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The Emotional Life of Governmental Power
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ABSTRACT: This paper explores the emotional life of governmental power through the affective domains of confidence and respect in criminal justice, in the context of a climate of insecurities and uncertainties with existing modes of governance. The paper problematises some of the key tenets of the governmentality thesis and questions its core assumptions about forms of rationality, processes of subjectivation and the conditions of possibility for ethical conduct. It also prompts us to reconsider the tenets of contemporary neo-liberal governance, its “rationalities of rule,” technologies and apparatuses, how these work to capture hearts as well as minds, and how these may promote an “emotionalised” art of government such that we might properly speak of “emotionalities of rule.”

Keywords: Governmentality; Foucault; subjectivation; rationalities; emotionalities; Deleuze; the fold; criminal justice; security; confidence.

Introduction
Studies in governmentality have opened up our understanding of how neo-liberal strategies of rule govern through the self-regulated, entrepreneurial, competitive choices of autonomous individuals who exercise economic, political and social rationality in the choices and decisions they make. As Burchell puts it, “(g)overnment increasingly impinges upon individuals in their very individuality, in their practical relationships to themselves in the conduct of their lives; it concerns them at the very heart of themselves by making its rationality the condition of their active freedom.” Throughout Foucaultian accounts of neo-liberalism we consistently encounter a citizenry of responsibilised subjects who self-integrate into a myriad of “calculative regimes,”

1 Earlier versions of aspects of this paper were presented at the Stockholm Criminology Symposium held at the University of Stockholm, 4-6 June 2007, paper entitled “Public confidence as an emotionality of rule;” and at the Fifth Social Theory Forum, held at the University of Massachusetts, 16-17 April 2008, paper entitled “Powers of life and death in the governance of affect.” I am grateful to conference delegates for their constructive feedback and comments on the paper. I am also indebted to the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful and fulsome reviews of this article. These have been invaluable to shaping the final version of the paper.

subscribe to their own privatised forms of “risk-management” and adopt an ethics of “utilitarianism” such that they maximise their lifestyles and then (mis)take these as a product of their own personal choice. According to this description, it would seem that neo-liberal subjects have a purely instrumental relation to themselves and others; identifications with governmental technologies and practices, and obligations to align themselves with them, is represented as a purely cognitive affair. I have no difficulty in accepting the view that the figure of a self-actualising citizen is “the most fundamental, and most generalizable, characteristic of these new rationalities of government,” but what is understated, and largely ignored in this perspective, is the possibility of a neo-liberal subject who is “actualised” by something other than (or as well as) governmental reason. In short, the governmentality thesis appears to make little room for responsibilised individuals who may “decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as subjects of desire,” and whose affective selves, therefore, constitute a key site for the exercise of governmental power.

This focus follows, and builds on Rose’s influential work on the genealogy of the self in which he expounds “the technologies and techniques that hold personhood – identity, selfhood, autonomy and individuality – in place.” In this work, Rose acknowledges that desire, passions, sentiments and emotions are integral to such technologies, but he does not explicate this theoretically and provides no conceptual tools for understanding the governmental relations of affective life. Similarly, and inspired by Spinozan philosophy, a range of scholarship has consolidated what Patricia Clough has identified as an “affective turn” in the humanities and social sciences. However, it is not until the collection of original essays edited by Clough and Halley that affect is theorized as having political potential within relations of power – a perspective which moves beyond Massumi’s supposition of affect as “pre-social.” As the sub-title of the collection suggests, here is a series of papers which see the affective turn as necessary, if not central to “theorizing the social,” and which explore the affective life of, inter alia, organised sex

9 For this argument, see Patricia Ticineto Clough, “Introduction,” in Patricia Ticineto Clough & Jean Halley (eds.), *The Affective Turn*, 2.
work, health care training, Korean diaspora, cinematic technologies and fashion modeling. It is in this spirit that this paper uses the domain of criminal justice, security and crime control in an age of risk and uncertainty as a lens through which to investigate the emotional life of governmental power.

In many respects, a focus on emotional life problematises some of the key tenets of the governmentality thesis and forces us to question some of its core assumptions about forms of rationality, processes of subjectivation and the conditions of possibility for ethical conduct. It also prompts us to reconsider the tenets of contemporary neo-liberal governance, its “rationalities of rule,” technologies and apparatuses, how these work to capture hearts as well as minds, and how these may promote an “emotionalised” art of government. The discussion is divided into three parts. The first explores forms of rationality and makes the case for thinking about the mutually sustaining relationship between cognition and affectivity, between the instrumental and expressive capacities of the subject of power. The discussion moves on to consider processes of subjectivation, paying particular attention to the problematic of Foucault’s “subject-less subject.” Using a framework based on the Deleuzian notion of “the fold,” the third part of the discussion sets out a case study exploring the affective domains of confidence and respect to suggest ways in which subjectivities of affect constitute a key site for the exercise of governmental power. The case study centres on a period of intensified and highly mediated governmental concern for freedom, protection (from risk) and the minimisation of harm and threat from dangerous others. Though it refers to a particularly eventful year in the United Kingdom, 2006, the case study explores a range of contemporary modes of government which are by no means exceptional, but are fairly typical of governmental mechanisms deployed in the name of security and which seek to reassure the public and restore confidence in, and respect for systems of governance.

1. Forms of Rationality

Foucault’s interest in rationality should not be confused with the Weberian conception and analysis of rationality as a global and historical process. As Smart points out, for Weber, a process of rationalization had permeated all spheres of social life such that he proposed it as the principal defining feature of modernity. By contrast, and at times defending himself against the allegation that his work “boils down to one and the same meta-anthropological or meta-historical process of rationalization,” Foucault emphasises the contextuality and historical variability of different forms of rationality, their specific functions and effects. Of all the forms, then, which “rationality” can take, a globalising, trans-historical and universal form is not amongst them. Rather, “rationalities of rule” are specific ways of thinking about how to govern at particular times and places. This is not a question of formulating and implementing some grand design distilled from political and philosophical analysis, or imposing a schema of governmental logic on an imperfect reality. “Rationalities” are discursive; they propose strategies, suggest reforms, identify problems, recommend solutions and constitute a series of

10 Barry Smart, Michel Foucault (London: Routledge, 2004), 138.
suppositions, instructions and assumptions which are encapsulated in discourses and knowledges that guide, advise and inform our ways of being in the world. As Rose reminds us, “(t)hese rationalities... operate not so much to describe the world as to make it thinkable and practicable under a particular description.”12 Lemke uses the phrase a “pragmatics of guidance”13 and goes on to assert that a political rationality is not some kind of pure, neutral knowledge, nor is it exterior to knowledge, but is an “element of government itself which helps to create a discursive field in which exercising power is “rational.””14 Lemke’s use of quotation marks to indicate the ambiguity of “rational” is significant here. He is drawing attention to Foucault’s rejection of any notion of an ideal, transcendental reason against which can be counterposed nonreason or irrationality. Foucault describes such a comparative exercise as “senseless”15 and he compares corporal and carceral forms of penalty to make the point:

The ceremony of public torture isn’t in itself more irrational than imprisonment in a cell; but it’s irrational in terms of a type of penal practice which involves new ways of calculating its utility, justifying it, graduating it, etc...16

Foucault’s refusal to evaluate systems of penalty by a criterion of scientific rationality is typical of postmodern accounts that regard reason and logic “on the same footing” as myth and magic.17 However, Foucault’s typicality is short-lived and he parts company from postmodern perspectives on ”rationality” by insisting that we should restrict our “use of this word to an instrumental and relative meaning.”18 Though he repeats here the importance of context-specificity, he nonetheless substitutes instrumentalism for ”reason” as the yardstick of ”rationality.” For those of a postmodernist persuasion, instrumental or purposive ways of ”reasoning” are especially objectionable since they emphasise utility, efficiency, reliability, durability, superiority, at the expense of expressive values and sentient forms of human existence. Even modernist commentators complain that Foucault is ”unduly instrumental and purposive;”19 or worse, that he subscribes to a ”dogmatic functionalism.”20

However, much of the evidence for these accusations centres on his theoretical work on disciplinary and bio-power, suggesting that while critique may be analytically persuasive, it is nonetheless specific to Foucault’s genealogical studies and is primarily relevant to his contemporary focus on disciplinary society, bio-politics, surveillance and panopticism. Similarly, Foucault’s self-incriminating assertion of the utilitarian ethos of ”rationalities” should not be overstated or taken as his only or last word on the matter. It is debatable, for example, whether,

14 Ibid., 55.
16 Foucault, ”Questions of Method,” 79.
18 Foucault, ”Questions of Method,” 79.
19 David Garland, ”Frameworks of Inquiry in the Sociology of Punishment,” British Journal of Sociology, 41, 1 (1990), 3
20 Ibid., 4.
in using the term “instrumental,” Foucault is referring to an ambitious schema of calculative, technocratic utility, or to something more modest, such as the “practical” or “do-able” qualities of governmental techniques, discourses and practices in their experiential immediacy – “rationalities,” then, as a sort of everyday “how-to” or “know-how.” Such an interpretation does not, therefore, exclude a consideration of what we might usefully term “emotionalities of rule”– that is, discursive and material forms which propose and suppose particular ways of feeling about the world. We could suggest, then, that “rationalities of rule” is a more inclusive concept than has hitherto been suggested, and refers to all manner of governmental technologies and apparatuses that render practicable how to think, how to act, and how to feel.

On purely nominal grounds, we might refer to processes that sustain the emotional life of governmental power as “emotionalities of rule.” This does not suggest their opposition to “rationalities of rule,” but encourages an inclusive frame of reference that recognises the mutually sustaining relationship between the cognitive and instrumental, on the one hand, and the affective and the expressive, on the other. Put another way, in order for neo-liberal subjects to think differently about the choices and decisions they can make, they may also need to learn to feel differently about them.

2. Processes of Subjectivation

Many scholars have been swift to point out how governmentality recognises the multi-dimensionality of power relations, and suggest that the thesis overcomes much of what was regarded as Foucault’s one-dimensional focus on disciplinary power and forces of domination. As Lemke puts it; the notion of governmentality has “innovative potential” in so far as it recognises how power is both an objectivizing and a subjectivizing force, bringing into view the idea of a constituted-constituting subject permanently positioned within the interstice of individualising power and individual freedom. McNay suggests that one of the key analytical advantages to Foucault’s concept of governmental power over that of disciplinary power is that it introduces the idea of an active subject who has the capacity to resist the “individualizing and totalizing forces of modern power structures.”

Endowed with a capacity for resistance, a citizenry of (neo-)liberal subjects are capable, then, of transforming, subverting and challenging governmental relations of all kinds – from a refusal to commit to a healthy diet, to a failure to provide evidence as a witness of crime, through to a rejection of the need to recycle in the name of environmental protection. Implicitly, then, resistance is configured as a matter of self-reflexive choice or personal motivation to opt out of, ignore or dissociate from particular technologies and practices. This sits easily within a model of generative, autonomous agency, but is difficult to square with Foucault’s idea of subjectivation which denotes the dialectical nature of constraint and freedom – that “the subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices

21 McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction, 123.
of liberation, of liberty."  

24 McNay complains that Foucault fails to offer a satisfactory account of agency and that he vacillates "between moments of determinism and voluntarism."  

25 Butler is critical of the term "subjectivation," seeing it as paradoxical in so far as it "denotes both the becoming of the subject and the process of subjection – one inhabits the figure of autonomy only by becoming subjected to a power, a subjection which implies a radical dependency."  

26 Tie points out that Foucault’s constructed subject stands in a difficult relationship to itself in as far as the reflexive self is unable to "strike a radically resistive, critical distance from the terms of its construction."  

Foucault’s failure to provide an account of agency makes it difficult, then, to distinguish practices of the self that are imposed on individuals through governmental sanctions and regulatory norms, from those which express relations of resistance. Equally there is no basis for understanding the nature of compliance – whether it is the consequence of self-reflexivity, or the realisation of a (perverse) attachment to subjection.

27 In a mixed economy of power relations wherein “individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized,”

28 processes of subjectivation can never be linear or homogenous. Consequently, Tie argues, the cumulative effects of this heterogeneity cannot be predicted, and in the absence of a hermeneutics of selfhood and agency, the "possibilities for resistive action will always emerge accidentally" rather than through a reflexive and critical process of self-realisation.

The problematic of Foucault’s "subject-less subject" continues to haunt his analytics of power and has generated a subsidiary scholarship that, in various ways, attempts to theorise governmental subjectivities. Psychoanalytical approaches feature prominently in this work and the contributions of Žižek, Butler and (the application of) Lacan, Klein and Freud to understanding the psychic dimensions of the constituted-constituting subject is of particular relevance. In an eloquent and perceptive article, Tie discusses the relative merits of these perspectives suggesting that "subjects" complicity in their subjectivation cannot be understood as being purely the effect of their positioning in discourse. Rather, their complicity has an “affective dimension.”

29 Of interest here is how that "affective dimension" is conceptualised within these particular psychoanalytical theories, and how it is mobilised as an exercise of power. Žižek, for example, talks of an "unconscious supplement," and posits a kind of sub-terranean reservoir of feeling which exists as Other to sovereign power, and which “provides enjoyment which serves

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28 Foucault, “Afterword: the Subject and Power,” 221.

29 Tie, 165.

30 Ibid., 161, Emphasis added.
as the unacknowledged support of meaning.”\(^{31}\) However, it is debatable how far (or whether) Žižek’s thesis adequately addresses the question of agency, but this is of less concern here than his formulation of an “unconscious supplement.” It is not clear, for example, why “economies of pleasure” are regarded as “extra-discursive,” and therefore positioned in a pre-linguistic realm of the unconscious. This would seem to support an essentialist position that posits the notion of a pre-social, biological and “extra-conscious” realm of emotionality.

Meanwhile, for Butler, the “self-realisation” of the constituting subject occurs in a moment of trauma induced by a continual inability to constitute the self as a coherent and complete entity. Butler posits the endless need to reiterate “who we are” as demonstrative of the incoherence of selfhood, a state of affairs which emerges from an unruly residue of psychic life “which exceeds the imprisoning effects of the discursive demand to inhabit a coherent identity, to become a coherent subject.”\(^{32}\) The psychic in Butler circulates in zones of un-intelligibility, is surplus to the requirements for subject-hood and is disruptive to it. This is a pretty familiar psychoanalytic account of resistance. For example, in Rose,\(^{33}\) the disruptive potential of the psyche is read through the Lacanian lens of an “alienating destiny” wherein the subject is rendered permanently unstable through the constitutive loss of (the possibility of) self-identification. In Jefferson,\(^{34}\) the ambivalence of Mike Tyson’s selfhood (as convicted rapist, as superstar boxer, as hypermasculine stud, as “juvenile delinquent,” and as “little fairy boy”) is understood through the Kleinian notion of an anxiety-reducing, psychical defence-mechanism. Tie invokes the Freudian motif of “the uncanny” as a “special shade of anxiety”\(^{35}\) which arises from “a return of unresolved psychic dilemmas”\(^{36}\) – such as the realisation that what had seemed familiar (a sense of self, for example) turns out to be disturbingly and, perhaps, pleasurably strange. Similarly, Butler has applied Freud’s concept of melancholia to understand the trauma of the impossibility of coherent subject formation; as she puts it, “the melancholia that grounds the subject (and hence always threatens to unsettle and disrupt that ground) signals an incomplete and irresolvable grief.”\(^{37}\)

In each account, subjects’ resistance is located in an affective dimension of psychic life – alienation, anxiety, uncanniness and melancholia. As such, it is not clear how these various psychic (or emotional) states reformulate or subvert the conditions of subjection, or redirect the discursive and material effects of power, so much as remain in a state of permanent powerlessness at the margins of subject formation. And what are we to make of a psychic life that is


\(^{32}\) Butler, 86.


\(^{36}\) Tie, 170.

\(^{37}\) Butler, 23.
energised by such a limited repertoire of emotions? “Good humours” such as delight, excitement, satisfaction and optimism do not feature in a psychoanalytic register of affects; yet there are no grounds to suppose that any emotional state – apart from apathy, perhaps – cannot be experienced as excess. Citing de Beauvoir, McNay notes, “the language of psychoanalysis suggests that the drama of the individual unfolds only within the self and this obscures the extent to which the individual’s life and actions involve primarily a “relation to the world.” There is clearly merit in drawing attention to the libidinal, kinetic energy of psychic life as a destabilising force, but without an account of intersubjective relations, in which power is always implicated, it induces/incites neither complicity nor resistance within processes of subjectivation.

A significant route out of this impasse is found within the Deleuzian notion of “the fold.” Deleuze invents this metaphor to denote a “zone of subjectivation,” adding that “subjectivation is created by folding.” “The fold” does not presume a self with any essential interiority; nor is it the effect of an exterior field of power relations; it is, rather “a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities.” The notion of “the fold,” then, not only rejects psychoanalytical suppositions of an interiorised psyche, but also addresses (and overcomes) the paradox of Foucault’s constituted-constituting subject. As far as Deleuze is concerned “self-realisation” has nothing to do with a psychic residue or unconscious excess, neither is it the effect of the limits and exclusions of individualising practices; he argues:

There never “remains” anything of the subject, since he (sic) is to be created on each occasion, like a focal point of resistance, on the basis of the folds which subjectivize knowledge and bend each power... The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis.”

Deleuze’s thesis of enfolding has been taken up by a number of governmentality theorists, most notably Dean, whose essay stands, perhaps, as the clearest exemplar of Deleuzian-Foucauldian eclecticism on matters of government. Dean undertakes what he refers to as a “critical ontology of our selves” to explore how modes of “governmental authority,” and “rationalities of rule” are doubled or enfolded into our ways of being, thinking and doing – “(i)n this sense,” he

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39 McNay, Gender and Agency, 129.
40 Gilles Deleuze, “Foldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation),” in Michael Kelly (ed.), Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate (Cambridge: MIT, 1995), 337 Diagram.
41 Ibid., 323.
43 In “Afterword: The Subject and Power”, Foucault talks of struggles against the ‘government of individuation’ which ties an individual to ‘his own identity in a constraining way’ (Ibid., 212.) However, he leaves us with no analytical tools to think through how, in these ‘moments of struggle,’ we can overcome the submission of subjectivity.
44 Deleuze, 325.
writes, “one might speak of a folding of exterior relations of authority to sculpt a domain that can act on and of itself but which, at the same time, is simply the inside marked out by that folding.”46 As valuable as this work is for thinking about processes of subjectivation as the “enfolding of authority,” it rests on a somewhat selective and partial reading of Deleuze, one which has the effect of obscuring from view the enfolding of “emotionalities of rule.” It is a surprising oversight given that most commentators acknowledge the complementarity of Foucault’s machinic theory of power, and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s machinic theory of desire.47 In Deleuze and Guattari, desire is regarded as the productive motor force of social relations. In Anti-Oedipus, they assert:

We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product of desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production. There is only desire and the social, and nothing else.48

From within this schema, affects are conceptualised as forces of desire, continuously flowing as “intensities of movement, rhythm, gesture and energy.”49 Affects follow “lines of flight,” escaping “planes of consistency,” such as centred subjectivity and habitual routines, moving in unpredictable directions as a deterrioralising and productive wave of libidinal energy. As Patton summarises, “the feeling of power is an affect which is associated with a process of becoming-other than what one was before.”50

It is this notion of “becoming-other” as an “enfolding” of “emotionalities of rule” that I want to unpack in the remainder of this paper.51 Based on Foucault’s original framework set out in The Use of Pleasure,52 Deleuze outlines “four folds of subjectivation;”53 this frame of reference has been applied to great effect by Dean54 to elaborate the “enfolding of authority,” and it is being used here to structure and inform an exploration of the “enfolding of emotionality” using the affective domains of confidence and respect as a case study. The analysis develops four key aspects for thinking about the “emotional self” as a problem of government; this involves, as

48 Deleuze and Guattari, 29.
50 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 74-75, Emphasis added.
51 See also, Elaine Campbell, “Narcissism as ethical practice? Foucault, askesis and an ethics of becoming,” Cultural Sociology, 4, 1 (2010), 23-44.
53 Deleuze, 323.
54 Dean, “Foucault, Government and the Enfolding of Authority.”
Dean puts it, posing “questions of ascetics (the governing work)… ones of ontology (the governed material), deontology (the governable subject) and teleology (the telos of government).”

3. Protecting Our Freedom

For me, building a foundation of security, public order and stability is the basis for the trust and confidence which individuals, families and communities need to fulfil their potential. We can only drive lasting and sustained change by empowering people to take greater responsibility for the strength and well-being of their own lives and communities in a way that establishes a different relationship between Government and the governed.

In this foreword, the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, neatly articulates the normative conditions for neo-liberal subjects to fulfil their potential – security, public order, stability, empowerment and responsibility for self and community. What appears to be “different” about the governmental relationships iterated here is the emphasis placed on their anchorage in an affective relationship of trust and confidence. It is nothing new for liberal democratic societies to value, if not sanctify such affectivities as necessary conditions of governmental legitimacy, authority and consent, most especially in terms of the political institutions which embody, uphold and protect the rule of law. However, in this document and elsewhere in speeches, launches, press conferences, media interviews, consultation papers and policy statements, it is the absence of trust and confidence and the presence of fear, insecurity and uncertainty, which is routinely foregrounded as a problem of government.

A telos of negative freedom

In a speech to DEMOS in 2006, the Home Secretary (now John Reid) proclaimed that “we now live in a world where insecurity is a phenomenon that crosses the economic and the social, the domestic and the foreign, the psychological and physical, the individual and the collective.” Such assertions reinforce Giddens’ somewhat overworked notion of “ontological insecurity” as a general descriptor of our common experience in late modernity. While there is much to support this gloomy outlook, the rhetoric of a runaway world and its accompanying narratives of disembeddedness, suspicion, precariousness, risk, threat and fear, serves as an “organising disposition,” an “affective register” or an “emotionality of rule” for re-imagining the kind of government which can be fashioned in the name of freedom. When the boundaries of the state of nature and the state of civil society are blurred, a self-interested citizenry will not only be receptive to emphatic (and oft-repeated) banner headlines, such as “Our citizens should not live

55 Ibid., 226.
in fear,” but they will also be open to governmental techniques and modalities which promise to realise the utopian telos of order, safety and stability. Such an eventuality is made possible by a negative formula of freedom grounded in an ontology of (self-) protection. As Blair put it:

...this is not a debate between those who value liberty and those who do not. It is an argument about the types of liberties that need to be protected... and it is an attempt to protect the most fundamental liberty of all – freedom from harm by others.60

This begs a number of questions, not least the matter of who are “the others” from whom we must be protected, and what kinds of harms can “these others” inflict which inhibit and threaten our freedom to govern ourselves and be governed as confident and secure individuals. I want to suggest that an oppositional relation between self and “harmful others” is currently, and primarily mobilised through the inculcation of certain affective states of being in the world; these, in turn, encourage a receptivity to alternative governmental realities and forms of (self-) government – an ontology which Bennett theorises as “a mood with ethical potential.”61

More or less government?
In the late spring of 2006, the UK experienced what might best be described as an emotional rollercoaster of existential angst. Scandals, crises, fiascos, incompetencies, controversial sentencing, murders, abductions, rapes, ministerial sackings, prison abscondings, clandestine employment and a call from the former Chief Inspector of Prisons, Lord Ramsbotham, for the Prime Minister to ”shut up,”63 created the conditions for a very public, and highly mediated debate on the scope and ambition of government, and its ability to meet “its core purpose of protecting the public.”64

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60 Ibid.
63 Nigel Morris, “Blair Told to ‘Shut Up’ About Prison Sentencing,” The Independent (June 16, 2006), 4
In the United Kingdom in 2006, over the course of a few months, there was scarcely a governmental constituency which did not in some way constitute a “harmful other.” Amongst these, the usual suspects of terrorists, criminals and the “permanently delinquent” did not so much loom large as form a backdrop of prevailing terror, suspicion, fear and intimidation upon which a range of different emotions came to be refracted. The passions stirred by the “most harmful” are nothing new and form the kernel of primordial affectivities that sustain the need for government of any kind. What was novel about 2006 was how a series of “unfortunate events” triggered a range of emotional dispositions that called into question what it means to govern and be governed; and as the year progressed, different emotional harms not only exposed the self as vulnerable, unprotected and ontologically precarious, but also came to invest, inspire and produce an affective formation of uncertainty. In April 2006, the “foreign prisoners scandal” focused attention on the Home Office; whether it and the Home Secretary were “fit for purpose” was a question which persisted long after Charles Clarke’s dismissal in the following month, and continued under the incoming stewardship of John Reid. The scandal centred on the revelation that an estimated 1,023 foreign prisoners had been released from prison between 1999 and March 2006 and had not subsequently been deported. It further emerged that there was an unknown number of serious offenders (murderers and rapists) among those released, but the actual number was never determined and was variably reported as anything from 5 to 179. Perhaps the most honest report came from David Roberts at the Immigration and Nationality Directorate who admitted that he had not got the “faintest idea” as to how many illegal immigrants there were in the United Kingdom. Later that same week, attention turned to the revelation that more than twenty convicted murderers had absconded from Leyhill Open Prison in the past five years; but this figure was to be quickly revised upwards following a BBC investigation which found that more than three hundred inmates had absconded from the prison in the previous three years. In the meantime, the head of the Prison Service, Phil Wheatley, was compiling his own statistics, and two days later admitted that around seven hundred prisoners had absconded from the open prison estate in the previous year alone. Not to be excluded from what was rapidly becoming a spectator sport, the spotlight belatedly fell on the Criminal Records Bureau when it made public that 2,700 “innocent people” had been wrongly screened as having criminal records, with some being turned down for jobs as a result. It was little wonder that as this catalogue of errors began to unfold, the Prime Minister “stumbled over answers when he gave them, and his mood appeared something between depressed and fed up. The authoritative, commanding, dismissive Blair was nowhere to be seen.”

69 Ibid.
Charles Clarke Resign?\textsuperscript{71} with “shocking,” scandalous,” “sickening,” “dismayed,” “annoying” and “stunned” featuring prominently as emotional harms caused by the saga of Home Office and ministerial blunders.

If the “foreign prisoners scandal” and its aftermath had not already shaken confidence in the capacity of the state to protect the public, further revelations continued to expose the fragility of government in uncertain times. A series of high-profile murders which culminated in court trials and sentencing in the spring of 2006, raised serious concerns about the effectiveness of offender management within the community. For example, on November 2005, Mary-Ann Leneghan was kidnapped, raped, tortured and murdered by six youths, four of whom were under the supervision of the Probation Service at the time. Quite predictably, and responding to a wave of public criticism and negative press coverage, the incoming Home Secretary, John Reid, was swift to pledge a review and overhaul of the Probation Service admitting that there were “shortcomings… to be frank, the probation system is not working as well as it should.”\textsuperscript{72} By the end of the year, the Home Office had published figures which confirmed that more than five hundred serious, violent and sexual offences (including rape), and ninety-eight murders had been committed by offenders under probation supervision in the previous two years (\textit{The Scotsman}, December 6, 2006). Even though the politicians restated the issue as one of organisational and operational failures that could be addressed by reform, a bystanding public grew ever anxious but in a much more diffuse sense. In desperation, a contributor to the online discussion, \textit{Do we need a Probation Service review?} pleaded “for God’s sake protect us!”\textsuperscript{73} In the same discussion, Ian from Whitwick asked:

\begin{quote}
How many more innocent people have to be murdered before the public are protected. I am really so angry that the Courts, Police and Probation services have failed to achieve their prime directive: TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE! (sorry for shouting). (Uppercase in original).\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

From this perspective, which was shared by many other discussants, the failures of one statutory service was taken as symptomatic of a wider malaise of institutional government that was rapidly losing its protective appeal. In an article which was cautious of punitive remedies and sceptical of the “good sense” of organisational overhaul, Mary Riddell argued of the Mary-Ann Leneghan case, that:


74 Ibid.
The Probation Service is the wrong target here. If Michael Johnson and his five co-torturers were really all “psychopaths” that would not be so frightening. Johnson himself sounds a particularly brutal character. But some of his gang sound chillingly normal – young men who tangled with drugs and relatively minor offences before somehow bonding together to form a death squad.75

Here, Riddell hints at the collapse of the binary which separates “Us” and “Them,” the “normal” and the “pathological,” the “fearful” and the “feared.” Such a collapse evokes a Gothic sensibility, triggering emotional displacements about our being in the world and amplifying deep-seated concerns and anxieties associated with a specific socio-political and historical moment. In short, things are never quite what they seem.76 A different kind of expressive logic was articulated in the online discussion. Nick from Warwickshire, UK wrote:

The most frightening thing about the gang that killed that teenager is that they didn’t care; care about abducting the girls, care about torturing and raping them, care about killing them, care about being caught or care about going to prison. How are we going to deal with individuals like this is anyone’s guess. We have a whole generation coming up that doesn’t give a second thought about using extreme violence as a daily event.77

For Nick, the greatest fear was the apparent loss of an ethics of care and the absence of mutuality; in prospect was the advent of a Hobbesian state of nature, and a future which was in the hands of a generation that, having already normalised violence, were sounding the death knell for sociality.

Even without a prevailing meta-narrative of insecurity, these several events conspire to further undermine trust and confidence in the capacity of governmental authorities, techniques and forms of expertise to police the boundary between order and chaos leaving the self exposed, vulnerable and seeking its own protection. Mead suggests that when the conditions for stability and certainty are not met, people will gravitate to more authoritarian forms of government – he notes that “(p)people are not interested in “freedom” if they are... in any fundamental way insecure. They will want more government not less.”78 This view may account for the emergence of an “authoritarian liberalism”79 and the “ratcheting up (of) one of the undisputed core functions of government – the maintenance of order and security – creating more and more efficient police, and promoting more punishments.”80 It also goes some way to accounting for

76 See, for example, Fred Botting, Gothic (London: Routledge, 1996).
77 BBC News, “Do We Need a Probation Service Review?”
the advent of the “new punitiveness” driven by a virulent “punitive populism” and its concomitant clamour for retributive, incapacitative and deterrent forms of justice.\(^{81}\) The punitive/authoritarian thesis has a certain *prima facie* appeal, but in much the same way as Žižek’s notion of the “unconscious supplement” it rests on some dubious and contradictory assumptions about both the strength *and* direction of the relationship between “structures of feeling” and authoritarian forms of rule.\(^{82}\) Moreover, and again following Žižek, it tends to regard “collective sentiments” as the expression of a monolithic public in a universally punitive mood. Put another way, “punitive passions” do not exhaust the range of sensibilities that an affectivity of insecurity and uncertainty might involve – for example, feelings of disappointment, frustration, bewilderment, sorrow, despair, anger, shock, insult and confusion all feature in the public discourse detailed above. Consequently, we would need to ask how an ontology of confidence and trust in the work of government – especially its sovereign and disciplinary forms – is conjured out of an aesthetic of these negative dispositions; how is a state of confidence rendered technical, governmental and political and what kinds of ethical commitments are inspired by it; what are the techniques of self-governance which enfold insecure subjectivities and reproduce them as confident, assured citizens?

**Authoritarian and other selves**

Whenever attention is paid to the authoritarian orientations of liberal democratic societies, there is a tendency within criminology to focus exclusively on statutory institutions and those measures which rely on the exercise of sovereign and disciplinary power – such as harsher, deterrent sentencing; high visibility and targeted policing; greater use of surveillance technologies; intensification of juridical powers. This limited focus results in a void in our understanding of what it means to govern the ”authoritarian self” in a context of insecurity and disorder. Nonetheless, there are important expositions of the form, means, function and content of “authoritarian techniques of the self” to be found in the wider sociological literature. I am thinking here of Hindess’ essay on the notion of ”(self-)improvement” and its centrality to what he describes as “the liberal government of unfreedom;”\(^{83}\) and Valverde’s innovative work on the notion of ”habit” and its role as a key technique for different forms of self-despotism.\(^{84}\) In each of these accounts, practices of self-government are always-already embedded within the ”common obligations of citizenship”\(^{85}\) such that by working through a programme of self-improvement, or resolving to rid oneself of ”bad habits” expresses a social and political relationship and an ethical commitment to others.

Dean talks of the formation of citizen-subjects as concerning a “”mode of subjectification” or “mode of obligation”… the position we take or are given in relation to rules and norms…


\(^{82}\) See, for example, Roger Matthews, “The Myth of Punitiveness,” *Theoretical Criminology*, 9, 2 (2005), 175-201.

\(^{83}\) Hindess, “The Liberal Government of Unfreedom.”

\(^{84}\) Valverde, “‘Despotism’ and Ethical Governance.”

why we govern ourselves or others in a particular manner.”

Though I agree with Dean’s analysis, deontological questions do not solely involve normative ways of thinking, being and doing; this overlooks the transformative potential of affective modes, and how particular ways of feeling are implicated in practices of the self, in the production of self-otherness, of becoming-other, of feeling otherwise in order to be otherwise.

In September 2005, the UK government set up a Respect Task Force, appointing both a Government Co-ordinator (Louise Casey) and a Minister for Respect (Hazel Blears) to oversee its progress. Committing £80 million of new funding to the programme, in January 2006, the Prime Minister published a Respect Action Plan and by the end of October 2006, the Respect agenda had established its own Respect Squad and set up its own web-site and action hotline. With its nifty logo and catchy sound bites, the roll-out of the Respect programme was well underway before, during and after the spring scandals had left the UK citizenry reeling in despair for its own protection. Accompanied by a good deal of trumpet-blowing, the programme promised to deliver an affective mode of obligation which would enhance ethicality, mutuality and sociality. In the launch speech for the Respect Action Plan, Blair announced:

Respect is a way of describing the very possibility of life in a community. It is about the consideration that others are due. It is about the duty I have to respect the rights that you hold dear. And vice-versa. It is about our reciprocal belonging to a society, the covenant that we have with one another.87

To earn respect, feel respect, be respectable, act respectfully is, then, expressive of an affirmative ethical affiliation, and for Blair, is an affective disposition held by the majority of people. For example, in the launch speech, he comments, “(o)f course, the overwhelming majority of people understand this intuitively and have no trouble living side by side with their neighbour;”88 and in the foreword of the Respect Action Plan, he notes that “(m)ost of us learn respect from our parents and our families.”89 It is this reference to “the majority” – those who are capable of self-government as respectable citizens – juxtaposed with “the minority” – those who have limited or no capacity for living an ethical life based on respect for others – which is of particular interest here. As Dean reminds us, in liberal democratic societies, those who do not, cannot or will not form themselves as subjects of government are eligible for authoritarian techniques of rule.90 Thus, the Respect Action Plan makes it crystal clear that “(e)veryone can change – if people who need help will not take it, we will make them.”91

What seems to be proposed here is a cartography of un/governable subjects. With the assurance that those who lack respect are to be subjects of and subjected to authoritarian technologies of rule, the “rest of us” can be (more) confident of living in a stable, ordered and

86 Dean, “Foucault, Government and the Enfolding of Authority,” 224.
88 Ibid., Emphasis added.
90 Dean, “Liberal Government and Authoritarianism.”
91 Respect Task Force, 1.
certain society. To realise this telos, rather than rely on “deep-end” authoritarian measures as conventionally conceived in articulations of “more government,” sovereign and disciplinary forms of government are to be put to work in, by and for the community. In other words, in a process of responsibilisation, civil society forms the key locus for the deployment of a range of affective technologies for constituting subjectivities of both confidence and respect, displacing (though not replacing) the need for overt practices of “crime control” in favour of a series of networks of obligation and alliances of mutuality.

**Arts of the emotional self**

The Respect programme assumes the existence of a “respectable majority” who, despite their own capacity to self-govern, need to work on themselves and others to achieve an affective state of confidence and assurance. Such an ascesis is most clearly spelled out in the strategy document, *Confident Communities in a Secure Britain: The Home Office Strategic Plan 2004-2008*, which is further elaborated in the *Together We Can Action Plan*, and is articulated repeatedly as “our (the government’s) commitments to law-abiding citizens.” Amongst other things, “the respectable majority” is encouraged to make use of an array of “new” opportunities and arrangements for getting involved in community concerns by, for example, keeping themselves informed of, and getting involved in the steps taken by local agencies to address local cultures of disrespect; by taking a stand against anti-social behaviour by reporting incivilities; by regular updating to the “relevant authorities” of the impact of anti-social behaviour in neighbourhoods; and by helping to set local policing priorities and making suggestions for specific actions from local policing teams. Through these governmental modalities, the “respectable majority” is thereby transformed into a variegated and fluid network of responsible authorities, and through this process is enabled to self-actualise (become-other) as a confident citizenry. But what of “the minority,” those who lack respect and for whom a more authoritarian approach may be necessary?

As Dean notes, authoritarian liberalism distinguishes between subjects according to their relative capacities for autonomy. Thus, as well as their difference from “the majority,” within “the minority” are those “who can be profitably assisted in the exercise of their own freedom and those who must be coerced.” In relation to the former, the Respect agenda holds that “parenting is one of the most important responsibilities in creating a strong society based on mutual respect.” Parenting technologies, therefore, constitute a key component for inculcating appropriate dispositions and aesthetic comportments. It may be that individuals within “the minority” are capable of self-governance in some aspects of their lives – as consumers, as employees, as tenants, for example – but if, as parents, they “are unwilling, or unable to meet their responsibilities we (‘the majority’) must ensure that they are challenged and supported to do so.” Support comes by way of various “new” services, interventions and sources of

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93 Home Office, *Confident Communities in a Secure Britain.*
95 Dean, “Liberal Government and Authoritarianism.”
96 Ibid, 47.
97 Respect Task Force, 17.
98 Ibid., 17.
financial, social and cultural help for both parents and their children. Challenge, on the other hand, renders support compulsory, enforced via a panoply of new and extended (out-of-court) summary powers of which the ASBO (Anti-Social Behaviour Order) is the most notorious. At the level of ascesis, then, the operationalisation of liberal/illiberal modes of governance maps onto a dichotomised population wherein membership of “the majority”/“the minority” is determined by the presence/absence – and within this latter, the educability – of an aesthetics of respect. In light of this, I want to suggest that the modalities and techniques of liberal/illiberal forms of government are mobilised through familiar “taxonomies of affect” or what I have termed, “emotionalities of rule.” In this paper, I have examined confidence and respect as “emotionalities of rule,” as preferred and promoted sensibilities which are nurtured, en-gendered and enfolded through specific governmental technologies and practices. Of course, confidence and respect do not exhaust the emotionalities that circulate in governmental discourses; we can think, for example, of how tolerance, compassion, optimism and (even) happiness assume a special relevance and importance within liberalism – these are not merely personal dispositions but are expressive of a specific political and ethical relation. Quite properly, then, we can speak of “emotionalities of rule” as arts of government through which we seek to govern and be governed in sentient, aesthetic and affective ways.

4. Conclusion
Analyses inspired by Foucauldian governmentality do not purport to apply theory to the empirical world, and thereby explain it. Rather, the Foucauldian project suggests a number of conceptual tools for understanding how different forms of government are made thinkable and do-able, and how subjectivities are formed and transformed when autonomous individuals identify with a complex array of governmental technologies, strategies and expert authorities. However, and despite a rich and diverse “governmentality scholarship,” little attention has been paid to how desire, affect and sensate life is implicated in processes of subjectification; how passion can prompt (or not) an identification with governmental programmes; and how “emotionalities of rule” propose and suggest ways of feeling about the world – how we should feel about ourselves and others, how we participate in, cultivate and enact an aesthetic life, and how we seek to govern and be governed in sentient, expressive ways. The case study presented here demonstrates how questions of government, power and politics, morality and ethics can never be solely a matter of cognition and reason. To assume that self-directing individuals identify with particular technologies and practices of the self on purely instrumental grounds is to deny the emotional and affective intensities which circulate, permeate and inform cognitive and discursive ways of being, doing and saying. It is these intensities which confront and unsettle our ontological security, and which not only trouble our sense of social order and stability but also provoke a questioning of the work of government and its capacity to direct our own and others’ conduct. Moreover, such emotional “disturbances” are not reducible to a singular psychic state – melancholia, as psychoanalysis would have it – but are highly differentiated, complex and fluid such that they open up multiple “lines of flight” and initiate a plethora of alternative possibilities for the (re-)formation of un/governable subjectivities.

However, such moments of intensity may incite new identities and provoke ethical attachments that are inimical to particular regimes of rule such that they pose dangers for that regime, and problematise its modes and rationalities of governance. In the case study, loss of confidence in the work of government, along with expressed feelings of distrust, disappointment, shock, outrage, confusion and fear, create the affective conditions for questioning the exercise of governmental power in a liberal, democratic society, and prompt the need to realign an uncertain citizenry as confident, assured subjects – a process which I have described as the “enfolding of emotionalities.” There is much to be learned from an account that places affective agency at the heart of an analytics of government. First, it alerts us to the way in which modes of obligation within liberalism involve obligations not only to legal and moral codes, but also to normative sensibilities, particular ways of feeling which are deemed appropriate to sustain political and ethical life in a liberal society – for example, tolerance, confidence, compassion, trust, optimism. Secondly, it suggests that participation in and full membership of civil society relies as much on an affective identity as it does on any other kind of selfhood, as a “rational actor,” for example. Thirdly, and following this last point, an account which centres on affective life emphasises how politico-ethical credentials are demonstrated and established not solely by a capacity to be a self-enterprising or self-sufficient individual, but also relies on expressive capabilities and the display of certain aesthetic qualities. Finally, while the co-existence and intersection of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental power has been widely recognised, very little attention has been paid to the way in which taxonomies of affect underwrite the deployment of liberal/illiberal modes of governance across constituencies differentiated by ontologies of feeling. Governing through subjectivities of affect is, then, an integral strategy of governance and is indispensable to the notion of governing through freedom.

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