against bureaucratic management, and encouragement for popular movements, among other things, was his response. As against them, Deng proposed a set of policies consisting of institutional politics under Party leadership, politics of a broad united front, discouragement to campaigns and an ideology of modernization seeking to fulfill democratic rather than socialist tasks. In many ways, it is a retreat to the phase of people's democracy of the 1950s and the argument is that the objective conditions were not ripe for launching the kind of socialist policies which Mao hastened with. The level of economic growth was low; productive forces were backward. Therefore, Mao Zedong committed idealist deviation by promoting this line.

The suspension of campaigns involving mass demonstrations and big public debates has created a situation of stability in the normal working life. Several laws have been passed to ensure legal channels of adjudication replacing arbitrary action by party cadres. The freedom given to intellectuals has created an atmosphere of academic work which was vitiated by constant political interference before. Non-communist political parties and groups have been allowed to function. This atmosphere of relaxation has promoted exchange of students and scholars with foreign countries.

Yet political reform has just begun in China. The student demonstrations of 1986-87 demanded greater democratization and even though there were several trends among them the dominant current was for democratization on socialist lines. Deng Xiaoping found his protegee Hu Yaobang going too far with the demand and consequently Hu was removed from the post of the General Secretary of the CPC. The Thirteenth Party Congress does indicate

an unfolding of the process of democratization, but the details are not yet formulated. There are still elements of the old structure, centralization and bureaucracy and at the same time emergence of managerial autocracy is visible. Dissent is still discouraged, even suppressed, though in some cases mildly. Deng Xiaoping still plays the central role, even though he gave up some key posts at the Thirteenth Congress. What is most significant is whether China is evolving a mode of socialist democracy or whether it is merely borrowing some practices of liberal democracy. Thus while many of the steps do demonstrate a serious concern for democratization, there is no comprehensive response yet to the contradiction between people and the state. In fact, in several ways this is related to the problems in the economy and how the contradiction between the political economy and technology is handled. Whether the economic process generates alienation or curbs it is a critical issue affecting people's perception of the state.

Political Economy and Technology

With the growth of population and people's needs there is always the demand for increasing productivity. Therefore, the human effort has been geared towards discovering new ways of producing goods and services or evolving new technology for production. Simultaneously, there is the effort to create appropriate social conditions to foster productivity. According to the liberal viewpoint, if individuals are encouraged to compete with each other and try to maximize profit by responding to the market they would achieve greater productivity. That would also facilitate technological progress without which productivity cannot be raised. Marxism challenged this position by pointing out that after the initial push to productivity and science, capitalism creates obstacles to the growth of productive forces, by generating alienation of labour, creating inequalities in society, and by empowering an exploitative capitalist class. Thus the relationship between technology and the political economy which includes technology as a component of it affects production, distribution, and political organization. This classical debate has now acquired interesting dimensions in the world and even more so in the socialist countries.

There are two positions among Marxists on the political economy of technology. Some believe that since primacy in the forces of production belongs to the techniques of production and forces of production have a determining effect on the relations of production, technology is the most important driving force in the production process. This is the position which

is advanced by the post-Mao leadership in contemporary China. Several important documents in China emphasize the class neutrality of technology and plead for bridging the technological gap between the advanced western countries, mostly the capitalist countries, and China. The Open Door policy of China allowing the entry of foreign capital and technology to China, sending students abroad and having joint projects are part of this approach.

The other view is that technology is part of the mode of production and therefore serves the interest of the dominant class. Once the objective knowledge is communicated and put to use in any form it is related to the class situation or, for that matter, to any social order characterized by domination and dependence. Therefore, technology always possesses a social character. This view was shared by Mao Zedong which explains his reluctance to open China to capitalist economic and technological influence. His emphasis on distribution on socialist lines and orienting technology to achieve that purpose contrasts with the line of Deng Xiaoping.

Presentday debates can perhaps be construed to have questioned both the above positions. Technological determinism, almost believing in the mystique of technology, has been exposed by the fact that consequences of technology are matters of debate. Some technology destroys environment more than others, disrupts people's cultural experience more severely than others, generates greater disparities than others and causes alienation at several levels. Therefore, all forms of technology are subject to evaluation and choice. And the choice involves political and ideological considerations in addition to economic considerations. Yet once a certain technology is chosen it has its own logic to some extent. Besides, growth of knowledge, including technological knowledge, is a part of the world process and that itself presents certain imperatives for choice. The nature of the world process imposes certain limits to the choice. Therefore, we are placed in a situation where autonomy of technology is relative, not absolute.

The modernization line under Deng has generally accepted the class-neutral view but is bound to be driven towards the relative autonomy view. This is because of the first contradiction which involves reducing inequality through better distribution to curb alienation. It also warrants greater economic well-being of the people which requires pushing production further. This draws China towards getting advanced technology and capital and modernizing the economy and carrying out economic reforms. Thus China will have a degree of openness in order to handle the contradiction between

technology and the political economy, but it will always be regulated. It is possible that the dependence on foreign capital and technology and over-emphasis on technology and market generate a climate of "acquiescent socialism" that settles for levels of inequality and alienation for some time, but it cannot go very long on that path because of the first contradiction.¹² Also because the legacies of the Chinese revolution will not easily allow the third contradiction to be reduced to an acquiescent socialism.

Socialism and World Capitalism

The magnitude of this contradiction now looks far more serious than it appeared to be at the end of the World War II or earlier. It was believed by Communist Parties that world capitalism was moving from crisis to crisis and was decaying fast. The Great Depression, the World War II, the end of colonialism, the oil crisis of the 1970s, etc. were clear signs of the decline of capitalism. This notion was magnified during the Cultural Revolution in China when Lin Biao stated that the contemporary era was the era when imperialism was heading towards its total doom and socialism was advancing towards worldwide victory. This line of thinking has consistently underestimated the power of capitalism and has overlooked the fact that in the decades since the Depression capitalist systems have periodically readjusted their structures and survived crisis after crisis. There is no doubt that an overall decline is evident in their reduced influence worldwide. But they still dominate world economy maintaining their superiority in terms of capital and technology. The recovery in the Western economies in the 1980s is a demonstration of this process. The communist parties of China and the Soviet Union have begun to acknowledge this situation, albeit reluctantly, only recently. In this China has been ahead of the USSR and has opted for forging economic and technological links with the West.

The world's fund of capital and technology, wherever they may be, has to be utilized and this reasoning underlies the Open Door policy of the People's Republic of China. This also gives a new dimension to China's foreign policy which has to serve China's socialist transformation. China has opted for creating a peaceful environment for it to carry out the modernization programme. Towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, China's obsessive anti-Sovietism had drawn it closer to the USA. Slowly China retrieved the situation and in 1982 it declared that it was pursuing an "independent" foreign policy. Indeed, it began to normalise its relation with the USSR and develop economic relations with it. There was considerable improvement in

the China-India relations. Peaceful Coexistence became the main orientation of China's policy. It was no longer a principle applicable to the relations between countries with different social systems. It now applied to every country including socialist countries. The principle has now been extended even to the relations between communist parties having differences on ideological issues. The Chinese Communist Party now has political relations with more than one communist party in India. While the CPI-M re-established relations in 1982 the CPI began its interaction in 1987.

The pressures of the movement for peace and nuclear disarmament in the past decade have also influenced China to change its stand on war and peace. China still blames the two superpowers for tensions in the world, but has now admitted that it is possible to strive for peace by disarmament and a new international economic order.

Thus, sharing the capital and technology of the capitalist countries, pursuing peaceful coexistence, and participating in the peace and world order movement are part of the new approach to handle the contradiction between socialism and world capitalism. But unless the other side of the contradiction is handled simultaneously this might cause problems.

The fact that the world process is that of democratic and socialist transformation and the Chinese Revolution was part of that process will continue to generate a political pressure in China. If there is a total integration of the socialist systems with the world capitalist network then the capacity of the socialist systems to defend the character and legacies of their revolutions will diminish. There is also a worldwide trend of post-colonial transformation to restructure the world political economy and curb the domination of the western capitalist powers. The movement for a New International Economic Order is part of that process. China has to remain an important part of this campaign alongside the other countries of the Third World. Thus the pressure of the movement for democratization of the world political economy will link China's Open Door policy with the socialist objectives. These objectives have served the nationalistic urge of China as well. But sometimes they were stretched too far giving rise to an isolationist foreign policy or militant interventionist policy. Both these policies adversely affected the process of democratic and socialist transformation. The present line of pragmatic and peaceful foreign policy behavior, however, cannot be detached from the objective of promoting the worldwide process of transformation. But now the Chinese government realizes the important lesson which had emerged from their own revolution that revolution was

essentially the business of the people of the country concerned and outside help can only play a secondary role in it. No doubt, this formulation is far more complex today in a world of greater integration. Still the primacy of the internal factor remains.¹³ Hence there has to be a new and more sophisticated approach to the promotion of worldwide transformation while consolidating one's own democratic or socialist development. Therefore, the challenge facing the socialist countries, including China today, is how to negotiate with the capitalist powers for sharing capital and technology and working for peace while at the same time participating in the world process of transformation.

Conclusion

These three contradictions - between people and the state, political economy and technology and socialism and world capitalism - characterize the dialectics of socialist construction in China today. In order to avoid political stagnation of an acquiescent socialism China has to handle them creatively so that it effectively contributes to the world process.

Manoranjan Mohanty is Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, and Vice-President of the Indian Academy of Social Sciences.

NOTES

- 1 A. Appadorai, *The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 6.
- 2 Actually Jawaharlal Nehru himself often spoke of this linkage while making a strong political case for non-alignment. See his *Selected Speeches September 1946 - April 1961* (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1961). See also K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs August 1947 - January 1950* (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1952).
- 3 V.P. Dutt talks about the link between the "hard line" in foreign relations and tough internal policies. *China's Foreign Policy* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 1. This link is placed in a wider theoretical perspective by Mira Sinha in "The Maoist World System and India's Place in It", *The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, Vol. III, No. 3 (January 1971). See also Manoranjan Mohanty, *The Political Philosophy of Mao Tse-tung* (New Delhi: MacMillan, 1978), Chapter 3, "Contradictions in the Modern World: the Maoist World-View".

- 4 Manoranjan Mohanty, *Revolutionary Violence* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1977) Chapter 1 presents this notion of strategy.
- 5 John King Fairbank's many works present this view. See *The Great Chinese Revolution* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1987).
- 6 S.N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations* (New York: Free Press, 1978). See also S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).
- 7 Tan Chung, *Triton and the Dragon: Studies on Nineteenth Century China and Imperialism* (Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1986).
- 8 The bulk of western social science writings in the 1980s makes this point. Scepticism on China's capacity to carry on economic reforms is pervasive in the Western media.
- 9 "Tradition and Transformation in India and China: A Total Society Approach", in Erik Cohen (et al. eds.), *Comparative Social Dynamics* (London: Westview Press, 1985).
- 10 Manoranjan Mohanty, "Political Comprehension of the Post-Colonial World", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 5 (May 1987).
- 11 Antecedents to this formulation are suggested in Manoranjan Mohanty, "Mao, Deng and Beyond: Dialectics of Early Stage of Socialism", *China Report*, Vol. XX, Nos. 4 & 5 (July-October 1984). Another paper applying this approach to the changes in the USSR is "Three Contradictions in Socialist Construction", in Zafar Imam (ed.), *Restructuring Soviet Society* (New Delhi, 1987).
- 12 For a discussion of "acquiescent socialism", see Manoranjan Mohanty, "Towards a Political Theory of Inequality", in Andre Beteille (ed.), *Equality and Inequality* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).
- 13 Manoranjan Mohanty, "Dynamics of the Internal and the External in the Revolutionary Environment", *China Report*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (April-June 1987).