Joanna Crosby and Dianna Taylor: The theme of this special section of Foucault Studies, “Foucauldian Spaces,” emerged out of the 2016 meeting of the Foucault Circle, where the four of you were participants. Each of the three individual papers contained in the special section critically deploys and/or reconceptualizes an aspect of Foucault’s work that engages and offers particular insight into the construction, experience, and utilization of space. We’d like to ask the four of you to reflect on what makes a space Foucauldian, and whether or not (and why or why not) you’d consider the space created by the convergence of and intellectual exchanges among an international group of Foucault scholars at the University of New South Wales in the summer of 2016 to be Foucauldian.

Lynne Huffer: With the very first words of History of Madness (1961), Foucault draws his readers into an intensely spatial conception of history:

At the end of the Middle Ages, leprosy disappeared from the Western world. At the edges of the community, at town gates, large, barren, uninhabitable areas appeared, where the disease no longer reigned but its ghost still hovered. For centuries, these spaces would belong to the domain of the inhuman.1

I read this invocation of “large, barren, uninhabitable” spaces at the edge of the human as an opening frame for apprehending Foucault’s life-long attention to the violence of humanism and the historical sedimentation under which that violence is buried. If lepers are no longer the “others” of the human, the spaces they inhabited still exist. This means Foucauldian spaces are spectral, haunted by the ghosts of those whose exclusions we no longer witness but who form the forgotten, violent foundations of our knowledge and our culture.

In History of Madness, Foucault’s first major book, the same haunted spaces where leprosy once reigned outside the gates of medieval Paris will become, in the 17th century, a single space of confinement inside the city. But how can this be? How can outside spaces also be a single space inside? The answer is obvious (although my students sometimes miss it): as Paris developed over the course of the classical age, the city expanded, swallowing up the spaces “at the edges of the community” and incorporating them within a single,

normalizing grid. This movement of expansion and exclusion within describes the logic of settler colonialism, providing a spatial description of Foucault’s understanding of modern biopower as normalizing and self-referential. This shift from the leper to the plague model is easily tracked across a number of Foucault’s works, from *History of Madness* to *Abnormal* to *Discipline and Punish*. *History of Madness*, in particular, painstakingly traces the shift as post-Cartesian, moving from the *cogito’s* rejection of the madman to the inclusion of madness as so many positivities produced and apprehended by reason. The modern triumph of reason’s domain is the generalizing inclusion of all the little normals once rejected outside within the Cartesian *ratio’s* statistical domain. As *History of Madness*’s opening spectral space reminds us, that domain is haunted, its ghosts both produced and occluded by those rationalizing maneuvers. Foucault’s temporalizing, genealogical project is thus, also, a spatializing one: to excavate those “large, barren, uninhabitable” spaces that constituted the “domain of the inhuman.”

Bringing this spatializing logic to contemporary concerns, we might say that the leper haunts today’s asylums, prisons, detention centers, refugee camps, homeless shelters, and other spaces of exclusion within, from Guantanamo Bay to the Gaza Strip to Standing Rock to Belfast. The specter of “leprosy” still inhabits what Foucault calls today’s “carceral network,” which “takes back with one hand what it seems to exclude with the other.”2 If, as Foucault claims, the panoptic society is a society of light—of “small theatres” that induce in all of us “a state of conscious and permanent visibility”3—his invocation of spectral spaces might be read as an invitation to turn toward society’s shadows. We should not understand this beckoning toward darkness as a reversal of the panopticon back into the dungeon, but rather as a genealogical gesture of solidarity with those *petits fous*—the “little mad ones”—Foucault spent his life engaging through his work in the archives.4 Indeed, the archive is perhaps Foucault’s most important spatial tool. The archive functions as the Foucauldian double of the spectral spaces—leprosarium, General Hospital, asylum, prison, carceral network—where humanist violence is both produced and masked.

How might this sense of Foucauldian spaces help us to think about the 2016 meeting of the Foucault Circle at UNSW as a space of convergence and intellectual exchange among an international group of Foucault scholars? Here’s one thought: Just as *History of Madness* begins with an invocation of space, so too did the Foucault Circle. In usual fashion, Ben Golder kicked off the proceedings with a host’s welcome to all the conference participants. But less usual, at least in my experience, was Golder’s reminder, right from the start, that the space of the campus—the ground that literally supported our intellectual exchange—was colonized land once inhabited by aboriginal peoples. (I have never witnessed such a

3 Ibid, 200.
reminder of the indigenous land on which the U.S. academy is built.) Golder’s invocation of aboriginal land produced, in the conference, the effect of a haunting. While Golder’s words did not restore justice to that particular space, UNSW’s Law School, his verbal gesture was hardly meaningless or inconsequential. In Foucauldian fashion, Golder’s remarks tore the scrim that formed the unseen backdrop for this academic occasion. We were called by Golder’s words to “restor[e] to [the] silent and apparently immobile soil” of the UNSW “its rifts, its instability, its flaws.”5 As he uttered the words, “aboriginal lands,” my own unconscious assumptions—about myself, my trip to Australia, my own knowledge practices—were disturbed. I suddenly saw myself sitting with ghosts, called to acknowledge the settler logic that brought me there. The specters remained there, hovering, throughout the week, unsettling the space of the Foucault Circle.

Jana Sawicki: Thank you, Lynne, for beginning with such a hauntingly beautiful description of the centrality and function of spatiality in Foucault’s histories. You rightly suggest that one function of Foucault’s preoccupation with such spectral spaces might be to produce solidarity with “abnormals” throughout the histories that he maps for us. If Foucault was so profoundly reluctant at times to speak as himself, this reluctance may have stemmed from his sensitivity to the inevitability that his own discourse would also cast its own shadows.

I want to gesture, for a moment, toward another angle from which we might address spatiality in Foucault’s discourse, namely, one that focuses more narrowly on what Foucault actually says about a peculiar kind of space, namely, heterotopic space. As we all know, he did not say much about heterotopias after the late 60s. Yet there are at least three occasions where they figure centrally as a topic of discussion: the preface to The Order of Things, in which he is concerned with discursive spaces (1967) and with Borges, a lecture to architects from 1966 (published in 1984) entitled “Of Other Spaces,” in which he identifies some specific heterotopic spaces that he finds in his archival research, and a 1966 radio broadcast in which he focuses on social and cultural spaces. In particular, the 1966 lecture might provide the point of departure for another, slightly different meditation on space in our time, and perhaps, on the spatiality of the conference itself.

In this lecture Foucault invokes a history of spatiality and suggests that the “present epoch” might be one of space rather than time: “We are at a moment,” he says, “...when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein.”6 He goes on to describe his current epoch as one of “simultaneity,” “juxtaposition” and the “side-by-side” – in short, as composed of heterogeneous sites or spaces. “[W]e live inside sets of relations that delineates

sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another.”[7] The epochal space in this case is not an empty container, but a set of relationships between heterogeneous sites in which we find ourselves – much like Heidegger’s idea of Being-in as “involved.” In any case, heterotopias assume a particular function in this heterogeneous ensemble of sites. They are “beside them” them, perhaps, queer, in some sense. They can mirror, contest, or invert the sites around them. Thus, they may serve as “counter-sites” – sites that make visible features of the existing order of things that might not otherwise be seen; they serve to problematize the present and expose the “unrealness” of the spaces that we occupy – their contingent and sometimes shaky foundations, as well as their shadows.

Yet, I am reluctant to consider our Foucault conference a counter-space, a space of resistance. Things are surely more complicated than that. Consider this: Foucault also describes heterotopic spaces as “involving systems of opening and closing.”[8] In some cases, access might require having undergone rituals of purification. In others, the opening might be illusory – one might be in some sense partitioned off upon entry. Foucault’s example of the latter is the motel. Open to just about anyone who can pay, but an opening that simultaneously separates off the entrants. It seems to me that our conference had features of both sites. After all, entry requires the proper credentials. Yet, at the same time, universities open themselves to all, but then partition off the entrants in disciplines, fields, niches, and so forth. We are allowed a space in which we can challenge the existing order of things, unsettle it, but in such a way as to be marked as critical, radical, “Foucauldian,” as in some way deviating from the status quo while operating within it. This marking or labeling can be a way of disarming it. I am not entirely pessimistic about the prospect of occupying such sites in ways that might shake things up, produce seismic activity that opens up other possibilities for thinking and being, but I am not optimistic either. Having said this, I am entirely aware that academic freedoms that I may be taking for granted are under threat at the moment.

Paul Patton: Thanks Lynn and Jana for opening this discussion. I struggled for a while with the idea of “Foucauldian spaces” and especially with the question what makes a space Foucauldian. I appreciate the many ways in which Foucault is a spatial thinker, meaning one who thinks in spatial rather than temporal terms, but found it hard to go beyond the thought that there is nothing particularly “Foucauldian” about the spaces that he discusses: spaces of confinement, treatment, surveillance and so on. I am thinking of his well-known analyses of particular institutional spaces, such as asylums, hospitals and prisons, along with his discussion of architectural designs such as Ledoux’s Saltworks at Arc-et-Senans or Bentham’s Panopticon.

There is a sense in which Foucault is a spatial thinker even when he is describing immaterial spaces such as the different formations of discourse in particular empirical domains during certain historical periods. Even though there is a history of such formations, Foucault’s concept of discourse is profoundly spatial, describing statements in terms of a series of regularities between different functions, and discursive formations in terms of the relations between statements via what he calls “systems of dispersion.” This way of thinking about discourse is no doubt related to his structuralism, if we can call it that. He appears to have an idiosyncratic understanding of structure, not unlike the one Deleuze outlines in his ‘What is structuralism?’ essay where structures are conceived as dispersed and differential systems of a certain kind.

Foucault invokes a related understanding of structure at the beginning of “Different Spaces,” where he elaborates on his suggestion that the present age is more spatial than historical:

Structuralism, or at least what is grouped under that somewhat general name, is the effort to establish, between elements that may have been distributed over time, a set of relations that makes them appear juxtaposed, opposed, implied by one another, that makes them appear, in short, like a kind of configuration.9

He goes on to characterize the peculiar spatiality of modern Western existence in terms of “relations of emplacement” where these are, in effect, the relations that define a structure. His thesis is that “we live inside an ensemble of relations that define emplacements that are irreducible to each other and absolutely non-superposable.”10

Like Jana, I was drawn back to this essay in trying to think through what might be a Foucauldian space. Here at least we are dealing with a spatial concept - the concept of a certain kind of space - that is particularly Foucauldian in the sense that it is a concept that he invented. “Different Spaces” is of course an occasional piece, not entirely at a tangent with his major works and the well-known analyses of institutional spaces, but certainly a more playful piece. For a minor essay by Foucault, it has nevertheless given rise to an extraordinary amount of secondary literature: there is even a website devoted to Heterotopian Studies.11 I was drawn to this essay not only because it seemed a defensible way to make sense of the notion of Foucauldian space but also because it seemed the most promising way to make sense of the suggestion that our Foucault Circle conference at UNSW Australia in June-July 2016 might be considered a Foucauldian space. If we consider

---

10 Ibid, 178.
11 [Http://www.heterotopiastudies.com/contact/](http://www.heterotopiastudies.com/contact/)
the defining traits of heterotopian spaces that he outlines, it is not difficult to include the academic conference among such spaces.

Conferences are a rite of passage for aspiring academics and to that extent a form of “crisis heterotopia” akin to those that Foucault mentions in modern societies. They are a kind of non-place, sometimes held on university campuses but often in hotels that could be anywhere, where scholars go to consummate or to reaffirm their status as researchers of national or international renown.

There is no doubt a history of the academic conference to be written, if it has not been written already, in which the development of these gatherings and the many forms they now take might be traced across the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Conferences serve a variety of purposes that differ widely from one academic field or discipline to the next, and they come in all sizes.

In every case, however, they bring together a diverse array of speakers in a particular discipline or on a particular topic. They represent more or less adequately the entire range of approaches, ideas or ideologies accepted within a given field at a given time. The Foucault Circle conference draws a relatively narrow band of speakers defined by their relation to a particular oeuvre, but it still has the capacity to “juxtapose in a single real place several emplacements that are incompatible in themselves” such as a Weberian, an Agambenian, an Ancient Greek or a biopolitical Foucault.12

Conferences are part of the annual cycle of academic life, but they are also an escape from the weekly routines of teaching, supervising and administering. To that extent they are comparable to those transitory heterotopias such as the festivals, fairs, and Club Méditerranée holidays that Foucault mentions. Conferences are another way for academics to visit exotic locations far from their usual emplacements. They enable them to travel back in time if they are held in castles in the old world, or forward in time if they are held in the most advanced sectors of the new world.

They also exhibit the peculiar forms of openness and closure that Foucault lists as a fifth characteristic of heterotopias. Most academic conferences impose conditions on attendance and some even involve rigorous pre-selection of participants and refereeing of papers. But even those that are relatively open to academics and students, like the huge mass-market disciplinary conferences that accept anyone willing and able to pay the registration fees, have their inner hierarchies and systems of exclusion.

The final trait that Foucault describes is perhaps the most difficult to apply to the academic conference. This involves their function in relation to the space that remains, which I take to mean the academic space from which they derive and which in some ways they reflect, like the mirror that provides his first example of a heterotopian space. This function is “spread between two extreme poles:”

12 Foucault, “Different Spaces,” 181.
Either the heterotopias have the role of creating a space of illusion that denounces all real space, all real emplacements within which human life is partitioned off, as being even more illusory. Perhaps it is this role that was played for a long time by those famous brothels which we are now deprived of. Or, on the contrary, creating a different space, a different real space as perfect, as meticulous, as well-arranged as ours is disorganized, badly arranged, and muddled. This would be the heterotopia not of illusion but of compensation, and I wonder if it is not somewhat in that manner that certain colonies functioned.\textsuperscript{13}

Space of illusion or space of compensation, brothel or colony, it is hard to know where the contemporary academic conference sits along this continuum. It is just possible to imagine a conference that so fulfilled our dreams of pure intellectual camaraderie and exchange that the real academic world seemed by contrast a poor reflection. Plato’s Symposium provides a classical model, but a more contemporary version might be a kind of academic Westworld where participants get to shoot down or seduce as many hosts as they like, or where they can play a role in their chosen conference narrative and revolutionise a field or start a movement like Derrida did in Baltimore in 1967. In a similar vein, it is possible to imagine a conference as meticulously organized, well planned and executed as the university is currently disorganized, badly planned and unsure of its purpose and function in the larger social and economic world, but I have yet to attend such an event.

Real conferences like the one we attended fall well below and between these extremes, but they nevertheless remain an important space in the academic world. Neither denunciations of nor compensations for the realities of academic life, they are still spaces where there is a relatively free exchange of ideas among participants with shared or overlapping interests, where new relations and new connections are established, and where participants are enabled to think differently about things they thought they knew. In a passage from The Use of Pleasure that Deleuze read out at Foucault’s funeral, he asked in what after all does philosophical activity consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known?\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Steven Ogden}: Thank you, Lynne, Jana, and Paul for your insights on Foucauldian spaces and the 2016 Foucault Circle Conference. On reflection, I find myself being drawn to the beach at Coogee. I was staying there during the conference. And every morning, I’d leave that wonderful coastal space and walk to the conference space on the UNSW campus. I enjoyed the conference, but I resisted leaving the beach. But what about these Foucauldian spaces? Regrettably, Foucault did not develop his spatial approach fully, but it was an important part of his \textit{gaze}. From language to asylums and prisons, he interprets the world

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 184.

spatially. Foucault himself was aware of the untapped potential of his spatial reflections, which have been pursued by a raft of scholars, across a range of disciplines. Curiously, he often refers to “fields;” perhaps the field has the same spatial status in France, as the beach in Australia?

In addition, there is a wider debate about space and place, and which of these concepts has epistemological primacy. Partly semantic? Not quite, but certainly revealing of different starting points. This debate, however, does not always do Foucault’s spatial practice justice. While Foucault takes things seriously, there is also often an element of play, which encompasses the objective and subjective dimensions of experience, including the imagination. Foucault, however, does not ultimately develop the concept of the imagination, but he signals its importance early in his career. This importance is apparent in his references to the “force” or “power” of the imagination, as well as in the implicit link Foucault draws between imagination and space in the concept of the heterotopic imagination. Arguably, it is through the imagination that a place, even a non-place, becomes a lived space. So, what exactly can we say about Foucauldian spaces?

As Paul prefigured, it is hard to define in precise terms what is meant by Foucauldian spaces. So, I am focusing on Foucault’s spatial practice, which is a way of seeing. This is Foucault’s gaze, what Deleuze referred to as Foucault’s “passion for seeing,” which challenges us to examine how we see spaces like beaches, campuses, and conferences. While tantalizing, it leaves us with ambiguity. Lynne caught something of this claiming that “Foucauldian spaces are spectral.” In my view, Foucauldian spaces embrace the subjective and the objective, the past and the present, clarifying some things and blurring others. As he protested, “I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves . . . Each can only be understood through the other.”

What about the Foucault Circle Conference space? I am not sure. As Jana reminds us, “entry requires the proper credentials” and not just the academic. In fact, the non-academic credentials, working beneath the surface, are the most powerful, revealing “inner hierarchies and systems of exclusion.” So, I enjoyed the conference (and the beach), but was

---

19 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 50.
left wondering about the conference space per se. Is it a counter-space or, under neoliberalism, an alternative space of social ordering?21

Joanna Crosby and Dianna Taylor: Does “prison” continue to be a Foucauldian space? Depending upon how you responded above, this question could perhaps be more accurately posed in terms of whether prison continues to be a space of Foucauldian interest and concern – or some other terms altogether upon which we hope you’ll elaborate! We raise this question in light of mass incarceration in the United States and Australian “offshore processing” of asylum seekers and refugees, the devastating effects of these practices, and quiescence as well as resistance in the face of both.

Jana Sawicki: I love Paul’s more upbeat account of the conference space. Mine is certainly less positive, though I must confess that I too often welcome the temporary suspension of routine academic life that I often experience at them. And once one is tenured and less under scrutiny in the academy’s panoptic and normalizing regime, they can be quite pleasurable as well!

Reading his response also suggested a way of thinking about the second question we have been asked to consider – the question concerning how Foucault might respond to contemporary prisons, offshore processing of asylum seekers and refugees, and, I would add offshore sites of indefinite detention such as Guantanamo. The latter strikes me as the sort of mirror that reveals illusory aspects as well as costs of the freedoms that the U.S., for one, is allegedly defending.

A brief search on the Internet reveals that many academics familiar with Foucault’s work continue to find it useful for addressing such contemporary spaces of exclusion, punishment and surveillance. Much of it concerns the rise of neoliberalism and tracks important changes in how power is exercised. Some, for example, point out that disciplinary power has become less central under this new regime of capitalism – that insofar as individuals are treated as “entrepreneurs of themselves,” as human capital, they assume the bulk of responsibility for investing in themselves, for disciplining themselves, for developing themselves. In this system some individuals are deemed less valuable, or dispensable – not having invested enough in themselves.

It seems that Foucault was drawn to the relative freedom from discipline and normalization that neoliberal thought promised, that it might offer the prospect of a plurality of spaces where individuals and groups might experiment with ways of living. Moreover, because he was critical of the bureaucratic and disciplinary features of socialism in France, as well as the exclusion of the new left by traditional Marxists, perhaps he considered neoliberal thought a resource for another type of “socialist governmentality.”

The literature on Foucault and neoliberalism is full of tensions about where he stood with respect to it. I regard his discussion of it as more descriptive than prescriptive, but one can still ask why he chose to address it in the way he did.

In any case, it is easy to imagine him deploring mass incarcerations, detention centers, offshore processing and so forth, but perhaps his critical response would have required a different mapping of power relations than that with which he was operating in the 1970s. To be sure, one still sees disciplinary power operating in prisons. Privatized prisons that make up the so-called prison-industrial complex surely require discipline. Prisons do not necessarily resemble detention centers or offshore processing sites. One has to identify their different functions, see how they draw upon extant techniques of power, and invent new ones in order to develop strategies for resisting them.
Steven Ogden: Getting inside our heads

The prison is a Foucauldian space in neoliberal social ordering. As such, Foucault’s conception of prison is still relevant, but needs to be put in a wider political context. By doing so, both sovereign power and disciplinary power re-emerge in the context of “mass incarceration” and “offshore processing.” With offshore processing, for example, we have a new form of prison, which is a disciplinary tactic that arises in conjunction with the extra-legal practices of the Australian government, producing docile bodies, as well as shaping public discourse.

For Foucault, the prison marked a relatively “new tactic” in nineteenth century Europe, reflecting new emerging discursive practices relating to disciplinary society. For Foucault’s interest in the prison echoed his interest in the military, and, as Lynne signaled, the transition from practices surrounding the treatment of lepers to new responses to the plague. Specifically, for Foucault the prison reflected the transition from sovereign power to disciplinary power. Instead of public displays of torture intimidating the crowd (i.e. collective), power is expressed by getting inside our heads (i.e. individuals), so much so that Foucault declared “the soul is the prison of the body.” Interestingly, Judith Butler picks up nuances of Aristotelian causality here, which in Foucault has links with the Catholic tradition of material-formal causality.

Foucault read Aristotle, but as a child, he attended Mass at St. Porchaire Poitiers with his siblings and grandmother. This was during the reign of Pius XI (1922-1939); a period in which church life was dominated by neo-Thomist thinking and practices. The church of Saint Porchaire itself is a heterotopic space. The double-nave building, lacking a church yard or buffering space, between it and the township, adjoins other buildings. Admittedly, Foucault as an adult was not a practising Catholic, but he was not anti-Church, which helps explain in part his astute critique of the church. Nonetheless, by osmosis, it seems reasonable to speculate that he had been influenced implicitly by a neo-Thomistic construal of material/formal causality, which was originally grounded in Aristotle. In simple terms, the character of matter is realized by virtue of its form, likewise, the character of a body is realized by virtue of its soul. In Foucault’s case, and under disciplinary power, the formative role of the soul is decisive as “the soul is the prison of the body.”

---

23 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 30.
25 Foucault, The Punitive Society, for example, “what the hospital is for the body, the prison is for the soul,” 91.
26 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 181.
Thomistic nuance, however, should not be exaggerated, but it serves as a reminder that Foucault’s work did not emerge in theoretical isolation. So, what about the prison?

In the prison, the focus is on individual bodies, such that, by getting inside our heads, the soul becomes the prison of the body. In this light, neoliberalism has vested interests in the deployment of both sovereign and disciplinary power in order to create sated docile bodies of self-interested entrepreneurs, where “Rank in itself serves as a reward or punishment.” Neoliberalism is panopticism writ large, from CCTV cameras to credit card details, constituting the finely calibrated, virtually invisible, art of subjection. In an Australian context, the offshore centres of Manus and Nauru become new forms of disciplinary power, as the Australian government exercises sovereign power. Hence, the macrophysics of sovereign power and the microphysics of disciplinary power are not eliminated, but reformulated, under modern governmentality. So, what about these new offshore spaces?

Extra-legal prisons “in” Australia
The modern debate on sovereignty begins with Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin. In short, when is state violence justified? In contemporary terms, then, under exceptional circumstances, the state does not have to adhere to the law, or the state can change the law. As such, the sovereign is the one who decides on the exception. For example, faced with a terrorist threat, a prime minister or president authorises the government to impinge on the rights of citizens, all for the sake of national security.

Foucault was aware of the power of sovereignty. He sought to address the issue of “power without the king,” recognizing the persistence of sovereign forms of power. This often involves the use of disciplinary tactics. In institutions, for example, the neoliberal agenda is managed by the use of disciplinary power: “Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” In other words, the prison is constantly resurfacing as a place of social ordering.

Lastly, offshore processing in Australia is an example of such ordering. In terms of context, aquatic spaces, like Coogee beach, figure prominently in the Australian imaginary. According to official discourse, offshore processing was developed as a deterrent in order to protect refugees from drowning at sea. So, without trial, and ignoring human rights, refugees were sent across the sea to the islands of Manus and Nauru. As such, Manus and Nauru are spaces of exclusion. On the one hand, they were created, outside the law, as a public display of sovereign power, making a point to potential people smugglers and the

---

27 Ibid, 266.
29 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 228.
Australian people. On the other hand, observation, judgment, examination transform internees into docile bodies and Foucauldian delinquents.\footnote{Foucault, \textit{The History of Sexuality: Volume 1}, 91.}

**Paul Patton**: The nature and function of prisons further complicates the question of Foucauldian space. We tend to think of prisons as disciplinary spaces, seeing them through the lens of Foucault’s analysis of the prison as an exemplary institution organized in terms of the spatial and temporal ordering of activities that was central to disciplinary power. We should not, however, overlook the penultimate chapter of \textit{Discipline and Punish}, in which he notes that the failure of the prison to achieve its disciplinary aims was coterminous with the advent of the prison as the primary form of judicial punishment in Western societies, and that prisons have survived and even proliferated in part because they serve a variety of other political and economic functions.

The extraordinary growth of prisons and prison populations in countries such as Australia and the U.S. should be understood in these terms. They serve a range of political and economic functions that have little to do with producing docile subjects. Bernard Harcourt and others have drawn attention to the extraordinary overcrowding in U.S. prisons, to the point that they are little more than warehouses for a remarkably constant section of the population. This is a consequence of mandatory sentencing policies that allow politicians to appear to be doing something about crime rates, but also sustains the profitable business of running and servicing such prisons. Whereas in the US the larger part of the prison population is African American, in Australia it is Indigenous people who make up a disproportionate share of those imprisoned: Aboriginal people constitute just under 3\% of the population but 28\% of the prison population. Imprisonment remains a key element of the ongoing process of colonisation by reinforcing the exclusion, marginalisation, and demoralization of the broader Indigenous population. This is not a function of imprisonment that Foucault discussed, but it is one that is perfectly consistent with his analysis of the political polyfunctionality of the carceral archipelago.

Foucault’s history of the prison illuminates some features of modern imprisonment, but it is a history that focuses on certain features (producing docile bodies, reproducing delinquency) and on a particular period at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. He noted in a 1977 discussion of Bentham’s \textit{Panopticon} that “the procedures of power at work in modern societies are much more numerous, diverse and rich” than the principles of permanent visibility so important to Bentham and that “disciplinary power was in fact already in Bentham’s day being transcended by other and much more subtle mechanisms for the regulation of phenomena of population, controlling their fluctuations and compensating their irregularities.”\footnote{Foucault, \textit{Power/Knowledge}, 148; 160.} From our present standpoint, I think that we can see not only that disciplinary techniques have been overtaken by a variety
of other mechanisms for the control of individual and collective behaviour, but also that disciplinary techniques themselves have been transformed and applied in new domains and by means of new technologies. The proliferation of surveillance techniques is an obvious example: not only the use of CCTV both inside institutions and on the streets and motorways, but also the range of technological means to track individual movements, consumption patterns, political and sexual desires via the internet, GPS location devices and the range of voluntarily adopted social media platforms. At least in relation to the principle of permanent visibility, our society is disciplinary to a much greater degree than was possible in the nineteenth century, when mechanisms of surveillance were limited to lines of sight of individual overseers. In this sense, a key component of the disciplinary power that Foucault sought to characterise has metamorphosed, swarmed and proliferated far beyond the institutional sites that were the focus of his analysis.

Conversely, I think that the institutional form of the prison has been transformed and transposed to new domains of political functionality. The range of offshore detention centres is a good example of this process. Neither the U.S. sites used for the detention of suspected terrorists nor the Australian centres for the detention of asylum seekers have anything to do with rehabilitation or behavioural modification (the devastating psychological effects on long term detainees are probably an unintended consequence). While the Manus Island detention centre maintains extensive surveillance of detainees, through all available means including CCTV, computer, and telephone monitoring, the reasons for doing so have more to do with controlling the flow of information to outside media and limiting the risk of “reputational damage” to the Australian government than with encouraging behavioural change among detainees.32

The very existence of offshore detention centres such as Manus Island even complicates the distinction that Foucault draws between sovereign and disciplinary power, as Steven suggests. The political purpose of these centres is to discourage asylum seekers from even attempting to land in Australia by boat. They are explicitly defended in these terms as part of a wider effort to disrupt the business model of “people smugglers.” As such, their strategic purpose is closer to that of the spectacular displays of capital punishment practised by sovereign power than to the enclosed and silent means of disciplinary incarceration. The display of sovereign power sought to deter by fear of consequences rather than by transforming delinquents into docile subjects. Although the detention centres are a kind of prison, their primary political function is to make it known that so called “illegal arrivals” will spend years in this kind of limbo with no prospect of settlement in the promised land of freedom and opportunity.

**Lynne Huffer:** Prison is a quintessential Foucauldian term. And Foucault’s book about its

“birth,” *Discipline and Punish* (1975), is perhaps his most well-known work. But what exactly is this prison whose birth the book describes? It is not a physical building or institution but what Foucault calls “man”: his genealogy explores how “a specific mode of subjection [*assujettissement*] was able to give birth to man.”

The birth of the prison is the birth of man: a man, Foucault writes, “whom we are invited to free,” but who “is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself.”

Might we reexamine the early 21st-century meaning of prison through the specifically Foucauldian lens of subjection? Steven helpfully reminded us that for Foucault prison is about power “getting inside our heads.” In his famous description of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault writes that “a real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation” and that man “becomes the principle of his own subjection.”

The mechanism of that subjection is “the modern soul”

“a ‘soul’ inhabits [man] and brings him to existence.” And what is this soul that subjects us? It is the “reality-reference” that gives us “psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.”

Soul is our psychic interiority: an incarceration, a modern “great confinement.” Today, more than ever, we must take seriously this psychic resonance of prison: “the soul [as] the prison of the body.”

I return to Foucault’s famous imprisoning soul as a way to address our second question: Does prison continue to be a space of Foucauldian interest and concern? Specifically, I want to rethink the soul as prison in relation to the already disastrous reign of the 45th U.S. president. How might Foucault’s soul-as-prison help us to think about Trumpism, democracy’s fragility, and the possible resurgence of fascism in the 21st century?

Foucault helps us to see how fascism is made possible through the panoptical crafting of modern subjection. If prison is a power that gets “inside our heads,” an analysis of how that in-carceration plays out in the age of Trump seems crucial to strategizing ways of resisting fascism. As Foucault warned in his introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* (1972), we must develop strategies and tactics to counter “the fascism . . . in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us.”

---

34 Ibid, 30.
36 Ibid, 23.
37 Ibid, 30.
The connection I’m drawing here between Foucault’s thinking about prison and his thinking about fascism is not accidental. Foucault wrote the introduction to Anti-Oedipus at a time when he was deeply immersed in anti-prison activities with the French Prisons Information Group (Groupe d’information sur les prisons, or GIP). The GIP was founded by Foucault, Deleuze, Naquet, Domenach, and others in 1971 to contest the intolerable conditions of French prisons; its primary purpose was to “give prisoners the floor,” and it explicitly linked itself to the struggles of the Black Panthers and other anti-prison groups around the world. Although as an activist group the GIP was short-lived (1971-72), its “work” continues today in a number of ways. The GIP persists, for example, in the form of Discipline and Punish (1975); as a book Foucault wrote in the wake of the GIP it bears the traces of that political activity. Even more important, contemporary anti-prison theorists and activists are now returning to GIP documents from the early 1970s for new perspectives on mass incarceration in the early 21st century. Active Intolerance: Michel Foucault, the Prisons Information Group, and the Future of Abolition (2016), edited by Perry Zurn and Andrew Dilts, is one recent example of that effort.42 Thus the GIP continues to serve an important genealogical function: As a counter-archive, it contests the police network of surveillance and registration that produced the prison as an archive of violence. If Discipline and Punish is a genealogy of the power “inside our heads,” we might view the GIP archive as a counter-force with the capacity to unsettle that subjection.

How might this apply to modern-day Trumpism? I think the anti-immigrant, anti-Black, misogynist, planet-destroying politics we call Trumpism is at least in part a result of the prison that is “the fascism in us all, in our heads.”43 In Undoing the Demos, Wendy Brown has suggested that “we the people” no longer exist: thanks to neoliberalism, homo economicus has squeezed the breath out of homo politicus.44 If Brown is right, the soul that imprisons our contemporary body politic is narcissistic, profit-driven, and entrepreneurial. It is governed internally by the panoptical hall of mirrors that is Twitter, Snap Chat, and reality TV. This assemblage “define[s] power relations in terms of the everyday life of men.”45 It is generalizable, which means “it can in fact be integrated into any function (education, medical treatment, production, punishment).”46 It produces subjection by “multiple methods of ‘incarceration,’”47 as Jana points out, constituting what Foucault calls

42 See Active Intolerance: Michel Foucault, the Prisons Information Group, and the Future of Abolition, eds. Perry Zurn and Andrew Dilts, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
43 Foucault, “Preface,” xiii.
45 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 205.
46 Ibid, 206.
“a subtle, graduated, carceral net”—a “great carceral continuum”—that “diffuse[s] penitentiary techniques into the most innocent disciplines.”

The monstrous entrepreneur who sits in the White House is a grotesque avatar of the soul-as-prison whose birth Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish. If the birth of the prison can be tracked through a genealogy of the modern soul, Trumpism marks the flourishing of that soul as the power “inside our heads.” Trumpism epitomizes the manifestation of a panoptical technology of incitement and persuasion, from The Apprentice to Fox News to error-ridden presidential tweets. We are all components of that technology, that prison, those mechanisms of incarceration. We can rage against Trump and counter his lies with well-honed displays of truth. But that rage and that truth will not free us from ourselves, from our episteme, from “the fascism . . . in our heads and in our everyday behavior.” Our mostly unconscious, everyday, mundane reliance on various forms of securitization—the production of delinquency, mass incarceration, anti-immigrant policies, “generalized policing,” the “perpetual surveillance of the population”—underscores our collective investment in a carceral regime that has “no outside.”

“Is it surprising” then, Foucault asks, “that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” Assata Shakur echoes Foucault in describing her own experience of prison: “For many the cells are not much different from the tenements. . . The police are the same. The poverty is the same.” As a prison abolitionist concerned with the racialization of delinquency that drives the prison-industrial complex, Shakur reminds us not only that the prison has “no outside,” but also that carceral mechanisms of subjection produce “a play of truth and infamy” where some folks are more intensely incarcerated than others. Foucault describes the spectacle of “that other species, ‘the race apart that has the privilege of populating the convict-ships and prisons.’” Trump’s criminalization of immigrants and foreigners, his race-baiting, and his incitement of white nationalist violence all painfully demonstrate the relevance of the prison-fascism connection in Foucault’s genealogy of modern subjection. Foucault’s prison thus poses for us an ethical challenge, like Anti-Oedipus, which Foucault retitled an Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life, calling it a “book of ethics.” If the basic Socratic ethical question is “how are we

48 Ibid, 297.
49 Ibid, 281.
50 Ibid, 301.
51 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 228.
53 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 259.
54 Ibid, 258; emphasis added.
55 Foucault, “Preface,” xiii.
to live?,” prison today requires us to sharpen that question in the same way Foucault did as he read his friends’ work: how are we to live a non-fascist life?

Joanna Crosby and Dianna Taylor: Lynne’s response above provides a segue into our final question concerning the status of neoliberalism given recent developments in Western democracies such as the U.K., the U.S., and European countries such as France and Poland. Is the West witnessing a receding of (neo)liberalism in the face of nationalism and right-wing populism, its expansion in the form of plutocracy, a resurgence of fascism? In light of the Foucauldian perspective you’ve articulated in the previous questions, what is your response – and what might constitute a Foucauldian response – to these emergent (anti)political space(s)?

Jana Sawicki: My response to the current situation with regard to neoliberalism, the rise of populism and nationalism, the racism undergirding some of it, and current fears that fascism is on the rise is definitely Foucauldian in spirit! How so? To answer this question, I cannot escape addressing how Foucault might respond today to developments in the thirty plus years since his death. There has been significant debate about his relationship to neoliberalism. I am sympathetic with those who suggest that he considered the governmental rationality of economic liberalism (including Ordoliberalism) a promising counter-strategy to both the statism of the French Left, and the humanism of the tradition of political liberalism that relies heavily upon philosophical anthropology.

While the session at the Sydney conference on Zamora and Behrent’s collection, Foucault and Neoliberalism, did not settle the debate concerning how to understand Foucault’s relationship to neoliberalism, it was helpful insofar as it highlighted the specificity of Foucault’s concerns at the time, namely, resisting disciplinary and biopolitical normalization, the failures of French socialism to deliver on its promises, and the fact that the socialism had no governmental rationality of its own. I can think of myriad ways in which Foucauldian inspired thinkers might and do respond to what is happening today – presumably the responses will be limited to doing the sort of work that Foucault did, namely, problematizing dangerous trends within the intersection of three dimensions of current regimes of power-knowledge, that is, biopower—governmentality—freedom. They would be concerned with the dangers associated with domination and the concomitant reduction of possibilities for living (ethics), and with resisting tendencies toward micro- as well macro-fascism. Regimes of biopolitical power/knowledge can be found operating in medicine and universities, in the obsession with data collection by Google, in intelligence agencies all over the world, as well as in the techno-science of climate change and its effects on populations, to name a few. In the era of biopolitics, as Foucault understood in the mid-70s, there is less concern about disciplining individuals than there is about identifying regularities or patterns in populations in order to develop policies, manipulate populations, and sell products, among other things. At the same time, disciplinary power has by no
means disappeared in every space, even if it is no longer a singular aspect of many contemporary societies.

What is the main danger? The answer to this question will partly depend upon where one is situated. Neoliberalism has taken different forms in different places and people have different relationships to it, experience it differently. Foucault’s methods are available for many uses. I doubt that the main danger concerns who is currently in power in any given country (although I do not mean to minimize the impact, and certainly think it is important) as much as it does in what is happening on the ground, in the everyday lives of people who are very differently situated. Citizens in Western democracies can probably learn much about how to resist, survive, and sometimes carve out livable lives from populations in countries that have toggled from democracy to demagoguery more than once in in their lifetimes.

Now is a good time in the U.S. as well as other democracies under threat that face increased poverty and inequality to identify the socialist correctives to neoliberal governmentality – perhaps bolster movements for worker self-management, unionization, and basic income, but also to continue to find ways to use biopolitical power to move populations in different directions – to structure fields of possible action differently, to give populations a different range of choices, to invent new possibilities for viable ways of living so that individuals can “opt out” of the most pernicious trends in contemporary control societies. I think Foucault might agree. For although he appreciated some of the libertarian tendencies in economic liberalism as a governmental rationality, he would not be in favor of the reduction of real choices, and the increased power to manipulate populations despite the pervasive rhetoric of choice, freedom, and self-interest that we see today.

I realize that I have not answered the question very directly, and that this response is in some respects vague. But the point is that there are many dangerous trends within neoliberal and biopolitical regimes that have intensified over the course of thirty years in ways Foucault could not anticipate. We might need some new tools, but his general approach to addressing power and freedom could still be helpful. A hyper- and active pessimism still seems apropos to our current situation.

Steven Ogden: The task of analysing the contemporary political space is daunting. On that note, Jana is right to focus our attention on present dangers, that is, “pernicious trends in contemporary control societies.” In response, I am addressing the rise of populism and nationalism. I am specifically interested in both Trump’s presidential discourse and practice, and the motivation of Trump voters.

At the beginning of his presidency, Trump positioned himself as the sovereign exception, discursively and practically (cf. executive powers). Discursively, Trump continues to present himself as a benevolent father figure, reassuring voters that they do not have to worry. Just leave the decisions, and the thinking, to him. As such, I am using Foucault’s schema of pastoral power to explore the dynamic between Trump and voters. In
the process, I am foreshadowing a future research area by positing that what makes this dynamic “pernicious” is an implicit, but powerful, demand for obedience, which reads as be loyal, despite facts, or divergent interests. So, in this case, neoliberalism, which appeals to economic self-interest, conceals trends leading to a “reduction in real choices.” But first, let’s start with neoliberalism, and Foucault’s notion of power-relations.

First, neoliberalism is “a peculiar form of reason that configures all aspects of existence in economic terms.”56 In Foucauldian terms, it “is a matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of society.”57 Certainly, the confluence of Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics (1978-1979) and the elections of Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1981) formed a defining moment in neoliberalism’s relatively short history. But what now?

Second, in Foucault, power is not easily defined. The interpretive key is power-relations, which are complex, variable, productive, strategic, and coupled with knowledge, shaping human subjectivity. Foucault describes power-relations as, “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization.”58 As such, power “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives.”59 So, what is happening with Trump? The clue is pastoral power.

Foucault’s pastoral power was intended to explain a political transition, in historical terms, from a disciplinary era to modern governmentality.60 It was not developed as a complete model. Basically, it describes the dynamic between leaders and followers, expressing it in terms of the relationship between shepherd and sheep, where “the tie with the shepherd is an individual one. It is personal submission to him.”61 In this context, the shepherd is responsible for each sheep; and each sheep is dependent on and obedient to the shepherd. Obedience is prized, as there is no salvific alternative. Ironically, the shepherd is willing to sacrifice the whole flock for a single sheep (Luke 15:4).

Pastoral power is “a beneficent power”62 and “a power of care,”63 which tells us something about modern subject formation, which includes “specific modes of

56 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 17.
58 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 92.
63 Ibid, 184.
individualization.”\textsuperscript{64}\textsuperscript{[9]} In fact, the valorisation of obedience is part of the legacy of pastoral power, where “The relationship of submission of one individual to another individual, correlating an individual who directs and an individual who is directed, is not only a condition of Christian obedience, it is its very principle.”\textsuperscript{65} Arguably, under neoliberalism, all forms of power, including pastoral power, are harnessed to achieve economic goals. To that end, I am using Trump’s inauguration address\textsuperscript{66} as an example of how discourse can be used to simultaneously demand loyalty and justify sovereign practices.

Like a father figure, Trump reassures voters that things will be alright, and appeals to their self-interest. For instance, the inauguration address includes economic terms like “rewards,” “cost,” “wealth,” “enriched foreign industry,” “trillions of dollars overseas,” “made other countries rich,” concluding with “We will make America wealthy again.” Within this frame, Trump’s discourse echoes Foucault’s pastorate. An implicit contrast, for example, is made between Trump as true shepherd and false shepherds (e.g. Obama). This kind of contrast is embedded in the Christian imaginary, where Jesus is the good shepherd (John 10:11), which is set within the tradition of God as true shepherd, in contrast to the many false shepherds (Ezekiel 34:2). This theme resonates strongly with evangelical Christians, many of whom supported Trump.

Having expressed great care, Trump demands “total allegiance to the United States” emphasizing the need for mutual self-sacrifice in the face of real danger (cf. “I will build a great wall”). In contrast to the false shepherds, Trump will restore America’s “promise for all our people,” which will entail “transferring power... back to you.” Apparently, he is willing to lay down his life for the sheep, as “I will fight for you with every breath in my body.” Along the way, his discourse is infused with religious rhetoric like “a righteous public,” “The Bible tells us,” and “the same almighty Creator.” In a prophetic lament, he proclaims he has not forgotten the lost sheep, and that struggling families, as well as forgotten people, “will never be ignored again.”

In conclusion, the status of neoliberalism is a matter of debate. In broad terms, however, the market is the site of truth where “economic behavior is the grid of intelligibility.”\textsuperscript{67} So, on the basis of a mix of economic self-interest and fear of the other, Trump implicitly demands obedience. In the face of terror, the good shepherd can do whatever he needs to do. After all, obedience is prized, and there is no salvific alternative.

\textbf{Paul Patton}: There is no doubt that we are in the midst of a popular backlash against the effects of neoliberal economic government. Neoliberal reform of government policy at both domestic and international levels has played a major role in transforming economies around the world. The work of Thomas Piketty and others has documented the resultant

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, 175, see n. 29 textual error.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{66} Inaugural address as prepared.
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, 252.
massive increase in inequality. The opening up of domestic economies to international competition, the deregulation of currencies and increased mobility of capital have had devastating effects on the working populations of certain sectors in what were once advanced industrial economies. Governments of both the left and right for many years pursued policies aimed at deregulating markets, increasing competition and restricting various forms of protection or subsidy for producers and consumers in some sectors of the economy. While parties on the left sought to justify this market-oriented path towards economic growth by distributing some of the benefits more widely, right wing parties relied on an unsustainable combination of neoliberal policies and social conservatism that pandered to the illiberal religious and other beliefs of their constituencies. Brexit in the UK and the election of Trump in the U.S. represent, among other things, the end of those political strategies.

While neoliberal ideas about economic management have played an important role in the history of government since the 1980s, these are not necessarily the ideas that Foucault discussed at length in his 1979 lectures, nor are they the only factor in the rapid changes to the global economy since then. The “German model” that he gave as a reason for devoting lectures to the discussion of the principles of the social market economy did not have the impact in France and elsewhere that he thought it might. At the same time, other economic and political models have been remarkably successful with resultant impacts on Western economies. 1978, the year in which Foucault began to lecture about “governmentality,” was also the year in which Deng Xiaoping approved the reforms in agriculture that eventually led to the introduction of a market economy in China and its remarkably successful integration into the global market of goods, services and capital. China’s is now the largest manufacturer and exporter of goods in the world, so there is some truth to the Trump campaign complaint that China has “stolen American jobs.” There is also evidence that neoliberal economic ideas played a role, both externally and internally, in China’s rapid economic growth. This is but one of a number of neoliberal governmental trajectories outside the purview of Foucault’s lectures in 1979. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to explore further the role of neoliberalism in China’s economic development since 1978, and indeed whether the novel combination of party rule and a socialist market economy represents an unanticipated answer to the question posed about the nature of socialist governmentality at the end of the fourth lecture.68

Neoliberalism is not the only reason for the tectonic shifts in the global distribution of economic and military power that have made the present a more uncertain if not more dangerous world. The development of new forms of non-conscious cognition and their

implementation in intelligent machines promises to steal many more jobs, and not only in America. The effects of global warming on the natural environment have only just begun to impact on many people’s lives. But the same economic, technological and cultural developments make possible new forms of life that were unimaginable in 1978. The global interconnection of individuals and populations, currencies no longer tied to sovereign control of monetary systems, a variety of renewable energy sources, regional and indigenous challenges to the authority of multi-national states are but a few of the developments that point toward the possibilities for a more cosmopolitan, egalitarian and sustainable future. It is not yet clear whether we are living through a new age of enlightenment or the beginnings of a new age of darkness and misery. Either way, Foucault’s commitment to a practice of philosophy that works on the limits of the present has never seemed more apposite.

Author bio

**Lynne Huffer** is Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University: lhuffer@emory.edu

**Steven Ogden** is an adjunct lecturer in theology, and a member of the Center for Public and Contextual Theology (PACT), with Charles Sturt University Australia. He is also the Rector of Holy Trinity Church, Fortitude Valley: oogden@csu.edu.au

**Paul Patton** is a Professor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities and Languages at the University of New South Wales: prp@unsw.edu.au

**Jana Sawicki** is a Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Oakley Center for Humanities and Social Sciences at Williams College: jsawicki@williams
References

• Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, (Oakland: University of California Press, 1998)
• Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 50.
• Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010)
• Michel Foucault, “Preface,” in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983),
• Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (New York: Routledge, 2006)
• Stuart Elden, *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History*, (New York: Continuum, 2001)