

Hometown Volunteers: A Case Study of Volunteer Organizations in Surakarta Supporting Joko Widodo's Presidential Campaign

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Abstract

This article discusses the phenomenon of volunteer organizations supporting Joko Widodo – better known as Jokowi – in Surakarta and the surrounding area during Indonesia's 2014 presidential election. This research is important because, although volunteerism has been commonly replicated since Barack Obama's victories in the 2008 and 2012 American presidential elections, profiles of volunteers (their identities, motivations and self-definitions of their activities) and their activities (how they organize carry out and fund them) are still largely unknown. The article aims to address this lack of research within both the context of political transformation in Indonesia as well as the broader context of volunteerism, and to show how it contributes to democratization in Indonesia. This article reveals that volunteerism as a movement crosses class, age, ideological and gender boundaries, while its organizational form at the local level seems to be based on class, gender and/or age. Through their organizational models, activities, approaches and motives, volunteers have restored activism and volunteerism to Indonesian political processes. Nonetheless, this article cannot be certain of the movement's contribution to the development of Indonesian democracy.

Keywords: Election volunteers, volunteerism, democracy, Surakarta, Indonesia

Introduction

This article discusses the phenomenon of volunteers supporting Joko Widodo – better known as Jokowi – in his 2014 presidential election campaign against Prabowo Subianto, which he won with 53.15 per cent of the vote. The research focuses on the volunteerism in Jokowi's hometown, Surakarta, and the surrounding areas known collectively as Greater Solo (covering Sragen, Karanganyar, Wonogiri, Sukoharjo, Klaten and Boyolali). This site has been selected because Surakarta was where Jokowi was born and where he began his political career.

He served two terms as the city's mayor (2005–2010 and 2010–2012). Furthermore, Surakarta is a stronghold of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrat Indonesia (PDI), renamed PDI-P on 1 February 1999), which backed Jokowi in the 2005 Surakartan mayoral election, the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election and the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. This city was also chosen owing to historical considerations, as Surakarta has frequently been the locus of important socio-political movements, even before Indonesia's independence. In this city, a number of modern political organizations came to life. Here, too, modern political methods and techniques such as boycotts, open political meetings and rallies, as well as modern political jargon, were introduced before spreading to other cities in Indonesia (Larson 1990; Shiraishi 1997; Suhartono 1991).

Investigation into volunteerism is important because such research has remained uncommon despite volunteerism becoming increasingly common following its successful use by Barack Obama in the 2008 and 2012 American presidential elections. We are yet to see a comprehensive profile of volunteers – who they are, what are their motives, how they see themselves and define themselves. We are also yet to encounter sufficient coverage of their activities – how they organize themselves, how they work and how they fund their activities. This article intends to answer the above questions while also examining how and to what extent volunteers have contributed to democratization in Indonesia.

Research for this article was conducted by a team from the Department of Politics and Government at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Research examined the different tendencies of volunteers supporting Jokowi in three different areas – Jakarta, Surabaya and Surakarta – and was conducted over four months immediately following the presidential election (9 July 2014). Field research in Surakarta was conducted from August to September 2014. The snowball technique was used to identify and contact the subjects of this research: one respondent gives the name of another, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on.

From Volunteerism to Electoral Volunteerism

Discussion of volunteer movements is important for several reasons. First, the presence of volunteers in political campaigns indicates a fundamental shift in volunteerism's character, from individual and non-political – romantic, idealistic and altruistic (Mowen and Sujana 2005) – to

highly political. Efforts to involve volunteers in politics and improve the quality of democracy have a lengthy history. Alexis de Tocqueville's two-volume classic work *Democracy in America* (originally published in 1835 and 1840, in French) introduced the concept of 'public association in civil life', in which social qualities such as feelings of reciprocity, loyalty to fellow citizens, imagination regarding the possibility of a better life, and the potential to overcome problems and become useful citizens capable of growth and development become the basis for civil participation that can guarantee functional democracy (Verba et al. 1995). However, the transformation of such volunteerism into support for candidates – presidential or otherwise – brings the method outside its traditional understanding as individual 'leisure behaviour' (Bull 1971; Kelly 1972) shaped through a long and repetitive process. This is reflected in studies by Omoto and Snyder (1995: 683–684) as well as Penner and Finkelstein (1998: 526–527), who have identified volunteer movements in a formal organizational context oriented towards manifesting solidarity (Cnaan et al. 1996). As will be shown through the cases of pro-Jokowi volunteerism in Surakarta, this shift also deviates from the characterization of volunteerism as 'non-obligatory helping' in which 'actions are not motivated by a sense of personal obligation to a personal recipient' (Cicognani and Zani 2015: 126).

Second, this phenomenon represents a shift within the tradition of electoral democracy, one that breaks from the conventional framework that prioritizes political parties. In an Indonesian context, the presidential election regime implemented in 2004 was a crucial part of the momentum for ending party elites' monopoly on authority in selecting the president through the People's Consultative Assembly, then the highest decision-making body in Indonesia. This momentum created new spaces for involving the public in promoting the development of civil society (Lay 2017a: 1–24) without them having to join a political party or bear the associated negative stigma. Volunteer groups arose in this period and became some of the most dynamic and prominent actors in the 2014 presidential election. The rise of direct presidential elections also meant the end of the longstanding dominance of state–corporate relations, which allowed the establishment of new, more democratic political linkages (Lay 2017b: 130–150).

However, the emergence of volunteer movements in Indonesia cannot be attributed solely to the domestic political transformations described above as global developments following Obama's successful campaign in the 2008 American presidential election, which relied on volunteerism

were also influential (Ganz 2009; Han and McKinna 2015; Presta 2010). Obama's continued use of volunteerism in his successful 2012 campaign reaffirmed this method's effectiveness. After Obama's election, volunteers, long viewed as 'burdens', have been treated as important 'assets' by those who have attempted to replicate his approach around the globe, including in emerging democracies.

The replication of Obama's reliance on volunteerism has occurred at the national level not only in Indonesia, with Jokowi as the central figure, but also in the 2014 elections in South Africa and the 2015 elections in Canada (Bryden 2015).¹ Furthermore, volunteerism has not been limited to the national level, penetrating also into local elections, as seen in Odessa, Ukraine (Holmov 2015).² In Indonesia, reliance on volunteerism was seen most recently with the 'Friends of Ahok' ('Teman Ahok') (Riana 2016),³ a group of volunteers campaigning (albeit unsuccessfully) for Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, to become Governor of Jakarta in the 2017 election.⁴ Unfortunately, these developments have yet to be explored satisfactorily. In Indonesia, only Suaedy (2014), Sefsani and Ziegenhain (2015: 14–33) and Lay (2017c:31–61) have used academic approaches in an attempt to analyse this phenomenon.

Surakarta: Hometown of Jokowi, PDI-P Stronghold

Jokowi belied the Indonesian idiom 'tak ada pahlawan yang dihargai di rumah sendiri' ('no hero is honoured at home') by receiving 84.36 per cent of votes in the 2014 presidential election in his hometown, Surakarta (Damanik 2014). This was far above his national average of 53.15 per cent (Sinaga 2014).⁵ As will be shown below, this victory was realized through a lengthy process of proving his abilities, which has frequently been cited as the reason for volunteer groups and individuals supporting him in Greater Surakarta.

Jokowi was born in Surakarta on 21 June 1961. Unusually for a politician in Indonesia, he was not born to a family of politicians, bureaucrats or soldiers. His father, Notomihardjo, was a carpenter, while his mother, Sujiatmi Notomihardjo, was a housewife. After completing his baccalaureate degree at the Faculty of Forestry, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Jokowi opened a furniture business. His political career began when he was elected Mayor of Surakarta, with F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo (best known as Rudy) as his running mate, in the 2005 election. He received 36.62 per cent of votes, defeating the other three candidates.⁶ Jokowi and Rudy recognized that, owing to their relatively small margin, they needed

to consolidate their position. They did so by implementing techno-populist policies that developed a sense of collective identity among the residents of Surakarta. Jokowi launched a tourism programme in which Surakarta was advertised as being 'the Spirit of Java'. This created a sense of togetherness among city residents, expanding Jokowi's political base. These programmes were complemented by using Rudy's unique position – he was a charismatic figure, the leader of the Surakarta branch of PDI-P, and had broad, stable networks – to connect Jokowi to the grassroots. Both men were also skilled at effectively utilizing existing political linkages between the government and citizens' groups (Pratikno and Lay 2013).

This combination of approaches can be seen from policies enacted by Jokowi during the relocation of almost a thousand sellers of used (and sometimes stolen) goods from Taman Monumen 45 Banjarsari to Notoharjo. Facing hard-line resistance, Jokowi resolved issues through dialogue, holding no fewer than 54 lunches with these used goods sellers. Praised as *nguwongke wong* – humanizing people – this approach was not only successful in establishing a consensus in a peaceful and dignified manner, but also set a new standard for political leaders' interactions with constituents. This in turn meant increased effectiveness in policy implementation and improved public legitimacy, as evidenced by the relocation's then completion after almost nine years of obstruction. Following the relocation, Jokowi became Indonesia's media darling, and his popularity surged to unprecedented heights. The concurrent widespread adoption of social media in Indonesia facilitated the spread of the 'Jokowi effect', especially among the urban middle classes.

This populism, marked by strong connections between government leaders and their constituents and realized through problem solving-oriented policies, led to Jokowi being considered the ultimate representative of the lower classes. In the Surakarta mayoral election of 2010, Jokowi and Rudy received an overwhelming 90.09 per cent of votes, winning at 931 of the 932 ballot stations. The only other candidates, Eddy Wirabhumi and his running mate Supradi Kertamenawi, backed by the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) and Working Groups Party (Golkar), received only 9.91 per cent of votes. On 28 July 2010, Jokowi was inaugurated as mayor of Surakarta for the 2010–2015 term (Sodiq 2010).⁷

At the national level, Jokowi's political career became more prominent after PDI-P nominated him as its candidate, paired with Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Initially, the residents of Surakarta were divided in their response to Jokowi's willingness to

accept this nomination, to the point that some challenged his candidacy in court (Satriawan 2012).⁸ However, the people of Surakarta largely supported him. Merchants at the Notoharjo used goods market, for instance, gathered voluntary contributions to be donated to Jokowi's campaign. Other activities were held throughout the city, including congregational prayers, signatures and fingerprints being collected on a stretch of white cloth by the Facebookers Community for Jokowi; and a banquet-sharing ceremony held by the merchants. When Jokowi was inaugurated, the people of Surakarta expressed their excitement (Bramantyo 2012).⁹

Jokowi's impressive achievement cannot be separated from the role of the parties supporting him. Surakarta, aside from its status as Jokowi's hometown and long history of political activism, is a stronghold of PDI-P, the political party that discovered and nominated Jokowi. This can be seen in the election results under Suharto's New Order: unlike in national parliamentary elections, in which the PDI-P always finished last, this party consistently came in second, behind Golkar, in elections for the regional parliament of Surakarta. This is readily evident from the data shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. Comparison of Votes Received in the National General Election (DPR) and the DPRD of Surakarta, %

Election	Golkar		PDI		PPP	
	DPR	DPRD	DPR	DPRD	DPR	DPRD
1977	62.11	50.75	8.60	32.11	29.29	17.44
1982	63.64	55.20	7.88	27.07	27.78	17.73
1987	73.16	53.98	10.87	31.45	15.97	14.57
1992	68.10	48.31	14.89	36.41	17.01	15.28
1997	74.51	56.17	3.06	3.31	22.43	40.52

Source: Office of Society and Politics, Municipality of Surabaya, quoted in Adnan (2002: 44–45)

In the election of the New Order in 1997, PDI-P saw a drastic downturn, receiving only 3.31 per cent of the vote; this can be attributed to supporters boycotting the elections in protest at the government's mistreatment of the party, particularly its violent ejection of central figure and chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri (Kaligis 2015).¹⁰ In the first election of the Reformasi era, held on 7 June 1999 and contested by 48 parties, PDI-P received the greatest share of the national vote (33.74 per cent), followed by Golkar, at 22.44 per cent, and the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party; PPP), at 10.71 per cent (Committee for General Elections 2008).¹¹ Though results in Surakarta were

similar, PDI-P's victory was more definitive: it received 56.7 per cent of votes. This led to a dramatic change in the city's political configuration: PDI-P held 24 of the 45 seats in the regional parliament, whereas Golkar and PPP only held three seats each. Although Golkar won nationally in the 2004 election, PDI-P maintained its stronghold in Surakarta, receiving 35.9 per cent of the vote; by comparison, Golkar only received 11.1 per cent locally.

In the 2009 election, at the national level the winner was the Partai Demokrat, a relatively young party that had run in only one previous election. It received 20.85 per cent of the vote, a nearly 300 per cent increase over the previous election (7.455 per cent). Golkar came in second place, with 14.45 per cent of the vote, and PDI-P followed in third with 14.03 per cent. This differed significantly from the situation in Surakarta, where PDI-P remained dominant, receiving 37.5 per cent of the vote (15 seats). The Partai Demokrat came second, with 17.5 per cent (7 seats), pushing aside Golkar, which only received 10 per cent of the vote (4 seats). In the 2014 general election, PDI-P rebounded, winning the majority of the national vote (18.95 per cent), followed by Golkar at 14.75 per cent and the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya; Gerindra) at 11.81 per cent. The Partai Demokrat came in fourth. Similar results were reported in Surakarta; however, the gap between parties was dramatic. PDI-P received more than half of the vote (51.25 per cent). Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), the National Mandate Party, came in second place, with 7.65 per cent of the vote, followed by Gerindra at 7.20 per cent, and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) at 6.58 per cent (Sunaryo 2014).¹²

Models, Profiles and Activities of Volunteer Movements

Generally, the volunteer groups supporting Jokowi in Surakarta followed one of two organizational patterns. First there were those organized as part of a national volunteer movement. Groups following this model positioned local volunteers as expansions, extensions or satellites of Jakarta-based national volunteer organizations. Second there were locally organized volunteer organizations. This model had three different variants: (1) volunteers with a basis in local networks/organizations, (2) those with a basis in a certain 'territory' and (3) people acting on an individual basis, with no group affiliation. This model was followed predominantly by PDI-P or Jokowi supporters who acted of their own volition, without coordination or instruction from any group or political party.

Despite differences between these models and their variants, volunteer organizations shared certain similarities. They were all peer groups, with a high level of intimacy, and founded on principles of trust. As citizens, they were mostly politically passive – be it because they were uninterested in politics or because they had withdrawn from politics during the authoritarian New Order – but had the knowledge and imagination to dream of ideal politics and leadership. Their decision to become volunteers derived from a combination of factors, including Jokowi's own charisma, his capacity to deliver concrete programmes as well as his position as a 'new figure' originating from outside politics, the bureaucracy and the military – channels traditionally used by Indonesian leadership. Furthermore, these volunteers were similar in that they used their own funds, in that any support was sporadic and not given in cash, and in that they worked intermittently – barring those whose efforts were based on control over a specific area or territory – and used information technology intensively.

This research identifies two faces of volunteerism, namely as organization and as movement. As will be discussed in detail below, such volunteer movements were significantly different in character. In terms of a movement, volunteerism has diverse profiles. They do not represent specific social classes or age groups, nor are they shaped along ideological, identity or gender lines. Diverse groups worked together to realize a shared goal: Jokowi's electoral victory. However, organization-level volunteerism is delineated in terms of class, gender and age. Moreover, this research shows that, owing to the rise of digital technology, volunteers have generally been exposed to the latest information on politics. They are easily connected with each other, able to contact each other readily, quickly and cheaply through electronic platforms. This eased efforts to consolidate volunteer work. As the discussion will demonstrate, although the number of pro-Jokowi volunteers was limited – generally six to ten per group – their cleverness in selecting activities/issues, media and approaches led to them becoming colossi both on the internet and in the city.

Model 1. Satellite of National Volunteer Organization

Viewed in terms of their organizational models, several pro-Jokowi volunteer groups in Surakarta were part of national volunteer groups, serving as satellites of these larger bodies. Here we discuss three prominent examples of such groups: Formation

of Volunteers for President Jokowi (Barisan Relawan Jokowi Presiden; BARA JP), National Secretariat of Youths Supporting Jokowi (Seknas Muda Jokowi) and the People's Central Command Post (Posko Center Rakyat; POSTERA), as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2. Forms of National Volunteer Organization Satellites

No	Name of Organization	Membership	Work methods	Financing	Relation with other organizations
1	BARA JP	Banker peer group	Door-to-door Social media	Membership dues	Independent
2	Seknas Muda Jokowi	University students	Door-to-door Social media Movie screening	Individual party activist	Dependent
3	POSTERA	Loose membership	Door-to-door Cultural activities	Individual member	Independent

BARA JP Surakarta (Barisan Relawan Jokowi Presiden, Formation of Volunteers for President Jokowi)

BARA JP Surakarta (henceforth BARA JP) was established in February 2014 on the initiative of Indra Kramadipa, a construction materials seller from Boyolali. Indra was relatively new to politics, first becoming involved when he participated in the World Congress of Jokowi Volunteer Supporters (Kongres Relawan Jokowi Sedunia), held at the Indonesia Menggugat Building in Bandung on 15 June 2013; a few months later, he began to set up BARA JP. In February 2014, Indra asked Kuku Hendra, an employee of the Pundi Bank of Surakarta, to join; he, in turn, invited some 15 colleagues (interview with M. Sofiudin, 10 August 2014).

BARA JP's members are middle-class professionals, who work at several banks in Surakarta. Politically, they had previously been passive citizens because they considered politics immoral. Furthermore, they were not affiliated with any political parties. As such, their volunteer

involvement was their first experience in politics. Aside from Indra, the initiator, only one member had previous volunteer experience: Sofiudin, a bank employee who had volunteered for Jokowi before through the Jokowi-Ahok Social Media Volunteers (Jasmev) during the 2012 gubernatorial election,¹³ as well as the Garuda Social Media Volunteers (Relawan Garuda Social Media).¹⁴ At the time of writing, Sofiudin is the secretary general of BARA JP.

Volunteers organized themselves and their activities simply, using a WhatsApp (WA) group that had previously been dedicated to the distribution of social/general information. During the tense lead-up to the 2014 presidential election, this WA group transformed into a forum for exchanging information on politics. It subsequently became a medium for recruiting members: more than 20 members joined BARA JP in this way. Many bank employees joined because they had previously planned to establish their own group in support of Jokowi, whom they considered a straightforward figure and close to the people. The invitation to join BARA JP gave them this opportunity without requiring the establishment of a new organization (interview with M. Sofiudin, 14 August 2014). This challenges the common view that urban middle classes are innately passive and lack any political awareness. Borrowing from Amna and Ekman (2013: 1–21), they can in fact be considered as 'standby citizens' ready to transform into active political actors if given the proper motive and momentum.¹⁵

BARA JP exploited primordial sentiments by promoting Jokowi as 'the presidential candidate from Surakarta', referring implicitly to Pacitan, whence came President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Pacitan's development was viewed as being a direct result of SBY becoming president, and such development could thus be replicated for Surakarta should the city elect a local candidate (interview with Kukuh, Deputy Chair of BARA JP, 20 August 2014). It mainly targeted rural voters, particularly in Sukoharjo, whom it considered easily influenced by the negative rumours spread by Jokowi's opponents. Its second target was members of the public. Thus, the organization campaigned door-to-door, using brochures, shirts, stickers, tabloid papers and banners to reach rural voters, as well as social media to connect with urban voters (interview with M. Sofiudin, 14 August 2014).

BARA JP Surakarta was an 'expansion' of the national BARA JP.¹⁶ However, this was more in name only than an empiric reality. The research for this article has confirmed that the relations between the two were far from reflective of an organizational hierarchy. Each organiza-

tion worked separately, with limited coordination and communication. This can be attributed to the local organization's independent funding, which came from members' dues. For example, promotional material such as tabloids, stickers, shirts and banners were purchased using weekly membership dues. According to its records, BARA JP only received 100 shirts from the national organization, with shipping covered by the local branch (interview with Kuku, 24 August 2014). This organization held routine meetings every Friday evening to discuss the activities planned for the following week. As the organization lacked headquarters, meetings were held at restaurants, while BlackBerry Messenger and WA groups were used for coordinating members (interview with M. Sofiudin, 18 August 2014).

Seknas Muda Jokowi (National Secretariat of Youths Supporting Jokowi)

Seknas Muda Jokowi was a bloc of the national Seknas Jokowi.¹⁷ This organization was declared on 3 May 2014 in Surakarta. Volunteers were mostly students and this group was also initiated by an individual activist, Tied Gilham, a student at Sebelas Maret University, Surakarta, who became the organization's leader. His involvement could be attributed more to friendship than political awareness. Gilham was invited to join by a friend from Jakarta named Yulius. Relying on his personal ties, he invited his classmates, including Topik and Chyntia Putri. An organizational administration soon took form and was reported to the central organization. This evidences the importance of 'trust' in this group's establishment. It is thus not surprising that recruitment of the organization's 16 members – eight of whom were highly active – used a word of mouth model that ensured familiarity among members. The organization also attempted to recruit members via Facebook, a less personal approach, but was unsuccessful (interview with Gilham, 26 August 2014).

All members of Seknas Muda were first-time volunteers, without any previous experience of activism or political parties. Hoping that Jokowi could bring change, they decided to become volunteers. However, unlike other groups, who relied entirely on Jokowi's charisma, Seknas Muda considered another factor: Jokowi's surroundings. As stated by Gilham, they became volunteers because they saw that 'Jokowi, as a new figure, was surrounded by innocent people' (interview with Gilham, 27 August 2014).

As with other volunteer groups, Seknas Muda conducted door-to-door campaigning as its main method. It was active not only in

Surakarta, but also Karanganyar and Wonogiri. It also utilized public spaces to voice its support. In Surakarta, for instance, it campaigned through oration and the distribution of stickers at Klewer Market, a large traditional market and *batik* bazaar. It also gave free *takjil* during the Ramadan fast.¹⁸ On 25 May 2014, this group offered 'Free Shirts of Inspiring Indonesian Leaders' ('Sablon Gratis Tokoh Inspiratif Indonesia') to commemorate National Awakening Day. This activity was intended to inspire reflection on the leadership of inspirational figures such as Jokowi. Seknas Muda also held several activities in Matesih, Karanganyar and Wonogiri. It distributed promotional kitchen knives, stickers and banners. In Wonogiri, it screened a film about Jokowi (interview with Nugroho, Presidium of Seknas Muda Jokowi Surakarta, 29 August 2014). It also worked with another pro-Jokowi volunteer group, POSTERA (see below).¹⁹ Unlike BARA JP, it was quite active on social media, operating Facebook and Twitter accounts that functioned to share information and recruit members.

Seknas Muda received logistical aid from several actors. It received shirts, stickers, brochures and magazines from the central Seknas Jokowi administration. Furthermore, it received financial aid from a member of Surakarta's parliament, Paulus Hartoyo (PDI-P), as well as shirts and pins from a member of the national parliament, Arya Bima.²⁰ Although it received aid, it was also self-sufficient in funding, particularly for its routine expenses (food, gasoline, etc.). It also worked with PDI-P through the Team of Nine, formally active at the municipal, district and sub-district levels. At several places in Serengan, for example, the party offered 'campaign specialists' as well as material aid (interview with Hartoyo, member of local parliament, 10 September 2014 and Krisnamukti, member of local parliament, 11 September 2014). Seknas Muda Jokowi Surakarta met routinely, three to four times a week. Meetings were held at restaurants, as the organization had no headquarters.

POSTERA (Posko Center Rakyat, People's Central Command Post)

Posko Center Rakyat Jokowi Surakarta – henceforth the Center – a chapter of the national POSTERA movement, was established on 1 January 2014. Unlike the above two groups, the Center was initiated by a national activist, Agus Widiarto. He was one of the founders of the national POSTERA movement and lived in Surakarta. Together with J. Dasanta, he operated the Center out of the Manahan district (interview with Dasanta, head of POSTERA Central Java, 27 August 2014).

No detailed profile exists of the volunteers involved in this organization. Although the Center claims 1,200 members of all social and age groups, only six to ten of them are active. POSTERA issued identity cards for its members; aside from serving as proof of membership, these also prevented members from joining other groups. This indicates another dimension of volunteerism: inter-group competition.

Because POSTERA was formally established before Jokowi became a presidential candidate, its early focus was on mobilizing support for his candidacy. Activities shifted to promoting Jokowi's electoral victory after he was nominated by PDI-P;²¹ and shifted again to monitoring and supporting the government after Jokowi's election. To promote Jokowi's candidacy with PDI-P, the Center mobilized support by collecting signatures. Meanwhile, to promote victory in the election, it put on several cultural events, including stage performances near its headquarters in Manahan as well as at Manahan Stadium. It also carried out door-to-door canvassing, distributing brochures and shirts, as well as plant seedlings (a common practice in Indonesian campaigns). In each activity, POSTERA emphasized that voting for Jokowi was a form of worship (interview with Agus Widiarto, Head of the Center, 27 August 2014). Unfortunately, none of its planned activities intended to monitor/support the Jokowi government once in power have been realized.

Financially, this group differed significantly from others in that its funding originated from a single source: Dasanta, who claimed to have spent some 286 million rupiah (equivalent to US\$21,000). The reason the Center did not receive assistance from other parties was not clearly articulated. However, it appears that Dasanta wanted total control over the group. As with BARA JP, the Center was linked to the national-level POSTERA, but there was no coordination between the two (interview with Dasanta, 3 September 2014). In May 2014, the Center began involving 17 other volunteer groups in its large-scale activities, during which each organization flew its own banner.

The Center utilized an interesting organizational model. On the one hand it presented itself as a national network, but on the other hand its approaches and funding were highly individual. This appears to be linked to Dasanta's position on volunteers, whom he viewed as being civilians who are protesting the political system (including politics). In presidential elections, volunteers thus seek the best leader. However, at the individual level volunteering has a specific function: 'giving personal satisfaction when a candidate wins' (interview with Dasanta, 4 September 2014).

Model 2: Independent Local-Based Volunteers

The second pattern found in Surakarta is the manifestation of local volunteer organizations. Those following this model are completely initiated by local actors. They have minimal contact with or influence from national-level organizations. Several examples, representing three important variants of this model in Surakarta, are discussed here and shown in Table 3. The first two case studies represent the network/organization-based variant; the third case represents the territorial-based variant; and the final two cases represent the individual-based variant.

Network/Organization-Based Volunteers

Wijaya Kusuma

In Grogol, Sukoharjo, on the border between Sukoharjo and Surakarta, there emerged a volunteer organization named Wijaya Kusuma, which was derived from the micro-financial institution of the same name. Wijaya Kusuma has been active in savings and loans since 2013, with 180 members spread throughout 14 villages (interview with Suhasto, Head of Wijaya Kusuma, 15 August 2014). Members are loyal supporters of PDI-P, having regularly voted for this party in elections. This volunteer group was launched on 1 June 2014, less than a month before the presidential election, having been inspired by Jokowi's populist style of leadership. More than that, however, members were united in terms of class and regional solidarity. Jokowi's origins among the lower classes of Solo – their own socio-economic and regional origins – was the main reference point for these individuals when making the decision to volunteer, along with their party identification. Although they had little time, they still organized several activities, including gathering signatures from New Solo residents, collecting 1,000 rupiah (less than US\$0.10) notes for Jokowi, and door-to-door campaigning. To increase their effectiveness, they divided themselves into territorial units, with each village coordinated by one person. Fourteen village coordinators were active in Grogol District, all of whom distributed pamphlets, stickers, pins and banners to provide residents with information.

Wijaya Kusuma once worked with BARA JP, when the two volunteer groups collaborated on an action at the New Solo Roundabout. The former also received pamphlets from BARA JP, which were used to reach

TABLE 3. Forms of Independent Local-Based Volunteers

No	Types of Volunteer		Member-ship	Work Methods	Financing	Relation with other organiza-tions
1	Network Organi-zations-Based Volunteers	Wijaya Kusuma	Peer group	Door-to-door campaign Distributed pamphlets, stickers, pins, banners Fundrais-ing	Member-ship dues Donation	Dependent
		Sahabat Jokowi (Friends of Jokowi)	Loose member-ship	Focused on online activities Distributed stickers, magazines, movie	Founder and his col-leagues	Indepen-dent
2	Territo-rial-Based Volunteers	Kampung Relawan Jokowi (Village of Volunteers for Jokowi)	Residents of Kam-pong Gam-birsari	Consolidate voters ter-ritorially	Residents dues	Indepen-dent
3	Individual-Based Volunteers	Mayor Haristanto		Sporadic Held exhibi-tion	By himself and with colleagues	Indepen-dent
		Sri Muly-aningsih		Sporadic Door-to-door Social media	By herself	Dependent

potential voters. Wijaya Kusuma received no logistic aid from political parties or from outside actors; all its activities and logistics were funded through membership dues. In fact, it assisted PDI-P in establishing posts in several villages. Wijaya Kusuma argued that, by supporting Jokowi, it would bring its members prosperity. As with other groups, members understood their volunteer activities as needing no recompense.

Sahabat Jokowi (Friends of Jokowi)

Sahabat Jokowi was a local-based volunteer group established on the initiative of Eddy Pramono, who also served as its chair.²² Pramono was a well-known local figure active in various fields. He owned a photography studio, taught as a guest lecturer at Slamet Riyadi University, Surakarta, and served as an advertising consultant for legislative and executive candidates. Pramono had been close to Jokowi since 2005, when he served as photographer for Jokowi's mayoral campaign team. He has continued to photograph Jokowi during the latter's activities in Surakarta.

Sahabat Jokowi targeted young and first-time voters. As such, it was most active on social networks such as Facebook, which it used for public outreach. Aside from its ability to reach young voters, social media was selected because of its expedience and ease of access. Social media was also selected to fill gaps that received no attention from other political parties. To organize its activities, the group engaged nine volunteers, working shifts and thus ensuring 24-hour activity. They monitored and utilized material from posts on the pro-Jokowi group Facebooker Lovers for Jokowi.

Although it focused on online activities, Sahabat Jokowi was also involved in campaigning offline. A prominent example was its branding of a Volkswagen with Jokowi's image (Figure 1). This car was displayed in strategic areas on Car Free Day, a weekly event held on a major thoroughfare since 16 May 2010, and drew considerable attention from passers-by, who used it as a backdrop for their photos. Many of these were uploaded to social media, particularly Facebook, and thus promoted knowledge of Jokowi. This group also prepared and distributed stickers, magazines and films about Jokowi to combat rumours and provide more diverse information on the candidate (interview with Pramono, 2 September 2014).

In his activities, Pramono received aid – particularly financial – from his friends. One of the cars branded with Jokowi's image came from Helmi Yahya, Pramono's colleague in the Surakarta photographers' community. Pramono himself donated his time, energy and multime-

dia expertise (interview with Pramono, 9 September 2014). Unlike the groups mentioned above, who kept their distance from political parties, Sahabat Jokowi communicated frequently with PDI-P. Pramono and his partners regularly voted for PDI-P and were familiar to party administrators. However, Sahabat Jokowi kept its distance from other volunteer groups – particularly those with ties to Jakarta – to ensure its freedom and independence. This group also had a different image of Jokowi. As stated by Pramono, he became a volunteer because he believed Jokowi to be the perfect 'general' and 'imam' for the future of Indonesia – offer-

FIGURE 1. Jokowi's mother, Sudjiatmi Notomihardjo, with a Volkswagen belonging to Sahabat Jokowi



Source: Eddy Pramono

ing a combination of military and religious leadership. However, like other volunteer groups, Sahabat Jokowi members saw themselves as participating out of their own concern for the nation's fate. They believed that, through successful implementation of policy (as previously seen in Surakarta), Jokowi could contribute significantly to national politics. Together with the arguments of the territory-based group discussed below, this reveals another dimension of the volunteerism phenomenon: it is linked to candidates' programmes and their capacity to deliver said programmes. It is thus not solely about candidates' charisma.

Territory-Based Volunteers

Kampung Relawan Jokowi (Village of Volunteers for Jokowi)

Gambirsari, Kadipiro Subdistrict, Banjarsari District, Surakarta, is a settlement known as the Kampung Relawan Jokowi. It was initiated and declared by residents of RW (a semi-governmental administrative structure below the village) 13, Gambirsari, in June 2014, without local government or party interference. Residents announced their support

for Jokowi because they considered him to have been effective as mayor. He was considered an exemplary leader, one who often became involved in and showed concern for the common people. As one resident stated, Jokowi's frequent visits gave them a sense of pride and shared destiny. Jokowi had masterminded construction of the Talud irrigation canal, pioneered an anti-dengue fever movement, established education parks, celebrated the birthdays of the elderly, spearheaded a child-friendly city and opened a bridge (interview with Mulyono, planner of Kampung Relawan Jokowi, 9 September 2014).

The establishment of Kampung Relawan Jokowi was not as ambitious as those of other groups: it was intended solely to consolidate voters in this residential area. To do so, they worked together every week, particularly near election day, and also established a place for people to gather and socialize. Towards the end of June 2014, residents put up large photographs of Jokowi and his activities as mayor of Surakarta along the road, hoping that residents would remember their progress under Jokowi's leadership.

All activities of community members were funded and their equipment purchased by residents themselves. They neither worked with nor received aid from other groups. Their activities were likewise limited in scope to their own neighbourhood. And their strategy was effective, as shown by the fact that Jokowi received 96 per cent of the area's 2,323 votes – well above his average in Surakarta (84.36 per cent).

Individual-Based Volunteers

The third variant of the local-based organizational model is individual, involving persons acting on their own. The following section discusses two such actors: Mayor Haristanto and Sri Mulyaningsih, better known as Sri Gunting. These two individuals present different profiles.

Mayor Haristanto

Mayor Haristanto, an artist also involved in event organizing and advertising, was president of the Creative Headquarters for President Jokowi (Posko Kreatif Jokowi Presiden) as well as an active volunteer. He supported Jokowi not only during the latter's presidential campaign, but also in the mayoral campaign. Although he disapproved of Jokowi's plans to run for governor of Jakarta in 2012, he still supported this candidate after Jokowi was nominated by PDI-P.

FIGURE 2. Photographs of Jokowi posted in the Jokowi Volunteer Village



Source: http://www.timlo.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/IMG_2397.jpg

His activities, often unique – including holding a student body election at a mall, and setting the records for the most people kissing a flag, the most people eating eggs simultaneously, and for the most people drawing on the pavement in chalk and so on – have led to him becoming a newsmaker in Surakarta. He holds 31 records from the Indonesian Record Museum (Museum Rekor Indonesia, MURI) set over 15 years (interview with Haristanto, 9 September 2014). Such approaches were intended to draw the interest of the public, which he believed would also attract the attention of the mass media. Media coverage afforded him the opportunity to reach broader audiences without spending much money. This scheme also allowed him to criticize conventional fundraising techniques, in which the masses are mobilized by political parties. According to Haristanto, the conventional approach requires significant resources and carries great risk but has questionable effectiveness.

Haristanto's activities were not only politically motivated; they also had business aspects. He admitted that, in every volunteer activity, he would proudly show the logo of Republik Aeng-Aeng, his event organization company, and that this promotion was quite effective. Nonetheless, Haristanto emphasized that volunteerism must be sincere. As with other volunteers, he viewed Jokowi as a 'nice man' and stated

that the political and economic dimensions of volunteer activities have not yet been adequately exploited.

Unlike the formal procedures of many volunteer groups, Haristanto followed no fixed schedule or routine in his activities. He explained that he acted as he pleased. If he felt a desire or had an idea, he would act. This was possible because he did not rely on others in his activities. The ability to act without a schedule is characteristic of individual-based volunteerism, as also shown by the experiences of Sri Mulyaningsih. However, it must be noted that independence in volunteer activity does not mean independence in financing. As Haristanto said, although he funded his activities himself at first, over time he received financial aid from two entrepreneurs in Surakarta.

Sri Mulyaningsih

Sri Mulyaningsih was another volunteer who acted on her own. She worked selling gudeg (prepared jackfruit) in the Banjarsari area. She decided to volunteer independently for two main reasons. First, she did not want to be ordered about by other groups, and second, because she felt that such groups' activities were ineffective in gathering support. Unlike most volunteers discussed here, Mulyaningsih had a lengthy history of activism and political activity. In the early 1980s, when she was still in senior high school, she was a member of the Youth Red Cross in Yogyakarta. In 1985, she became a member of PDI in Yogyakarta, acting as a field coordinator for fundraising. In 1990, she married, and over the next ten years she withdrew from activism. In 1999, she moved to Surakarta, where she decided to again become active in politics following the drastic political changes in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998 (interview with Mulyaningsih, 16 September 2014). Mulyaningsih's case indicates that Reformasi both created space for activists to return to Indonesian politics and gave them a motive to do so.

Mulyaningsih began actively supporting Jokowi during the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election, when she joined the Bekasi-based movement 'Sundari 3 Jari' (Three Finger Sundari). Through the training offered by this group, she obtained the knowledge and skills needed to work with others in new situations. In the lead-up to the 2014 presidential election, she received further training during a five-day congress in Jakarta, sponsored by the women's branch of BARA JP. She got further experience when she joined the campaign teams of several PDI-P candidates competing for seats in the Surakarta and national parliaments – Roy Saputro, Didik Prasetyo and Indra Kramadipa – with the support

of Unggul, a member of the National Team for Jokowi (Tim Nasional Jokowi) and the Coalition for a Great Indonesia (Rumah Koalisi Indonesia Hebat).

Although she was independent, Mulyaningsih also communicated with other volunteers, including those in Jakarta. She also had a POSTERA identity card, which she used pragmatically to ease her own movement. She emphasized that, going by her experiences, such an identity card was useful evidence of legitimacy to show suspicious potential voters, and it served as a 'password' of sorts to ensure access to volunteer organizations. For example, her membership of POSTERA allowed her to join the Srikandi Congress of BARA JP, which required participants to be members of certain groups (interview with Mulyaningsih, 18 August 2014). Many of the campaign material she used were purchased with her own funds. Unggul also offered some material support for her activities, including campaign aids such as stickers, pins and banners.

Mulyaningsih campaigned for Jokowi both online and offline. Online, she used Facebook to combat lies and attacks. Owing to her ability to 'cut through' her opponents' attacks, she became known as 'Sri Gunting' (Lady Scissors). Offline, she was involved in door-to-door campaign activities in many regions, including Bekonang in Sukoharjo Regency and Purwodadi in Grobogan Regency, some 67 kilometres from Surakarta, as well as coastal Gunungkidul in Yogyakarta Province. During her activities, she brought campaign materials such as pins, stickers and banners, to facilitate communication with potential voters.

Although Mulyaningsih was an individual volunteer, she did not work on her own. Her husband, Agus Purwoko, played an important role in facilitating her mobility. Together, they went to different regions without any prior planning. Their efforts were widely discussed and appreciated among other volunteers, as shown by Mulyaningsih being selected as one of 88 volunteers sent to a national BARA JP event in Surabaya on 31 August 2014. As with other volunteers, Mulyaningsih adapted her activities in the face of local developments and the funds available to her. During Ramadan, for instance, she distributed takjil – in the form of gudeg – in Banyuwangi. When she received 1,000 soursop seedlings from PROSPERA, she distributed them to the ethnic Chinese community in Surakarta. Meanwhile, her stickers and other materials, aside from being used during her door-to-door campaigning, were also distributed along the main roads of Surakarta (MT Haryono and Ahmad Yani). On election day, 9 July 2014, she distributed 400 portions

of gudeg as a form of thanksgiving. She again distributed food when the General Elections Committee formally announced Jokowi's victory on 23 July 2014.

Mulyaningsih's knowledge of Jokowi was unique, as he had frequented her renowned gudeg stall in Surakarta. She decided to become a volunteer because she was impressed by his simplicity and concern for the poor. As such, she was certain that he could offer honest governance and lower market prices. She considered her volunteering a form of protest against the government's poor performance to date. As she stated in her interview, volunteering was her way to 'demand positive change'. This argument signifies two points: aside from Jokowi's charisma, social class identifications were an important factor in the decision to volunteer, as was candidates' capacity to deliver on their promises.

Concluding Remarks: Implications for Democracy

The discussion has indicated various key points. First, the rise and expansion of volunteerism in Indonesia is linked closely to changes in the process through which presidents are selected, from indirect elections through the People's Consultative Assembly to direct popular elections. This shift has challenged party elites' monopoly and offered the public previously unimagined space for political activity, as shown by volunteer groups becoming prominent in Jokowi's successful presidential campaign in 2014. At the same time, this shift has opened space for alternative leaders who may enter politics through non-traditional channels. Jokowi is part of this process. Far from simply becoming a 'new leader', he was perceived as the embodiment of good leadership, being surrounded by 'innocent people' and having the capacity to effectively deliver government programmes.

Second, the rise of pro-Jokowi volunteers indicates a transformation of ideas and practices around volunteerism. A sense of personal obligation to a particular recipient and a feeling of spontaneity have become central to volunteers' motivations and approaches. This is diametrically opposed to classical understandings of volunteerism. Third, the data collected indicates that only six to ten members of each volunteer group are active. However, these people have the capacity to expand their social bases, become properly involved and transform stand-by citizens into political actors. Fourth, volunteer groups' selection of issues, activities, media and approaches have been sufficient to transform them into colossi with a significant presence both online and offline. Fifth, this article has shown

another interesting aspect: comparison of volunteers' profiles, both as groups and individuals, indicates that volunteerism as an overarching movement is classless, gender blind and age blind, while volunteerism in its organizational forms at the local grassroots level seems to be class based, gender based and/or age based.

Finally, in relation to the future of Indonesian democracy, amidst the expansion of political pragmatism in Indonesian elections, the rise of volunteer movements has reinvigorated the spirit of activism and volunteerism in the political process, including funding. In Indonesia, where the public does not trust 'electoral institutions', this has promoted optimism for the future. Examining the organizational models, approaches, methods and motivations used by pro-Jokowi groups, it is clear not only that citizen-initiated campaigns have become integral to restoring activism and volunteerism as foundations for democracy, but that this has occurred without consideration of class or gender. This suggests a promising future for Indonesian democracy. However, to what extent this optimism will be converted into tangible benefits remains unknown. Volunteerism in Indonesia is still in its formative phase, and thus it requires time to develop as an ideology, political movement and organizational model and thereby support democratization.

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NOTES

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- 2 Nikolai Holmov 2015, 'Political Voluntarism', *Odessa Talk*, <http://www.odessatalk.com/2015/10/political-voluntarism-odessa/> (accessed 28 June 2016).
 - 3 The Teman Ahok volunteer group consisted of youths, mostly aged 23 to 25. Its five founders, Amalia Ayuningtyas, Singgih Widiyastono, Aditya Yogi Prabowo, Muhammad Fathony and Richard Haris Purwasaputra, had known each other since their days with Jakarta Baru ('New Jakarta'), which supported Jokowi–Ahok in the 2012 gubernatorial election. In the 2017 election, Teman Ahok first dedicated itself to collecting a million identity cards from Jakarta residents so that Ahok could run as an independent candidate. Friski Riana 2016, 'Teman Ahok, Anak Muda yang Melawan "Gajah" Politik' (Teman Ahok, Youths Fighting the Political "Elephant"), *Tempo*, <https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2016/03/15/214753630/teman-ahok-anak-muda-yang-melawan-gajah-politik> (accessed 27 October 2016).
 - 4 After winning the first round of the Jakarta gubernatorial elections with 42.99% of votes, ahead of Anies–Sandi (39.95%) and Agus–Silvy (17.02%), Ahok–Djarot lost (42.04%) to Anies–Sandi (57.96%) in the second round following accusations of blasphemy. This defeat, however, did not stop the volunteer movements supporting him, which have continued their activities even with Ahok in prison.
 - 5 Caroline Damanik 2014, 'Jokowi–JK Menang di Solo, FX Rudy Batal Mundur dari Ketua DPC' (Jokowi–JK Victorious in Solo, FX Rudy Fails to Resign as Chair of DPC), *Kompas*, <http://regional.kompas.com/read/2014/07/23/16421381/Jokowi-JK.Menang.di.Solo.FX.Rudy.Batal.Mundur.dari.Ketua.DPC> (accessed 4 November 2014); Eri Komar Sinaga 2014, 'KPU: Jokowi–JK Peroleh Suara 53,15 Persen dan Prabowo–Hatta 46,85 Persen' (Jokowi–JK Obtain 53.15 Per Cent of Votes and Prabowo–Hatta 46.85 Per Cent), *Tribun*, <http://www.tribunnews.com/pemilu-2014/2014/07/22/kpu-jokowi-jk-peroleh-suara-5315-persen-dan-prabowo-hatta-4685-persen> (accessed 27 October 2014).
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- 10 Kaligis 2015, 'Mengenang Tragedi Berdarah 27 Juli 1996' (Remembering the Bloody Tragedy of 27 July 1996), <http://www.berdikarionline.com/mengenang-tragedi-berdarah-27-juli-1996/> (accessed 5 June 2016).
 - 11 Committee for General Elections 2008, 'Pemilu 1999' (Election of 1999), <http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999> (accessed 7 June 2016).
 - 12 Arie Sunaryo 2014, 'PDI-P Rajai Perolehan Suara Pileg di Solo' (PDI-P Leads in Votes for Legislative Election in Solo), *Merdeka.com*. <http://www.merdeka.com/politik/pdip-rajai-perolehan-suara-pileg-di-solo.html> (accessed 5 June 2016).
 - 13 JASMEV was launched on 12 August 2012. It was designed to convey information about Jokowi and Ahok through social media (Twitter, Facebook, Kaskus, YouTube) and the blogosphere. During the 2014 presidential election, JASMEV was transformed into 'Jokowi Advanced Social Media Volunteers' and dedicated to campaigning for Jokowi.
 - 14 The Relawan Garuda Social Media actively campaigned on Facebook, Twitter and the blogosphere for Central Javan gubernatorial candidate Ganjar Pranowo and his running mate Heru Sudjatmoko.
 - 15 Erik Amna and Joakim Ekman identify three types of citizens: active citizens, manifestly passive citizens and stand-by citizens, who 'stay alert, keep themselves informed about politics, and are willing and able to participate if needed. In short, they can be seen as potential political participants, which contrasts with citizens who are genuinely passive by virtue of doing nothing and by shunning politics altogether'.
 - 16 When first established, BARA JP was intended to urge Megawati Soekarnoputri and PDI-P to nominate Jokowi as their presidential candidate, a mission realized by collecting signatures, fingerprints and identity cards. Its founders included Sihol Manullang, Syafti Hidayat, Utje Gustaaf Patty and Ferdinandus Semaun.
 - 17 Seknas Jokowi was established on 15 December 2013. Its administrators included Dadang Juliantara, M. Yamin, Samuel Pangarepan, Antonius Prajasto and Sereida Tambunan. It served as the national secretariat of various regional organizations, communities and initiatives that supported the presidential candidacy and election of Jokowi. Branches of Seknas Jokowi included Seknas Muda Jokowi, Seknas Perempuan Pendukung Jokowi (National Secretariat of Women Supporting Jokowi), Seknas Petani Jokowi (National Secretariat of Farmers for Jokowi), Seknas Advokat Jokowi (National Secretariat of Lawyers for Jokowi) and Seknas PKL Jokowi (National Secretariat of Street Vendors for Jokowi). The administrators of Seknas Muda Jokowi at the national level were Ajianto Dwi Nugroho and RirinSefsani.
 - 18 The word *takjil* originates from Arabic and means 'refreshment'. More specifically, it refers to the refreshment breaking the fast with a starter dish.
 - 19 This information, which originated from an interview with Tiead Andika Gilham, was confirmed by Y. Dasanta, the head of POSTERA for Central Java. Surakarta, 27 August 2014.
 - 20 This information, which originated from an interview with Tiead Andika Gilham, was confirmed by Paulus Hartoyo, 12 September 2014, and Aria Bima, 17 September 2014.
 - 21 PDI-P announced Jokowi's candidacy on 14 March 2014.
 - 22 The name Sahabat Jokowi was found not only in Surakarta, but also at the national level. However, the Sahabat Jokowi in Surakarta was unrelated to the one at the national level.

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