ARTICLE

Feminism, Foucault, and the Critique of Reason: Re-reading the History of Madness
Amy Allen, Dartmouth College

ABSTRACT: This paper situates Lynne Huffer’s recent queer-feminist Foucaultian critique of reason within the context of earlier feminist debates about reason and critically assesses Huffer’s work from the point of view of its faithfulness to Foucault’s work and its implications for feminism. I argue that Huffer’s characterization of Enlightenment reason as despotic not only departs from Foucault’s account of the relationship between power and reason, it also leaves her stuck in the same double binds that plagued earlier feminist critiques of reason. An appreciation of the profoundly ambivalent nature of Foucault’s critique of reason offers feminists some insights into how to navigate those double binds. What feminists should learn from the early Foucault is precisely his commitment to engage in a rational critique of reason that highlights reason’s dangerous entanglements with power while resisting the temptation to reject or refuse reason altogether.

Keywords: Foucault, feminism, reason, power, empowerment, domination.

Over the last thirty years, engagements with the philosophy of Michel Foucault have generated some of the most productive and exciting work in feminist theory.¹ While much of the initial feminist reception of Foucault focused on the usefulness of his analysis of modern power for theorizing gender and sexual subordination and normalization,² later engagements concentrated on the fruitfulness of Foucault’s work on ethics and practices of the self for feminism;³ most recently, some feminist theorists have moved beyond interpretive questions and

---

¹ Thanks to Cressida Heyes, Lynne Huffer, Colin Koopman, and two anonymous reviewers for Foucault Studies for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.
³ Cressida Heyes, Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Margaret Mclaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002); Ladelle McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization (Bloomington,
instead used Foucault’s genealogical methodology as a tool for analyzing contemporary gender, racial and sexual subordination. One common feature of these otherwise disparate engagements with Foucault is the lack of attention to his early, archaeological work. This is not entirely surprising, since the analyses of disciplinary power and embodied practices of self-transformation that have proven so fruitful to feminist theorists are not explicitly thematized in Foucault’s early work. Instead, the early work contains austere discussions of discursive formations, archives, and epistemes that are rather more difficult to connect with feminist concerns.

The most obvious exception to this characterization of Foucault’s early work is his first major book, the History of Madness, which, as Foucault himself later notes, was largely about power even if he hardly ever used this term in the text. Now that the unabridged version is available to readers, it has also become apparent that the text was much more about sexuality than was previously realized. Hence, it makes sense that the History of Madness would provide the occasion for the first major feminist engagement with the early Foucault: Lynne Huffer’s brilliant and important book, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory.

Although Huffer’s primary focus is queer theory, she also situates queer theory in the context of its frequently fraught relationship with feminism, and she maintains that Foucault’s early work contains resources not only for a “different queer theory” but also for a “different feminism.” Central to Huffer’s queer feminist appropriation of Foucault’s early work are his “anti-Enlightenment challenge to rationalism” and his articulation of an alternative “political ethic of eros.” On Huffer’s reading, the History of Madness traces the violent, constitutive ex-

---


5 An exception to this rule is Lois McNay, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender, and the Self (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), which does contain some brief, though largely very critical, discussions of Foucault’s early work.


11 Ibid., 325, 327.
clusions of a despotic Enlightenment rationalism and offers queer feminism an alternative vision of an erotic practice of freedom.\(^{12}\)

In making this argument, Huffer re-engages a debate that feminist philosophers had in the 1980s and 1990s under the heading of “the feminist critique of reason.” Although a wide range of important feminist theorists, including Luce Irigaray, Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, Judith Butler, and feminist philosophers of science such as Evelyn Fox Keller,\(^{13}\) were engaged in this critique, it was articulated most clearly and succinctly in Genevieve Lloyd’s classic text, *The Man of Reason* (1993).\(^{14}\) Lloyd’s main argument can be summed up in a single sentence: “Reason, despite its pretensions to be gender-free” is, in fact, “thoroughly ‘male’.”\(^{15}\) For Lloyd, this means both that our ideals of reason have been defined by the exclusion, transcendence or subordination of the feminine, and that our conception of femininity has been constituted through its exclusion from the rational. Throughout the 1990s, feminist philosophers debated the validity of this critique\(^{16}\), with feminists such as Martha Nussbaum defending the classical, philosophical conception of reason against the feminist critique and others such as Linda Martin Alcoff defending the feminist critique against Nussbaum’s counterattack.\(^{17}\)

To be sure, Huffer’s queer-feminist appropriation of Foucault departs in many ways from this earlier feminist critique of reason. For one thing, Huffer focuses on the exclusion not of femininity but of a madness that the Classical Age associated with queerness and sexual deviance. Furthermore, the feminist critique encompasses the whole history of Western philosophy, going back to Plato and Aristotle, whereas Huffer, following Foucault, locates the exclusion of madness by reason in European modernity. Nevertheless these critiques share a common core: both are committed to the idea that the modern, Enlightenment conception of reason is predicated upon the exclusion of its others, which include madness, irrationality, embodiment, affect, femininity, and queerness. Hence, they also generate similar questions about how best to respond to this critique of reason: should we claim a space for women and queers within reason? Or should we reject reason in favor of an embrace of its Other(s)? As Lloyd astutely points out, neither option seems viable, since both tacitly accept the exclusionary logic on which the notion of reason is based.\(^{18}\)

\(^{12}\) On the importance of this point for feminist theory, see also Cressida Heyes, “Be reasonable: A response to Amy Allen’s *The Politics of Ourselves,*” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 38 (7) (2012), 753-760.

\(^{13}\) For discussion of Irigaray, Grosz, and Braidotti in relation to the feminist critique of reason, see Linda Martín Alcoff, “Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?” *Philosophical Topics* 23 (2) (1995), 1-26; for discussion of Keller, Irigaray and Butler, see Herta Nagl-Docekal, “The Feminist Critique of Reason Revisited,” *Hypatia* 14 (1) (1999), 49-76.


\(^{15}\) Ibid., xvii.


\(^{18}\) Lloyd, 104-105.
In what follows, I shall argue that Huffer’s queer feminist Foucaultian critique of reason remains, despite her repeated attempts to avoid this fate, caught in a version of this double bind. This is so because she presents reason in thoroughly negative terms—as a “despotic” force—and, correspondingly, links freedom—understood as freedom from reason’s oppressive power—with madness, unreason, and the undoing of the rational subject. In doing so, I shall also argue, Huffer departs from Foucault’s own position. Although she is no doubt correct that Foucault aims to expose reason’s entanglements with power relations and to uncover its constitutive exclusions, he also continues to embrace and affirm the norms of reason. On my reading, the History of Madness implicitly stakes out the same fundamentally ambivalent stance toward reason that is explicitly articulated in Foucault’s later work, for example, when he says: we are “fortunately committed to practicing a rationality that is unfortunately criss-crossed by intrinsic dangers.” Finally, I argue that this reading of Foucault gives feminists some insights into how to navigate the double binds that are generated by the queer feminist critique of reason. What feminists should learn from the early Foucault is precisely his commitment to engage in a rational critique of rationality that highlights reason’s dangerous entanglements with power while resisting the temptation to reject or refuse reason altogether.

**Foucaultian Feminism and the Critique of Reason**

A central aim of Huffer’s book is to argue for the foundational importance of the History of Madness for queer theory. Whereas most queer theorists have taken Foucault’s History of Sexuality, volume 1, as their foundational text, Huffer insists on the importance of the History of Madness for queer theory, inasmuch as it offers a richer, thicker, more experientially textured analysis of sexuality than one finds in Foucault’s later work. The exclusive focus on History of Sexuality, volume 1 has left queer theory strangely “drained of the experience of life and love, of eros” and allowed it to evade questions of ethics. By contrast, drawing on Foucault’s ethics of eros—and against queer theorists such as Janet Halley who cite Foucault to urge a break from a feminism that they perceive as overly moralizing—Huffer aims to “reengage Foucault as a theoretical resource for a constructive ethical project that can speak to queers and feminists alike.”

The connection between unreason and madness, on the one hand, and sexual deviance and queerness, on the other, is apparent in Foucault’s account of the classical conception of unreason. There Foucault makes it clear that the classical category of unreason included not only those who would later be termed mentally ill, but also all manner of what he would later

---

19 This is a term that Huffer repeatedly uses to characterize reason, philosophical reason, rationalism, and Freudian psychoanalysis; see, for example, Huffer, xiv, 2, 50, 88, 160. As far as I can tell, it is not a term that Foucault himself uses, at least not in the History of Madness.


22 Huffer, 78.

23 Ibid., 48.
call ‘abnormals’: homosexuals, libertines, the unemployed, and criminals.\textsuperscript{24} Hence, as Huffer puts it, “just as [classical] reason excludes nonsense from itself, so, too, it excludes the queer.”\textsuperscript{25} On her reading, Foucault presents classical reason as a despotic force that is at once a gesture of division—separating unreason from reason—and of moral exclusion—marking those who are deemed unreasonable as morally inferior. This structure of rational and moral exclusion comes on the scene philosophically with Cartesian rationalism and socio-historically in the Great Confinement, and it reaches its apotheosis in Freudian psychoanalysis. The \textit{History of Madness} tells a genealogical story about the production of modern subjectivity on the basis of rational and moralist exclusion, which in turn produces the interiority of the psyche. Hence, the “the sovereign, patriarchal despotism of psychoanalysis” repeats “the despotism of philosophical reason... In this, Freud \textit{is} Descartes.”\textsuperscript{26}

On the basis of this reading, Huffer claims that one of the central themes of Foucault’s work as a whole is his “sustained critique of moral and political exclusion and his lifelong challenge to the despotic power of philosophical reason”\textsuperscript{27} and she maintains that the goal of Foucaultian critique is to “get out from under the thumb of rationalist philosophy.”\textsuperscript{28} Practically speaking, this means engaging in a practice of desubjectivation, an “unlearning or releasing of the rationalist subject.”\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, Huffer is critical of queer notions of performativity precisely because they do not go far enough in this direction; they undo “gender but not the subject itself,”\textsuperscript{30} leaving the structures of moral exclusion that constitute modern subjectivity untouched.\textsuperscript{31} Huffer acknowledges that her call for desubjectivation is “deeply unsettling” inasmuch as it is represented by “the terrifying disintegration of the face in madness.”\textsuperscript{32} And yet we must confront this experience, this “undoing of the subject that is reason’s ‘other’.”\textsuperscript{33} Why? Not so that we can romanticize the experience of madness; Huffer repeatedly defends Foucault against this charge.\textsuperscript{34} Nevertheless, she also repeatedly links madness to desubjectivation, and both of these to freedom.\textsuperscript{35} Complete desubjectivation is indistinguishable from losing oneself completely in madness, and madness is, for Huffer, both “a loss to be grieved and the murmuring promise of a future freedom.”\textsuperscript{36}

The notion of desubjectivation is central to Huffer’s queer feminist Foucaultian political ethic of eros, which is presented as an \textit{alternative} to rationalist morality: “If returning to the Greeks was Foucault’s way of getting out from under Christian morality, returning to the

\textsuperscript{24} Foucault, \textit{History of Madness}, chapters 2 and 3.
\textsuperscript{25} Huffer, 2.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 160. This means that, on Huffer’s view, psychoanalysis is of limited use for queer theory, since it fails to challenge the structures of moral exclusion that found modern subjectivity.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., xiv.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 243.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 112.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 116.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 118.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 119.
\textsuperscript{34} See ibid., 88, 100, 119.
\textsuperscript{35} See, for example, ibid., 121.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 168.
moment of splitting in the Age of Reason was Foucault’s way of getting out from under philosophy’s despotic moralizing power.”

In other words, if Enlightenment reason is founded on the despotic exclusion of not only madness but also queerness, then queer theory should be founded not on a recuperation of reason—for this can only be a gesture of self-alienation—but instead on its rupture: “an erotic, nonphilosophical, coup de foudre encounter that is lyrical and ironic…” And the same goes for feminism: “Both feminists and queers are to be counted among those extravagant prodigals of reason who can’t or don’t want to go home again; we are the ever-changing subjects of the exclusions of rationalism and family morality. Pinned down, as we are, as reason’s others, we have resignified ourselves as forces of resistance.”

Feminists and queers can’t or don’t want “to return to reason”; instead, they must resist reason.

To be sure, Huffer does not engage in a simplistic valorization of that which reason has excluded, a move that would obviously leave unchallenged the very structure of division that she aims to critique. For one thing, she does not sugarcoat her account of eros; she emphasizes that “eros is driven not only by the force of an intersubjective generosity but by a force of ironic undoing as well,” an undoing that is destructive and painful. Moreover, just as she resists the charge of romanticism in Foucault, she insists that her own “postulation of the ethical possibilities of eros is not sentimental or romantic. Rather, the eros of generosity always acknowledges and remains in tension with the possibility of erotic dissolution.” And she acknowledges the inevitable irony involved in challenging the despotism of philosophical reason from within the language of reason itself. Huffer says that she aims to negotiate “the uncomfortable space of the in-between” and to resist the desire to take sides between reason and its Other(s) by interrogating the splits and the irony. And yet, she also claims that she finds in Foucault “the capacity to embrace my split, my own contradictions, my queerness — what Foucault might have called my madness” and that the aim of her Foucaultian ethical project is to produce “an ethics that would allow unreason to speak.”

Huffer also connects this desire to break out of a despotic Enlightenment rationalism by allowing unreason to speak and claiming one’s own madness to Foucault’s distinctive historical method. History, at least on the traditional philosophical understanding of it that we have learned from Hegel, is the story that reason tells about itself; hence, critiquing reason for Foucault means critiquing History in this sense, which means refusing any notions of teleological progression or dialectical reconciliation. Huffer connects Foucault’s refusal of dialectical reconciliation to a political stance that attempts to “claim the future as mad, to occupy a place of

37 Ibid., xvi.
38 Ibid., 38.
39 Ibid., 82.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., xvii.
42 Ibid., 43.
43 Ibid., 4.
44 Ibid., 10.
45 Ibid., 42.
46 See ibid., 15-21.
unreason whose renunciation grounds History itself”; 47 this may well require us to “take up an impossible position: to be mad. But that impossible, queer position—the position of madness—is also, politically, the one we must hold.” 48

Huffer’s reading of Foucault is deep, insightful, imaginative, even brilliant, and there is much about it that I find absolutely compelling. Her book breathes fresh air into the ongoing feminist engagement with Foucault by showing convincingly the importance of his early work not only for his oeuvre as a whole but also for feminism. And yet, I fear that, despite her own attempts to avoid this problem by highlighting the splits and ironies of her own project, Huffer remains caught in the same double bind that Lloyd identified in the earlier feminist critique of reason. Although she clearly rejects the option of finding space for women and queers within the Enlightenment conception of reason—as she says, feminists and queers can’t or don’t want to go home again, and should instead resignify themselves as forces of resistance to reason—her critique seems caught on the other horn of the dilemma, insofar as she links freedom from reason’s despotic power to an embrace of its Other(s): unreason, madness, queerness, and eros. From a feminist perspective, both the equation of reason with despotism and the linking of queer feminist freedom with unreason seem problematic: the former because it fails to recognize the ways in which speaking in the language of reason is not only a necessary evil without which we cannot be understood but also extremely useful and important, even empowering, for feminists; 49 the latter because it seems tacitly to confirm the assumption that women and queers aren’t fully rational. In other words, despite her best efforts and her protestations to the contrary—and on this point perhaps she doth protest too much—I don’t think Huffer succeeds in avoiding a romanticization of madness. Not only is this rejection of reason and embrace of madness as a space of freedom dangerous—a point that Huffer certainly acknowledges!—and, for the reasons stated above, problematic for feminism, it is also, I think, un-Foucaultian. Or so I shall argue in the next section.

Foucaultian History of the Present as Critique: Beyond Dialectics and Romanticism
The aim of this section is to sketch out an alternative reading of Foucault’s History of Madness that reveals the aim of the text to be not a rejection of reason in favor of a romantic embrace of madness or unreason, but rather a critique of reason that foregrounds the ongoing spiral of rationality and power. Foucault has, I suggest, a fundamentally ambivalent stance toward reason, one that is well-expressed in the passage that I quoted above: we are “fortunately committed to practicing a rationality that is unfortunately crisscrossed with intrinsic dangers” and the task of critical thought is “precisely to accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, its indispensability, and, at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers.” 50 One way to put my disagreement with Huffer would be to say that characterizing reason as despotic makes it difficult to understand how Foucault could say that we are fortunate to be committed to it. Huffer tends to present reason as a necessary evil: we

47 Ibid., 19.
48 Ibid., 19.
49 On this point, see Nussbaum, “Feminists and Philosophy” and also Alcoff, 1.
have to speak in the language of reason if we want to be understood, but this means submitting ourselves to its despotism, and true freedom, were it possible, would be an escape from the constraints of reason altogether. Unlike Huffer, however, Foucault does not view reason as despotic, and he is well aware of the problems associated with saying that “reason is the enemy that should be eliminated” and the sterility involved in putting reason on trial. My goal is to show that this ambivalent conception of reason and the related understanding of critique, expressed explicitly in Foucault’s later work, are already implicit in the History of Madness.

In order to make this case, I want to return to Foucault’s historical method. I do this because I think that Huffer is right that Foucault’s critique of History—that is, of the Hegelian story that reason tells about itself and its self-development—is central to understanding both his critique of reason and his account of freedom, though, as we will see, I view the relationship between reason, history and freedom differently than does Huffer. As Huffer argues, Foucault’s historical method cannot be understood except in relation to the Hegelian notion of history that he rejects: the notion of History as the story of reason’s dialectical self-realization as it progresses toward Absolute knowing. The problem with this conception, as Foucault sees it, is that it presupposes a “suprahistorical perspective” from the point of view of which “the finally reduced diversity of time” is translated into “a totality fully closed upon itself,” and all of the myriad “displacements of the past” are recognized and reconciled. However, and to preview my argument in this section, Foucault’s alternative understanding of history implies neither a rejection of reason nor a romantic idealization of unreason as the outside of this rational, progressive, teleological conception of History. Although there is an important connection between unreason and freedom in the History of Madness, Foucault is not committed to the simplistic claim that freedom is the embrace of unreason (let alone madness). Rather, as I shall argue, the figure of unreason serves to illuminate lines of fragility and fracture in our historical a priori; this illumination opens up spaces of freedom within our historical a priori and allows us to see not only that our present is contingent but also how it has been contingently made up through complex historical events.

Huffer astutely points out that the History of Madness is best understood as an attempt at “de-dialectizing Hegel,” by “undo[ing] Hegel from within.” How does Foucault attempt this de-dialectizing of Hegel in the History of Madness? And what are its implications? There

51 Ibid.
53 For the purposes of this paper, I will have to set aside the difficult question of whether Foucault’s understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of history is accurate. Suffice it to say that this is a controversial point among Hegel scholars. For a helpful summary of some of the main issues, see William Dudley (ed.), Hegel and History (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2009).
55 For an insightful discussion of the importance of both contingency and complexity in Foucault’s genealogical understanding of history, see Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), chapter 3.
56 Huffer, 199.
are several important elements. The emphasis on discontinuity over continuity in thinking about historical change is certainly one such element; this aspect of Foucault’s historical method became quite prominent in his later, explicitly ‘archaeological’ period, though it was subsequently abandoned in favor of a genealogical analysis of historical transformation.57 Foucault also steadfastly refuses to assume that history should be understood under the idea of progress toward some endpoint or goal.58 But perhaps even more important than either of these two elements, and less often noticed, is Foucault’s attempt to historicize Hegel’s philosophy of history, to offer a genealogy of Hegelian History. This is, to be sure, a paradoxical project, one that requires the genealogist to “change roles on the same stage.”59 Writing a genealogy of History requires the genealogist to inhabit a historical mode of thinking that we have inherited from the nineteenth century without being seduced by the consolations of dialectical History. The genealogist must take up the project of History and transform it from within; it is “only by being seized, dominated, and turned against its birth” that History can become genealogy.60 Foucault undoes the dialectical approach to History in the History of Madness by writing a history of reason—or, more precisely, of the emergence of our modern form of rationality as it is understood in relation to madness as mental illness—in such a way that makes room for contingent, discontinuous, and fragmented events,61 all of which resist being reconciled and recuperated with the dialectical unfolding of History. In this way, Foucault opens up an internal fracture within the notion of History, a structure of thought that is definitive for the modern historical a priori.

Hence, even though something called “history” holds a privileged place in Foucault’s methodology, Foucault makes no universal, transhistorical claims about the historicity of reason or of philosophy. Rather, as Foucault puts it, “if history possesses a privilege, it would be... insofar as it would play the role of an internal ethnology of our culture and our rationality, and consequently would embody the very possibility of any ethnology.”62 That is to say, history is important for Foucault not because we are essentially historical beings or because all philosophical knowledge is essentially historically conditioned, but rather because History is central to our modern historical a priori, so much so that we might even call our historical a

---

57 For helpful discussion of this transformation in Foucault’s historico-philosophical method, see Koopman, chapter 1. As Gary Gutting shows, the emphasis on historical discontinuity in Foucault’s early work can be traced to his philosophical relationship to Bachelard and Canguilhem; see Gary Gutting, “Foucault, Hegel, and Philosophy,” in Foucault and Philosophy, edited by Timothy O’Leary and Christopher Falzon (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

58 As he writes in the preface to the History of Madness: “We must therefore speak of this primitive debate [between reason and non-reason] without supposing a victory, nor the right to victory; we must speak of these repeated gestures in history, leaving in suspense anything that might take on the appearance of an ending, or of rest in truth.” (Foucault, History of Madness, xxviii)


60 Ibid.

61 On the importance of the notion of the event in his historical method, see Foucault, History of Madness, 577 and “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” 373.

priori the Historical historical a priori. Hence History is something that must be thought through if our modern form of life is to be effectively problematized.63

By transforming History from within and turning dialectics against itself until it becomes genealogy, Foucault is not killing history, as Sartre famously complained, though he is at least attempting to kill what he calls the “philosophical myth” of “History for philosophers,” a nineteenth century myth of continuity, reconciliation, and progressive redemption.64 However, killing (dialectical) History does not mean that Foucault’s project should be understood as a story of regress, a romantic Verfallsgeschichte in which the moment before the split between reason and madness is presented as the space of freedom. The key to understanding this is the difficult and shifting but crucial distinction between madness and unreason.

63 For a discussion of the links between Foucault’s approach to history and the political aim of his conception of critique, see Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth,” Political Theory 21: 2 (1993): 198-227, at 223-224. For an insightful reading of Foucault that foregrounds the importance of problematization for his genealogical method, see Koopman, Genealogy as Critique.

64 “This philosophical myth, which I am accused of killing, well, I am delighted if I have killed it, because it is precisely that myth I wanted to kill, not history in general. You can’t kill history, but as for killing History for philosophers—absolutely—I certainly want to kill it” (cited in Claire O’Farrell, Foucault: Historian or Philosopher? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 35).

65 Foucault, History of Madness, 47.

66 As he puts it, “perhaps one of the fundamental traits of our culture” is that “it is not possible to occupy a place, deliberately and resolutely, at the distance offered by unreason, for any length of time. For it must be forgotten and abolished no sooner than it is measured, in the vertigo of the sensible or the confinement of madness” (Foucault, History of Madness, 351).

67 Foucault, History of Madness, 352.

68 Ibid.
All of which suggests that if there is a romantic idealization of anything in the *History of Madness*, it is not madness, but unreason that is idealized and figured as a space of radical or absolute freedom. If there is a lament about how the history of our modern form of rationality has played out, it is a lament about the fact that one cannot be unreasonable without being forced to be mad, and thereby medicalized, objectified, and silenced. The gesture toward Nietzsche, Nerval, Artaud and others isn’t a lyrical glorification of their *madness*, for it is precisely their descent into madness that ruptures their philosophical and artistic oeuvres. “Where there is an oeuvre,” Foucault insists, “there is no madness”; madness is the absence of an oeuvre, and these men are geniuses precisely because they were able to create an oeuvre. But they are all unreasonable—indeed, in the modern age, “unreason belongs to all that is most decisive in the modern world in any oeuvre”—and the tragedy is that they are unable to inhabit the space of unreason without exploding into madness. But this does not lead Foucault to the conclusion that we should celebrate, much less emulate, madness.

Nor, I think, does it lead him to the conclusion that we should celebrate or emulate unreason, or claim it as the space of true freedom, though it may be tempting to draw this conclusion. Rather, it is through reflection upon the descent of these unreasonable ones into madness that “the world is made aware of its guilt,” and “obliged to take part in a process of recognition and reparation, to find an explanation for this unreason, and to explain itself before it.” Hence, the point of recovering the experience of unreason is not to glorify unreasonableness, but rather, to “interrogate [our] culture about its limit-experiences,” to make those limit-experiences present to us, and thereby to compel ourselves to reflect on those limits that make thinking, being and doing possible for us. This is why Foucault keeps coming back to the idea of unreason as untimely, as linked to what he calls the “immobile structures of the tragic” and the monotonous “background noise” from which the language of rational thought that “culminates in time” was “extracted.” Unlike unreason, madness, from the late eighteenth century onwards, was recuperated within the dialectical, developmental structure of reason working itself out in history; it “was intimately connected to history” and “took shape inside a historical consciousness.” Unreason, by contrast, remained associated with the tragic outside of history and linear temporality—with “a pure plunge into a language that

---

69 Here I agree with Len Lawlor, who is careful to distinguish unreason from madness and to link freedom with the former. But he also suggests that freedom in *History of Madness* means being unreasonable, whereas, as will become clear later on, I draw the connection to freedom differently. See Leonard Lawlor, “Violence and Animality: On Absolute Freedom in Foucault,” (unpublished manuscript, available online at: [http://www.academia.edu/443382/Violence_and_Animality_On_Absolute_Freedom_in_Foucault](http://www.academia.edu/443382/Violence_and_Animality_On_Absolute_Freedom_in_Foucault); accessed 8/12/13).


72 Ibid., 537.

73 Ibid., xxxix.

74 Ibid., xxx.

75 Ibid., xxxii. Thanks to Lynne Huffer for helpful discussion of this point.

76 Ibid., 377.

77 Ibid., 378.
abolished history”\textsuperscript{78}—hence unreason resists recuperation within the Hegelian dialectic, and this is precisely why it opens up the possibility of reflection on the limits of our Hegelian, Historical modernity.

So there is a sense in which the experience or figure of unreason is linked, for Foucault, to freedom. But it is not that Foucault views unreason—much less madness—as the space of freedom. Rather, he is arguing that it is only by the illumination provided by the lightning flashes of unreason that we can start to glimpse the outlines of our own system of thought, and doing this is a necessary condition of freeing ourselves up in relation to that system, so that we might think beyond it. Not only is this not a romanticization of a past experience of madness or unreason or of the moment before the split between reason and unreason that founds modern subjectivity, it is not even an attack on our modern historical a priori, or its conception of reason. If Foucault’s histories of the present give the impression that they are polemical attacks on our present, on our way of constituting ourselves as rational, sexually normal, law-abiding, sane, normal subjects, this is a function of what is necessary for the very difficult task of problematizing the present. When Foucault attempts to define the Classical age, he can do this by contrasting it with the Renaissance, on the one hand, and with the nineteenth century, on the other. But when he attempts to define the modern age, he can only do so by contrasting it with the classical age, on the one hand, and our own, still mostly modern, era, on the other. This project requires, as he says, “pulling oneself free of that modern age,” which forms the very conditions of possibility for our own thought and practical activity.\textsuperscript{79} While the shape and configuration of an age other than our own can be uncovered “through gentle digging,” when it comes to articulating the discursive and non-discursive practices that serve as conditions of possibility for our own form of life, “then archaeology, like Nietzschean philosophy, is forced to work with hammer blows.”\textsuperscript{80}

So Foucault’s historico-philosophical method attempts to move beyond dialectical History by refusing the supra-historical point of view, and beyond romanticism by refusing nostalgia for the past. Even assuming that such a methodological stance is desirable, that it is useful and worthwhile to write a history of our present while neither presupposing nor lamenting a victory (or the right to a victory) on the part of modernity, (how) can such a stance be maintained? What, in short, is the position of Foucault as archaeologist or genealogist? Does he stand within his own historical a priori or power/knowledge regime or outside of it? If the former, does this vitiate his critical reflections on that historical a priori, or undermine his attempt to articulate the limits of his own culture? Does this mean, as Derrida suggests in his famous critique of the History of Madness, that “the history of reason cannot be the history of its origin... but must be that of one of its determined figures?”\textsuperscript{81} And if the latter, is Foucault guilty of appealing implicitly to a unity of Reason that transcends the specific forms that rationality takes during different historical epochs, thereby, as Derrida also suggests, “confirm-

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 373.
\textsuperscript{79} Foucault, “On the Ways of Writing History,” 293.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
Foucault seems to have only two options here: either he is stuck within the determined figures of the history of reason, and thus he can’t really write the history of the origin of the split between madness and reason that founds that history; or he can write this history, but only by accessing some point of view outside of that history, which could only be an supra-historical, metaphysical standpoint. (As Derrida put it: “Hegel again, always.”)

Derrida is right that Foucault’s suspension of “anything that might take on the appearance of an ending, or of rest in truth” seems to require the assumption – or perhaps it would be more accurate to say the positing—of something that can neither be fully conceptualized in the language of reason nor reconciled in the dialectical unfolding of History. This something goes by the name of unreason. The assumption that unreason is radically outside of reason and History appears to motivate the recurrent suggestion that unreason escapes language and linear temporality itself, and that this is what the tragic consciousness of madness allows us to glimpse, however fleetingly. But Derrida’s charge of metaphysics is not quite on the mark inasmuch as Foucault’s aim is neither to describe this unreasonable outside nor to claim that freedom consists in occupying this space. Rather, the figure of the outside, of unreason, represented in language or thought, but also in works of art, serves to open up and illuminate lines of gaps and fissures—what Foucault calls “lines of fragility” or “kinds of virtual fracture”—in our own historical a priori. These lines of fragility and fracture allow us to see how “that-which-is might no longer be that-which-is.” The function of the figure of unreason is to create some distance between ourselves and our system of thought, our historical a priori; it is this space opened up within our historical a priori by the figure of the outside—rather than the space of the outside itself—that is the space of freedom.

Sometimes, in his early work, Foucault suggests that his historical critique is possible because our own historical a priori is in the process of breaking up and transforming into something new. For example, he speaks optimistically of the breaking up of the modern experience of madness and the impending death of “homo dialecticus” in his essay “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre”: “one day, perhaps, we will no longer know what madness was.” We will be as puzzled by the twentieth century’s “deep and pathos filled relationship to mental illness” as we are by the passage from Borges’ Chinese encyclopedia that opens The Order of Things: to confront this pathos-filled relationship to mental illness will bring our future selves face to face with the sheer impossibility of thinking that. If there is a romanticism to be found in Foucault this is it, I think. It is not a nostalgic aim of recovering a time or a space—or achieving a future—in which madness, or, more precisely, unreason, is free and

---

82 Ibid., 40.
83 Ibid., 43.
85 Ibid., 126.
86 On this point, see Derrida, 38.
87 Foucault, History of Madness, 543.
88 Ibid., 541.
89 Ibid., 543.
unfettered, but instead a youthful, romantic optimism that our current episteme is at the moment undergoing radical transformation, that the ground is crumbling beneath our feet, that we are on the brink of something radically new. Later, Foucault would become more sanguine about what we might call his earlier presentistic exceptionalism.\footnote{…we should have the modesty to say to ourselves that, on the one hand, the time we live in is not the unique or fundamental or irruptive point in history where everything is completed and begun again. We must have the modesty to say, on the other hand, that… the time we live in is very interesting; it needs to be analyzed and broken down, and that we would do well to ask ourselves, ‘What is the nature of our present?’” (Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual History,” 126)}

Not coincidentally, I think, in his later work, Foucault also places more emphasis on the role that critique plays in transforming our historical a priori, precisely by revealing it as a contingently emergent way of thinking, experiencing and acting, in order to open up the space for the possibility of being, doing and thinking otherwise. Hence, the historical task of tracing the contingent emergence of our modern historical a priori—an a priori which is both historical and Historical—is a crucial component of this project of critique. As Foucault puts it:

\begin{quote}
What reason perceives as its necessity, or rather, what different forms of rationality offer as their necessary being, can perfectly well be shown to have a history; and the network of contingencies from which it emerges can be traced. Which is not to say, however, that these forms of rationality were irrational. It means that they reside on a base of human practice and human history; and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they have been made.\footnote{Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual History,” 127. As this passage shows, genealogical critique not only reveals historical contingency; it also uncovers the historically specific practices through which our contingent present has been made. In other words, genealogy as critique involves showing not just that our present is contingent but also how it has been contingently formed, so that we can understand not only that it can be transformed but also how to go about doing so. See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, chapter 3, for insightful discussion of this crucial yet often underappreciated aspect of genealogical methodology.}
\end{quote}

The recurrent glimpses within the modern age of the tragic consciousness of madness in the work of such figures as Nietzsche, Artaud, Nerval, and Van Gogh should be understood as examples of how the lines of fragility and virtual fracture within our Historical historical a priori can be illuminated. As Foucault puts it at the end of the final chapter of the History of Madness: “by the madness that interrupts it, an oeuvre opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without an answer, opening an unhealable wound that the world is forced to address.”\footnote{Foucault, History of Madness, 537.} The work of critique is precisely to trace these lines of fragility and fracture, these open wounds, and to use them to open up a difference, a discontinuity, however small, between our historical a priori and ourselves. This opening up generates “a space of concrete freedom, that is of possible transformation.”\footnote{Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual History,” 127.}
fends more explicitly in his later work, where reason is understood in fundamentally ambivalent terms and where freedom consists in opening up a space between our selves and our historical a priori. In *The History of Madness*, Foucault uses the figure of unreason to open up this space, to reveal the contingency of our Historical historical a priori and the complex social, institutional, and ideological structures out of which our contingent present is constructed. From the point of view of Foucault scholarship, uncovering this conception of critique in the *History of Madness* is important, because it shows how the idea of critique that becomes explicit in Foucault’s later work is already implicit in his work from the beginning. From the point of view of a feminist engagement with Foucault, this reading is important because, as I argue in the next section, it provides a more promising way of using Foucault to revisit the feminist critique of reason.

Feminism and the Critique of Reason Revisited

As I argued above, the feminist critique of reason thus seems to leave us caught in a double bind. One response to this critique is to claim that the exclusions, of women or queers, for example, from our conception of rationality are not constitutive but accidental; on this view, the feminist critique of reason does not challenge the conception of reason per se, and there is no reason not to suppose that women and queers are rational in the usual sense of that term. In other words, this response assumes that there is nothing wrong with reason as such, only with the ways in which the concept has heretofore been applied. The limitation of this approach is that it simply denies what a great deal of feminist scholarship over the last three decades has patiently documented, namely, that the traditional philosophical conception of reason has been constructed through a series of exclusions of the body, the emotions, and the irrational, all of which are associated with the feminine. Hence, as Alcoff puts it, “a feminist project determined to gain for women the realm of the ‘mind’ will never work to overturn male supremacy. We cannot simply remove women from the sphere of the ‘body’ and claim for ourselves the sphere of the ‘mind’ and ‘reason’ when these latter concepts have been constructed on the basis of our exclusion.” If this is correct, then those who have been constitutively excluded from our conception of reason can be included only at the cost of their own self-alienation, by denying or disavowing their femininity or their queerness. This response also tacitly relies on an implausible conception of reason as, at its core, pure, untainted by entanglements with power and ideological blind spots.

A second line of response to the feminist critique of reason consists in rejecting reason and embracing its excluded Other, whether that be the body, the emotions, irrationality, madness, or eros. As Nussbaum has argued, however, this stance is troubling for several reasons. It fails to appreciate fully the ways in which feminist theory and practice rely on reason—and associated concepts such as objectivity and truth—for the defense of their own positions, and it also tacitly upholds an image of women—as less rational than men—that feminists have

---

94 Nussbaum, “Feminists and Philosophy.”
95 Alcoff, 9.
96 Nussbaum, “The sleep of reason is a female nightmare”; see also Alcoff, 10 and Nagl-Docekal, 70-71.
challenged for centuries.\textsuperscript{97} This stance also fails to recognize the ways in which reason is not only a necessary evil—a tool that we have to have recourse to in order to make ourselves understood—but also a means of empowerment for women.\textsuperscript{98}

In order to avoid this double bind, feminists should neither downplay the problems with our conception of reason by insisting that its exclusions are accidental rather than constitutive, nor should we overreact by rejecting reason altogether, in favor of a celebration of unreasonableness. As I argued above, I think that despite her efforts to avoid this fate and despite her highly sophisticated appreciation for the logic of splitting, Huffer’s characterization of reason as despotic, her linking of freedom to madness, unreason, and desubjectivation, and her call for feminists to resist rather than to recuperate reason leave her stuck in this double bind. Fortunately, I also think that feminists can find resources within the early Foucault to avoid this fate. The trick is to engage in an ongoing critical interrogation of what Foucault calls the \textit{spiral} of relations of power and forms of rationality. This interrogation demands a refusal of the either/or choice between a sterile rationalism that refuses to admit that forms of rationality are necessarily impure, inevitably entangled with relations of power and exclusion, and hence crisscrossed with certain intrinsic dangers, and a flamboyant irrationalism that refuses to see that we are nevertheless fortunately committed to that our form of rationality insofar as it is both empowering and enabling. As Alcoff has argued, drawing on Foucault, the key is thematizing and rethinking the relationship between theory and power:

\begin{quote}

it is not possible to seek a theoretical discourse that will stand completely outside of power, that will enforce no exclusions and contain no elements having to do with the desire and the will to maximize one’s own sphere of effectiveness... the better alternative is to reconfigure the relationship between power and theory, between the ego and the unconscious, between reason and its others, to acknowledge the instability of these categories and the permeability of their borders, and to develop a reconstructed notion of reason, not as a mastery of an ego over the whole but as including multiple forms and operating on many levels.\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}

In other words, the best way of taking up the feminist critique of reason is precisely to interrogate in an ongoing fashion reason’s entanglements with power relations—including the subordination of women and queers, but also racialized and colonized subjects—but without giving up our investment in reason, or our faith in its empowering effects. This means acknowledging that the first response to the feminist critique of reason—that of claiming women’s reasonableness—has the appeal that it has because reason itself is empowering. In a context in which one has been excluded from the space of reasons, or reluctantly included but marked as an inferior participant, asserting or claiming one’s reasonableness and one’s capacity to give good, cogent reasons can be an important act of resistance against subordination. Not only that, but as Nussbaum and Alcoff also point out, feminism starts with a refusal to accept the status quo that is grounded in a demand for a rational justification of the current social order. Reason is not a necessary evil but rather a means of empowerment; hence, feminists spurn the

\textsuperscript{97} Nussbaum, “Feminists and Philosophy.”
\textsuperscript{98} Nussbaum, “The sleep of reason is a female nightmare” and Alcoff, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{99} Alcoff, 23.
demand to be reasonable at our peril. But the second response to the feminist critique of reason is, I think, equally appealing, and this is so because reason is predicated on the exclusion and domination of all of its Others—madness, the body, the emotions or passions, irrationality—all of which are associated with femininity and with queerness and racially marked and colonized subjectivities. Reason is not only empowering, it is also entangled with relations of dominance and subordination, which means that by claiming access to reason—at least, as that concept has been traditionally understood—those who have been excluded risk re-enacting their subordination and engaging in a form of self-alienation. Hence, the conflict can be understood as arising from reason’s simultaneous entanglement with two different modalities of power: empowerment and domination.

Rather than rejecting a reason understood as thoroughly despotic in favor of an embrace of unreasonableness, eros, or madness, feminists should follow the early Foucault in accepting the spiral generated by the irreconcilable tension between reason and power, which means that we accept that our form of rationality is both dangerous and indispensable. This means, as Foucault said, that critique must be ongoing, that there is always more for it to do, that we are “always in the position of beginning again.” However, this commitment to ongoing critique, to the belief that we will never accede to a point of view outside of power where we have access to a form of reason that has been purified of all exclusions, is compatible with the project of developing a more capacious conception of reason by reassessing the role played by the body, the affects and emotions, judgment, the imagination, in the operation of reason. The commitment to ongoing critique does not require that we resist reason altogether; it simply requires that we be willing to subject our new conception of reason to critical scrutiny and accept that such scrutiny may well reveal that it is marked by constitutive exclusions that we are not now in a position to see. Thus even if we are able to construct new conceptions of reason that are more open to and inclusive of the body, the emotions, the affects, the imagination, and so on—and thus to challenge the constitutive gendered exclusions of traditional conceptions of reason—we will always have to be attuned to the possibility of new forms of exclusion that we may not now even be able to envision.

Amy Allen
Department of Philosophy
Dartmouth College
6035 Thornton Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
USA
