SPECIAL SECTION

The Forgotten Spanish Charity: Love, Government, and The Poor

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“Ella me avisó que vendría... y hoy precisamente.”
— Juan Rulfo, Pedro Páramo

INTRODUCTION

The recently published book by Michel Foucault, Les aveux de la chair, challenges us to recognize once again the relevance of Christianity for the philosophical project of writing a historical ontology of the present. This paper follows that invitation and analyzes the articulation and legacy of the Spanish version of the Catholic doctrine of charity at the moment of its decline. During the eighteenth century, the articulation of the doctrine was based on urging the believers to undergo a transformation according to the complex love of charity. The first section of this paper analyzes the “practice of the self” that believers had to perform for undergoing such a transformation and thus realizing the truth act of charity. Section two studies almsgiving and “tribulation” as the two truth acts Catholic believers had to perform while dealing with the poor’s needs and poverty’s pains. In their respective and hardly compatible ways, these exercises of charity modeled not only a charitable believer but also made that believer a steward for others. Thus, they were critical pieces for forging a charitable pastorate, which formed a distinctive reciprocity between the members of the Spanish Catholic community of the eighteenth century. The third section of this paper will claim that the charitable pastorate was neither abolished nor forgotten when the Spanish Monarchy established the police of the poor—a new type of giving led by the State. Rather, the charitable pastorate became a building block for the Spanish police of the poor. Thus, this unlikely encounter between charity and the police

1 “She told me you would come...and that you would come precisely today.”
of the poor was not a seminal moment for a process of secularization. Instead, it gave rise to a distinctive pastoral power integrated into the State along with two of its primary concerns, i.e., poverty and the poor. As in Juan Rulfo’s novel quoted above, paying a visit to the ancient Catholic charity is the beginning of a long overdue journey that is filled with characters who live and speak to us out of a past that has forged our present.

1. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY, “I BELIEVE”

"Horum autem maior est charitas"  
— St. Paul, Corinthians, 13

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Spanish Catholic charity was not simply an informal and voluntary tithe but a doctrine with its own truths and its rules. Charity had its own knowledge and ways of conducting men and women. The present section will explain that the critical goal of becoming a charitable believer entailed something else than to state “I believe” — it required a distinctive practice of self-mortification directed towards eliminating self-love and thus allowing the love of charity to shape the believer’s will in depth when a distinct number of crucial issues arise.

The matters that the doctrine of charity concerned itself with were not banal but as serious as the material needs of the poor, the spiritual life of believers and their neighbors, hatred for one’s enemies, and the subject’s own pain. Despite the fact that we are used to considering charity and almsgiving to be synonymous, the latter did not encompass all the facets of the former. Indeed, almsgiving was only one of the five exercises that forged the Catholic doctrine of charity. Is this a historical example of that game written by Borges that made Foucault laugh? Maybe. In any case, it is important to trace and organize charity’s forgotten governmental knowledge not because of its originality but due to its capacity to usher in for us the Spanish problematization of poverty before it was transformed and gave rise to the police of the poor.

Charity not only comprised a number of exercises but also had a unique position for the Spanish Catholicism of the time — it was the queen of all virtues through which the enigmatic encounter of the Creator and His creature was carried out in a privileged way. One of Joseph Climent’s (1706–1781) sermons vividly expresses this point. Climent, who would later become bishop of Barcelona, explained the centrality of charity by recalling its relationship with the virtue of faith:

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3 “The greatest of these is charity.” Unless otherwise noted, translations from Latin are mine.
4 A varied range of texts, from theological treatises to the manuals of confessors, regulated the distinctive exercises of charity that each Catholic had to perform to confront these urgent matters. These exercises, which ranged from almsgiving to fraternal correction, avoiding scandal to loving thy enemy and tribulation, modulated those actions that dealt with those issues that urged charity.
the virtue of faith, according to St. Thomas, is called alive when charity accompanies it; and dead when it lacks charity. The former is also called a formed faith, charity being its form; whereas the latter is amorphous because it does not have the form of charity.\(^5\)

This account of the connections between these two theological virtues was not Climent’s eccentricity but a common way to explain their intertwinement and underline charity’s primacy—a dominance that Paul of Tarsus made explicit to the Corinthian Christians by saying that among charity, faith, and hope, "horum autem maior est charitas" (“the greatest of these is charity”; St. Paul, 1 Cor. 13).\(^6\)

The Jesuit Pedro Calatayud, in turn, expressed the central place of charity using an unusual version of the Prometheus myth. “The love of charity is of the nature of fire,” the Jesuit preacher said, but the poets pretended that it was Prometheus who stole the celestial fire and, by infusing it into a human body made out of clay, gave the body life. The truth is that this portion of celestial flame does not come from the Greek gods but rather God, who gives it freely by pouring it out in the human heart—charity is the fire of God that gives life to the believer.\(^7\) The infused nature of charity described by Calatayud through the metaphor of a fire given gratuitously by God did not rule out that the queen of all virtues also depended on the activity of the subject. As Calatayud asserted, charity is also like fire because it must be constantly activated in order to stay alive.\(^8\) The theological texts confirm this crucial feature of charity by recalling that charity as a virtue demands the Catholic’s action and his habit to act.\(^9\)

The varied and vital virtue of charity unfolded at the heart of Spanish Catholicism. According to the cartography established by the Catholic doctrine of the time, it was in the human heart where those passions that each believer must govern moved—and stirred up the inclinations that must be conquered by the love of charity in order for a man to be not only an animal or a rational man but a divine one. The heart thus was not a tranquil bay but a battlefield or, as Calatayud said more beautifully, like an ocean in constant movement—always stirred by passions that could lead to both vice and virtue.\(^10\) The heart’s concerns were acute if those disorderly motions shook it up; whereas if correct

\(^5\) Josef Climent, *Sermones*, vol. 3 (1815), 143–144. The same analogy is also found in Francisco Echarri, *Directorio Moral*, vol. 1 [1728] (1776), 113; Francisco Echarri, *Directorio Moral*, vol. 2 [1728] (1776), 3–4.

\(^6\) The texts of the eighteenth century used Saint Paul’s dictum to describe the place of charity among the other theological virtues. See, for instance, Jose Faustino Cliquet, *La Flor del Moral*, vol. 2 (1734), 82; Francisco Larraga, *Promptuario de la Teologia Moral* [1706] (1726), 215. On the primacy of charity, see Francisco Echarri, *Directorio Moral*, 2:23; Pedro de Calatayud, SJ, *Doctrinas Practicas*, vol. 2 [1737] (1797), 129. Unless otherwise noted, the translations from the Spanish texts are mine.


\(^8\) Ibid., 2:130–131.

\(^9\) Jose Faustino Cliquet, *La Flor del Moral*, vol. 1 (1733), 187. In *Les aveux de la chair*, Foucault referred to the duality composed by grace and virtue in the section “Le Recours à Dieu” (Appeal to God). He did not cancel the importance of grace but directed his attention to the articulation of virtue through the examination of the self and the direction of the soul. Foucault, *Les Aveux de la chair*, 127, 132–133. Unless otherwise noted, the translations from *Les aveux de la chair* are mine.

\(^10\) It was not a matter of rejecting those passions, which were thought of as morally neutral. Rather, the task was to govern them with a perfect understanding and will. *Doctrinas Practicas*, 2:241–242, 252.
reason and a will embedded by the divine love of charity blew, it floated on a peaceful sea.\textsuperscript{11}

Significantly, when the time came to act and thus to govern in a specific way those passions that arose concerning the matters that urged the doctrine of charity—it was the spiritual power called will that was ultimately involved.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, to give life and form to the subject’s faith meant not only knowing and accepting certain revealed and natural truths but also shaping the believers’ will so that will could move according to the love of charity in the midst of those issues that triggered charity’s anxieties. In other words, in order for a believer to be charitable, the doctrine of charity required a constant government of the self that focused on forming the believer’s will.\textsuperscript{13}

More precisely, forming the human will by the love of charity required the subject to govern his passions in a way that demanded an examination of the type of love that formed her own will. The doctrine of charity distinguished between two kinds of love, and thus installed a binary division within love itself. On the one hand, it was the love of charity and, on the other, it was self-love (amor propio), which was also called self-will (voluntad propia). They were the “two clashing loves”\textsuperscript{14} that moved the subject’s heart in opposite directions and constantly stressed the subject’s will. Unfortunately for the believer, both loves resemble each other regarding the type of movements they originate in his heart, and the power that they have to govern that “race of slaves” called passions.\textsuperscript{15} As the human heart could not live without love, the battle between these two loves was inescapable for the subject. For the constitution of the Catholic subject, the correct resolution of this unavoidable dispute between these two loves was crucial because it would enable the believer to forge himself as a divine human being—i.e., a charitable believer—or put him into the path of condemnation.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, in order to give life and form to the Christian faith, the believer had to constantly examine and govern his will without ever relying on its power or its movements—his ceaseless task was to give rise to a charitable will by eliminating his self-will.

Consistently, the various exercises of charity shaped a practice of self-mortification that would form the believers’ wills anew by killing self-love and thus sin—“Do you have charity and the love of God? Well, you have already killed off every sin.”\textsuperscript{17} During this process of converting the subject’s heart, each believer must recall and trust in the transformative strength of the charitable fire, which was as powerful as death—“fortis est ut

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\item [11] The heart does not replace the soul in the Catholic doctrine of the time, but its presence seems to generate a displacement regarding what should be conducted for becoming a charitable believer—the heart was like an embodied soul. \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 2:229–230, 234, 235, 260.
\item [13] \textit{Cliquet, La flor de la moral}, 1:187. Interestingly, the pivotal role of the will to become a subject in the doctrine of charity seems to coincide with Foucault’s account of the issue of the will in Augustine. \textit{Les aveux de la chair}, 325–361.
\item [14] \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 2:127.
\item [15] Ibid., 2:241, 270, 273–274.
\item [16] Ibid., 2:149.
\item [17] Ibid., 2:131.
\end{itemize}
mors dilectio" ("charity is as powerful as death"). For the constitution of the Catholic believer, the doctrine of charity thus constituted a specific regulation of the subject’s conversion towards God that passed through the formation of the believer’s will. For explaining such a conversion, the fire metaphor will be used once again. In the process of becoming a virtuous Catholic, charity has effects similar to those of physical fire; namely, it enlightens, warms, and burns. The fire of charity illuminates the human understanding to discover many eternal truths, fires up the human heart to love and yearn for God while fulfilling its moral duties, and crucially burns the soul to purify it.

Love of charity was not a love free of difficulties that smoothly and purely flowed from the heart. On the contrary, it was a laborious, suffering, demanding, bellicose, and, to a significant degree, humanely unattainable type of love. This peculiar love of charity was called to shape the believer’s will and thus constitute the subject according to the love of God—one of the most central of the Catholic truths. The usual criticism directed against the voluntary nature of charity loses sight of this critical point: namely, the fact that for charity the will was the crucial surface for the constitution of a charitable subject—the battlefield of a strenuous and endless practice of the self.

In sum, it was not enough for a believer to simply say "I believe" in order to have a faith that was formed and alive. It was not even enough to comply externally with the true religious precepts such as that of almsgiving. No, Catholic charity was not superficial. For those who walked towards their salvation, the exercises of charity demanded a timely practice of self-mortification while confronting those urgent matters regulated by the doctrine. In other words, as long as material wants, spiritual needs, hate, pain and harmful behavior existed in the subject’s life, the exercises of charity required the subject to become charitable by governing his heart’s passions and shaping his will according to the love of charity. For an act to be truly an exercise of charity, it had to be part of a conversion through which the believer had to constitute his will in a way that made charity his truth and thus manifested the truth of charity. The exercises of charity were, therefore, distinctive acts of truth for the believer. Significantly, these truth acts of charity did not only

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18 Both dilectio and charity properly formed the love of God. While dilectio separated the will from everything except what had to be loved, charity properly allowed an inner esteem of what is good. Doctrinas Practicas, 2:129, 132.

19 Doctrinas Practicas, 2:132. We thus find operative herein that the purity of the subject’s heart was necessary for God’s contemplation and entailed the abandonment of the believer’s own will. Les aveux de la chair, 144–145.

20 Despite the fact that charity was a virtue and the subject had to use different techniques to expel self-love, such a result demanded the divine power—it required a supernatural love that could dominate and thus transform the subject. In other words, God’s infused love was indispensable. Doctrinas Practicas, 2:146, 149.

21 For the pivotal and paradoxical role of the will for Christian subjectivity with a reference to the works of mercy, see Les aveux de la chair, 125–126.

22 It was not enough to believe that God existed (credere Deum) and believe in His words (credere Deo); one must love God and strive to have Him be the ultimate end of the believer’s life (credere in Deum). This last requirement, albeit enunciated concerning the virtue of faith, could only be fulfilled by the virtue of charity. Directorio Moral, 2:3–4.

23 Michel Foucault not only unearthed the notion of the truth act from the medieval regulation of the sacrament of penance but also used it to designate and to analyze any regulated form through which a subject
revolve around the verbal manifestation of the truths hidden in the subject’s soul—a focus Foucault emphasized in his studies24 and was also present in the eighteenth-century doctrine.25 Rather, being charitable also consisted of performing specific acts—the exercises of charity, which as distinctive and regulated practices of the self, permitted the most prominent of all virtues to shape the believer’s heart in truth.

2. POVERTY, BETWEEN ALMSGIVING AND TRIBULATION

The exercises of charity defined specific ways by which the Catholics of the eighteenth century manifested their own truth. Almsgiving and tribulation were two distinctive and hardly compatible exercises that each believer had to perform for the manifestation of a crucial Catholic truth—God’s charity as a governing force in each subject and the world when the needs of the poor and the pain of poverty loomed. The following two sections will spell out the architecture of each one of these truth acts so as to characterize in the third section the charitable pastorate they forged.

A. Almsgiving, a government of need and abundance

“Non deerrunt pauperes in terra habitationis tuae, idcirco ego præcipio tibi, ut aperias manum tuam fratri tuo egeno & pauperi.”
— Deuteronomy, 15

Almsgiving was a law each believer had to fulfill once he faced the needy. Such a precept was articulated through the mandate to compare needs and abundance in order to give. This section will explain such a legalistic articulation and evince that it aimed at a much more critical goal for Catholicism—creating pastors of the poor to govern needs and abundance within the congregation.

The problem of almsgiving was the need of the neighbor, evidenced by the presence of the poor who lived with the believer. “There will always be poor people in thy land: therefore I command thee to open thy hand to thy neighbors and to the poor” (Deuteronomy, 15) was one of the biblical texts (one that is shared with the Torah) that will be repeated in Spain at the beginning of the eighteenth century.26 This text summarizes with particular effectiveness both the emergency that had to be faced—i.e., the concrete existence of the poor rather than an abstract conception of poverty—and the precept to which Catholics must submit—i.e., that they ought to give the poor the alms they need. Thus, the exercise of giving alms begins by recognizing that everyone is subject to a divine and natural law, produces and is required by his truth in connection to both a government of men by truth and the technologies of the self. On the concept of the truth act, see Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980 [2012] (2014), 48, 52, 81–82, 101.

24 Notwithstanding that Foucault primarily analyzed the reflexive truth act of confession in The Government of Living and elsewhere, he did not limit the insertion of the subject in the government of men by truth to confession alone. Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 81–82.

25 The sins against charity had to be confessed. See, for instance, Juan de Ascargorta, Manual de Confessores ad Mentem Scoti [1713] (1743), 178–182.

not a recommendation,\textsuperscript{27} which compels every believer to give his neighbor in need to become a true Catholic.

At first glance, the organization of almsgiving by the doctrine of charity appears to follow a juridical pattern. The precept that mandated the giving of alms articulated one principle with a number of rules. The principle was uncomplicated: whoever has goods in abundance must give the excess to whoever lacks them. The rules organized the contrast between abundance and lack, detailing the types of needs and goods that created the situations in which one must become a giver. Importantly, that principle and the rules did not affirm the precept of “giving what is left over, as it seems to you.” The laws of almsgiving were, as we shall see, demanding. They may be considered too extreme for our taste and strange to any way of life that promotes either the accumulation of goods or a life of luxury that forgets the needs of the poor.

The rules that organized the obligation of giving alms were based on a twofold classification. On the one hand, the needs of the poor were placed into three categories: extreme, severe, and common. Though their respective definitions slightly varied according to the writers, they remained the same at their core. Extreme necessity materialized when the neighbor faced the danger of death, the loss of his senses or a major part of his body, or the incurrence of severe illness. Grave necessity occurred when a person confronted an evident danger of suffering great damage to his life, fortune, honor, and/or status. Finally, common necessity appeared when one suffered for lack of means but did not have a very painful and miserable life. On the other hand, in order to respond to these needs, the goods of the rich invariably are divided into three types: what was necessary for the life of the owner and his family, what was needed to maintain his status, and what was superfluous for both his life and status.\textsuperscript{28}

The rules of almsgiving correlated these three types of goods with the poor’s needs in the following way. Almsgiving’s fundamental rule was that the needs of the poor established an obligation for the rich to give what was superfluous—that is, what was not necessary to support the rich man and his family’s life and status to solve the poor’s severe and common needs.\textsuperscript{29} For confronting the poor’s extreme needs, the rich were obliged to give more than the superfluity. Namely, they were required to hand over to the poor even what was necessary to their status in order to remedy such a calamity.\textsuperscript{30}

The explanations offered above may encourage us to understand almsgiving as a legalistic matter alone. However, and this feature is consistent with a truth act based on a

\textsuperscript{27} Concerning the precept’s twofold nature, see Directorio Moral, 2:33; La flor de la moral, 1:190.

\textsuperscript{28} See these definitions in Calatayud, Doctrinas Practicas, 4: 384; Daniele Concina, Theologia Christiana Dogmatico Moral, Tomo I [1749] (1776), 136-140; Larraga, Promptuario de la Theologia Moral, 215. La flor de la moral, 1:199–200; Directorio Moral, 2:33.

\textsuperscript{29} The definition of rich was not linked to a social category of people but rather whoever had goods in abundance after taking all that was necessary to maintain himself and his family’s decent status. Doctrinas Practicas, 4:385.

\textsuperscript{30} Doctrinas Practicas, 4:386–387; Concina, Theologia Christiana Dogmatico Moral, 137, 138; Promptuario de la Theologia Moral, 216. La flor de la moral, 1:200, 201; Directorio Moral, 2:33, 34.
distinctive practice of the self, giving alms was instead a prudential issue.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, the doctrine of charity never dictated in advance a specific value to hand over and rejected the use of force by any authority to enforce the payment of this peculiar levy.\textsuperscript{32} Instead, the doctrine emphasized that almsgiving rested on the subject’s self-government, which should be diligently and carefully assisted by the pastors.\textsuperscript{33} Such a characteristic did not mean informality or arbitrariness—almsgiving had both criteria that oriented the giving and commands that formalized it. Rather, it emphasized that the subject had to consider at each moment what was appropriate to give to the needy not only following the aforementioned contrast between need and abundance but mostly according to the internal acts of love that must shape the subject’s will in order to give.\textsuperscript{34}

Thus, to give a small amount was not to give alms.\textsuperscript{35} However, the insufficiency did not amount to just a simple infraction of the duty to which one had consented as a believer. It was instead a failure to realize an act of truth and, as such, evidence of a subject who impeded the divine government of the world and was consequently in need of conversion. Indeed, and this specification speaks of the requirement of conversion, if the excessive attachment to earthly goods defeated the giver, then his salvation would be at stake in the final trial: “What do you respond, oh miserable! to the judge? You dress your walls and do not dress a man? You adorn the horses with trappings and despise your brother dressed in rags?”\textsuperscript{36} As for the divine government, every rich man who opulently lived amidst the poor was unjust because he rejected God as a governor by despising the poor’s lives while keeping to himself those goods which did not belong to him. This breached the fifth commandment of Moses, i.e., the prohibition on killing another human.\textsuperscript{37}

The aforementioned reference to justice relied on an understanding of the property of goods, which, though curiously forgotten today, was critical for the constitution of the

\textsuperscript{31} Foucault noted that the Christian pastorate forged distinctive imperatives of truth. One of them, called the imperative of prudence by Foucault, refers precisely to the worldly issues such as the neighbor’s needs. \textit{Les aveux de la chair}, 393–395.

\textsuperscript{32} The texts of the time did not set a strict amount destined for alms. However, if we follow the examples offered by these texts, then we will notice that between thirty and forty-five percent of the subject’s annual wealth was considered superfluous. In other words, such amounts were considered to be allocated, at least in principle, for the poor. See, for instance, \textit{Promptuario de la Teologia Moral}, 215; \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 4:385 and \textit{La flor de la moral}, 1: 200.

\textsuperscript{33} It was a confessor’s duty to guide and correct the believers, especially the nobility, the powerful, and royalty, concerning the appropriate use of their goods. \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 4:417; \textit{Theologia Christiana Dogmatico Moral}, 141, 142. \textit{Directorio Moral}, 2:30.

\textsuperscript{34} For loving “your neighbor, it is not enough to help him outwardly concerning his needs, but necessary is to engage with him and talk to him—to do an inner act of loving him and wishing him well.” The rejection of such a requirement, Cliquet reminded his readers, was condemned by Pope Innocent XI in 1679. \textit{La flor de la moral}, 1: 190–191.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 4:399–400.

\textsuperscript{36} St. Basil quoted by Concina in \textit{Theologia Christiana Dogmatico Moral}, 133. Detailing the cases of mortal sin, see \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 4:389–393. The word satin is a speculation because the handwriting of the manuscript is not clear at that point.

self in the exercise of giving alms. Almsgiving supposed, on the one hand, that the giver was the legal owner of his goods. Indeed, it was due to his status as legal owner of these goods that he was obliged by the precept. On the other hand, the giver’s duty to hand some of these goods over was justified through the universal destination of the earthly goods, which in turn entailed that the Creator had a preeminent property over those goods He created:

Why? Do I not own my goods? That is so; but God is also and a much more proper owner than you of them: meum est aurum, meum est argentum (‘Gold is mine, silver is mine’) and he has placed on the goods He gives you an irredeemable levy, which is that you have to distribute them among the poor...for this purpose, he gives them to you.

Property rights, therefore, were not understood as the unconditional rewards of the activity by which one intervened in this world and modified it to create something new. Property rights were not absolute; nor were the subject’s abilities to transform the world due exclusively to his merit. Instead, they were only intelligible due to the assertion of a God who was both a loving creator and a just governor, and as such was a benefactor of all His creatures. This included those who intervened in the world and generated innovation within it, as well as those who could not. In other words, a sort of commonality of goods was primary and meant that, for each believer, property rights were limited by the poor’s shortages.

Thus, for realizing the truth act of almsgiving, the believer must constitute himself through the practice of evaluating both his own and the poor’s needs, as well as his abundance of wealth. During this examination, he would learn not only about others’ needs and his own excess but also about those passions that pulled him towards immoderately accumulating material goods and thus put him at risk of becoming greedy and losing eternal life. By governing those passions according to the love of charity, the subject would be able to constitute himself as a charitable believer and thus allow the justice of God’s creation and His love to manifest in his heart and the world. This government of the self was the way to become a charitable believer concerning his goods; that is, to become God’s limosnero (giver of alms) or mayordomo (steward). Meaningfully, such a

38 Theologia Christiana Dogmatico Moral, 140, 141.
40 Indeed, the universal destination of the subject’s earthly goods is predicated not only on those things that he inherited but also on those gained by his effort. Climent, Pláticas Dominicales, Vol. 3 (1793), 56.
42 Thus, when necessity entailed the danger of dying, losing one’s senses or body parts, or experiencing a severe illness, all goods not necessary for the owner’s life became common to all: “In extrema necessitate omnia bona sunt communia, preter necessaria ad vitam” (“In extreme need, all goods are common, except those necessary for the owner’s life”). Promptuario de la Theologia Moral, 215–216.
43 The reference to the vice of greed was particularly important because it referred to a passion that prevented men from continuing the community of goods present at the beginning of the world. See, for instance, Promptuario de la Theologia Moral, 216.
subjectivation will be explained using the evangelical call to be poor in spirit; to live in a way where everything is primarily held in common or, inversely, where nothing is held exclusively as your own.\textsuperscript{44}

In sum, the apparently simple and almost legalistic mandate to compare need and abundance was simply the beginning of the charitable act of giving, and aimed to provoke a truth act that would constitute a charitable Catholic—that is, a steward for the poor who allows God to govern the world. Thus, giving alms would commence the believer’s transformation into God’s limosnero by fulfilling one of the main goals of the Catholic pastorate: feeding thy neighbor.\textsuperscript{45}

Minister, you are of our good God and are dispenser and steward of your fellow men. Do not believe that all these riches have been prepared only for your stomach; take as belonging to others those goods that are in your hands; they will gladden you for a short time; then they will pass as transient goods, and God will ask you for a complete account of them.\textsuperscript{46}

\section*{B. Tribulation, a government of pain}

Doctrines VIII and IX on tribulation and patience end the treaty of charity written by the Jesuit Pedro Calatayud. They show a different and crucial dimension of the problematization of poverty as it was constituted by the Catholic conception of charity in the eighteenth century— they regulated how to govern the pains provoked by poverty.

The point of departure for the government of pain forged by the exercise of tribulation was thus the affliction experienced by the believer because of the lack of sufficient means to sustain his life or status.\textsuperscript{47} A crucial element that shaped this self-government was the separation of the subject’s pain from its cause.\textsuperscript{48} It was not relevant to tribulation whether the affliction was provoked by God in His constant effort to lead human beings or if it originated in the Devil; whether it was incited by the injury produced by a neighbor or by our {	extit{amour-propre}}.\textsuperscript{49} What was at stake for this exercise of charity was a peculiar government of the self by which the believer would unite with God, who was discovered precisely in the pain of his indigence, and thus become an afflicted (atribulado) believer.\textsuperscript{50}

Thus, the truth act of tribulation urged the believer to take his painful experiences as opportunities to detach his will from worldly goods.\textsuperscript{51} During these labors, God was

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{44} Climent, \textit{Pláticas dominicales}, 1: 48–49.
\bibitem{45} Ibid., 1:50. On this goal, see \textit{Les aveux de la chair}, 385–386.
\bibitem{46} St. Basil quoted by Concina in \textit{Theologia Christiana Dogmatico Moral} Ch. 5. See also \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 4:398, 408, 409.
\bibitem{47} Poverty was not the only affliction that concerned tribulation. The list included agonies due to the loss of life, health, body, worldly goods, fame, virtue, and conscience. Calatayud, \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 5:2.
\bibitem{48} This separation was not unique to tribulation but was also visible in other exercises of charity such as the management of hatred involved in the exercise of loving thy enemy. \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 4:338–341.
\bibitem{49} \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 5:2, 22.
\bibitem{50} Ibid., 5:1, 2.
\bibitem{51} Since self-love is at the origin of pain, the subject must be convinced that the tribulations suffered are due to his own faults, and thus he must accept them with resignation. \textit{Doctrinas Practicas}, 5:24, 43–44.
\end{thebibliography}
envisioned as a doctor who, by hurting, permitted believers to heal. Thus, the practice of feeding one’s tribulation taught the subject a crucial truth; namely, that divine love sometimes hurt, or, as previously said, the love of charity sometimes burned. In any case, a hurtful love was what allowed believers to die patiently for their sins. Poverty and any other agony regulated by tribulation were thus opportunities not only to show strength and self-control but also to cook those afflictions “with the heat and fire of charity.” Interestingly, the instances of afflictions that Calatayud spoke of could have been either the evidence of a divine betrayal or an occasion of rebellion, but instead they were transfigured into privileged moments where the subject could encounter the Divine through the certainty of a hurtful love that must be endured with patience.

To realize this exercise of charity, the subject’s will was once more at stake. Tribulation consisted in deploying a practice of knowing and conquering oneself in order to “remove the will from the worldly goods and tastes in which it is muddled.” Consistently, one of the remedies suggested by pastors was meditating on “the great good and sweetness that brings the mind to conform with the will of the Lord in everything.” The acceptance of God’s will was the goal of tribulation, which required the believer to humble himself and be stripped of his self-will. Such a transformation during the terrible afflictions of poverty enabled the believer to govern himself and thus become master of his own heart—paradoxically, this self-government came into being when he allowed God to govern him.

Did tribulation demonstrate indifference to the pains of poverty? No. For the truth act of charity, it was instead a commandment to transform that pain into a master and thus into a pathway to happiness and eternal salvation. In other words, the well-lived tribulation of poverty could amend the believer and transform him in an afflicted subject—one who has accepted pain as the teacher sent by God and thus has become peaceful, free, and happy.

At the end of his treatise on charity, Pedro Calatayud, S.J. presented the example of the conversion of Johannes Tauler and with it the possibility that tribulation helped one to become a pastor. Tauler was a medieval mystic who converted after he witnessed and talked to a beggar that left himself entirely in God’s loving hands. Though this beggar still suffered the afflictions of material needs, he had shaped his heart entirely according to God’s charity and was therefore perfectly happy. The exalted example offered by Calatayud was, in other words, a mendicant who had become voluntarily poor—a subject

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52 Doctrinas Practicas, 5:4, 27.
53 Ibid., 2:165.
54 Ibid., 5:17, 18.
55 Ibid., 5:3.
56 Ibid., 5:28.
57 Ibid., 5:45.
58 Ibid., 5:44, 23, 28.
59 Ibid., 5:24, 23.
60 Ibid., 5:28.
61 Ibid., 5:16.
62 Ibid., 5:19, 44, 47.
who learned to govern himself through the exercise of tribulation and received God’s loving grace during that process. Significantly, the mendicant’s life not only underlined the fundamental insufficiency of earthly goods for men to carry out their destiny and ground their actions but also that it is those who are able to be *atribulados* (afflicted) in poverty who God will choose for “the guidance and rule of many souls.”

In sum, material necessity cooked by the fire of charity allowed the believer to obtain what was more important than earthly goods; namely, the ability to conquer the self during times of scarcity as a path towards God’s salvation. It was the tribulation’s promise that such a face-to-face encounter with the divine—the fundamental and mysterious promise of every exercise of charity—occurred while suffering poverty. As a result, this exercise reaffirmed not only the secondary role that the body had in comparison to heavenly salvation but also indicated that it was not through earthly goods that believers achieved happiness. Additionally, those able to govern poverty’s pain through tribulation could be chosen to be pastors of other souls.

C. Towards a charitable pastorate

Almsgiving and tribulation forged a distinctive charitable pastorate, which was both global and specific, individualizing and incorporating. This section will briefly point out those features and then analyze the type of reciprocity the charitable pastorate modeled between the members of the Spanish Catholic community of the eighteenth century.

Almsgiving and tribulation forged a distinctive charitable pastorate concerning the poor, one in which the government of the self was inextricably interwoven with the government of others. Thus, one of the crucial effects of these exercises of charity consisted in the fact that their respective truth acts forged a charitable steward that conducts others. The rich who governed themselves with regard to their material goods would not only avoid the sin of greed but also become stewards for the poor; and the voluntary poor who endured the afflictions of poverty through tribulation would not only live peacefully but could also be shepherds for many souls. There was a distinctive charitable pastorate embedded in almsgiving and tribulation—one that asked for and even rested upon a peculiar government of the self that was directed to perform the truth act of charity.

This Spanish charitable pastorate of the eighteenth century was characterized by some important features. To begin with, it was not exclusively located at the high end of the Catholic hierarchy. Rather, all the charitable congregants shared, at varying levels of intensities and at different moments, the pastorate. Priests and bishops were not the only pastors of the poor; every believer who had riches beyond his needs was compelled to fulfill by deeds what Foucault called the nutritional principle and thus become a steward for the poor. By bearing in mind this apparently simple aspect of the charitable government of others, we can discern two critical features—it was global inasmuch as it

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63 *Doctrinas Practicas*, 5:11.
64 On the intertwinement between the government of the self and the other, see Michel Foucault, *About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Lectures at Dartmouth College, 1980 [2013]* (2016), 25, 26.
65 *Les aveux de la chair*, 385–386.
concerned every member of the community and specific since it had distinctive goals (i.e., feeding the poor) and methods (i.e., almsgiving).66

Secondly, the charitable pastorate was an individualizing and incorporating type of government. It was individualizing insofar as the truth act of charity meant that the believer subjectivized himself according to charity’s exercises and, connected to such subjectivation, it allowed the pastor to scrutinize his heart and conduct his will to achieve charity’s salvation. Thus, charity formed “un lien de formation et transmission de vérité” (“a bond for the formation and transmission of truth”).67 Additionally, fulfilling the commandment to not kill thy neighbor by giving alms effectively incorporated the poor into the congregation, occasionally by requiring givers to risk their own economic status. Certainly, such an incorporating effect could have been articulated along with an individualizing power exercised by the rich stewards of the poor, but it is crucial to notice that such articulation is not necessary and does not rule out the demand for integration. As Michel Senellart suggested, the incorporating effect of the charitable stewardship contained a promise and a permanent yearning to build a fraternal bond—one that would recognize and include the givers and those who were worse off within a utopian body.68

Thus, the charitable pastorate generated a distinctive type of reciprocity. In order to characterize it, we must first notice that destitution generated a point of tension between the government of needs and excess crafted in the exercise of almsgiving, and the government of pain explained in the exercise of tribulation. On the one hand, the subject must hand over his goods and, in extreme cases, get rid of that which might be necessary for his status in order to cover the poor’s needs. He was called to be God’s steward for the poor and subsequently to take responsibility for their lives. However, at the moment of giving, he could not help but ask: Should I not judge carefully before giving? Am I hastily finishing a tribulation that has not yet produced its effects? Am I fostering a way of life that is not grounded on God’s love, but on laziness? On the other hand, the pain caused by lacking worldly goods must be borne with patience, even if it was caused by another’s unjust action. The poor was called to be an afflicted subject, which means that he was urged to welcome the pain of poverty as a bridge towards God. Thus, before asking for alms to relieve such poverty, he should consider: how can I urgently ask for help in relieving my own need if that is a proof of impatience or of lack of the necessary openness for the learning process triggered by tribulation? Nevertheless, if God’s creation is for all, should I not demand that my neighbors fulfill their duties?

The tension expressed in the questions asked above supposed a peculiar reciprocity that has given charity its ignoble reputation. Namely, almsgiving and tribulation tended to complement each other in the following way: the wealthy were called to be poor in

66 On these characteristics of pastoral power, see Les aveux de la chair, 390.
68 Michel Senellart, “Gouverner l’être-autre. La question du corps chrétien,” in Foucault(s), ed. A. Braunstein, Jean François; Lorenzini, Daniele; Revel, Ariane; Revel, Judith; Sforzini, Arianna (2017), 205–21.
spirit and, therefore, were the stewards of the poor concerning their goods, while the poor were called to be happy in their tribulation despite their poverty. As a consequence, involuntary poverty remained in the uncertain terrain between the opportunity for salvation and iniquitous suffering; amid the tension of bearing tribulation and asking for alms due; between being a peaceful believer and manifesting just indignation against those who had not given the believer the alms that are their due. For the eighteenth-century conception of charity, there did not seem to be a way to resolve these tensions without a personal examination. Nor does the concept leave room to envision the possibility of changing the social circumstances that created people’s destitution—in fact, the opposite seems to have been the case.

The theologian Daniel Concina (1687–1756) will summarize the rigid character of charitable reciprocity by asserting

the rich and the poor are two opposite, but very necessary parts. If everyone had the same riches or the same needs and poverty, there would be no friendship between them, nor would there be society. No one would need the help of the other, no one would subject himself to the other, no one would be a servant, no one would be a lord, there would be no opportunity to exercise charity and mercy, and there would be no tolerance of need and poverty. Therefore it is expedient that some should be rich, others poor, that they may all live together, with a mighty and everlasting bond of love.69

Thus, the Catholic reciprocity seemed to accept (or perhaps was part of the production of) a community marked by both a social hierarchy based on the complementarity of the believers’ riches and a distinctive power granted to the wealthy as stewards for the poor concerning their goods.

Voluntary poverty gave charitable reciprocity both its exalted manifestation and its limit. As the beggar found by Teuler evidences, to become voluntarily poor was not just a stoical test but a way of life70—one that was based on and pointed to the source of the steward’s authority; namely, God’s love. Thus, to be voluntarily poor meant dwelling in a place of truth upon which all human authority was built and, perhaps, a place where all existing human authority could be dissolved. Consequently, the act of truth that Teuler’s beggar realized by voluntarily experiencing poverty’s afflictions transformed him, a simple poor person, into a candidate to govern other’s souls—it anointed a poor mendicant as a possible steward. Crucially, what surfaces with this voluntary poverty is a Catholic stewardship that did not rely on any material goods or social position—one that furthermore evinces a paradox internal to the governmental knowledge of charity. The same exercises of tribulation and almsgiving were capable of both entrenching a rigid social hierarchy in which stewardship by the rich was indispensable and of containing the seeds to subvert such a hierarchy by recalling that the ultimate foundation of the Catholic

69 Theologia Christiana Dogmatico Moral, 132.
stewardship was not those riches but the love of charity that organize the distribution of such riches.

The incorporating facet of charitable reciprocity—that which demanded that no member be left outside the congregation, emphasizes the primary role of charity’s love. As God’s steward for the poor concerning earthly goods, the rich had to give to the poor and thus effectively incorporate them into the community. In doing so, they did not do philanthropy, nor were they merely generous, but instead they gave what God had created for all.

This incorporation of the poor into the congregation through almsgiving manifested a crucial truth of the Catholic governmental knowledge: that all believers were part of what we could call a loving family with a common patrimony. A loving bond was displayed when the love of charity that formed the giver’s will met with the poor’s love of survival, which moved them to ask for alms.\(^{71}\) Crucially, such a fraternal encounter was the germ of what we could anachronistically call a social bond founded on Divine love. Thus, the laborious love of charity was able to constitute not only each charitable subject but also bring about a Catholic community upon which political institutions could be established. As for the family patrimony, the maintenance of the poor by the rich displayed the justice of God, who had created the world and its goods for all. He appointed each person a role, which was not to own the earth and simply profit from its fruits but to serve as a steward for the poor regarding earthly goods.

The charitable reciprocity was able to achieve a pivotal twofold effect. Giving alms allowed for the survival of the individuals, which was the elementary building block for the physical existence of the human community. Additionally, the maintenance of the poor, through acts grounded in the love of charity and the endurance of the afflictions of poverty, manifested that the ultimate foundation of the congregation, i.e., the love of God, virtuously united the community in moments of destitution. Almsgiving and tribulation both sustained the congregants’ physical life and offered them a way to live virtuously together. Thus, they crafted a solution to the two ancient political goals classically formulated by Aristotle that will soon obsess the police.\(^{72}\) Consequently, failing to comply with the giver’s duties would involve consequences at both the individual and communal levels. For the former, neglecting almsgiving would entail committing a theft and being condemned to eternal fire;\(^ {73}\) whereas for the latter, it would breach the due reciprocity that allowed the existence of a Catholic community.

3. GLIMPSE THE FUTURE OF CHARITY

Glimpsing the future of charity means noting an event we might easily overlook, namely, the charitable pastorate integrated into the Spanish State through the police of the poor established by the Monarchy at the end of the eighteenth century. The present section will

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\(^{71}\) Doctrinas Practicas, 2:151.


\(^{73}\) See, for instance, Doctrinas Practicas, 4:401 and Climent, Pláticas dominicales, 3: 52, 53, 56.
briefly point out one critical aspect through which such integration occurred. Namely, the
police of the poor relied on charity and almsgiving and consequently asked believers to
become charitable by assuming the role of the stewards for the poor.

By the standards of today, the future of charity does not look promising. The concept
is presently looked down upon, and it seems that charity cannot add anything important
to the current debates about poverty. It could even be argued that, by the end of the Span-
ish eighteenth century, charity began its inexcusable journey towards oblivion. Indeed, be-
tween the years 1775 and 1783, the Bourbon King Charles III enacted a corpus of laws to
form the new Police of the Poor—a State-led endeavor that would organize the assistance
to the needy and eventually banish destitution from Spain.74 Notably, this new institu-
tional order did not entail the complete replacement of the old Catholic charity by the new
Police of the Poor. Rather, it was the moment of a complex and early-asserted alliance
between the two.

The most prominent of the Catholic virtues found a new partner. Instead of faith and
hope—the other two theological virtues—charity began to be accompanied by the police.
The governmental knowledge of the police, which, as Foucault noticed, did not have a
great beyond, not only embraced but created a new home for charity—a religious virtue
through which Spanish Catholicism gave life and form to its faith and accounted for the
enigmatic encounter between God and his creatures. In order to remove destitution and
thus create a powerful and happy monarchy, the declared goals of the science of the po-
lice,75 it seemed necessary that these two bodies of knowledge would be able to “come up
with a thousand ways to alleviate” the poverty of the poor.76

Unsurprisingly, charity’s presence was rather omnipresent at the moment when the
Catholic men of the Spanish Enlightenment lost their familiarity with the poor and pov-
erty—i.e., when they began to refashion the way they thought about and governed the
poor with the police of the poor. The Spanish poor laws, for instance, referred to the rele-
vance of the older concept of charity on two critical occasions, both in justifying the new
police institutions and considering how to maintain them. Thus, the institutional deploy-
ment of the police of the poor was envisioned in part as the means by which the king and
the citizens fulfilled their pious duties and thus helped out to forge a happy and powerful
Nation.77 In other words, the police of the poor relied on asking believers—including the

74 Despite numerous laws enacted before and after those years, the core of the new policy towards the poor
took place between the enactment of the 1775 law that extended the notion of vagrancy and mandated that
vagabonds be sent to hospices, the army, and the navy, and the law of 1778 that established juntas de caridad
(Councils of Charity) to reach other poor people within their homes. They were both strengthened by a law
enacted in 1783 that recalled that everything has been done for the good police of the poor. Novísima Recop-
itación de las leyes de España, Mandada Formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV (Madrid, 1804), book XII, title XXXI,
law VII; book VII, title XXXVIII, laws I-VII; title XXXIX, laws XVIII-XX, XXII-XXIV; Pedro Escolano de Ar-
rieta, Practica del Consejo Real, vol. 1 (1796), 488.
75 On these goals, see Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, Elementos Generales de Policía [1756] (1784), 1.
76 Bernardo Ward, Proyecto Económico (1779), 199.
77 See Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España, book I, title XXV; book VII, title XXXIX, laws XX, XXII; title
XXXVIII, law V. Notably, neither taxes nor any other civil obligation was used by Spanish reformers to justify and
sustain the new policy.

Foucault Studies, No. 31, 119-140.
sovereign—to do what they must, i.e., become charitable for the sake of them and the State.  

The police of the poor not only relied on charity but also transformed it. One of the crucial innovations of this police consisted in encouraging vassals to become givers not at every encounter with the poor but through the new institutions created to impose order on this giving. In other words, the police asked the believers to channel their charities through hospices and *Juntas de Caridad*—the new organizations created to assist the poor. Only these institutions could guarantee the due *discreción* (prudence) of the old charity by organizing a way of knowing the poor and giving the alms that suited each poor subject. Consequently, the police of the poor was deployed to become the primary giver of the State or, more accurately, the governmental means for the State to be the charitable giver par excellence—the one able to know, assist, and thus lead the poor to achieve the happiness of the State.

The new police institutions assisted the poor in different ways. The most relevant of these was preparing the poor for working or, if possible, providing them with jobs. "We will never satisfy the obligation we have to help the poor better than by providing food to them through their work, as it is necessary to acquire our bread". Work became the quintessential police almsgiving; not only because it sustained the physical life of the poor but also because working entailed a practice of the self for the recipient. In tune with the truth act of charity that called for a personal transformation, the police of the poor aimed at providing jobs in order to help the poor constitute themselves as religiously productive subjects. Thus, the institutions that forged the new stewards for the poor “will act more justly” when, instead of indiscreetly giving to the poor, they “correct those who unjustly ask alms.”

Interestingly, the police of the poor not only accepted the mission of caring for the poor but also put the needy into the same place in which charity had placed them. As it was explained in the previous section, the exercises of charity that assured both the poor’s physical existence and the congregants’ virtuous lives were called on to actualize God’s power. In other words, for charity, the divine power and glory were at stake in the social

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78 Supposing such a duty, the Brief by Pius VI of 14 March 1780 grants to the Spanish king the “faculty to demand of the dignities, canonries and other benefits the third part of their products” for continuing his material and spiritual assistance of the poor. See Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España, Mandada Formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV (Madrid, 1804), book 1, title XXV.

79 To be a prudent giver was to restrict the alms given to the undeserving poor, which was only possible when such a giver examined the poor. The police of the poor’s institutions aimed at both knowing the poor and handing out charities appropriate to each type of poor person.

80 Tomás Anzano, Elementos preliminares para poder formar un sistema de gobierno de hospicio general (1778), 16. On the duty of working in the hospices, in the Army, and in the Navy, see especially Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España, book XII, title XXXI, law VII; book VII, title XXXVIII, laws IV-VII and title XXXIX, laws XVIII-XX, XXII-XXIV.

81 The Spanish laws about the hospices are particularly eloquent on this goal. More generally, the science of the police circumscribed the role of religion to create useful vassals for the State. Justi, Elementos Generales de Policía, 126. Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España, book VII, title XXXVIII, laws IV-VII.

82 Anzano, Elementos preliminares para poder formar un sistema de gobierno de hospicio general, 17.
body’s weakest members.\textsuperscript{83} Notably, the poor will remain in this position for the police of the poor. Remedyng poverty was the way to realize the glory of the Monarch and create a happy State.\textsuperscript{84} In order to achieve these goals, these needy vassals were regarded as key elements of the State’s population that the State had to activate.\textsuperscript{85} Thus, for the police, the entire political body seemed to rest on adequately governing those humble subjects.\textsuperscript{86}

In sum, the police of the poor was a peculiar invention that channeled a Catholic pastorate into the modern State. Such integration was crucial not only because a distinctive pastoral power was incorporated into the modern State through the police of the poor\textsuperscript{87} but also due to the fact that, through such a police, the Spanish State took responsibility for issues that will become of its primary concern—poverty and the poor.

\textbf{FINAL REMARKS}

We must add the forgotten Spanish eighteenth-century conception of charity as one of the sections found in the ambivalent archive of love and the fraught archive of government.\textsuperscript{88} Instead of considering this ubiquitous notion as the ideological façade of a police wielded by Spanish absolutism, these pages have analyzed the old conception of Catholic charity to evidence that eighteenth-century Spanish Catholic charity was not an informal and merely voluntary tithe but a doctrine with its own knowledge and ways of conducting men and women. For those believers who walked towards their salvation, the critical goal of becoming a charitable believer entailed something else than to state “I believe” —it required a distinctive practice of self-mortification directed towards allowing the love of charity to shape the believer’s will in depth. Such a practice of the self was regulated by a number of exercises of charity that constituted distinctive acts of truth that must constitute the believers in a way that made charity their truth and thus manifested the truth of charity.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} This pivotal position of the poor was not forged by the eighteenth century but had been in place at least since the controversy about the poor during the sixteenth century. See the telling metaphor used by Domingo de Soto, \textit{Deliberacion en la Causa de los Pobres} (1545), 141, 142.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Bernardo Ward, \textit{Obra Pia y Eficaz Modo Para Remediar La Miseria de La Gente Pobre de España} [1750] (1767), 9.
\item \textsuperscript{85} The Spanish texts accepted the direct connection between increasing the number of inhabitants and augmenting the power of the State. Such a position supposed the productive activation of the vassals to justify the key importance of their increment. Thus, those texts subscribed to what Foucault called the “classic” view of population. \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, 55–79; Pedro Rodríguez conde de Campomanes, \textit{Discurso Sobre el Fomento de la Industria Popular} (1774), 66; \textit{Elementos Generales de Policia}, 38; Jakob Friedrich Freiherr von Bielfeld, \textit{Instituciones Politicas}, vol. 1 [1760] (1767), 115.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Justi confidently asserted that the science of the police’s main tasks were assisting the miserable and putting to work the idle poor. \textit{Elementos Generales de Policia}, 165.
\item \textsuperscript{87} On the critical importance of the integration of the pastoral power to analyze the modern States, see Michel Foucault, “The subject and the power” [1982], in \textit{Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics}, ed. Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. (1983), 213-215. Interestingly, before Foucault coined the concept of pastoral power, he had acknowledged the intertwine ment between police and religion by concluding that they were transparent to one another during the classical age. See, Michel Foucault, \textit{History of Madness} [1961] (2006), 76.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Matthew Chrulew, “Suspicion and Love,” \textit{Foucault Studies} 15 (February 2013), 9–26.
\end{itemize}
The critical goal of becoming a charitable believer was particularly urgent when the poor’s needs and poverty’s pains were aroused. As soon as those urgent matters appeared, almsgiving and tribulation were called to regulate two distinctive and hardly compatible acts of truth that each believer had to perform. On the one hand, the apparently simple and almost legalistic mandate to assess the giver’s wealth and the other’s needs regulated by almsgiving was merely the beginning of the believer’s conversion into a charitable Catholic—that is, a steward for the poor who allows the justice of God’s creation and His love to manifest in his heart and the world. On the other hand, the government of pain crafted by the exercise of tribulation did not attempt to consider the causes of the subject’s destitution and any injustice related to them. Instead, this exercise consisted in deploying a practice of knowing and conquering the self in times of scarcity as a path towards the encounter with God and His salvation. Thus, the charitably atribulado (afflicted) could also become a steward of other souls.

Almsgiving and tribulation forged a distinctive charitable pastorate concerning the poor, one in which the government of the self produced a charitable steward who could conduct others. Such a pastorate was not exclusively located at the top of the Catholic hierarchy. Rather, its specific goals and methods were globally triggered from different points within the congregation. Additionally, this pastorate articulated not only an individualizing power concerning the subjects but also a force towards the incorporation of the poor within the Catholic community. Thus, these exercises of charity articulated a way to sustain the congregants’ physical life and created a path to virtuously live together when poverty loomed over the Spanish Catholic community of the eighteenth century.

The connections between the rich and the poor through almsgiving and tribulation formed a hierarchical and highly rigid reciprocity between them. Nevertheless, such a reciprocity did not account for the entire scope of the old theological virtue. Those voluntary poor exalted a different and ambiguous possibility—they dwelt in a place of truth on which all human authority was built and, perhaps, where all existing human authority could be dissolved. Strikingly, the exercise of tribulation could thus have two radically different roles—entrenching a rigid social hierarchy in which the stewardship of the rich was indispensable but also containing the seeds of this hierarchy’s subversion by recalling God’s charity, i.e., the ultimate foundation of any authority and reciprocity.

The charitable pastorate was not forgotten but became a building block against and upon which the Spanish police of the poor established for creating a powerful and happy State. This unlikely encounter was the beginning of a conceptual and technological invention still in need of being fully traced for Spain and América—a moment when a distinctive pastoral power incorporated into the modern State along with two concerns that will be critical for it, i.e., poverty and the poor. Thus, studying the forgotten Spanish charity and its legacy seems to be a critical step towards delineating the Spanish-American problematization of poverty and writing the genealogy of the modern States in Spain and América.89

89 For undertaking such endeavors, we should rely on Foucault’s early detection of the emergence of a new type of way of governing the poor during the classical age and keep in mind different chronologies and
distinctive deployments for the Spanish American Monarchy. The chronological caveat is justified geographically. The reception of the science of the police in Spain was a late acquisition that began exactly at the time that Foucault recognized its decay in those places he analyzed, i.e., France, Germany, and Italy. For Foucault’s analysis, see especially Michel Foucault, History of Madness, 44-77, 381-418 and Security, Territory, Population, 341–358.


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