Greater Self-Assertion and Nationalism in Japan

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Abstract
Out of the deep spiritual vacuum from defeat in the Second World War, two fundamental rifts emerged in Japan. First, on the foreign policy front, the realism embraced by the conservative government was opposed by strong idealistic pacifism advocated by opposition parties and media, and this rift continued until the end of the Cold War. Second, with regard to the war in Asia, the Japanese gradually learned of atrocities committed, for which Japan owed an apology. However, views prevailing at the time to totally reject the past caused discomfort among many Japanese, and the issue of lost identity was left unanswered during the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, Japan began to move towards a more responsible and self-assertive security and defence policy. A series of initiatives toward clearer apology and reconciliation were confronted by a strengthened nationalism, and the issue of lost identity remained unresolved at the end of the 1990s. Koizumi has done well to implement a more responsible, proactive, realistic and self-assertive security and defence policy; moreover relations with the US have been considerably strengthened. But in East Asia, the issue of lost identity has reappeared and foreign policy towards Russia, Korea and China has resulted in a hardening of Japan's position in the region. Japan needs to have the courage to overcome this unresolved issue, while other countries' greater understanding of Japan's move toward a re-established identity will facilitate this process. Genuine dialogue is needed on all fronts.

Introduction
This paper aims to analyse two parallel foreign security policy directions which are emerging under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, together with their historical background. On the one hand, Japan is becoming a more realistic, proactive, responsible and self-assertive country in regional and world affairs. For those who have long thought that Japan ought to assume a more prominent role to enhance regional and world peace and security, such changes are welcome. On the other hand, recent
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events indicate that nationalistic thinking in search of identity has influenced and hardened important Japanese foreign policy decisions in East Asia, and that this will have a major impact in the coming decades.

This paper argues that these two disparate policy directions share a common origin, and could be described as two stems growing from the same root. From the point of view of academic orientation, this analysis is based on the theory of international relations and takes account of all three major contemporary schools of thought: realism, liberalism and constructivism. The author considers that in order to understand the background to Koizumi’s foreign policy, it is useful to adopt an eclectic approach to these three strands of thought. Recent eclectic analyses by Peter Katzenstein (2004:1-33) and Thomas Berger (2000:406-28) provide a good perspective.

Japan’s recent move to become a more realistic, responsible and self-assertive player in regional and global security affairs could be described as a shift from idealistic pacifism towards realism. Idealistic pacifism could be incorporated within the broad range of liberalism. The pursuit of liberal values (democracy and freedom) in the domestic policy, efforts to achieve economic development via the free flow of goods and services, and reliance on world politics to maintain a state of global peace (Doyle 1997:210,302-6) all reflect typical post-war Japanese liberal thinking, with the caveat that extreme passivity in post-war Japanese idealistic pacifism (vis-a-vis own security and global peace) should also be noted.

Realism can be understood in the traditional sense that the world is composed of power-motivated states, that relations between states are conditioned by the competition for power, and that peace and security are preserved through a balance of power. Hans Morgenthau’s definition of realism as ‘the concept of interest defined in terms of power’ (Morgenthau and Thompson 1948: 5) is still instructive in this regard. Japan’s realization that it should become more proactive, assertive and responsible signifies its shift towards realism.

This paper does not intend to focus on the degree of the change occurring in Japan’s policies from liberalism to realism. Although that is an important subject for debate, the author considers that an analysis restricted to the liberal–realist dichotomy does not fully explain Japan’s recent drift towards nationalism. In the contemporary theory of international relations, constructivism would seem to bring us closest to the truth. Constructivism here is understood, largely based on Alexander Wendt’s (1994:385) theory, as highlighting ‘identity’ as a key determinant of a state’s behaviour. A country’s definition of its national
interests depends on how its identity is constructed. Constructivism also underscores the intersubjectivity of identity: 'actors learn identities and interests as a result of how significant others treat them' (Wendt 1999: 171). This paper puts its emphasis on the historical formation of identity in Japan. Intersubjective development in conjunction with such actors as China, Korea or Russia is not accentuated in this paper. Though highly significant, the author considers that given the constraints of space, Japan’s identity analysis in its historic and domestic context should take precedence over intersubjective analysis of outside actors. Thus, historical analysis dating back to the post-Second World War period, together with contemporary political analysis composed of psychological, cultural, political, economic and other factors, constitute this paper’s principal analytical tools.

The Impact of Defeat in the Second World War

The impact of Japan’s defeat in the Second World War on the national psyche was immeasurable. Japan as a nation had been defeated and occupied for the first time in its entire history. In national memory, there were only three occasions when Japan fought wars against outside forces. In the 12th century, Japan was attacked by the Mongolian Empire, whose fleets were destroyed by a hurricane, called kamikaze. In the 16th century, Hideyoshi Toyotomi invaded Korea, where his army was defeated. While this was technically a defeat, the episode is usually remembered as an unsuccessful operation by an omnipotent ruler. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan achieved, for the most part, continuous victories.

Thus for the majority of the Japanese people, the shock incurred by defeat in the Second World War was so great that they became engulfed in a huge spiritual vacuum. John Dower discusses vividly this state of ‘spiritual vacuum’ in his book Embracing Defeat (Dower 1999: 87-121). Defeat in war also meant the end of the values that had led to war. But the majority of the population had little opportunity to analyse and reflect upon the significance of the events which had set Japan on the path to war and defeat.

Externally, Japan was occupied by the United States. The initial Allied policy was to demilitarize and democratize Japan. Idealism governed initial US policy – to turn Japan into a peaceful, democratic, middle-scale economic power (Murata R. 2002: 19). American directives informed the new Constitution which was promulgated in November
1946. In particular, Article 9, which stated that ‘the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation as means of settling international disputes’ was thought to be the work of General Douglas MacArthur.\(^5\)

US occupation also brought to light many of the atrocities committed by Japan during the war, particularly after the Manchurian incident in 1931. Japan's war responsibility was heavily engraved from early in US occupation and through the International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE) (May 1946 to November 1948). The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty obligated Japan to ‘indemnify those who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan (Article 16)’. For the majority of Japanese, those revelations were new, and some of them were shocking. A dawning realization of Japan's culpability for its actions during the Second World spread in the spiritual vacuum of post-war Japan. Many post-war intellectuals and the mass media followed this line.

Thus Japan’s pacifism under Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan's negation of all pre-war activities began to dominate immediate post-war thinking in Japan. This way of thinking had its merits, but also its limitations, which began to emerge in the next stage of Japan’s history: the Cold War.

**Cold War Years: the Rift between Realists and Passive Idealists**

The initial period of the occupation which was characterized by idealistic pacifism did not last long. The Cold War began in Europe, almost before the Second World War had ended, and descended on East Asia in 1947: Korea’s formal split in 1948, the civil war in China, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the relocation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1949, were followed by the Korean War and Chinese intervention in 1950.

In the Cold War environment, the initial post-war US policy towards Japan was transformed. From early 1948, Japan became a regional bulwark of the democratic camp. A policy of ‘partial peace’ establishing diplomatic relations with democratic countries took shape; close security ties with the United States became essential; Japan was urged to rebuild minimum security forces; and an economic policy to enhance reconstruction and economic recovery was introduced.\(^5\)

Japan’s reaction was complex. The government, under the conservative leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, basically welcomed
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and implemented these policies. Yoshida’s objective was to rebuild the economy, while ensuring Japan’s security through its ties with the US. It was a realistic and responsible policy for the time. A peace treaty, together with a security treaty with the United States, was thereby concluded in September 1951. Symbolic security forces were established, which later became the Self-Defence Forces (SDF).6

Inside Japan, idealistic pacifism deriving from the immediate post-war period was in full swing, supported by leftist political forces, the socialist and communist parties, labour unions, influential intellectuals and public opinion, as well as the media. On the other hand, the conservative parties and a minority of intellectuals espoused the government’s realism. Thus under the Cold War iron umbrella of US-Soviet rivalry, the first deep contradiction in Japan’s foreign security policy emerged as a rift between realists and passive pacifists. The conservative government led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) established itself in 1955, with the creation of the so-called ‘coalition of conservatives’. But the opposition led by the Socialist Party and backed by media-led public opinion was no less influential, particularly in parliamentary debates. The rift between the two camps continued for almost four decades.

This does not mean, however, that important proactive and self-assertive initiatives were not undertaken during this time, but they were always accompanied by the political struggle between realists and pacifist idealists. In 1960 the Japan-US Security Treaty was revised to place the two countries on a more equal footing. This revision met with mass protest, which feared Japan would become entangled in US-led wars.

In 1969, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Nixon agreed on the basic principles for the reversion of Okinawa. The key issue was whether nuclear weapons, in an emergency, would be allowed to re-enter Okinawa. Public opinion was totally against re-entry. Given this reality, Sato announced publicly that nuclear weapons would never be allowed, although a secret agreement with the US allegedly promised otherwise. Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972.

Cold War Years: Japan’s Identity Issue

The second issue emerging from Japan’s deep spiritual vacuum from its defeat in the Second World War concerned the nation’s responsibility for pre-war activities. This is an issue deeply related to Japan’s identity: what was Japan before and after the war? What brought Japan to the war? What was right and what was wrong in Japan’s pre-war deeds? How should this issue be related to post-war Japan’s diplomacy?
As stated earlier, the initial years of occupation brought about a new recognition of the negative aspects of Japan's pre-war activities, which was strongly shared by post-war intellectuals and the media. Masao Maruyama championed those anti-militarist views. His thinking identified a unique and structural cause in pre-war Japanese state and society that had precipitated Japan to ultra or extreme nationalism, as manifested in the tract *Chokokkashugi no Ronrito Shinri* (The Logic and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism) written in 1946 (Maruyama 1964: 11-28). This became an enduring banner for post-war Japanese intellectuals. Saburo Ienaga, who waged a lone court case from 1965 against Japanese textbooks that failed to adequately address Japan's responsibility and atrocities during the war, also became a symbol of consciousness of many intellectuals during the Cold War period (Togo 2005: 142).

At the same time, there emerged another type of post-war consciousness, rarely supported by the media majority. This constituted an effort to understand and re-state Japan's position from the perspective of the erstwhile top Japanese leadership at the time of the war. This historical narrative was prominently on display at the time of the IMFTE trials, for example, by Shigenori Togo, foreign minister of Japan in the Tojo and Suzuki Cabinets, who did everything he could to prevent the war from happening (and failed) and everything he could to end the war (and succeeded).³

While confused, the people of Japan gradually developed an understanding that Japan owed an apology for its atrocities and wrong-doings during the war, particularly towards its Asian neighbours. At the same time, simply to negate all its pre-war past because of this regrettable aspect, left feelings of unease among those Japanese who thought that many of their soldiers had conducted themselves with honour, in the belief that they were fighting for the right cause for Japan and Asia. Positions began to diverge among Japanese intellectuals, government agencies, political forces and public opinion generally.

However, this divergence regarding Japan's past and its identity did not really come to the forefront of foreign policy during this Cold War period. In other words, protected under the Cold War iron umbrella, Japan itself never succeeded in resolving this inner contradiction to come up with a reasonably clear national consensus about what was wrong and what was right regarding its past and to elucidate and re-establish its identity. Thomas Berger writes an interesting analysis that 'the relative looseness of the US-led coalition, the paucity of democracies in the region, and the deep divisions among the Communist nations in Asia'
contributed to this issue failing to come to the forefront of Japan–Asia relations (Berger 2003: 60).

At any rate, the Japanese government went through war crime tribunals, paid reparations and related funds for economic co-operation, and settled claims with foreign governments, in the belief that through this process, it was fulfilling all the victors’ requirements. Through the 1960s and 1970s, when Japan resumed relations with Korea and China, the issue of war responsibility was heatedly discussed, but was resolved with the key expression of Japan’s expression of ‘deep remorse’ (Togo 2005: 129, 159). The decade of the 1980s marked the start of China’s policy of ‘reform and opening’ and Korea’s rapid economic growth (leading to the Seoul Olympics in 1988). During this period economic ties between Japan and these two countries strengthened remarkably. But historical issues reappeared in the form of controversial textbooks (1982), official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (1985), and contentious statements by a number of Japanese politicians. On the surface, these issues were resolved through the revision of textbooks to excise and/or modify offending sections, the discontinuation of official Yasukuni visits, and the resignation of the outspoken politicians from their official positions. These case-by-case solutions, however, did not resolve the fundamentals of the identity issue for Japan: ‘What was wrong and what was right in pre-war Japan?’

Post-Cold War: From Idealistic Pacifism towards Realism

The end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on Japanese foreign and security policy. The iron umbrella, which had protected Japan for 40 years, disappeared. Japan became more directly exposed to the harsh reality of international politics.

The Gulf War of 1990–91 was the first ‘post-Cold War’ shock for Japan. Japan mobilized a total of $13 billion in economic assistance, but was unable to contribute personnel. America perceived that Japan was willing to share the financial burden of the war, without sharing the human risks of putting its young men and women in harm’s way. Japan’s efforts went naturally unappreciated by the international community. Michael Green writes about ‘shockingly little gratitude for Japan’s $13 billion to support the Gulf War’ and that the ‘war was a colossal diplomatic failure for Japan’ (Green 2001a: 24). The derision that met Japan ensured that the first Gulf War would be remembered as ‘Japan’s defeat in 1991’.

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The second shock occurred in East Asia. The 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis brought East Asia to the brink of war. The crisis was settled through a framework agreed by the US and North Korea, but it made US and Japanese defence officials realize that, should a crisis break out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan, lacking the necessary legal basis, would be unprepared to co-operate with US troops. Yoichi Funabashi gives a detailed account of how the officials on both sides shared a common concern about Japan’s inability to respond to a crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula (Funabashi 1997: 310-21).

The third shock in 1995-96 took place in the Taiwan Strait, when China exercised missile-launching across the Strait in the months preceding Taiwan’s election. Although tensions cooled after America sent two carriers to the Strait, a sense of crisis inevitably shook Japan.

Internal changes in Japan’s power structure were equally dramatic. From 1992 to the summer of 1993, several reformist politicians left the LDP to form new parties. In August 1993 the LDP lost at the polls for the first time since 1955, and a coalition of eight parties headed by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa took power. One year later, in June 1994, the LDP returned to power in a most unthinkable coalition with its Cold War arch-enemy, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), led by Tomiichi Murayama, who became prime minister. Murayama acknowledged the SDF as constitutional, and the Japan-US Security Treaty as admissible. The JSP, known for so many decades as the protector of Article 9, had to acknowledge post-Cold War reality. This recognition of reality crushed the Socialists’ raison d’être.

In January 1996 the LDP dissolved its coalition with the JSP, and Ryutaro Hashimoto became prime minister. In September 1996, the newly formed Democratic Party became the main opposition. The Democratic Party is a coalition of politicians with wide-ranging views on security but which is, on the whole, ready to recognize Japan’s more active and responsible participation in regional and global security matters.

Thus through the 1990s the external shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era and corresponding internal political changes resulted in a more realistic, proactive, responsible and self-assertive Japanese foreign security policy. Two examples highlight this change. First, ‘Japan’s defeat in 1991’ made the leadership think seriously about remedying the situation. In September 1991 a new bill was presented to the Diet; the International Peace Co-operation Law was approved in June 1992. The new law became the legal basis for the SDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.
The enactment of the International Peace Co-operation Law created the basis for Japan to participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), which began its work in March 1992. From September 1992, Japan participated in UNTAC. Japan's engagement in the East Timor crisis was slow to begin, as the law allowed the SDF to be dispatched only after a ceasefire had been signed. From the enactment of the new law in 1992 to the summer of 2003, Japan sent 17 missions: eight UN peacekeeping operations, four for humanitarian relief and five for election monitoring.

Second, Japan took a series of proactive measures to counter tensions in Northeast Asia. After the 1993-94 Korean nuclear crisis, intense efforts at co-ordination began between Japanese and US defence experts. Thomas Berger writes that 'after the near désastre in Korea, the two governments were finally galvanized into action', which led to series of agreements in the latter part of the 1990s (Berger 2004). The US Department of Defense published its report *East Asian Strategic Review* (EASR) in February 1995, which proclaimed the US intent to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in Asia. In November 1995, the Murayama Cabinet adopted a National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) which reconfirmed the importance of post-Cold War Japan-US security relations and extended SDF involvement to areas such as participation in international peacekeeping and large-scale disaster relief (Green 2001a: 75-79).

The efforts of the two administrations culminated in 1996. In April, upon President William J. Clinton's visit to Tokyo, *The Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century* was adopted. The document reaffirmed the Japan-US security relationship as the cornerstone for maintaining a stable and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, and announced the review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. Whereas the 1978 Guidelines had primarily addressed, under Article 5 of the Security Treaty, co-operation between the two governments in the event of Japan being attacked, the new Guidelines were a response to the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis, when a US-North Korea clash without a direct attack on Japan could be envisaged, although geographical definitions were carefully avoided.

The review of the Guidelines took nearly one year. Yoichi Funabashi describes how leading Japanese officials like Hitoshi Tanaka (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-MOFA) and Takeaki Moriya (Japan Defence Agency-JDA) proactively led the negotiations to establish 'an equal partner relations not in words but in deeds' (Funabashi 1997: 492). New Guidelines for defence co-operation were adopted in September 1997.
took nearly another year for Japan to prepare the necessary legislation to implement them, and after full parliamentary debate in the spring of 1999, The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was adopted in May 1999.

Post-Cold War: From Enhanced Apology to Rising Nationalist Sentiment

The end of the Cold War also deeply affected Japan's position on its history. Out of the unresolved issue from 1945 on 'what was wrong and what was right', a series of concrete measures to express an apology were taken in the wake of the Cold War. It is worth considering why, during the first half of the 1990s, the Japanese government became more forthcoming in expressing such an apology, and in the second half of the 1990s, in seeking reconciliation with related countries. First, the lifting of the Cold War iron umbrella might have forced these unresolved issues more to the forefront of international relations and Japan had to react to this reality. Or perhaps the watershed of 50 years since the end of the war brought a sense of a time limit, whereby things needed to be resolved in a more definite manner. But then, why more towards reconciliation?

The end of the Cold War brought into the Japanese government those politicians whose thinking was more inclined towards a straightforward apology. Prime Minister Hosokawa (1993-94), who represented the first non-LDP reformist government and Murayama (1994-96), a socialist Prime Minister, both had political backgrounds that favoured a straightforward apology. Hosokawa and Murayama, Miyazawa (1991-93), and Kono as his chief cabinet secretary, were leading thinkers in the LDP seeking reconciliation with Asia, and Hashimoto (1996-98) and Obuchi (1998-2000) belonged to the Tanaka faction, whose basic policy was to give priority to Japan-China relations.

Thus the Asian Womens Fund was established in the period from the Miyazawa Cabinet to the Murayama Cabinet specifically to pay atonement money together with a written apology to 'comfort women'. Prime ministers such as Miyazawa, Hosokawa and Murayama were particularly forthright in expressing their apology in this period. And the major historic statement of apology was made by Prime Minister Murayama on 15 August 1995, expressing his 'deep remorse and heartfelt apology'. Due to the polemical situation which occurred in relation to the Diet resolution adopted in August 1995, the importance of that statement is sometimes overlooked. Thomas Berger gives a lively description how
the Diet Resolution was debated and adopted in a confused situation (Berger 2003: 80). But despite this confusion, the Murayama Statement, as agreed by a Cabinet decision, became the basis of government policies of apology since 1995 to date. The key paragraph of the statement reads as follows:

During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history. (Togo 2005: 170-1)


Furthermore, Japan’s ‘engagement’ policy towards China in the face of its ‘reform and opening’ was manifested by the launching of massive ODA from 1979 (Nakanishi 2001: 176). Moreover, Japan expressed a strong appeal to the international community not to isolate China after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 (Murata, K. 2001: 221, 228), which enhanced their relations. As a culmination of this friendly relationship, the imperial visit took place in 1992. It is also noted that the Ienaga trial was concluded in 1997 at the Supreme Court, which has brought justice to many of Ienaga’s view on history (Togo 2005: 142).

This mood of general optimism changed sometime in the mid-1990s. Particularly in relation to China, the climate of genuine reconciliation rapidly began to wane. Japan’s expectation that the Chinese leadership would begin looking to the future rather than harking back to the past proved to be illusory. In 1995, at the time Murayama was making his historic statement expressing ‘deep remorse and heartfelt apology’, a campaign began all over China displaying pictures of the Nanjing Massacre in primary schools. Even pro-Chinese MOFA officials were desperate (Funabashi 2003: 59). The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96, nuclear tests in 1995-96 (Green 2001b: 80-2), the Senkaku Islands issue (Green 2001b: 82-8), and perceived arrogance by Jiang Zemin in ‘preaching to
Japan on past sins’ in 1998, all combined in the latter part of the 1990s to heighten tensions between the two countries.

Coinciding with this rising tension with China, those scholars and intellectuals who considered that Japan's affirmation of its honour and identity must play a central role in its internal and external policy became more vocal than ever. There are at least three beliefs common to thinkers in this group: (i) that much greater approval should be given to pre-Second World War Japan; (ii) that the post-war US occupation and the IMTFE destroyed Japan's honour and self-esteem and that these needed to be re-established urgently; (iii) that those atrocities that had been committed by Japan before the war had already been compensated in full by war tribunals and treaty obligations.

In December 1996, these scholars and intellectuals established a forum for a 'new history textbook'. In 1998, Yoshinori Kobayashi, a leading writer of the ‘new history textbook’ forum and a popular cartoonist specializing in history, published his Sensoron [Theory of War], which comprised a full justification of Japan’s cause in the Second World War. In 1999, Kanji Nishio, a leading historian belonging to the ‘new history textbook’ forum published Kokumin-no Rekishi [Nation's History] with the same flow of thinking. It may not be a coincidence that in 1999, Shintaro Ishihara, a popular politician whose political thinking is much in line with these scholars, was elected as governor of Tokyo.

Why did this nationalistic trend became more visible in Japan's intellectual world? Professor Rikki Kersten in a public lecture held in 2003 stated that the successes of Saburo Ienaga in court became a powerful dialectical force that engendered its antithesis within nationalist thinking.22 It may well be so; that dialectic precisely represented Japan's search for identity. At any rate, the upsurge in nationalist thinking did not directly affect Japan's foreign policy until the end of the 1990s. However, at the turn of the new millennium the government leadership was assumed by a new prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, and the issue of national identity began to assume more serious implications for Japanese foreign policy in East Asia.

**Domestic and Foreign Policies under Prime Minister Koizumi**

Junichiro Koizumi was elected prime minister in April 2001. Three factors underlie the internal dynamics which brought him to power. First, dissatisfaction with the economy had been growing since the 1990s, in
large part due to the government's inability to address the aftermath of the bubble economy. Huge non-performing loans continued to negatively impact on the growth of the economy, while social problems, including high unemployment, proliferated. At the same time, the Japanese socio-economic structure, once hailed as the engine of growth, came under fire for its role in preserving an uncompetitive, inefficient and over-protected society. Koizumi was brought to power amidst expectations that he would lead the country out of these economic difficulties. Second, Koizumi was an LDP politician of long standing but was never at the helm of an LDP faction, which formed the traditional power base within the party. He was a striking but lone figure within the Abe-Mitsuoka-Mori faction. Koizumi was, in large part, brought to office by his popularity among local LDP party members, who overwhelmingly voted for him at the time of the LDP presidential elections in April 2001. These local party members were attuned to the popular mood of the country, indeed, one may conclude that Koizumi’s power base rests on the ‘popular’ vote. Hence Koizumi is said to be a populist, with a keen understanding of the mood of public opinion. It may be added that the importance of ‘the voice of the people’ emerged against the background of the weakening iron triangle of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen who presided over post-war Japanese economic development.

Third, Koizumi, while a populist, is not a man who blindly follows ‘the voice of the people’. He seems to have a selectice political agenda, controversial in some cases, from which he does not retreat. His insistence on the need for reforming the postal services, his conviction that nothing should prevent Japan from ‘acting responsibly’ on defence and security matters, his determination to visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pay homage to the war dead: these show that he is not blindly bowing to fluctuating opinion polls. He may be convinced that his views correspond to what his era requires of him, ultimately to what the Japanese people expect. Externally, the greatest challenges Koizumi had to face were 9/11, the war in Iraq and the North Korean threat. Koizumi’s preoccupation with these security/foreign policy challenges at times overshadowed his primary task of socio-economic reform.

Without doubt, 9/11 in 2001 was the single major incident which shook the world after the end of the Cold War. The impact of 9/11 was so far-reaching that many international relations analysts maintain that the post-Cold War era has been replaced by a new era of the war against terrorism. All countries have had to take a position and Japan is no exception. President Bush waged war against Saddam Hussein.
in March–April 2003, as an extension of the war on global terrorism. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and links with Al Qaeda were originally identified as the primary motives to dismantle Saddam's regime. Japan, alongside other major countries, had to take a stance.

For Japan, an additional threat it had to face at the threshold of the 21st century emanated from North Korea. The DPRK became one of the most militaristic, totalitarian and oppressive regimes in the world during the Cold War. When it ended, the country emerged as the sole loser in East Asia. In order to consolidate power, North Korea has pursued a zig-zag between hard-line policies, including the worst kind of terrorist activities, and conciliatory behaviour, particularly addressed to South Korea. After the end of the Cold War, Japan responded to North Korean overtures. Aiming to establish diplomatic relations, Japan shipped humanitarian food aid, which brought three periods of relative quiet. But each period was followed by rising tension.

Against this background, Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in September 2002 ended with a series of seemingly remarkable successes. By then, the abduction issue had become foremost for the Japanese public. In the late 1970s at least a dozen Japanese citizens had been abducted by North Korea. Kim Jong Il acknowledged the fact, apologized, and promised that it would never happen again—a gesture nobody anticipated. Regarding the unidentified vessels encroaching upon Japanese territorial waters, Kim Jong Il stated that he had had no previous knowledge of the issue but had recently begun investigations, promising that such incursions would cease. Regarding nuclear weapons and missiles, North Korea in principle agreed in the Pyongyang Joint Declaration to comply with all related international agreements. The ground for re-opening negotiations to establish diplomatic relations appeared to be there, however it soon collapsed. The fact that eight out of the thirteen abductees were dead, a fact acknowledged by North Korea, shocked many Japanese. Japanese public opinion exploded in indignation against North Korea. The nuclear crisis which erupted in October 2002 was the final blow in cementing the Japanese perception of threat from North Korea.

Security Policy and US Relations: Greater Self-Assertion Based on Realism

As the greatest challenges Koizumi had to face in external relations were the war against global terrorism and North Korea, his foreign policy was heavily oriented towards defence and security matters. Koizumi's
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reaction was, in general, realistic, proactive, responsible and self-assertive. Five reasons account for his position.

First and foremost, we need to go back to the historical context. After four decades of strife between realists and pacifist idealists, Japanese increasingly found it more natural and comfortable to become a normal partner within the international community, sharing responsibility and participating in matters affecting global and regional peace and security. Koizumi, based on his intuitive understanding of popular opinion, took a series of proactive decisions. Some decisions, particularly relating to the war in Iraq, were controversial. Public opinion has been split, but thus far, Koizumi's decisions have not seriously undermined his basic popularity. In accordance with an Asahi Shinbun (AS) poll, Koizumi's rating which peaked at 78 percent in April 2001 (AS, 30 April 2001), declined to its lowest level of 38 percent in June 2002 (AS, 22 March 2003), because of internal political reasons. It rose slightly to 44 percent in February 2003 (AS, 25 February 2003), and dropped back to 42 percent only after Koizumi's open support of President Bush in March 2003 (AS, 22 March 2003).30

Second, ironically, it was the asymmetry that dominated the Cold War security environment that triggered Japan's proactive decision-making. Article 9 of the Constitution grants Japan the right to exercise minimal self-defence, but not the right of collective self-defence as granted by the UN Charter. Article 5 of the Security Treaty, on the other hand, obligates the US to defend Japan if it is attacked by outside forces. The Article is written in such a way as to exempt Japan in an equivalent situation.31 Abductions and North Korea's nuclear capabilities compelled the Japanese to take note of the security threat surrounding the country. The realization that Japanese security was ultimately dependent upon the United States, based on the above-mentioned asymmetry, underpinned Koizumi's decision to opt for responsible and self-assertive measures. Japan's position converged with President Bush's position in favour of further proactive engagement from Japan.

Third, Japan's economic crisis during the 1990s may have made the country more sensitive to its political role. Frustration emerging from economic failure translated into a desire to fulfil a greater political role. Declining economic power also deprived Japan of its once mighty cheque-book diplomacy. Contributions in the political arena may have become an alternative way for Japan to stay active in the arena of international peace and security.
Fourth, as previously discussed, from the spiritual vacuum in the summer of 1945 emerged two fundamental issues in post-war Japan: the nation's security role and its identity. Japan's greater role in its own defence and security, and its search for a more realistic, responsible and self-assertive role are certainly in line with the growing nationalism in search of clearer identity and greater self-esteem. Michael Armacost identifies this linkage between nationalism and Japan's readiness to play a greater security role (Armacost 2003: 102).

Fifth and finally, Japan's younger generation, which does not have any recollection of post-war hardship, let alone of the war itself, is increasingly supportive of Japan playing a greater role in matters related to global issues of peace and security. It is natural that Japan's greater self-assertion be supported by some of the older generation, whose sense of national pride has long been hurt by the post-war ascendancy of idealistic pacifism. But among the younger generation as well, Japan behaving normally without particular inhibition from the past is gaining new support.

**Post 9/11**

In contrast to the slow reaction of the past, Koizumi announced on 19 September Japan's decision to react to the terrorist attack on 9/11. Japan took the attack as 'Japan's own security issue' - a clear and unambiguous message of support for joint action by the international community. Three weeks later, the government presented the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill to the Diet. The essence of the bill was to send the SDF to provide rear-action support in the war against international terrorism. By the end of October, the bill had been approved in the Diet. Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels give a very positive evaluation concerning Koizumi's initial reaction (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002: 101-2).

The changes of the 1990s had prepared the Japanese people for this development. By the end of 2001, based on the Basic Plan adopted in November, five ships, eight aircraft and 1,380 troops (Saga Shinbun Kyodo, 17 November 2001) were in action, supplying fuel to American and British vessels in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea engaged in combat activities against international terrorism in Afghanistan. Aircraft were engaged in transport between American bases in Japan and the Guam Islands (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 7 November 2002).

Politicians, intellectuals, and public opinion in general were supportive of Koizumi's decision. Among the major newspapers, Mainichi
Shinbun did not support Japan's involvement, and such an influential politician as Nonaka voiced a message of caution (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002: 102-3). But they were not in the majority. Among the 'nationalist' camp, Yoshinori Kobayashi was conspicuous in justifying the terrorists' cause against the US, but he was in a minority (Kobayashi 2001: 9-32).

**War in Iraq in 2003**

When President Bush decided to disarm Saddam Hussein in the summer of 2002, public opinion in Japan, as in many countries in Europe and around the world, was against a pre-emptive attack. From the outset, Koizumi seems to have been determined that Japan would ultimately support the US. However, he believed that disarming Saddam would be more effective were he declared an enemy of the community of nations, and not only of the United States. Thus from the summer of 2002 to the winter of 2003, Japan advised the United States, discreetly, to go through the United Nations. At the Japan–US strategic talks in August 2002, the vice minister for foreign affairs Takeuchi said to deputy secretary Armitage that 'The US should create a structure of Iraq versus the international community, and not Iraq versus the United States. The UN Security Council will serve that purpose'. Armitage said proudly to the Japanese leadership in his visit to Tokyo at the end of the year that the US had fulfilled that Japanese request (AS, 10 December 2002).

The United States did go through the United Nations, but from February to March 2003, failed to command the support of the Security Council. At this moment, when a deep rift appeared in the long-standing transatlantic alliance, Japan emerged as a clear supporter of President Bush's position. On 18 March 2003, only hours after President Bush sent an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, Koizumi declared his open support for President Bush's decision. Public opinion was split, as were the editorials of the major newspapers: Yomiuri and Sankei in support, Asahi and Mainichi against. However, Koizumi's ratings did not fall appreciably.

After the fighting officially ended in Iraq, the Koizumi government presented a bill on 'Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq' to the Diet, which was approved in July. Koizumi took a whole half year to prepare for the actual sending of Japanese troops. Finally, in January and February 2004, Japanese troops from the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces (SDF) were stationed in Iraq, to be engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction activities (AS,
27 January 2004. In June 2004, Japan decided to join the multinational forces based on UN Resolution 1546, while preserving its right of command (AS, 19 June 2004). At the October 2003 Madrid Conference, Japan committed $5 billion for the period 2004-07 to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. It was the second largest contribution after the US's $20 billion (AS, 25 October 2003).

Koizumi’s decision to support President Bush and send the SDF, and the timing of this, have been widely debated in Japan. Some criticized that Japan was just blindly following US interests and instructions. Nonetheless, given the Japanese security concerns described above, it was Japan's own security that demanded good relations with the United States, and as a final resort, the Japanese people were ready to accept Koizumi’s support of President Bush. Questions remain however, as to whether Japan had pursued all alternative measures before Koizumi took the ultimate decision. Commentators have asked whether Japan could have pushed harder for a maximum role for the United Nations; whether Japan had fully explored dialogue with the Middle East and Europe; and ultimately whether Japan's dialogue was sufficiently honest in pointing out problems vis-a-vis the United States (Togo 2005: 310). The situation in Iraq after its liberation was so problematic that it was unfortunate for Japan that this war became the test case to assess its determination to become a responsible and proactive partner in the community of nations. But given the internal logic, as described at the beginning of this section, ultimately the only wise choice for Koizumi was to send the SDF to Iraq.

US reaction in academic analysis generally favours Japan's decision. Michael Armacost underlines the importance not to alienate the United States over Iraq at a time when [Japan] needed US support in dealing with a re-emerging threat in North Korea. His analysis also indicates that Japan, with its political support and limited reconstruction and humanitarian participation, but nonetheless fulfilling the requirement of 'boots on the ground', evinced a positive reaction from the US and increased its chances for future involvement in a lucrative Iraqi oil deal (Armacost 2003: 91-3). Mike Mochizuki makes an interesting observation that 'new nationalism' does not necessarily explain Koizumi's backing of Bush's policy because nationalism could have been directed towards an independent position vis-a-vis the United States. Instead, Mochizuki points to the North Korean threat as a key factor, and also that Koizumi might gain much foreign policy leverage at relatively low political cost (Mochizuki 2004: 113-17).
Enactment of Laws in Response to an Armed Attack

The threat from North Korea, in particular, resolved an issue which had dragged on from the 1970s: the enactment of laws to respond to armed attack. In 1977 the government began considering reform of the legal structure to allow for the country's defence if attacked by outside forces. But because of public reluctance to contemplate any war situation, and because the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union rendered such a situation rather hypothetical, the issue was frozen for more than 20 years (AS, 7 June 2003).

Following 9/11 and the heightening of the Japanese concern for security, Koizumi formulated three laws to addressing this issue, and presented them to the Diet in April 2002. The laws were approved by overwhelming majorities in the House of Representatives in May and in the House of Councillors in June.37 In April 2004 the government submitted to the Diet a second round of legislation—seven laws and three treaties. They were again approved by overwhelming majorities in the House of Representatives in May and in the House of Councillors in June.38

Growing SDF Capabilities

The annual budget approved in spring 2004 included two items not easily dissociated from the perception of a growing threat from North Korea. One was missile defence: the amount of 142.3 billion yen was allocated for the deployment of surface-to-air missiles, one Patriot Advanced Capabilities3 (PAC3) missile around Tokyo, and one Standard Missile3 (SM3) on an Aegis destroyer. The Defence Agency plans to deploy four PAC3s and four SM3s over the next four years.

The second item in the budget was the request for 116.4 billion yen for a new type of escort ship, in reality a helicopter-carrier. This new type of escort ship is 16DDH, 13,500 tons, and 195 metres in length. The ship is designed to carry four large helicopters but has at least twice that capacity. The MSDF is intending to equip two ships of this type, scheduled to be deployed in 2008 and 2009. The SDF explains that the purchase of this ship is necessary as 'long-term cooperative activities in the Indian Ocean, larger scale rescue operations, UN based PKO activities, transport of Japanese nationals at a time of emergency and other activities require large space and sufficient equipment' (AS, 30 August 2003).
Permanent Law to Deploy the SDF within Multinational Forces

Experience with the 2001 anti-terrorism law and the 2003 Iraqi assistance law made the leadership think that a 'permanent law' enabling Japan to participate in multinational coalitions would be necessary. On 1 August 2003, a special task-force was established at the Cabinet Secretariat (AS, 3 August 2003). Numerous issues are awaiting political and legal deliberation, including the role of the United Nations, the use of weapons and the nature of multinational forces.

As a prelude to these deliberations, in December 2002 a private advisory committee to the Cabinet General Secretary 'InternationalPeace Cooperation Committee', under the chairmanship of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, former under-secretary general of the United Nations, formulated a report and presented it to the prime minister. It claimed that 'ten years of Japanese peacekeeping operations after the Cambodian involvement lagged far behind compared to other advanced countries'. The report advocated a new law to allow the SDF to participate in all multinational forces based on UN resolutions (AS, 19 December 2002).

Japan-US relations

Under the foreign policy of Koizumi's government, relations with the United States reached their post-war apex. Koizumi's realistic, proactive, responsible and self-assertive approach to deal with the threats of global terrorism and North Korea coincided with the US wish that Japan play a more proactive and responsible role in regional and global security matters. Naturally the Japan-US alliance was consolidated. Japanese public opinion generally supported Koizumi's policy. In facing external realpolitik after the Cold War, and following the internal logic from idealistic pacifism to realism, public opinion felt Koizumi's policy was proceeding in the right direction.

One question needs to be raised: Is Japan supporting US policy on terrorism for the sake of Japan-US relations or for the sake of its own defence-security interests? My answer is clear: Japan's recent move toward a more proactive and self-assertive security policy derives fundamentally from its desire to fulfil its own national interests and responsibilities. This view suggests nothing provocative about the nature of Japan-US relations. Consolidation of Japan-US relations accords with Japan's geopolitical as well as global interests. This view is based
on historical analysis of 60 years of post-war Japanese history, and my
observation as to how Japan has moved from the spiritual vacuum in
1945 toward greater proactivity.

Foreign Policy in East Asia: the Shadow of Nationalism

Since Koizumi's East Asian foreign policy is such a wide, deep and
complex issue, I restrict myself to covering North East Asia only and
dwell on major events as they have unfolded up to the summer of 2004.

To set the context, it should be noted that economic and cultural
relations with major East Asian countries, China, South Korea and
Russia, are developing with a certain dynamism. One may argue that
East Asia is relatively stable, in part because of the balance of power
which favours the United States and Japan. Furthermore that China,
while a rising power, does not come close to matching the combined
resources of these two countries. Cultural relations with South Korea
have been particularly rosy due to an unexpected flood of emotions on
the part of Japanese housewives to a Korean movie-star. The response
was a genuine expression of friendly feeling toward Korea, void of any
historical memory.

However, political relations with all countries are suffering. With
Russia real difficulty is continuing with regard to the territorial issue.
With South Korea, good progress in 2004 has almost been obliterated
since March 2005 after a historic statement by President Roh Moo-
Hyum, although this incident is outside the scope of this paper. North
Korean relations are in stalemate because of the abduction issue, in
addition to the nuclear one. Relations with China are deteriorating for
many reasons, the historical legacy being one of the major factors. The
anti-Japanese movement in China, which revealed itself in the spring
of 2005 in a move against Japanese firms and merchandise, is beginning
to affect the economic environment.

Amidst all these issues which harden Japan's political relations, one
common factor stands out: Japan's urge to redeem its 'lost identity'. This
issue, which assumes a different shape in each bilateral relation, is the
single common thread that emerges in all of Japan's major foreign policy
decisions in East Asia: toward Russia, Korea and China. Furthermore,
regaining lost identity and self-esteem has been the central issue debated,
particularly among 'nationalists', from the latter part of the 1990s. As of
now, this 'nationalist movement' and foreign policy implementation in
East Asia are not directly linked and must be considered separately. And yet, the commonality here cannot be ignored.

From the *realpolitik* point of view, given the power relations in East Asia around the ascendency of China, it clearly is not in Japan's interest to clash with all surrounding countries. It is hard to fully comprehend this situation, if analysed only by the traditional realist-liberal approaches to international relations. This is why I referred to the constructivist approach. Alexander Wendt's emphasis on norms and identity seems to lend adequate theoretical scope and give some hope for the future.

The way political relations are developing (or not developing) between Japan and North East Asian countries is worrisome, not only from the point of view of Japan's national interest, but also from the point of view of surrounding East Asian countries. The current status of political relations is not in the interest of any bilateral relations in the region. From Japan's perspective, there is an absolute need to grasp how and where this attachment to 'lost identity' may lead. From the viewpoint of outside countries, there is an equal imperative to understand Japan's behaviour and influence in order to see how it might be accommodated within the framework of their own policies and interests. Thomas Berger rightly observed that 'while by itself the historical issue is unlikely to lead to military conflict, it can have a serious corrosive impact on the region and is likely to hinder efforts to forge a stronger regional alliance' (Berger 2003: 84).41

**Japan-RussiaRelations**

The first occasion when the issue of lost identity appeared after Koizumi assumed office was his Russian policy. It took the form of Japan's fixation on 'lost honour'. Japan and Russia had been seriously engaged since the end of the 1980s in talks to settle a territorial dispute over four islands northeast of Hokkaido.** Gorbachev visited Japan in 1991 when his foreign policy agenda was practically accomplished and his political tenure was weak. The maximum concession he brought was a written statement that the four islands would remain the object for negotiation.43

After the demise of the Soviet Union, President Yeltsin apparently launched in the spring of 1992 an unprecedented, confidential concessionary proposal, which was not accepted by Japan. This led to stagnation in negotiations until November 1997, when Yeltsin proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty by the year 2000. This was only achieved after
successful diplomatic approaches by Hashimoto to develop relations between the two countries on all fronts, including the establishment of personal relations between the top leaders. Japan then made its first concessionary proposal in April 1998, which seemed to have attracted President Yeltsin’s attention, but Russia rejected this proposal. **

The first year under President Putin was probably the most promising period for negotiations: in March 2001 Russia acknowledged its obligation under the 1956 Joint Declaration,* the possibility of discussing the real fate of the two larger islands almost emerged. But after Koizumi came to power in April, Japan’s Russian policy disintegrated. The first reason for this disintegration was an internal political struggle based on personality and power. The key players were: Suzuki Muneo, a parliamentarian who strongly supported the prime minister Mori’s Russian policy, but whose explosive character alienated many Foreign Ministry officials; Makiko Tanaka, foreign minister under Koizumi from April 2001 to January 2002, who was extremely popular but distrusted by Foreign Ministry officials; and top bureaucrats and Russian specialists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The struggle resulted in Makiko Tanaka’s resignation from the post of foreign minister and Muneo Suzuki’s arrest for corruption. Whatever the intention of those involved, peace treaty negotiations collapsed after Koizumi took office in the spring of 2001, and any remaining hope vanished in the spring of 2002.

Thus far, there has been little analysis in English about the state of negotiations in the first year under Putin, and the significance of its collapse thereafter. Gilbert Rozman’s article stands out (Rozman 2002: 337-52) and a short article of mine may be added (Togo 2004: 47-49). But in essence, the collapse of negotiations under Koizumi had deeper reasons than just personality and power struggle. Prime Minister Mori, supported by Muneo Suzuki, wanted to enter into real discussions over the two larger islands ‘without preconditions’. But political forces who sought to undermine Suzuki asserted that negotiating ‘without preconditions’ may lead to a solution other than ‘resolving the four islands issue as a group’. This hard-line approach—that only this position can protect Japan’s request to return the four islands and ultimately redeem Japan’s honour—gained support among Japanese politicians, opinion leaders and media.

Four years have passed since Irkutsk. The year 2005 was recognized as the 150th anniversary of the conclusion of the Shimoda Treaty which initially demarcated the Russo-Japanese border. By Irkutsk, both sides were close to reaching a common understanding that out of the four
islands under negotiations. Habomai and Shikotan’s status had been legally resolved in 1956; however, claims were divided regarding the sovereignty of Kunashiri and Etorofu, necessitating serious negotiations ‘without conditions’. If a possibility should present itself to resume the negotiations, Japan will have to weigh this situation seriously. Maintaining the demand for ‘four islands as a group’, will most likely simply stall the negotiations and lead to a stalemate. Accepting some compromise solution may not fully redeem Japan’s honour, but Japan has to consider the other side’s viewpoint and weigh up what, in the final analysis, it might conceivably be prepared to relinquish in order to resolve this long-standing issue. Judging its national interests based on a realpolitik balance of power in East Asia is also necessary.

At the time of the writing of this paper, there is no evidence that Japan is seriously considering a mutually acceptable solution. Nationalism and the association of national identity with territory seem to be blocking compromise. But should the situation arise where Japan is prepared to move away from seeking a full restoration of its lost honour, an equivalent compromise might be expected from the Russian side, so that both countries might maximize their attainable national interest.

**Japan-North Korea Relations**

After Koizumi’s Pyongyang visit in September 2002, an opportunity presented itself for intensive negotiations. The five survivors made what was planned as a temporary return visit to Japan from 15 October and were given a warm welcome under the spotlight of full media attention. But on 24 October, under pressure from family members of the abductees, the Japanese government decided not to return the five survivors to North Korea and to request the return of eight family members of the five abductees who remained in North Korea (AS, 25 October 2002). The decision was received positively in Japan, rapidly drawing strong support from public opinion. The five abductees eventually agreed to follow the government. Then and there, the people’s search for ‘justice’ prevailed, and substantial talks between Japan and North Korea ended.

When the US and North Korea deadlocked over the nuclear issue, and when six-party talks began in August 2003, Japan adopted the most stringent position among the five, together with the United States. China presided over the talks and Japan lost its slim opportunity to play a leading role in the negotiations. The fury of anti-North Korean feeling continued unabated in Japan. Even a description by a Japanese
Kazuhiko Togo

scholar that 'Koizumi's visit to North Korea might have brought a historic opportunity for Japan to play a leadership role in the Korean Peninsula, but Japan's fixation on the abduction issue greatly limited that possibility' (Soeya 2004: 214) sounded fresh and somewhat audacious against near-uniformity in emotional criticism of the North.

Against this backdrop, Japan's policy towards North Korea developed in several directions. First, Japan prepared concrete means to pressure North Korea through economic sanctions. A law to suspend currency transfers to North Korea was approved by the Diet on 9 February 2004 (AS, 10 February 2004). Another law which empowered the government to forbid the entry of North Korean vessels engaged in various transactions between the two countries was approved by the Diet on 14 June 2004 (AS, 15 June 2004).

Second, Japan participated enthusiastically in the six-party talks held in February and June 2004. The content of the negotiations has been kept confidential, but informed sources are suggesting that Japan is trying its best to find an avenue to bring about a realistic solution, despite its hard-line façade.\(^{46}\)

Third, on 22 May 2004 Koizumi revisited Pyongyang, led five out of eight abductees family members back to Japan, and agreed to find a location (later Indonesia was chosen) for the remaining three to be reunited with Mrs. Soga, who was the fifth abductee.\(^{47}\) North Korea agreed to further investigate the fate of ten outstanding abductees,\(^{48}\) and listened to Koizumi reiterate that all nuclear weapons should be dismantled. Japan agreed to humanitarian assistance via international organizations: 250,000 tons of food aid and $10 million of medical aid (AS, 23 May 2004). Koizumi overcame a further emotional upsurge of public feeling in Japan, including an explosive outcry by the five who had returned to Japan regarding a delay in the reunion with their children. This trip might have brought the relationship back to the point of September 2002.

Japan needs to find a way to achieve both objectives: resolving the abduction issue and achieving the denuclearization of North Korea. Mike Mochizuki also concludes that Koizumi's partial liberation from a fixation on the abduction issue may open up an opportunity for Japan to play a more effective role in the six-party talks (Mochizuki 2004: 118-20). However, treating the abduction issue as a high priority is unavoidable. It signifies something more important than the legitimate anger of the families. A great number of the Japanese people are satisfied to see that, after so many years of neglect, the state is finally
fulfilling its responsibility in its search for 'justice'. At the same time though, this agenda should be placed within the framework of Japan's overall objectives towards North Korea. It should be implemented in parallel with Japan's maximum contribution to the six-party talks, which tackle the denuclearization issue. After all, this issue is vital for Japan's own security. Also, six-party talks might become a basis for regional multilateralism in the future. In this context, dialogue, pressure, inducement and sanctions must be finely balanced in the most appropriate manner. Finally, it should not be forgotten that Japan's long-term policy objective is to achieve a normalization of relations with North Korea. Understanding and encouragement by the international community of Japan's multiple objectives would naturally assist Japan in this endeavour.

**China and Taiwan**

In order to place Sino-Japanese relations in a proper perspective, it may be useful to analyse the economic relations that existed prior to Koizumi's term of office. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972, it is generally thought that Sino-Japanese economic relations developed smoothly. The sharp rise in trade figures exemplifies this trend (see Table 1).

**TABLE 1: Total Trade (Imports and Exports) between Japan and China, ($bn)**

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>132.4</td>
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</table>


For the year 2003, Japan's trade with China amounted to $132.4 billion; its trade with the US totalled $174.1 billion; with the EU $124.8 billion; and with ASEAN it totalled $119.3 billion. The figures clearly show the immense growth in Sino-Japanese economic relations. The fact that China's exports to Japan exceeded US exports to Japan already in 2002 also reflects this emerging dynamic bilateral trade.

China's recent economic growth is comparable to the Japanese period of high growth in the 1960s. Investment flourishes from developed countries, making China 'the factory of the world'. Total trade nearly
doubled in the five years 1998-2002 with America, Japan, the EU and ASEAN (see Table 2).

**TABLE 2**: China’s Trade, 1998-2002 ($ bn)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: JETRO.*

China took initiatives in 2000 to conclude a free trade agreement with ASEAN by the year 2010. All in all, recent Chinese politico-economic behaviour shows more engagement towards regional and global issues. These positive developments are primarily the result of efforts made by the Chinese themselves, although it must be acknowledged that Japan continued to encourage China in this direction. Koizumi is certainly aware of the importance of economic ties.53

In contrast to these positive economic developments, political relations between Japan and China have registered considerable difficulties. There are numerous contributory factors to this problem, but I would like to concentrate on three dimensions which seem to be the most relevant, namely geopolitics, history and Taiwan.

1. **Geopolitics in Current Sino-Japanese Relations**

Turning first to the geopolitical context: China is on the ascendency and for its economic development, it needs energy from all over the world. The most obvious way to ensure this is through its coastal areas. China’s moves in its surrounding seas are obviously connected to this. Japan, on the other hand, which is becoming much more sensitive about the need to protect its people, territory and other rights in recent years, cannot to ignore China’s maritime activities. An inevitable collision has therefore occurred. Two examples may be given: the East China Sea and Okinotorishima.

In the seabed of the East China Sea lie rich resources, including an abundant supply of gas. These resources lie on both sides of the demarcation line of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as understood by Japan (equal distance from the borders). China’s position on the EEZ differs (the continental shelf belongs to the coastal country), but since China has control over gas resources which Japan could not claim, it began preparations for their excavation many years ago.
Japan’s anxiety became heightened that Chinese maritime research vessels were extending their activities into the Japanese EEZ. The two countries concluded an information sharing system in August 2000 (Togo 2005: 154). But Japan learned in August 2004 that China unilaterally had begun to excavate the gas-field. The area itself cannot be contested by Japan, but Japan expressed its concern because the Chinese excavation might deplete Japan’s gas, which may originate in the same gas-field. Successive requests by Japan for China to submit information about the state of the excavation have failed to elicit any response (AS, 24 October 2004). The excavation continues and irritation mounts on the Japanese side.

Turning to the second example, Okinotorishima is a tiny ‘island’ located southeast of Okinawa, over which Japan has long claimed sovereignty, and on the basis of which Japan has defined its EEZ. In April 2004, China advanced its claim that, in accordance with the Law of the Sea, Okinotorishima should be considered as ‘rocks’, which do not entitle a country the right of an EEZ. Japan objected. No convergence of views was achieved and Chinese maritime research ships are scaling-up their activities around Okinotorishima (AS, 24 April 2004).

From Japan’s perspective, a series of other issues, including the build-up of Chinese naval strength and renewed interest in the Senkaku Islands, are fuelling the growing concern. There seem to be some justifications for the increasing rivalry. If a great power rises and another power in its vicinity is eager to reinstate its position in the region, certain tensions will naturally arise. This is a time-honoured conclusion of realism. In such a situation, each country is entitled to develop necessary and appropriate measures to respond to the other’s power-plays, but both sides are expected to establish dialogue and exchanges to minimize possible conflict and the damage that might ensue, and to maximize possible rapprochement and its benefits. Illusory optimism does not help, but the reality of power-politics dictates that such governance of relations through dialogue and exchanges is in the interest of both parties.

2. The Historical Factor in Current Sino-Japanese Relations

Prime Minister Koizumi’s succession of visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in August 2001, February 2002, January 2003 and January 2004 have doomed mutual visits by the heads of state to each other’s capital for three years. In Japan a host of explanations have been advanced to explain Koizumi’s continued visits: his political commitment before his election as prime minister; his need to secure votes from the Izokukai (families of the war dead); his determination not to 'bow to China', etc.
However, probably the most relevant factor behind the visits is that Koizumi genuinely believes in the importance of visiting this shrine: through praying for those who sacrificed their life for their country and mourning the war dead, he is convinced that he is redeeming Japan’s ‘lost identity’. It is hard to detect anything militaristic or aggressive towards Asian neighbours. Koizumi is expressing with strong wording his remorse for the atrocities committed and is renewing his pledge for peace. For his statement made at the time of the first visit on 13 August 2001, he was even harshly criticized by a nationalist opinion leader that his language has become even stronger than that used by Prime Minister Murayama: ‘Koizumi even used hakarishirenai songai (immeasurable damage) instead of tadaino songai (tremendous damage)’ (Maeno 2004: 80). Although not appreciated at all by critical neighbours, he has so far consistently avoided 15 August as the visit date.

But despite his best intention to mourn the war dead and his efforts to reach out to the other side, he has not gained any sympathy in China. One salient reason can be highlighted in this regard: Japan has never successfully explained how mourning its war dead at a shrine which also commemorates Class A war criminals does not contradict its acknowledged post-war remorse for its actions and its sincere desire for peace. Whatever the reason, the absence of summit talks with China in these critically important years of the latter’s growth as a major regional and global player is a greatly missed opportunity and may harm Japan’s national interests. The realpolitik necessity for governing the relationship and the constructivist urge for establishing identity are colliding with a seemingly impossible contradiction. Japan needs to find a way to redress this situation, both for the sake of its own national interests and in the interests of surrounding Asian countries. At the same time, the resolution also lies in reciprocal efforts and understanding by the surrounding international community.

3. The Taiwan Issue

Finally, let us turn to the third dimension of the Sino-Japanese context, viz. Taiwan. After Japan established relations with China in 1972, Japan severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, though Taiwan remained one of Japan’s most important economic partners. Up until 2000, Japanese exports to Taiwan exceeded its exports to China.55 The emergence of a strong Taiwanese identity under President Lee Teng-hui in 1996 opened up a new debate in Japan on its policy towards China. In the latter half of the 1990s, Japanese politicians and intellectuals continued
to emphasize that Taiwan's identity is different from that of China's (Namiki 2004: 118-19), that Taiwan is a democratic country with which Japan shares common values (Kin 2004: 120-1), that Taiwan occupies a strategic position to protect sea-lanes that connect Japan and South-East Asia (Okazaki 2004: 117-18) and that Lee Teng-hui's praise of the positive aspects of Japanese colonial rule should be more appreciated (Nakajima 2004: 116-17). Anti-Chinese feeling often became mixed with pro-Taiwanese emotion.

The Taiwan issue, which depends on how it is handled on both sides of the Strait, is an extremely difficult one. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1972, Japan has committed itself to respecting the 'one-China' policy, requesting only that the matter be resolved peacefully. The basic structure of the Japan-US Security Treaty from 1960 is also unambiguous. Taiwan is a part of the long-standing geographical definition of the Far East of Article 6 of the Security Treaty (Togo 2005: 83), where the United States has its security interest. Should the US decide to act, Japan must make up its mind through the prior consultation system. But more than three decades have passed since then and conditions on both sides of the Strait have changed, as has Japan’s resolve to become a responsible partner of the international community. How this would affect Japan’s position in cross-Strait relations is an extremely important and delicate matter.

Japan observers abroad have naturally given a lot of attention to the increasing difficulties between Japan and China. Thomas Berger (2004: 153-6), Michael Armacost (2003: 95-6), and Mike Mochizuki (2004:121-5) all give detailed accounts about this difficulty, with a variety of degrees of optimism towards the future. As Mike Mochizuki points out, ‘the key challenge for both Japanese and Chinese officials will be the management of populist nationalism in their respective countries’ (Mochizuki 2004: 124). But the root cause of the difficulty is probably more serious than any of these writings show.

Ways Ahead

Looking from the perspective of Japan’s security and defence policy, the continuation of Koizumi’s proactive and self-assertive policy will most likely lead to the question of revising the Constitution’s Article 9. In January 2000 a five-year parliamentary research commission was established in the House of Representatives. On 1 November 2002, the commission published an interim report showing the divergence
of views concerning the revision of Article 9 (AS, 2 November 2003). Traditional 'revisionists' of Article 9 like Yasuhiro Nakasone and a new generation of security-oriented deputies such as Shigeru Ishiba (LDP) and Seiji Maehara (Democratic Party) stated that revision was necessary to specify that Japan could exert not only the individual, but the collective right to self-defence. The Komei Party, the Communist Party, and the Japan Socialist Party oppose revision of Article 9. The commission is scheduled to finalize its report in 2005.

Prime Minster Koizumi, after he assumed power in April 2001, made it clear that constitutional revision, while not his immediate goal, was a viable long-term objective (AS, 31 August 2003). On 25 August 2003, Koizumi told reporters that he endorsed the Liberal Democratic Party formulating a proposal for revision by 2005 (AS, 26 August 2003). The idea originated among influential party members within the LDP: November 2005 will be the 50th anniversary of the Party. Taking these facts into account, one cannot rule out the possibility that constitutional revision will be placed on the political agenda in the years after 2005.

But the revision of Article 9 inevitably leads to the state of Japan's relations with its Asian neighbours. Japan's decision to transform itself into a more responsible, proactive and self-assertive country should be understood and welcomed by other countries, particularly neighbouring countries. But the current state of political relations between Japan and its neighbours is far from satisfactory. One key difficulty is that the rationale behind Japan's desire to re-establish its identity and overcome its past is poorly understood by its neighbours.

There seem to be two major policy directions which should underpin Japan's efforts in this regard. First, Japan's efforts to re-establish its identity should be conducted parallel with its efforts to understand other countries' pain over the same issue and to apologize for this. 'Japan should have two types of courage: to acknowledge and to apologize for the deeds which were wrong; [and]— to stand firm against wrong accusations and to defend her honour' (Togo 2005: 426). Second, Japan's search for its identity must always be framed in the overall perspective of the geopolitical power balance in East Asia. Fixation on a single factor, be it identity or otherwise, does not serve Japan's national interest.

At the same time, efforts are required from the other side as well. Japan's neighbouring countries should show greater understanding of the nature of current Japanese policy, both towards a more responsible and proactive security policy and towards a search for its identity. Japan's neighbours should try to enlarge areas of co-operation for the sake of their own na-
tional interests and for the region more generally. Regional dialogue, as proposed by Thomas Berger (2003:84), in which both sides genuinely try to understand the other, may offer the best hope for the future.

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NOTES

2 Japan's Siberian intervention after the Russian revolution failed; the army was defeated by the Russians at Lake Khasan in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939.
3 The occupation of Japan was undertaken by the Allied Forces, which consisted primarily of American forces, with a symbolic involvement of Commonwealth forces.
4 Recent scholarly works indicate that the fundamental idea of idealistic pacifism was first proposed by then prime minister Kijyuro Shidehara in his meeting with General MacArthur on 24 January 1946 (Iokibe 2001: 45). For the Japanese people, who had no knowledge of this meeting, Article 9 was taken to be an American notion.
5 From February to March 1949, an American economist, Joseph Dodge, visited Japan and recommended a new policy to stabilize and stimulate the Japanese economy (Iokibe 2001: 61).
6 Security forces (hoanfai) were established in October 1952, which developed into the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in July 1954 (Ikei1997, chronology).
7 It was also called 'the system of the year 55'.
9 This expression is quoted from the title of a book written by Ryuichi Teshima, chief of the NHK office in Washington, on how Japan's reaction to the first Gulf War was confused, leading to non-appreciation of its efforts by the international community. See referred texts.
10 In March 1996, Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese who became the Kuomintang leader, was elected president.
11 The Japan New Party led by Masahiro Hosokawa, the Sakigake (Harbinger) Party led by Masayoshi Takemura, and the Japan Renewal Party led by Ichiro Ozawa were the major ones.
12 Already at the time of ‘Japan's defeat in 1991', the three ruling parties, the LDP, the Komeito Party and the Japan Democratic Socialist Party, had agreed to enact a new law which would enable the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations (Fukushima 1999: 69).
13 Japan dispatched eight ceasefire observers, 600 construction troops, 75 civilian police officers, and 41 election observers to UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia) (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/kyoryoku.html, viewed on 4 December 2002).
14 From March 2002, 680 SDF members to be engaged on facilities construction and 10 commanding officers were sent under UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor). Their work carried through to UNMISET (UN Mission of Support in East Timor). (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/jinteki.pdf, viewed on 5 August 2003).
The first key defence policy document was the Basic Policy for National Defence adopted in 1957. The second document was the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) adopted in 1976. That document was revised in 1995.


Hosokawa stated toward Korea in November 1993: ‘deep remorse and heartfelt apology’ (Togo 2005: 170), and toward China in March 1994: ‘deep remorse and apology’.


After becoming prime minister, Koizumi made a clear policy declaration in the spring of 2001 that the resolution of non-performing loans and the seven points of structural reform were major pillars of his economic policy.

As described above, the long-time governance of the LDP under the ‘system of the year 55’ ended in 1993 with a non-LDP government. After the LDP returned to power, the traditional system of factions based on power-sharing was weakened. In the 1990s the bureaucracy was shattered by a series of major scandals, involving major ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Welfare, the Defence Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The bursting of the bubble economy naturally shook business, above all financial institutions and middle to small-scale enterprises.

In 1991-92 there were eight rounds of negotiations to establish diplomatic relations; in 1995-97 the establishment of KEDO, Japan grants rice aid and the homecoming of former Japanese spouses; 1999-2000 three rounds of negotiations to establish diplomatic relations and continuing rice assistance.


In March 1988, the Japanese government recognized in the Diet that there were enough doubts to suspect that three couples had been abducted by North Korea (AS, 8 December 2002). Koizumi went to Pyongyang with a list of 11 abductees.

See note 26.


The Japanese prime minister’s popularity is typically very low; the danger level is usually seen as being around 10 percent.

Article 5 of the Security Treaty reads as follows: ‘Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.’ The expression ‘constitutional provisions’ refers to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.


The 1999 Surrounding Situation Law provided a solid legal basis for the enactment of this new law against terrorism. The structures of the two laws are similar. The basic purpose of SDF activities differ: the Surrounding Situation Law prescribes SDF co-operation with US troops within the scope of the Japan-US security treaty, whereas the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law prescribes Japan's co-operation against international terrorism, as defined by UN resolutions.

Sankei Shinbun makes an interesting analysis comparing these divergent tendencies (Sankei Shinbun, 18 April 2004).


The three approved laws were related to (1) response to armed attack; (2) revision of a part of the SDF law; (3) revision of the law establishing the security committee. On 15 May the three laws were approved in the House of Representatives with approximately 90 percent of votes in favour (AS, 16 May 2003). On 6 June they were approved in the House of Councillors with 202 deputies in support of the new laws among 235 present, with one abstention. The Communist Party and the Socialist Party were opposed (AS, 7 June 2003).

The seven laws were related to: (1) the protection of Japanese nationals at a time of armed attack; (2) help and support for US forces; (3) control of maritime transport of foreign military equipment; (4) usage of specified public facilities; (5) handling of prisoners of war; (6) grave offences against international humanitarian law; and (7) revision of a part of the SDF laws. The three treaties were: (1) 1949 Geneva Convention Protocol I; (2) 1949 Geneva Convention Protocol II; and (3) Revision of ACSA (http://www.jda.go.jp/j/yujihousei/index.htm). They were approved in the House of Representatives on 20 May (AS, 21 May 2004) and in the House of Councillors on 14 June 2004 (AS, 15 June 2004).

The report also advised Japan to soften principles within the International Peacekeeping Law to attune them to evolving standards of international co-operation.

One crude measure of calculating this imbalance is GNP ratio of over 12 to 1, $14 trillion to $1.14 trillion between the US and Japan vs China (calculated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs home page: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ecodata/gdp.html, viewed on 17 April 2005). See also Berger (2000: 408-20) and Katzenstein and Sil (2004:20-6).

This statement is related to China but in my view applies to all countries in the region, North Korea inclusive, if abduction can be included with history.

These four islands—the Habomai group, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu—formally became a part of Japan when the border between Japan and Russia was first demarcated in 1855. The Soviet Union occupied them from the end of August to early September 1945 after Japan had capitulated.

Japan and the USSR resumed diplomatic relations in 1956. The Joint Declaration then adopted specified that two smaller islands (the Habomai group and Shikotan) would be transferred to Japan after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, but Japan also insisted on the return of the two larger islands (Kunashiri and Etorofu). Since then, negotiations have turned around the issue of two (smaller) versus four (including the two larger).

In 1998 Japan proposed to demarcate the border between Etorofu and Uruppu, while making maximum concessions on all outstanding issues. No further details are disclosed by the negotiators, but Minoru Tamba, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, who assisted the negotiations between Hashimoto and Yeltsin, wrote in his memoir that Yeltsin was genuinely attracted to the proposal (Tamba 2004:66).

In 1960 when Japan revised the Security Treaty with the US, the USSR denied its
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obligation to transfer the two smaller islands until all foreign troops had been withdrawn from Japan.

This information is based on the author’s conversation with an informed Japanese source, who asked not to be identified (18 November 2004).

Mr. Jenkins, the husband of Mrs. Soga, is an American deserter, and refused to go back to Japan for fear of American prosecution. On 9 July the Soga family was reunited in Indonesia, and on 18 July returned to Japan (AS, 2 July 2004).

The total number of abductees as identified by the government is now 15.


In 2002, China’s exports to Japan were $61.6 billion whereas US exports to Japan were $57.6 billion. Although outside the scope of this analysis, China, together with Hong Kong, became the number one trading partner for Japan exceeding the US in the year of 2004.

These are Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.


Koizumi stated that he was not worried by Japan’s stalled political relationship with China because it was overshadowed by flourishing economic ties (Financial Times, 7 June 2004). Koizumi had promised 43 times in his pre-election campaign that he was going to visit Yasukuni on 15 August when elected as prime minister (Maeno 2004: 79).


The Japanese government position was determined in Article 3 of the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, which reads: ‘The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.’ Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation states that ‘The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out’ and the Cairo Declaration states that ‘...Formosa (Taiwan)...shall be restored to the Republic of China’.

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