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Re-thinking Thought:
Foucault, Deleuze, and the Possibility of Thinking

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ABSTRACT. This paper examines how Foucault and Deleuze understand each other’s work, arguing that they are united in their common endeavour to make it possible to think again. Focusing on Foucault’s ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ and Deleuze’s ‘Foucault’, it shows how each of Foucault and Deleuze considers the other as someone who opens anew the possibility of thinking. The first section examines Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault’s work. It demonstrates that, despite sounding as if he is elucidating his own philosophy, Deleuze is correct in saying that Foucault re-thinks thought by positing the disjunction between the articulable and the visible, among other things. Turning to Foucault’s review of Deleuze’s works, the second section explains why Foucault deems Deleuze’s notion of thought as a disjunctive affirmation. By underscoring the disjunctive role ‘and’ plays in the disjunctive affirmation of ‘the event and the phantasm’ and/or of thought itself and its object, Foucault considers Deleuze as someone who re-thinks thought not by conceptualising it but by thinking difference. The paper concludes that, while each endeavours to consider thought in a new light, both Foucault and Deleuze believe that the other makes it possible to think again.

Keywords: Foucault; Deleuze; audio-visual disjunction; disjunctive affirmation; thinking difference; thought

INTRODUCTION

In ‘Intellectuals and Power’, the 1972 dialogue between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, the latter asserts that both he and Foucault seek to undermine what may be referred to as ‘representative mind’. Deleuze remarks: ‘A theorising intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness’.1 Agreeing with Deleuze, Foucault replies, saying that it is not the intellectual’s task ‘to express the stifled truth of the collectivity’.2 This means that an intellectual may serve only as a mouthpiece

2 Ibid., 207-208.
through which the person he represents (e.g., the so-called delinquent, mad, and so on) finds a voice. Lawlor and Sholtz explain that, for Foucault and Deleuze, an intellectual does not speak on behalf of those he represents but rather amplifies and resounds their voices.\(^3\) How Foucault and Deleuze problematise representation, the role of the intellectual or what it means to represent another person, certainly needs to be unpacked. Nevertheless, what is clear in this dialogue is that both of them put into question this representative mind precisely because it epitomizes identity thinking—a totalitarian form of thought which, by identifying oneself with another, ironically eradicates their identity. Against representational or identity thinking, Foucault and Deleuze advocate non-representational and difference thinking, paving the way for a reconstruction of thought.

In this paper, I demonstrate that, despite their various ‘philosophical differences’,\(^4\) Foucault and Deleuze have at least one important thing in common: both strive to make it possible to think again. I argue that this is an important similarity between the two that is worthy of careful attention and study. There are various ways in which the question of how Foucault and Deleuze make thinking possible again could be addressed. One way would be to consider separately each of their methods of re-thinking thought and then identify the common means by which they open up the possibility of thinking. Another is to look at how Foucault and Deleuze each consider the other as one who makes thinking possible again. I will focus on the latter way not only because space is limited but also because it is more interesting and illuminating to examine how Foucault and Deleuze understand each other. More importantly, although a few scholars have considered the similarity between the two,\(^5\) as far as I am aware, nobody has examined how they respectively understand each other on the question of thinking.\(^6\) Conversely, various scholars emphasise the differences between them, but while these are laudable for assisting our understanding of Foucault’s and Deleuze’s often contrasting views, they nonetheless tend to overlook, if not obscure, their similar standpoints.

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\(^6\) Similar to Morar and Gracieuse, Kevin Thompson asserts that there is a similarity between Foucault and Deleuze. He explains how Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism enables Foucault to develop his own genealogical method, among others (Kevin Thompson, “Foucault and the ‘Image of Thought’: Archaeology, Genealogy, and the Impetus of Transcendental Empiricism,” in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail and Daniel W. Smith [2016], 200). Interestingly enough, towards the end of his paper, he remarks that, while Foucault and Deleuze have diverging views on ‘what compels us to think’, nonetheless Heidegger’s *Was heißt Denken?* ‘lurks behind the work of each figure during this formative period’, being ‘one of the points of convergence in [the Foucault-Deleuze] encounter’ (*ibid.*, 209). While it would be fruitful to investigate how Heidegger’s notion of thinking influences Foucault’s and Deleuze’s views on the subject, it is beyond the scope of this paper.

*Foucault Studies*, No. 27, 47-67.
By highlighting Foucault and Deleuze’s shared commitment to make thinking possible again, I seek to address a paucity in Foucault and Deleuze scholarship as well as illumine what it means to think difference. Simply highlighting the differences between thinkers (or things, for that matter) is not enough to undertake difference-thinking but, following Foucault, it is necessary to affirm them disjunctively. To unpack how the two re-think thought, in the first section, ‘Foucault’s problematization of thought’, I begin by examining how Foucault, to Deleuze, makes it possible to think again. Deleuze asserts that Foucault opens up the possibility of thinking by problematizing thought, particularly by investigating the conditions of strata or historical formations. Likewise, as I will show in the next section, ‘Thinking as disjunctive affirmation’, Deleuze, for Foucault, opens up the possibility of thinking. For him, Deleuze re-thinks thought not by conceptualising it but by considering it as a ‘disjunctive affirmation’ of the event and the phantasm as well as of thought itself and its object. The paper concludes that, apart from making it possible to think again, both Foucault and Deleuze believe that the other seeks to open anew the possibility of thinking, an endeavour which each of them fully supports. Each of their separate works individually contributes to re-thinking thought. Their analysis of each other’s work, then, reinforces their mutual pursuit. Let me now examine how Foucault, according to Deleuze, problematizes thought.

FOUCAULT’S PROBLEMATIZATION OF THOUGHT: DELEUZE ON FOUCAULT

From 1985-1986 at the University of Paris 8, Deleuze delivered a series of lectures on Foucault. Transcriptions of the series are available online and an English translation is also underway.7 At the end of this series, in 1986, Deleuze published a book-summary entitled Foucault. According to a number of commentators, the book Foucault unfortunately does not do justice to Deleuze’s lectures in the sense that it does not fully reproduce the richness of the lectures.8 Despite the injustice done to the series of lectures, the book nonetheless contains a wealth of information concerning Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault. In this section on Deleuze, I will refer extensively to Deleuze’s book to explain how, for him, Foucault makes it possible to think again. According to Deleuze, Foucault’s problematization of thought, which he accomplishes by investigating knowledge, power and the self, is his way of opening up the possibility of re-thinking thought.

One of Deleuze’s most important claims in Foucault is that ‘thought’ is the ‘one thing [that] haunts Foucault’.9 He goes on to say that Foucault’s history is not any history but ‘a history of thought as such’. ‘To think’, he continues, ‘means to experiment and to problematize. Knowledge, power and the self are the triple root of a problematization of

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7 Université de Paris 8, “La Voix de Gilles Deleuze en ligne” (2011); cf. Purdue University, “Course Transcriptions: Deleuze’s seminars on Foucault” (2018).
8 For instance, Morar, Nail, and Smith write: ‘Some of these [ideas and concepts] eventually made their way into [Deleuze’s] book on Foucault but there are many analyses that find no parallel in his published book, Foucault. For this reason, some of the most innovative philosophical scholarship on Foucault can be found in these lectures’ (Morar, Nail, and Smith, “Introduction,” 5).
thought’.¹⁰ I could not agree more with Deleuze on this point, subject to the qualification below. His assertion not only summarises his book but also captures Foucault’s project. I want to highlight Deleuze’s phrase, ‘Foucault’s history is a history of thought as such’ (phrase slightly modified).¹¹ The description, ‘history of thought as such’, sounds somewhat exaggerated. While it is true that Foucault writes a history of thought, he would not claim that it is a history of thought as such. In fact, in his essay, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, he makes it clear that his investigations are localised or drawn from the specific context of the West.¹² To speak of ‘history of thought as such’, therefore, may be slightly misleading on the basis that it is highly unlikely that Foucault would have wished his work to be categorised in this way and would not have thought of it that way himself.

Despite being a little overstated, Deleuze’s phrase gives us insight into Foucault’s undertaking. For, this is exactly how Foucault himself conceives of his work. Naming his chair at the Collège de France, ‘The History of Systems of Thought’, indicates that Foucault considers his work as a history of thought. Even more importantly, how he conducts or substantiates his research through his chair is what makes it a history of thought itself. Therefore, exploring the way in which Foucault conducts his research is of interest to anyone who seeks to understand in what way Foucault is concerned with thought or in how he opens up the possibility of thinking. By exploring and reconstructing Foucault’s research, Deleuze greatly helps in understanding the former’s project of writing a history of thought. As quoted above, he explains that the problematization of thought is anchored by Foucault’s threefold investigation of knowledge, power and the self. It would have been more instructive if we can explain how all the aspects of Foucault’s tripartite investigation together serve as the foundation for his problematization of thought. However, because space is limited, I can only discuss the first: the ‘anchor of knowledge’. Despite being the only anchor discussed, examination of the anchor of knowledge still clarifies how Foucault, for Deleuze, is not simply concerned with thought but really seeks to rethink thought. More importantly, the discussion of this anchor is where the similarity between Foucault’s and Deleuze’s respective ways of re-thinking thought is most apparent. For, here, we can find Deleuze’s explanation of what he might call ‘audio-visual disjunction’, one that bears striking parallels with Foucault’s understanding of Deleuze’s notion of thought as disjunctive affirmation. Let me now examine how, according to Deleuze, Foucault’s problematization of thought is rooted in the anchor of knowledge.

¹⁰ Ibid.
¹¹ Deleuze’s original statement reads as follows: ‘[Foucault] writes a history, but a history of thought as such’ (ibid.).
¹² Foucault writes: ‘Finally, these historico-critical investigations are quite specific in the sense that they always bear upon a material, an epoch, a body of determined practices and discourses. And yet, at least at the level of the Western societies from which we derive, they have their generality, in the sense that they have continued to recur up to our time’ (Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” [1984], in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer [2007], 117).
A. The anchor of knowledge

Deleuze asserts that, in understanding Foucault, it is important to be always mindful of his theories of ‘visibility’ and ‘articulability’. Otherwise, explains Deleuze, if one ignores or fails to understand these theories, there is a danger of misrepresenting not only Foucault’s peculiar understanding of history but also ‘his thought and his conception of thought in general’. For Deleuze, therefore, in order to capture Foucault’s thought as well as his notions of history and thought, it is necessary to pay attention to his theories of visibility and articulability. The important thing to highlight in Deleuze’s remark is the close connection between Foucault’s theories and his notions of history and thought. He would say that understanding this connection not only illumines what Foucault means by thought but also reveals how he makes it possible to think again. The question, then, is: how, according to Deleuze, does Foucault conceptualise these theories and how are they connected to his notions of history and thought?

The first thing to note about the terms ‘visibility’ and ‘articulability’ is that they are not Foucault’s but Deleuze’s. Despite being Deleuzian, these terms are nonetheless apt to describe Foucault’s theories. That is to say, even if they are not Foucault’s terms, the way Deleuze describes them is consistent with how Foucault conceptualises them. To answer the question of how Foucault conceptualises articulability and visibility as well as how they are connected to his notions of history and thought, he discusses Foucault’s idea of stratum or historical formation. He writes: ‘Each historical formation sees and reveals all it can within the conditions laid down for visibility, just as it says all it can within the conditions relating to statements’. In other words, each stratum or historical formation, what Foucault calls ‘episteme’, is conditioned by the conditions of visibility and articulability. The latter conditions, then, make it possible for any historical formation to emerge. In explaining the conditions of articulability or the statement, there are at least three things that need to be considered: 1) what Deleuze might call the ‘unconcealment’ of statements (i.e., they are not hidden); 2) the displacement of the subject; and, 3) the specificity and finitude of a corpus of words and texts and/or of phrases and propositions. The thing Deleuze wants to emphasise here is the specificity or historicity of these conditions, namely, that they are embedded in history, even though they serve as conditions for thought. For Deleuze, therefore, Foucault argues that the conditions of strata, historical formations or forms of knowledge (i.e., episteme) may not be sought outside of history but may be found therein.

By emphasising the historicity of these conditions, Foucault, according to Deleuze, departs significantly from Kant. It is precisely this deviating idea of what comprises a ‘condition’ that marks Foucault’s point of departure from Kant. Whereas Kant posits the existence of conditions that ground possible experience, Foucault, claims Deleuze, posits that these ‘conditions are those of real experience (statements, for example, assume a limited

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13 Deleuze, *Foucault*, 50.
14 Ibid., 59.
15 Ibid., 53-57.

*Foucault Studies*, No. 27, 47-67.
corpus’). Again, here, Deleuze sounds as if he is explaining his own philosophy. For, as has been commonly and justifiably held, he posits the existence of conditions not of possible experience as it was for Kant but conditions of real experience. Despite sounding as if he is elucidating his own work, he is actually correct in describing Foucault as someone who, like him, posits conditions of real experience. For, Foucault himself argues for the oxymoronic notion of ‘historical a priori’. Elucidating this idea in his works such as *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault explains that the ‘conditions of possibility’ for knowledge, power and forms of subjectivity, among others, may be sought not outside but within history itself. With his insistence on the historicity of these conditions, Foucault is more aligned with Deleuze than Kant, even though he employs the latter’s ‘conditions of possibility’. Deleuze, then, is justified in saying that what Foucault actually describes are conditions of real experience, thereby transforming the Kantian transcendental/ahistorical critique into a historical one.

Colin Koopman confirms Deleuze’s observation by elaborating how Foucault transforms Kant’s transcendental/ahistorical critique into a historical or genealogical investigation. Similar to Deleuze, who emphasises the differences between Kant’s critique and that of Foucault, Koopman argues that Foucault’s genealogical/historical critique is compatible but not identical with Kant’s transcendental/ahistorical critique. Compatible, explains Koopman, because, similar to Kant’s critique, Foucault’s critique also investigates the ‘conditions of possibility’ for, say, knowledge. Despite their compatibility, the two are not identical, argues Koopman, because of the way these conditions are constructed. Whereas in Kant these conditions are constructed ‘epistemologically’, in Foucault they are constructed ‘historically’. That is, Kant posits that what needs to be presupposed in order for experience to be possible are the pure and non-empirical conditions, namely, the synthetic activities of the mind, which include the syntheses of sensibility, understanding and, ultimately, the transcendental unity of apperception. Foucault reverses this, arguing that the impure, empirical or the conditioned themselves are the condition, or that the so-called ‘conditions’ are historically conditioned. That is to say, they are a conditioned condition.

In his *Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology*, Foucault shows how Kant’s notion of ‘*homo criticus*’ or ‘*man as a critical being*’ is actually a conditioned condition or that it is historically conditioned. Arguing for the historicity or temporality of this concept, he mines Kant’s works to determine the conditions that make possible the idea of homo criticus or the concept of the ‘transcendental subject’ itself. Uncovering these conditions is made

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16 Ibid., 60; my emphasis.
19 Foucault explains: ‘[I]f an archaeology of the text were possible, would it not reveal the genesis of a “*homo criticus*”, the structure of which would be essentially different from the image of man that went before?’ (Michel Foucault, *Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology* [1961] (2008), 19-20; Foucault’s emphasis). He continues, ‘there would be a certain critical truth to man, a truth born of the critique of the conditions of truth’ (ibid., 20; Foucault’s emphasis).
possible by comparing Kant’s Anthropology to the following: his notes or Reflexionen; Collegentwirfe; pre-Critical texts; its contemporary anthropological texts such as Baumgarten’s Psychologica emirica and Schmidt’s Empirishe Psychologie; Kant’s correspondences with Beck, Schütz and Hufeland; and, finally, Kant’s Critical works. All these comparisons are not only meant to show the major transformations of Kant’s Anthropology, the elements that remain constant and those that have been added to it, but, more importantly, they are also meant to show that the idea of homo criticus is a conditioned condition, accounting therefore for the temporality of this transcendental concept. One important implication of arguing for the temporality of conditions is the de-centring of the subject, particularly of Kant’s ‘I’ or ‘transcendental unity of apperception’, thereby paving the way for a shift in focus. ‘[T]he conditions’, explains Deleuze, ‘are on the side of the “object” and historical formation, not a universal subject (the a priori itself is historical)’.Moreover, it paves the way for a reconstruction of these conditions. Koopman explains that the conditions are no longer epistemologically constructed as the ‘necessary limits’ of certain forms of cognition but are rather historically constructed as ‘contingent limits’ of certain forms of practices. Both Deleuze and Koopman would say, then, that Foucault re-conceptualises Kantian critique and transforms it into one that is concerned not with necessary/universal/transcendent conditions but with contingent/historical/real ones.

Deleuze’s idea that Foucault re-conceptualises Kant’s critique is an important insight. Deleuze may even be the first commentator to identify this ‘neo-Kantianism’ in Foucault. Despite its importance and novelty, this is not a major breakthrough. What is more insightful in Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault is his idea of the ‘disjunction’ between what we see and what we say: ‘There is a disjunction between speaking and seeing, between the visible and the articulable: “what we see never lies in what we say”’. Deleuze elucidates this disjunction by saying that ‘the audiovisual is disjunctive’ and that its best examples may be found in the cinema. By resorting to the audio-visual or cinema to explain this disjunction, Deleuze once more sounds as if he is explaining his own philosophy. Despite this, his idea of ‘disjunction’ between the visible and the articulable is key to understanding how Foucault’s problematization of thought is anchored by an investigation of the formation of strata or knowledges. Before explaining how Deleuze’s idea of audio-visual disjunction illumines Foucault’s investigation of knowledge and, ultimately, of the latter’s problematization of thought, it is worth noting that we find more or less the same idea in Foucault. As I briefly mentioned in the introduction above and will elaborate later, Foucault describes Deleuze’s notion of thinking as a disjunctive affirmation of the event and the phantasm and/or of thought and its object. The similarity between Foucault’s and Deleuze’s notions of ‘disjunction’ is striking. I will explain this in more detail below, but, for now, I would like to stress the importance of Deleuze’s idea of audio-visual

21 Foucault, 60.
22 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 113.
23 Foucault, 64; my emphasis.
24 Ibid.
disjunction. Not only does it illumine Foucault’s problematization of thought but, more importantly, it also demonstrates the similarity, or, better yet, the disjunctive affirmation, between Foucault and Deleuze in relation to the reawakening of thought.

**B. The audio-visual disjunction: ‘a blind word and a mute vision’**

Deleuze describes the articulable and the visible in at least three ways. First and foremost, they comprise strata or historical formations. Deleuze explains that strata or historical formations are ‘sedimentary beds…made from things and words, from seeing and speaking, from the visible and the sayable…from contents and expressions’. In other words, the articulable and the visible are the basic units of any stratum. Without them, there would be no stratum or historical formation. Deleuze is correct in saying this because, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault explains that statements are the building blocks not only of language but even of thought (of a certain age) itself: ‘If there were no statements, the language (*langue*) would not exist; but no statement is indispensable for a language to exist’. This brings us to Deleuze’s second characterisation of both the articulable and the visible, namely, they are the conditions that make possible the emergence of the particular form of thought of a certain age. He writes: ‘Speaking and seeing, or rather statements and visibilities, are pure Elements, *a priori* conditions under which all ideas are formulated and behaviour displayed, at some moment or other’. This means that the viewpoint of a certain age, or the way it sees and says practically about anything, is shaped by visibilities and statements. Deleuze is again correct in saying this because, in *The Order of Things*, for example, Foucault argues that Modernity has its own way of seeing, saying or ordering things, which can be distinguished from the Renaissance, the Classical Age or, perhaps, our own time.

However, the question about how to determine with precision the particular form of thought of a certain age remains. This is where Deleuze is most instructive. He says, and this is his final and most important characterisation of the articulable and the visible, that it can be accomplished through differentiation or by considering them as disjunctive. Effectively, what Deleuze is saying is that the articulable and the visible together constitute strata, historical formations, knowledge or thought itself precisely by virtue of their disjunction. So, what does Deleuze mean by saying that the articulable and the visible are disjunctive? Before we can answer this question, we need to clarify what he means by the ‘articulable’ or the ‘visible’. What Deleuze refers to as the ‘articulable’ are statements. He explains that they are opened up or extracted ‘from words, phrases or propositions’. Although statements are extracted from the latter, they still need to be distinguished from them. As such, Deleuze would say that it would be futile to engage in ‘any linguistic study’ that analyses the ‘signifier, word, phrase, proposition, or linguistic act’. Foucault

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25 Ibid., 47.
26 Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 95-96; Foucault’s emphasis.
27 Foucault, 60; Deleuze’s emphasis.
28 Ibid., 52.
29 Ibid.
would agree with Deleuze on this point. As he explains in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, statements cannot be analysed using logic, grammar, or speech-act theory as they are not propositions, sentences, or speech-acts.\(^{30}\) They are subject, instead, to archaeology, which, explains Foucault, is concerned with a regularity among objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices.\(^{31}\) Deleuze interprets this to mean that it is archaeology that uncovers what he calls ‘a true form of expression’, namely, the articulable or statement.\(^{32}\) The articulable, therefore, is for Deleuze a form of expression.

Inasmuch as statements are opened up and extracted from words or propositions, visibilities, asserts Deleuze, are also extracted ‘from things and sight’.\(^{33}\) He explains that Foucault’s notion of ‘visible’ has nothing to do with the visible or perceptible elements (e.g., qualities, things or objects). Neither are they forms of objects nor illumined forms, but are rather ‘forms of luminosity…created by the light itself and allow a thing or object to exist only as a flash, sparkle or shimmer’.\(^{34}\) Whereas the articulable is a form of expression, the visible is for Deleuze a form of content.\(^{35}\) Penal law and medicine as forms of expression determine anything that can be articulated about delinquency and madness, respectively, while the prison and asylum as forms of content determine what can be seen or displayed, namely, the delinquent and the mad. Such a description is Deleuzian at its finest: ‘We borrow these last terms [i.e., content and expression] from Hjelmslev, but apply them to Foucault in a completely different way’.\(^{36}\) They are applied differently to Foucault because expression and content are not simply signifier and signified. Rather, as conditions of strata or historical formations, they determine what a particular age can say and/or see.

Although he would agree with Deleuze on a number of points discussed above, Foucault might find unusual Deleuze’s way of explaining visibilities. In the first place, to explain Foucault’s notion of ‘visible’, and more generally his archaeology, Deleuze gives examples from Foucault’s non-archaeological works, such as *Death and the Labyrinth*, *Discipline and Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1.\(^{37}\) It is reasonably common knowledge that these works are considered to be genealogical rather than archaeological. As such, Deleuze’s examples taken from these genealogical works appear somewhat to be misapplications or misappropriations. However, Deleuze can reply, saying that the division of Foucault’s philosophy into archaeological, genealogical and ethical phases is arbitrary. He could assert that this division, while not necessarily stupid or silly because it structures Foucault’s sophisticated corpus, nonetheless keeps us from seeing the interconnectedness among the various elements of the Foucauldian œuvre. One can even make a case, Deleuze could say, that Foucault undertakes archaeology even in his last published book,

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30 *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 91-94.
31 Ibid., 41.
32 *Foucault*, 52.
33 Ibid., 53.
34 Ibid., 52.
35 Ibid., 47 & 52.
36 Ibid., 47.
The Care of the Self, by isolating the regularity of certain principles that organises or determines what he refers to as the ‘culture of self’ or ‘ethics of the subject’. However, taking examples from Foucault’s genealogical works to explain his archaeology is the least unusual.

Second, and even more unusual than the genealogical samples of archaeology, is Deleuze’s method of extraction by which statements or visibilities are said to be drawn from words/propositions or things/sight, respectively. This method is problematic for two reasons. First, it suggests that statements or visibilities are buried ‘underneath’ words or things, lying in wait for an archaeologist to uncover or break them open. This is contrary to Foucault’s archaeological method. He asserts that archaeology does not uncover ‘hidden’ meanings, much less is it concerned with meaning per se as it is not hermeneutics. Instead, it finds relations among texts, while accounting for ‘discontinuities’. The second problem is that there is nothing in Foucault’s archaeology that suggests that statements are extracted from words or things. To reiterate, it seeks to describe a regularity and/or find relations among texts and not uncover the meanings they purportedly hide. The problem, then, with Deleuze’s method of extraction is that, while it is inexistent in Foucault’s archaeology, it also seems to misapply the way the methodology is undertaken. In response, Deleuze can assert that, in saying that statements or visibilities can be extracted from words and things, he does not mean that archaeology uncovers hidden meanings. Alluding to the curtain hiding ‘nothing either behind or beneath it’, he explains that, even if they are never hidden, statements to a certain extent lie ‘underneath’ because they are not as obvious as they seem. As they are somewhat hidden, we should know how to read them. Therefore, the best, most important, and the only thing that we can do, according to Deleuze, is to ‘describe the curtain’.

The final and most unusual facet of Deleuze’s explanation of Foucauldian archaeology is his assertion that the articulable and the visible are disjunctive. Despite being the most controversial explanation, it is nonetheless the most important, not only because this is where his similarity with Foucault is most apparent, but also, and more importantly, because it clearly illustrates how, for Deleuze, Foucault re-opens the possibility of thinking. By saying that the articulable and the visible are disjunctive, Deleuze claims that Foucault thinks through their difference (better yet, thinks difference), emphasising that they are the same and at the same time different. On the one hand, they are the same, first because, as we have seen, while not hidden, they are not easily readable (in the case of statements) or visible (visibilities). Second, the two together serve as conditions of strata or historical formations, which means that both have to be present for a stratum to be formed. Finally, inseparable from a ‘particular mode’, they are specific to a certain age, enabling it to say words and see things the way it does. On the other hand, they are different from each other.

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39 On Foucault’s archaeological-genealogical methodology going beyond hermeneutics, see Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (1983).
40 Deleuze explains: ‘[T]he statement does remain hidden, but only if we do not rise to its extractive conditions; on the contrary, it is there and says everything as soon as we reach these conditions’ (Foucault, 54).
other because they each have their own conditions that make them precisely what they are. Whereas ‘language-being’, on the one hand, makes statements articulable, ‘light-being’, on the other, ‘makes visibilities visible or perceptible’.

At first sight, Deleuze’s description of these conditions as the ‘being’ of the articulable and the visible may appear strange to Foucault. Even though he correctly points out two main differences between Foucault and Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty (e.g., Foucault’s ‘light-being’ is historical, whereas Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s is phenomenological), Deleuze seems to resort to Metaphysics, a move which Foucault would never be happy about. Worse, Deleuze seems to remove the conditions (i.e., statements and visibilities) further away from what they condition (i.e., strata or historical formations). The latter, then, appear somewhat twice removed from their ‘ultimate’ condition, making it look as if Foucault searches for conditions outside of strata or historical formations. If this is what Deleuze means, then he is mistaken because, as we have seen, Foucault does not search for transcendental or ahistorical conditions but for contingent or historical ones. Moreover, in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault makes it clear that what he is interested in is not the ‘origin’ that perpetually retreats but the ‘originary’ or ‘already there’. For Foucault, uncovering the ‘already there’ is the distinguishing feature of the true and proper anthropology (i.e., ‘pragmatic anthropology’), which, unlike the false one (i.e., ‘non-pragmatic anthropology’), does not go beyond time or history.

In response, Deleuze can assert that, in saying that language-being and light-being are conditions of statements and visibilities, respectively, he does not mean that they are outside of strata or historical formations. He refers to them instead as forms of ‘exteriority’ that, contrary to being external, lie at the fringes of statements and visibilities. While separating statements and visibilities from each other, language-being and light-being are at the same time the common limit that connects them. Deleuze elaborates that these limit-conditions are the two sides of the same coin: ‘a blind word and a mute vision’. They are responsible for maintaining ‘the heterogeneity of the two forms [i.e., the visible and the articulable], their difference in nature or anisomorphism’. On account of the twofold function of these limit-conditions, therefore, the articulable and the visible are said to be disjunctive.

From the foregoing, it is now easy to see how, for Deleuze, Foucault opens up the possibility of re-thinking thought. According to Deleuze, Foucault makes it possible to think again precisely by thinking difference, in particular by thinking through the anisomorphism or disjunction between the articulable and the visible. By examining Deleuze’s claims in Foucault, particularly in the chapter on ‘Strata or Historical Formations’, I have shown that, even if he sounds as if he is explaining his own philosophy, Deleuze is justified with his interpretation of Foucault. From what Deleuze says about Foucault,
particularly his discussion of how, according to Foucault, strata or knowledges are formed, we gather that, for Deleuze, Foucault is concerned with thought as elaborated above in the context of the anchor of knowledge and the disjunction between articulability and visibility. I would like to discuss now what Foucault says about Deleuze in the context of re-thinking thought.

THINKING AS DISJUNCTIVE AFFIRMATION: FOUCALT ON DELEUZE

In ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, Foucault not only reviews or explicates two of Deleuze’s major works, Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, but also praises Deleuze for ‘establishing the thought of the event and the phantasm.’ He asserts that ‘this century will be known as Deleuzian’, which may be constituted by undermining Platonism, among other things. Deleuze’s ‘reverse Platonism’ prioritises doxa to episteme and celebrates, for example, the spiteful Sophists, argumentative Stoics and crude Cynics. By debunking Plato, Deleuze not only reprises the age-old dispute between Platonism and other ancient philosophical traditions – nor does he simply side with Plato’s critics. More importantly, Deleuze, for Foucault, is ‘a lightning storm’ through which ‘new thought is possible; thought is again possible’. This Deleuzian lightning storm, says Foucault, makes it possible for us ‘to think through the event and the phantasm’. I would like to highlight Foucault’s italicisation, and therefore intended emphasis, of the conjunction (better yet, disjunction) ‘and’.

A. The disjunction ‘and’

According to François Dosse, Foucault demonstrates that the ‘fundamental question’ Deleuze raises is ‘that of knowing what thinking is’. From this fundamental question other important questions flow: how does Deleuze conceive of thinking? How does he pursue the knowledge of thought? In what way does thinking through the event and the phantasm characterise the particularly Deleuzian conception of thinking? I do not have enough space here to explore all these important questions given their scope and the multiplicity of possible answers. Nevertheless, for present purposes, let us just assume that it is possible to subsume all of them under the question: how, according to Foucault, does Deleuze’s thinking of the event and the phantasm make thinking possible again? We will see that, for Foucault, Deleuze awakens this possibility by identifying and elaborating what Foucault refers to as the ‘disjunctive affirmation’ of the event and the phantasm as well as of thought itself and its object.

48 Ibid., 343.
49 Ibid., 367.
50 Ibid., 353; Foucault’s emphasis.
Going back to Dosse, he finishes his statement above by saying that Deleuze’s fundamental question allows him to situate thought within what Dosse, seemingly following Foucault, refers to as the ‘affirmative disjunction’ of the event and the phantasm.52 I say ‘seemingly’ because nowhere in Foucault’s original French text, ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, can we find Dosse’s phrase, ‘affirmative disjunction’. Instead, what we can find are the following phrases: 1) ‘severed or disjoint affirmation’; 2) ‘to affirm disjunctively’; and, 3) ‘affirmation by disjunction’. The first is expressed in the phrase, ‘leur double affirmation disjointe, leur disjonction affirmée’,53 which is translated into English as ‘their severed and double affirmation, their affirmation of disjunction’.54 The second is found in the expression: ‘[Deleuze] a découvert la philosophie qui permet de les affirmer l’un et l’autre disjonctivement’,55 the last part of which is translated as ‘…that permits the disjunctive affirmation of both’.56 Finally, Foucault asserts that one of the requirements to free difference from ‘identity thinking’ is ‘une pensée affirmative dont l’instrument est la disjonction’,57 translated as ‘affirmative thought whose instrument is disjunction’.58 Presumably, one or all of these phrases are the basis for Dosse’s translation. Admittedly, he puts his phrase in quotation marks, suggesting that he is merely playing with words and perhaps intimating that the phrase may not be what Foucault meant. It is unfortunate that he does not elaborate what he means by ‘affirmative disjunction’. Nevertheless, I would argue that there is a crucial difference between his phraseology and that of Foucault. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish each of their phraseologies, because it helps to clarify how Deleuze, for Foucault, makes it possible to think through the event and the phantasm.

At first glance, the two phraseologies, Foucault’s ‘disjunctive affirmation’ and Dosse’s ‘affirmative disjunction’, sound the same. On closer inspection, however, one finds that there is a difference between the two. The difference is subtle but significant. In saying that Deleuze enables us ‘to think through the event and the phantasm’, Foucault wants to emphasise that the conjunction ‘and’ does not function here as a conjunction in the way that one normally expects, that is, connecting related words and things. In this case, it does not connect ‘event’ and ‘phantasm’, but rather connects them by means of disjunction or difference, hence ‘affirmation by disjunction’ or ‘disjunctive affirmation’. Foucault explains that, even though it is a conjunction, the term ‘and’ in the phrase ‘thinking of the event and the phantasm’ is disjunctive because it does not identify the event and the phantasm but rather differentiates them or affirms them disjunctively. Asserting that ‘the phantasm and the event [are] affirmed in disjunction’,59 Foucault emphasises the disjunctive function of ‘and’ by italicising it at least twice in the text. However, in being disjunctive,

52 Ibid.
55 “Theatrum Philosophicum” (2001), 955.
57 “Theatrum Philosophicum” (2001), 958.
59 Ibid., 353.
elaborates Foucault, ‘and’ nonetheless affirms both the event and the phantasm, asserting their truth, thereby confirming Deleuze’s view of thinking.

The disjunctive affirmation of the event and the phantasm by means of the conjunction (better yet, ‘disjunction’) ‘and’ is crucial in understanding not only Foucault’s phraseology but also, and more importantly, Deleuze’s philosophy itself. That is why Foucault could not stress enough the importance of what the disjunction ‘and’ does to both ‘thought-event’ and ‘thought-phantasm’, namely, to affirm both disjunctively. One can even make the case that in his review-essay Foucault focuses more on the disjunction ‘and’ or its disjunctive affirmation than on what Deleuze means by either ‘thought-event’ or ‘thought-phantasm’. Consequently, it can be argued that, for him, understanding each of them is somewhat of less importance than understanding the disjunctive function of ‘and’. However, that can be the subject matter of a different paper. It has to be clear that I do not discount the importance of understanding either thought as ‘event’ or thought as ‘phantasm’. All I am saying here is that understanding the role the disjunction ‘and’ plays is crucial because it penetrates into the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy, which, for Foucault, challenges and exhorts everyone to think difference itself.

Put more clearly, understanding the disjunctive affirmation of the event and the phantasm as well as the role the disjunction ‘and’ plays is important because it sheds light not only on thinking but also on the way it comprises what thinking is. Foucault explains that the disjunctive affirmation of the phantasm and the event is, for Deleuze, thinking itself. He writes: ‘The phantasm and the event, affirmed in disjunction, are the object of thought [le pensé], and thought itself [la pensée].’\(^{60}\) The original French text reads: ‘Fantasme et événement affirmés in disjonction sont le pensé et la pensée’.\(^{61}\) ‘Thought’, he continues, ‘has to think through what forms it, and is formed out of what it thinks through’.\(^{62}\) Although the words ‘le pensé’ and ‘la pensée’ are italicised in the English translation, Foucault’s original formulation of ‘le pensé et la pensée’ is unfortunately lost, with due respect to the translator. Not only is Foucault’s unique construction lost in translation; worse, the important function of the disjunction ‘and’ is also omitted. Even though it is present in the English translation, ‘and’ seems to function in its ordinary sense as a conjunction that connects ‘thought’ and ‘object of thought’. As such, it does not have the same meaning as the original phrase in French. Therefore, it is better to retain Foucault’s original construction and, once again, be mindful of the role the disjunction ‘and’ plays in it.

In the phrase, ‘le pensé et la pensée’, it appears that there is a unification between thought and its object (i.e., the event and the phantasm). However, it should be clear by now that, with the disjunctive function of ‘and’, any attempt to unify the two should be dismissed. Foucault acknowledges the ‘danger’ of his formulation because it might mislead the reader into thinking that he considers Deleuze as someone who seeks to unify both thought and its object. The formulation, ‘le pensé et la pensée’, is quite ‘dangerous’, explains Foucault, because ‘it connotes equivalence’ and at the same time makes one think that the

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60 Ibid.; Foucault’s emphases.
61 “Theatrum Philosophicum” (2001), 953; Foucault’s emphasis.
object is identified with the subject. If one identifies the object with the subject, thinking of it as the subject, or vice versa, he would fall into error for failing to grasp their relationship that needs to be affirmed disjunctively. By warning his readers against the false and erroneous identification between thought and its object, Foucault points once more to the important role the disjunction ‘and’ plays.

Similar to the disjunctive affirmation it applies to the event and the phantasm, thought and its object (i.e., the event and the phantasm) are also affirmed disjunctively by means of the disjunction ‘and’. Likewise, inasmuch as the disjunction ‘and’ disjunctively affirms both the event and the phantasm in such a way that it asserts their truth, it performs the same function in ‘le pensé et la pensée’, asserting the truth of both thought and its object. Therefore, Foucault would say that we should pay close attention to the disjunctive function of ‘and’ in thinking of ‘the event and the phantasm’ as well as in ‘le pensé et la pensée’, that is, in the way thought is determined by its object and vice versa. In the disjunctive affirmation of ‘le pensé et la pensée’, even while they are disjunctively affirmed in the same manner as the event and the phantasm, there is nonetheless mutual determination or inter-determination between thought and its object (i.e., the event and the phantasm): whereas the object is determined or thought through by thought, thought in turn is determined by its object. In other words, there is no thought without the event and the phantasm as the former is determined by them and at the same time the event and the phantasm would be nothing, without thought thinking them through.

This sounds as if Deleuze reprises one of the most important insights of Kant in his First Critique: ‘Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’. An important question, then, can be raised at this point: in seemingly reprising Kant’s insight, is Deleuze ensnared by the same set of problems as the ones he is trying to eliminate? If it were the case that Deleuze criticises Kant precisely on account of the way the latter conceives of thinking; or, if he presents himself as an alternative to Kant by searching for what grounds real experience and not possible experience as it was for Kant, then in what way does Deleuze differ from Kant? Foucault’s comments on Deleuze in ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ are insightful in addressing these questions. Interestingly enough, as we have seen, Deleuze also describes Foucault as a ‘neo-Kantian’ not because he blindly follows Kant but because he identifies these conditions as conditions of real experience.

As is well known, in the passage quoted above, Kant posits the unity of both sensibility and understanding and at the same time, more radically, he seeks to ground the unsynthesised manifold or every possible experience on the synthetic activity of the subject. Without going into too much detail, Kant reacts against empiricist epistemology that basically argues that, because the mind is a tabula rasa, knowledge comes from experience. Seeking to rectify empiricism by generating his own version of the ‘Copernican

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63 Ibid.
64 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [1781] (1998), A51/B75; my emphasis.
65 See Foucault, 60-61.
revolution’, Kant argues that it is not experience but the mind that serves as the condition for knowledge, that the former is grounded on the systematic unifications or syntheses by the *a priori* forms of sensibility (i.e., time and space), the categories of understanding and, ultimately, the transcendental unity of apperception or the ‘transcendental I’. Kant would say that only by presupposing the unity of these *a priori* conditions can knowledge or cognition be said to be possible. With this in mind, we can say that there are at least two ways by which Deleuze, according to Foucault, differs from Kant.

First, reminding ourselves again of the disjunctive function of ‘and’, Deleuze disjunctively affirms thought and its objects, and in so doing thinks difference itself. Therefore, unlike Kant, who grounds experience by presupposing the unity of the subject or the transcendental ‘I’, Deleuze does not presuppose any unity nor does he seek to unify both thought and its object but, again, disjunctively affirms them, respecting their differences, so to speak. Second, Foucault would say that, unlike Kant, Deleuze does not seek to ground the object on the synthetic activity of the subject. In other words, he does not seek to ground the event and the phantasm on thought. Rather, as quoted above, thought is formed by the event and the phantasm or that the latter determines thought. This mutual determination or inter-determination between thought and its object marks the beginning of a new era for thinking.

Foucault claims that, with Deleuze’s new way of thinking thought, there is once more another revolution, which revolutionises not only Kant’s philosophy but also the whole of philosophy itself precisely by thinking difference, in particular by thinking through the event and the phantasm. He asserts that the event and the phantasm are ‘what most urgently needs thought in this century’. This does not mean that they have never been thought, but rather, they have been neglected or have not been thought thoughtfully. This suggests that, somewhat similar to the Heideggerian ‘oblivion of Being’, philosophy, according to Foucault, has forgotten what it means to think through the event and the phantasm. Correlatively, philosophy has forgotten what it means to think. There is, then, what we can refer to as the ‘forgetfulness of the event and the phantasm’ and/or ‘forgetfulness of thinking’ in the history of philosophy from Plato onwards. Deleuze, for Foucault, seeks to address this paucity in philosophy by carefully analysing the elements or conditions of thinking the event and the phantasm. Foucault cites three conditions constitutive not only of thinking through the event and the phantasm but also of thinking itself. They are as follows: acategorical thinking, univocity of being, and repetition of being as difference. Fulfilling these conditions is what is meant to think difference.

When these conditions above are fulfilled, explains Foucault, affirming Deleuze, difference is freed and thinking is made possible again. For the longest time, Foucault’s story goes, difference has been suppressed by the identity of the concept, characterisation of resemblance, philosophy of representation, Hegel’s dialectics and, worst of all, the condition of categories. The condition of categories is the strongest form of suppression because, as Foucault explains, the ‘categories dictate the play of affirmations and negations,

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67 Ibid., 355-360.
establish the legitimacy of resemblances within representation, and guarantee the objectivity and operation of concepts’. That is why, if difference were to be truly liberated and if an attack were to be launched effectively against suppression, that would have to be directed against ‘categorical thinking’: ‘Difference can only be liberated through the invention of an acategorical thought’. Having liberated difference from its conceptual, representational, dialectical and categorical constraints, Deleuze, asserts Foucault, is the philosopher of difference par excellence. Now that thinking is made possible again, the question is, what does it mean exactly to think difference? To answer this, I would like to elaborate Seán Hand’s cryptic remark on Deleuze’s notion of thought.

B. The name ‘Foucault’ and translation

There can be no doubt that it is difficult to understand Foucault’s ‘disjunctive affirmation’, Deleuze’s notion of thought or, more generally, thinking difference itself. However, despite being concise, Seán Hand, the translator of Foucault, is very helpful in this regard. In attempting to explain Deleuze’s conception of thinking as ‘thought of the phantasm and the event’, he remarks that it may be designated in two ways: 1) the name ‘Foucault’; and, 2) translation. Hand’s twofold designation of Deleuze’s conception of thought is enigmatic. It is unfortunate that he does not elaborate on the reasoning behind this twofold designation. He merely concludes the above statement and, effectively, his introduction to Foucault, by saying that Deleuze’s notion of thought can mean ‘translation’, which he describes as ‘a disjunctive affirmation, the emergence of a new form’. We have seen that Foucault in ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ uses the phrase ‘disjunctive affirmation’. It is possible that Hand follows Foucault in equating Deleuze’s notion of thought with the name ‘Foucault’ as well as ‘translation’. However, it is difficult to establish this, because, even if he quotes a number of passages from Foucault’s ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ in his introduction, he does not acknowledge Foucault with his use of the phrase ‘disjunctive affirmation’. Nevertheless, despite not acknowledging Foucault and despite the brevity of his statement, we can still understand what Hand means when he says that Deleuze’s notion of thought can be designated by the name ‘Foucault’ and translation.

Whereas it can be argued that, in saying that Deleuze’s notion of thought can mean translation, Hand, as a translator, is merely self-aggrandising. However, I do not think that he is so unashamedly promoting his job as a translator, much less his own work. Rather, he honestly seeks to provide an explanation for what Deleuze means by ‘thought of the phantasm and the event’. Whereas others such as James Kelly seek to develop a Deleuzian theory of translation, Hand is absolutely justified in saying that translation

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68 Ibid., 359.
69 Ibid.
70 Hand ends his introduction to Deleuze’s book with the following statement: ‘Deleuze gives this thought of the phantasm and the event the proper name of “Foucault”. It might also properly be called translation: a disjunctive affirmation, the emergence of a new form’ (Seán Hand, “Translating Theory, or the Difference between Deleuze and Foucault,” in Foucault [1999], x).
71 Ibid.
itself is a good example of what Deleuze means by ‘thought’. For, following Foucault’s description of Deleuze’s conception of thought as ‘disjunctive affirmation’, any translation exemplifies such an idea. To elaborate, any translation expresses the meaning of the original text in another language. It is neither totally foreign to the original nor is it the same in toto as the latter. It is not totally foreign to the original because, even if it expresses the meaning of the original text in another language, it seeks to remain as faithful to the original as possible. Likewise, any translation is not the same in toto precisely because the original text is expressed in a different language, which, as Hand correctly describes, now emerges in a ‘new form’. It is in this sense that translation is a disjunctive affirmation.

While it is easy to see how translation exemplifies disjunctive affirmation, it is difficult to understand how Deleuze’s notion of thought can be designated by the name ‘Foucault’. Firstly, such a name does not command knowledge of Deleuze’s notion of thought. Secondly, because there is no congruence between the name ‘Foucault’ and Deleuze’s reconstruction of Foucault’s work in his book *Foucault*, it does not make one immediately understand what Deleuze means by the latter. Finally, this goes without saying that the name ‘Foucault’ in no way captures everything Deleuze says about Foucault’s philosophy. Sufficient to debunk Hand’s claim, all these reasons are clearly explained by Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. He argues that it is necessary to put into question pre-established unities such as a book or oeuvre (i.e., body of work).  

The unity of a book or oeuvre made possible by the name of the author needs to be questioned because it is merely a product of an interpretative activity. Now, if the author of a book or oeuvre is displaced or put into question, how much more the name that (seemingly) has nothing to do with another person’s work? However, if by the designation Hand has in mind Foucault’s understanding of Deleuze’s notion of thought as disjunctive affirmation, then he is absolutely correct in saying that the name ‘Foucault’ can be used to designate what Deleuze means by thought. The name ‘Foucault’ and translation, therefore, exemplify Foucault’s ‘disjunctive affirmation’ and/or how Deleuze, according to Foucault, thinks difference itself.

CONCLUSION

As mentioned above, in his book *Foucault*, Deleuze points out that ‘thought’ is the only thing that Foucault is concerned with. He explains that Foucault’s history or problematization of thought is anchored by his tripartite investigation of knowledge, power and the self. We focused our attention on the ‘anchor of knowledge’ for two reasons. It not only illumines how Foucault, for Deleuze, is primarily concerned with thought but also, more importantly, shows distinctly Deleuze’s similarity with Foucault. Although he may sound as if he is explaining his own work, it is clear that Deleuze does consider Foucault as someone who makes it possible to think again precisely by thinking difference or, more particularly, by positing that the articulable and the visible are disjunctive. We have seen...
that it is on account of this disjunction that the two comprise strata or historical formations.

For his part, in ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, Foucault describes Deleuze as ‘a lightning storm’ that enables us ‘to think through the event and the phantasm’. By underscoring the important role of the disjunction ‘and’, Foucault considers Deleuze as someone who opens up again the possibility of thinking precisely by thinking difference, thereby asserting that Deleuze is the philosopher of difference par excellence. We have seen that Deleuze’s new way of thinking thought, for Foucault, revolutionises thought by considering it as a disjunctive affirmation. Negatively, thought as disjunctive affirmation is not conceptual, representational, dialectical or categorical thinking. Positively, it is thinking difference, which is exemplified by translation and even the name ‘Foucault’ itself.

From this, it is safe to say that Deleuze’s idea of the disjunction between the articulable and the visible has strong similarities with Foucault’s understanding of Deleuze’s notion of thought as disjunctive affirmation. In terms of disjunction, therefore, what Deleuze thinks about Foucault is the same as (at the same time different from) what Foucault thinks about Deleuze. Their understanding of each other, then, may be said to be disjunctive. While there are stark differences between each of their examinations of the other’s work (what, how, why, and so on), both Foucault and Deleuze are one in their pursuit to re-thinking thought as well as in their understanding that the other re-thinks thought by thinking difference. This paper has articulated this important similarity between the two.

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