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In ‘Descent’ Proposal: Pathologies Of Embodiment In Nietzsche, Kafka, And Foucault

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The influence of Nietzschean thought on Michel Foucault’s lifelong pursuit of historical knowledge is well known. Foucault himself asserted in the preface to the first edition of *Madness and Civilization* in 1961 that his goal was to “confront the dialectics of history with the unchanging structure of the tragic,” and that he would conduct all his investigations “sous le soleil de la grande recherche nietzschéene— under the sun of the great Nietzschean quest.”¹ From the 1970s onward, Foucault explicitly re-articulated Nietzsche’s conception of *genealogy* in order to introduce and formulate the central themes of his own work — “power, knowledge, and the body.”² In *Discipline and Punish* (first published in 1975) and *The History of Sexuality* (1976), Foucault comes to argue that the body is the site upon which the most subtle and inconspicuous social practices form networks of relations that enable the large-scale organization of power:

[I]t is always the body that is at issue — the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission […]. The body is […] directly involved in a political field […]. This political investment of the body is bound up in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination […] the body becomes a useful force only if it [is] both a productive and subjected body.³


In his work after 1970, one of Foucault’s main preoccupations becomes not only the description of the way in which relations of power operate on human bodies (both at the individual level and at the level of the larger social body), but also the argument that knowledge of the body (which, Foucault says, constitutes a “political technology of the body”⁴) is methodologically integral to historical study. In Nietzsche, *Genealogy, History*, his clearest theoretical articulation of the body (originally published in 1971), Foucault conceptualizes the body not as a fixed entity, but as a heterogeneous multiplicity because it is a “volume in perpetual disintegration.”⁵ Foucault comes to define “genealogy,” his principal methodological approach to analysis from the 1970s onward, as an activity — namely as a “search for descent” whose function is not to lay foundations but to disturb “what was previously considered immobile,” to “show the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself.”⁶ The genealogist, as such, is one who searches for the ways in which descent “attaches itself to the body,” the ways in which “[i]t inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus.”⁷ The task of genealogy is to “expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body.”⁸

Although it is Foucault who most systematically developed the idea that the function of power is to order multiplicities through the control and inscription of the human body,⁹ it was his predecessor Friedrich Nietzsche who, almost a century earlier, claimed that the “body is a social structure,”¹⁰ and that philosophy is, first and foremost, “an interpretation of bodily states” — be they revealed or concealed.¹¹ In the preface to the *Gay Science*, Nietzsche

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⁶ Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 147.
⁷ Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 147.
⁹ “Every system of power is presented with the same problem,” writes Foucault — “the ordering of human multiplicities.” Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 218.
¹¹ Nietzsche’s view of the history of philosophy as “an interpretation of the body” (*The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), ‘Preface to the Second Edition’ §2) coalesces around his claim that “that which becomes conscious is involved in casual relations which are entirely withheld from us”; consciousness is therefore not “the directing agent” but an “organ of the directing agent” — Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), §524. Nietzsche assumes that the body (in its myriad effects) is both *visible* and *invisible*. This point is confirmed by Daniel Conway who writes that, “decadence is predicated not of the visible corporeal body, but of the ‘invisible’ instinctual body, the subsystem of drives and impulses that propagates the native vitality of the animal organism, see
argues that philosophy has hitherto been “merely an interpretation of the body and [what’s more] a misunderstanding of the body”: “those bold insanities of metaphysics, especially answers to the question about the value of existence, may always be considered first of all as the symptoms of certain bodies”. Foucault elaborates Nietzsche’s idea that the body is a multiplicity, that it is fundamentally affective and instinctual (Dionysian), and that it is the primary and primal battleground for the war among the instincts. The body is a multiplicity because it is a correlate and a function of fundamentally heterogeneous psycho-physiological processes, a particular expression of the multiple drives and affects of body, rather than immortal, transcendental or metaphysical essence. This Dionysian body is what Nietzsche calls a “higher

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12 Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Preface §2. One of Nietzsche’s most interesting political arguments — one that he articulated in opposition to his contemporary German nationalists — was that the health and vitality of the collective social body could only be measured by the vitality of its most exemplary artistic types. For example, he remarks that the unfortunate ‘patriotism’ or ‘fatherlandishness’ of the highest men of the age is a result of their misdirected belief that the individual is a mere reflection of the relative strength or weakness of the nation; thus when Nietzsche ponders whether there is anything ‘German’ about Wagner’s art, he suggests that it is not the German nation that justifies and gives value to Wagner’s art, but rather Wagner’s art — which emerges from the rich and manifold “supra-German” source of Wagner’s own physiological and psychological impulses — that justifies and gives value to the German nation — cf., Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §256. This is, nevertheless, also a point on which Foucault might disagree with Nietzsche: “one important difference between Nietzsche and Foucault is that whereas Nietzsche often seems to ground morality and social institutions in the tactics of individual actors, Foucault totally depyschologizes this approach and sees all psychological motivation not as the source but as the result of strategies without strategists” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 109). Although this argument is sound, it should be noted that while Nietzsche does often name exemplary individuals — Goethe, Napoleon, Schopenhauer — he uses primarily the language of individual types. In this sense, we can still argue that Nietzsche’s ultimate prototype for the highest type — the philosopher of the future — has no historical correlate; the future philosopher, like all of Nietzsche’s exemplary figures, is first and foremost, a de-personalized *typology* of human attributes.

13 By ‘affect’ Nietzsche seems to mean a variety of things: affect connotes for example, ‘felt emotions’ such as contempt and pity (*Will to Power*, §56); as ‘capacity’ such as will to enjoyment and capacity to command (*The Will to Power*, §98 and *Beyond Good and Evil*, §19); as an element of the multiplicity that makes up ‘subjectivity’ (*The Will to Power*, §556); as the deeper, hidden source of reality (*Beyond Good and Evil*, §36) that makes up morality (*Beyond Good and Evil*, §187); as an element that makes up ‘social’ tendencies, archetypes, or structures (*The Will to Power*, §719); and as a quanta of power (*The Will to Power*, §1024 and *Beyond Good and Evil*, §117). Nietzsche also uses ‘affect’ interchangeably with ‘drive’ (e.g. *Beyond Good and Evil*, §36) as that which ‘compels toward’, such as the ‘drive to knowledge’ (*Beyond Good and Evil*, §6); as a compulsion for domination and mastery (*Beyond Good and Evil*, §158); as ‘passion’ and ‘energy’ (*The Will to Power*, §26). Given the plethora of interchangeable terms and
The “body” in his Will to Power (§676). It is from this starting point that a human being could, according to Nietzsche, “become what one is” by uncovering “the chaos hidden within — a reservoir of corporeal energy.”

Despite the fact that the concept of body in Nietzsche does not attain the level of systematic conceptual clarity it later finds in Foucault’s thought, and that Foucault’s elaboration of genealogy diverges from Nietzsche’s in several ways, it can still be argued, as we do in the present paper, that the Foucaultian notion of ‘bodily inscription’ can be found in more rudimentary form in the Nietzschean idea of ‘bodily descent’ (which he first describes as the experience of ‘going under’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra) articulated in the preface to the Gay Science as the philosopher’s object and subject of study. The task of the philosopher, as Nietzsche articulates especially in Beyond Good and Evil and The Will to Power, is to chart the path qua pathology of this descent. A triangulation (ternary comparison) of Nietzsche and Foucault with Kafka — specifically with Kafka’s tale ‘In the Penal Colony’ — will serve as an exemplification and exemplary articulation of the relation between Nietzschean descent and Foucaultian inscription.

The present study is, in a wider sense, set within the context of the theoretical controversy regarding the relation between body, knowledge and identity — more specifically, in the debate as to whether a non-discursive dimension of the body can be posited, or whether the body is always already and inevitably discursive. Generally speaking, from the point of view of phenomenology, the body is understood as pre-reflexive, anterior to definitions, we equate ‘affect’, ‘drive’, ‘impulse’ etc. with Nietzsche’s understanding of ‘will to power’ as both personal and impersonal, gross and subtle: the unconscious and non-hierarchical quanta of force that compete for conscious expression, as well as the conscious feeling of emotion that results from the competition, conflict, repression and subsequent hierarchy of these unconscious elements.

Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, 69.


Although she does not make this specific claim, Butler does acknowledge the kinship between Nietzsche and Foucault on the question of the body’s role in the creation of values: “In a sense, for Foucault, as for Nietzsche, cultural values emerge as the result of an inscription on the body, understood as a medium, indeed, a blank page; in order for this inscription to signify, however, that medium must itself be destroyed — that is, fully transvaluated into a sublimated domain of values. Within the metaphors of this notion of cultural values is the figure of history as a relentless writing instrument, and the body as the medium which must be destroyed and transfigured in order for ‘culture’ to emerge,” cf. Judith Butler, ‘Subversive Bodily Acts’ in Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge Press, 1990), 130.
subjectivity, and prior to discursive construction.\(^\text{17}\) In contrast, [post]structuralist and materialist accounts view the body as a socio-cultural construct, a product of the formative and constitutive effects of power.\(^\text{18}\) While Foucault is most often associated with the latter, one of the criticisms leveled against him is that there is in fact the appearance in his work of a non-discursive, tacit and unintelligible body, one that disrupts the discursive economy of Foucaultian subjectivity:

Although Foucault writes, “Nothing in man — not even his body — is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men”, he nevertheless points to the constancy of cultural inscription as a “single drama” that acts on the body. If the creation of values, that historical mode of signification, requires the destruction of the body, much as the instrument of torture in Kafka’s Penal Colony destroys the body on which it writes, then there must be a body prior to that inscription, stable and self-identical, subject to that sacrificial destruction.\(^\text{19}\)

In the passage just cited, Judith Butler posits that the creation of values (to use the Nietzschean expression) requires the destruction of the body, and that the very possibility of such significant destruction is predicated on the existence of another body: a body outside of signification, external to the inscription *qua* destruction of that body. But as Butler herself goes on to say, this other body, far from “stable and self-identical,” is the locus of “an inherently untidy experience”: an “unruliness and disorder.”\(^\text{20}\) Our intent here is to uncover this ‘other’ body (identified by Butler) and to provide an account of how it is

\(^{17}\) Examples of a phenomenological and philosophical conception of the body are found in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’ in *The Visible and the Invisible* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1969); William James’ notion of ‘pure experience’ in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1967). Also see ‘The World Becomes the Self’s Body: James, Merleau-Ponty, and Nishida’ in the Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (1998), *Paideia Project Online Archive*, [http://www.bu.edu/wcp/paidarch.html](http://www.bu.edu/wcp/paidarch.html).


\(^{19}\) Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 130.

possible to locate in Foucault’s theorization of cultural inscription the interplay between discursive and non-discursive dimensions of the body. While it is clear with respect to their form that these bodies are antithetical to each other, we will show that they are in fact connected and interdependent with respect to their function. Through a detailed reading of Franz Kafka’s harrowing tale ‘In the Penal Colony’, we attempt to describe the disciplinary matrix upon which the inscription of the body is manifested and can be mapped. Finally, we suggest that it is in the presence of this untidy and indecent body (as Nietzsche knew and Foucault seems to suggest) that the possibility of resistance emerges. As Foucault himself suggests, there is “always something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves which in some sense escapes relations of power, something which is by no means a more or less docile or reactive primal matter, but rather a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge [...] a plebeian quality or aspect.”

I. ‘Decent’ And ‘Indecent’ Bodies: The Disciplinary Matrix

I have attempted to analyze how, at the initial stages of industrial societies, a particular punitive apparatus was set up together with a system for separating the normal from the abnormal. To follow this up, it will be necessary to construct a history of what happens in the nineteenth century and how the present highly-complex relation of forces — the current outline of the battle — has been arrived at through a succession of offensives and counter-offensives, effects and counter-effects. The coherence of such a history does not derive from the revelation of a project but from a logic of

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21 Michel Foucault, ‘Powers and Strategies’ in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 138. Nietzsche would disagree with Foucault’s characterization of this “something” that escapes relations of power as “plebeian”, and instead argues that the capacity of the “higher” types to recognize the ephemeral presence of this “something” is precisely that which makes them “aristocratic” — Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §257.

22 “Body is simultaneously a designation for ‘consciousness’ (here intellect is considered a physical phenomenon) as well as what we can loosely call ‘unconsciousness’. Perhaps the entire evolution of the spirit is a question of the body; it is the history of the development of a higher body that emerges into our sensibility. The organic is rising to yet higher levels. Our lust for knowledge of nature is a means through which the body desires to perfect itself. Or rather: hundreds of thousands of experiments are made to change the nourishment, the mode of living and the dwelling of the body, all kinds of pleasure and displeasure, are signs of these changes and experiments,” Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §676.
opposing strategies. The archaeology of the human sciences has to be established through studying the mechanisms of power which have invested human bodies, acts and forms of behavior.  

In this passage, Foucault describes his initiative to analyze the complex relations of forces of a particular historical punitive apparatus as the groundwork for the study of the mechanisms of power that have “invested human bodies, acts, and forms of behaviour.” In his post-archaeological works, Foucault pursues this study through the development of genealogical analysis, i.e. through the articulation of the dispositif or apparatus of power which he describes as “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourse, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions — in short, the said as much as the unsaid.” Methodologically speaking “the concept of dispositif is the basis of Foucault’s attempt to convert the quasi-transcendental episteme into a sociological model of human societies as functionally coordinated systems.” The disciplinary function of the punitive apparatus focuses on the individual human body in order to prepare and integrate it into a larger regulated system of social controls: Foucault thus defines ‘discipline’ as a “unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a ‘political’ force at the least cost and maximized as a useful force.”  

The disciplinary matrix, as such, is here defined as the functionally coordinated system of power relations in which disciplinary techniques work on human bodies for the purposes of organizing and normalizing human behaviour. If a disciplinary matrix (qua punitive apparatus) is a functionally coordinated system, then it should be possible to identify the structural principles or axes that make up this system. Although Foucault describes the

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25 Neil Brenner, ‘Foucault’s New Functionalism’ in Theory and Society, Vol 23, 1994, 687. Brenner goes on to define “function” as “the most basic unit” of the “coordination process” that occurs between “discursive practices, non-discursive practices, and their reciprocal effects on society at large.” “The dispositif concept can be understood as a tool for studying both the functional imperatives […] of different social formations and the complex processes, embedded deep within the social nexus, through which these imperatives are satisfied […]. Foucault’s theory is an attempt to analyze at once the functional requirements specific to a given historical conjuncture and the complex manner in which the latter are fulfilled or modified historically. The dispositif concept can be understood as a tool for describing the social context in which coordination of functions to imperatives occurs” — Brenner, ‘Foucault’s New Functionalism’, 687, 688.
26 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 221.
27 Brenner seems to be correct in asserting that “the dispositif can be understood as a tool for describing the social context in which this coordination of functions to
disciplinary matrix in terms of ‘heterogeneous tactics’ which have a common primary ‘target’ in the human body, the coordinates of this disciplinary matrix, which at one level govern and constrain the material parameters and conceptual possibilities of bodily identity, can — almost mathematically — be constituted by the intersection of two axes: the horizontal axis which, as we will see, Kafka in his tale calls the Bed of the penal apparatus, and the vertical axis which, as we will see, Kafka calls the Designer. The former functions along the lines of what Foucault would call the genealogical: the socio-historical and chronological dimension of the regulatory network — one which regulates syntactically, ordering bodies sequentially, following the conceptual rules of linguistic coherence and historical continuity. The latter functions along the lines of what Foucault would call the archaeological: the

imperatives occurs” (‘Foucault’s New Functionalism’, 688). We are not, however, arguing that one template describing the disciplinary matrix is sufficient to characterize every apparatus, past, present and future. Foucault makes it clear that every apparatus is formed in response to unique historical conditions that operate to regulate human bodies in highly specific ways. Our model of the apparatus is intended to be neither universal nor homogenous. Nonetheless, as Brenner rightly points out, given that the principal function of all apparatuses is to order multiplicities (as Foucault argues), its functional imperative remains “to dominate the human body while rendering it useful” (Brenner, 693). As such, the historical, linguistic and conceptual parameters which we have described under the rubric of the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ axes are present in all coordinated systems of disciplinary control.

28 See for example Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. Also see Brenner’s ‘Foucault’s New Functionalism’ for a comprehensive discussion of ‘targets’ and ‘tactics’ of biopower in Foucault’s work, especially 687-695.

29 It should be reiterated that this characterization of Foucault’s idea of disciplinary matrix is instrumental. We agree with Brenner’s point that Foucault’s social theory neither encompasses “a society like a Hegelian Geist,” nor hovers “above society like Parsonian ‘normative patterns’, nor determines “society […] like Althusser’s ‘overdetermined’ economic base” (Foucault’s New Functionalism’, 688). We use the coordination of two axes to exemplify the generic ‘coordinates’ of any disciplinary system in order to identify, through the example of Kafka’s penal apparatus, the conditions upon which bodily inscription is predicated.

30 Although the horizontal syntagmatic axis does not capture the entirety of Foucault’s notion of genealogy, especially as it is set out in his ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, it does capture one of the chief functions of genealogical analysis, namely the search for the conceptual principle by which the historical relations or networks of power governing social practices can be traced and identified. “The genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin”; “he must be able to recognize the events of history”; “history is the concrete body of a development”; “An examination of descent also permits the discovery, under the unique aspect of a trait or a concept, of the myriad events through which — thanks to which, against which — they were formed.” Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 144-46.

31 Again, the vertical paradigmatic axis captures an important function of archaeological analysis: “the analysis of statements” which is a “historical analysis, but one that avoids all interpretation; it does not question things as to what they are
synchronic and paradigmatic dimension which regulates bodies ideologically, ordering them typologically, ‘typing’ as it were certain circumscribed political perceptions and statements (states of being) onto given bodies. The intersection of genealogy and archaeology,32 of chronology and synchrony — of what we have here called the ‘syntactical’ and ‘paradigmatic’ axes, borrowing from the language of structuralism — determine the logico-grammatical parameters of the body as a socio-political existent, forming its disciplinary matrix: its stable, regulated, disciplined and discursive (logical-linguistic) structure.

If the disciplinary matrix were limited exclusively to these two structural axes, then we would have to agree with the contention that Foucault’s power dispositif, contrary to Foucault’s own intentions, remains an “untenably static and structuralist model of modernity.”33 But the body that is ordered by this intersection is neither stable nor self-identical. Impossible to classify and to identify as such, this altogether indecent, untidy and unstable ‘body’ is not the concept ‘body’ or the percept ‘body’ (what we understand the body to be or what we perceive the body to be). The body here is taken as an affect rather than as a concept or a percept; and we propose, what’s more, that this affective body in no way “pre-exists” its conceptual or perceptual dimensions — does not stand “prior to” these “stable and self-identical” conditions — but disrupts, disturbs, and “cuts across” them in what Foucault would call an “oblique” or “slantwise” way.34 The horizontal axis is the

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32 It should be made clear at this juncture that while we use the terminology of the ‘archaeological’ here, our conception of the disciplinary matrix is consistent with the post-archaeological/genealogical phase of Foucault’s work. Foucault abandoned the analytic language of archaeological analysis because it focused exclusively on ‘discursive’ practices; his post-archaeological methodological refinements place new attention on non-discursive practices. The disciplinary matrix we articulate here and which we exemplify through Kafka’s tale, encompasses both the rules of discourse that make inscription possible, as well as the relations of power (discursive as well as non-discursive) which constrain any instance of bodily subjection. As such, we speak of archaeology and genealogy as “functions” and as functional principles in Foucault’s methodological approach.


34 In ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’, Foucault invokes this ‘slantwise’ position/disposition in his discussion of the heterogeneous possibilities inherent in homosexuality. “Homosexuality,” he argues, “is an historic occasion to reopen affective and relational virtualities, not so much through the intrinsic qualities of the homosexual but because the ‘slantwise’ position of the latter, as it were — the diagonal lines he can lay out in the social fabric allow these virtualities to come to light” — Ethics,
disciplinary line that orders given bodies temporally or sequentially (i.e., historically); the vertical line being the disciplinary axis that orders given bodies archetypically and ideologically; the two together provide a set of demarcations that delimit, describe, and socio-culturally inscribe an otherwise disorderly and disoriented ‘body’, “an inherently untidy [bodily] experience.”

The ‘body proper’, a ‘proper body’, results from the descent upon an indecent condition of the twin axes of decency (of the normalizing apparatus qua disciplinary matrix). This descent upon the indecent — this inscription, circumscription, or meaningful ascription of orderly description on an otherwise untidy condition — is what the body undergoes in order to become what, in fact, it is. Kafka in his tale proposes a third dimension, called the Harrow, shuttling between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes of the disciplinary matrix: the harrowing affect produced by their mutual intersection — the cutting, simply put, which they infect. This unruly body, experienced as a disordered and disorienting sensation — or rather, lack of sense, a senselessness — is anathema to order, at odds with every ordination, aslant to any stable system of definable relations (“‘within and without, above and below, male and female, with and against’”

We can detect the presence of this indecent body in Foucault’s Nietzschean description of the multiplicitous “points, knots, or focuses of resistance” that “escape[s] relations of power”, a body that is not formed but rather only a “centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge.”

The presence of this disruptive and indecent body can also be found in Nietzsche’s work. For Nietzsche, all philosophy — especially the philosophy of the future — is an interpretation of bodily states; philosophy is a “desire of the heart,” an effect of the underlying contestation of the affects that make

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35 Butler, Gender Trouble, 131.
36 Butler, Gender Trouble, 131.
39 It is in large part from Klossowski’s theorization of the eternal return (as well as that of Georges Bataille) that Foucault was able to articulate the centrality of the body in Nietzsche’s thought. See Foucault’s understanding of the connection between Klossowski and Nietzsche in “La prose d’Actéon” in La Nouvelle Revue Française, March 1964, number 135, 444-459. Akin to a literary surface, Klossowski understands the Nietzschean body to be an inchoate and primal battleground of affective drives that are translated and communicated into thought within the cultural code of everyday signs. When stripped of its properties of identification, what remains are bodily impulses in motion, what Klossowski refers to as tonalities and fluctuations. See Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux (Paris: Mercure de France, 1975).
40 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §5.
up the “entire instinctive life.” The affective body is made up of multiple forces, and temporarily fixed within certain configurations that, through language, are identified as a totality or ‘self’. The interests of ‘life’ and “the value of existence,” as such, can only be pursued by the Nietzschean genealogist as “hints or symptoms of the body, of its success or failure, its plenitude, power and autocracy in history, or of its frustrations, weariness, impoverishment, its premonitions of the end, its will to the end.” Foucault directly picks up on this idea when he notes that ‘descent’ “seeks the subtle, singular, and sub-individual marks that might possibly intersect to form a network that is difficult to unravel.”

The obliterated ‘other’ of the tidy body — its abjected alterity, which we here term the ‘affective body’ — has only been obliterated conceptually and perceptually, and remains (sustains itself) in the obliquity of the organizing axes, as a shadow of sorts stretched across the otherwise clear and cogent map, neither conceptually nor perceptually meaningful in any way, but disturbingly affective nonetheless. Unable to be charted within the coordinates of the disciplinary matrix, this affective body is at odds with the historical and ideological condition[s], but is, rather, asymptotic, altogether agrammatical, hence indecent, untidy and unwarranted (structurally speaking). This agrammatical condition is disposed by the dominant and dominating axes, subsumed by the sign-system as such (signifying and signified), and subjected — as Butler says — to sacrifice: “subject to that sacrificial destruction” which allows for the production of “stable and self-identical” inscriptions as identities. Inscription, and identification as such, result from the cross-cut of these disciplinary axes: of syntagms and paradigms, of metonyms and metaphors, of genealogical stages and archaeological strata. A body as we conceive and perceive it (qua concept and percept) is a body that has undergone this axial inscription and sacrificed (subsumed, subordinated) in undergoing this its disruptive affectivity.

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41 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §36.
42 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ‘Preface’ §2. This is also an argument made by Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Tomlinson (Chicago: Athlone Press, 1983). Following Klossowski’s understanding, Deleuze argues that “a phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force. The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and a semiology. The sciences are a symptomatological and semiological system” (Nietzsche and Philosophy, 3).
43 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 145.
44 Butler, Gender Trouble, 130.
II. Harrowing Descent: The Disciplinary Apparatus According
To Franz Kafka

As we shall now see through Kafka’s tale, the twin axes of the disciplinary
matrix implicitly assume the presence of a third excluded term. This third
term is important because it enables us to understand Foucault’s attempt to
characterize “power relationships in the context of intelligible historical
processes without violating his Nietzschean rejection of both chiliastic and
dialectical models of human progress”.  

Foucault’s argument that regimes of power and knowledge
[re]produce themselves through bodily inscription is perhaps most forcefully
put forward in ‘The Body of the Condemned’, the first part of his study
*Discipline and Punish*. Not only do “power and knowledge directly imply one
another,” he argues in this study, but their mutual [re]production hinges on
a fundamental ‘subjection’ or grounding ‘subject’: the individual body as the
base and basic unit of the body politic. The body is “directly involved in a
political field,” explains Foucault — “power relations have an immediate hold
upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to
perform ceremonies, to emit signs.” Not only is the singular body a site —
indeed, *the* site — of socio-political inscription, but it is also, as Foucault says,
the singled-out, sole and solitary site where what we call the “soul” is
situated. ‘Body’ and ‘soul’ — the ‘living body’ as such — are the twin poles of
power- and knowledge- inscription, the ‘Bed’ and ‘Designer’ of Kafka’s
contraption in his exemplification and narration of bodily inscription ‘In the
Penal Colony’ (1914).

“The Bed and Designer were of the same size and looked like two dark
wooden chests,” writes Kafka in his story of discipline and punishment. “The
Designer hung about two meters above the Bed; and each of them was bound
at the corners with four rods of brass that almost flashed out rays in the
sunlight. Between the chests shuttled the Harrow on a ribbon of steel.” “The
Harrow” or inscriber, shuttling between the Designer and the Bed on a ribbon
of steel, was “made of glass” so that “anyone can look through [it].”

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45 Brenner, ‘Foucault’s New Functionalism’, 691. It should be noted that Brenner
himself does not make this statement to give evidence of the argument set forth here;
rather he makes the statement quoted above to argue that Foucault explains power
“in the conceptual grammar of imperatives and functions” because his apparent
intention was to characterize power as “intelligible” while at the same time consistent
with a Nietzschean rejection of linearity and logic.

46 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 27.


50 Kafka, ‘In the Penal Colony’, 147.
On the Bed the condemned man is laid […]; here are straps for the hands, here for the feet, and here for the neck, to bind him fast. […] Now listen: Both the Bed and the Designer have an electric battery each; the Bed needs one for itself, the Designer for the Harrow. As soon as the man is strapped down, the Bed is set in motion. It quivers in minute, very rapid vibrations, both from side to side and up and down. You will have seen similar apparatus in hospitals; but in our Bed the movements are all precisely calculated; you see, they have to correspond very exactly to the movements of the Harrow. And the Harrow is the instrument for the actual execution of the sentence. […] Whatever commandment the prisoner has disobeyed is written upon his body by the Harrow.51

What is described here is an apparatus in which that which the body ‘lacks’ (a law or commandment, in this case) is ‘inscribed’ upon it through the harrowing experience of having the dominant (overhanging) ideology enforced upon — literally embodied by — the subject. The machine, in short, is an apparatus of ‘subjection’, of ‘subject’-making by subject-‘marking’. The undisciplined body is made to conform to a position within the apparatus, or in this case, is strapped onto the bed of Kafka’s penal apparatus. Simultaneously, this regulated body is made to embody the ideological design of the socio-political system.

Based on our earlier articulation of the twin axes of any disciplinary matrix, these two modes of subjection might be articulated as the two axes of socio-political existence: the syntagmatic axis on the one hand (the ‘horizontal’, ‘base’, or ‘ground-level’ plane), corresponding to the Bed; and the paradigmatic on the other (the ‘vertical’, ‘superstructural’, or ‘over-hanging’ plane), corresponding to the Designer. The dominant paradigm (design) crosses the syntagmatic body — the body to be given a syntax, to be ‘ordered’, ‘disciplined’ and ‘sentenced’ as such — at the crossroads of a crucifixion, where (to ‘nail down’ the metaphor rather crudely) a harrowing experience occurs: the subjection of the individual body to the body politic through its embodying and actual (physical) articulation of the current ideological paradigm. While the violence of the apparatus is felt (indeed, quite forcefully, quite painfully), it remains invisible — as transparent as glass — except for the “four rods of brass that almost flashed out rays in the sunlight” which hold the repressive apparatus (the Designer and the Bed) in place. The Harrow, the violence in the system, “is made of glass” so that “anyone can look through [it],”52 and in its transparency, its ‘presence’ disappears.

The body that is to be ordered (‘sentenced’) — hence the ‘syntagmatic’ body, grammatically speaking — assents to its own paradigmatic subjection, very simply because it does not know and/or does not fully realize that it is being subjected (“He does not know his sentence?” asked the visiting explorer in Kafka’s tale; “No,” replied the executing officer. “But surely he knows that

51 Kafka, ‘In the Penal Colony’, 142-144.
52 Kafka, ‘In the Penal Colony’, 147.
he has been sentenced?” the explorer then asked; again the officer replied quite simply and matter-of-factly in the negative. The syntagmatic body assents to its descent onto the Bed of the apparatus (with “straps for the hands, [...] for the feet, and [...] for the neck”) ignorant of the fact that it is indeed an assent to descent — this fact alone already underscoring the fact that the descent is itself indecent — and upon being so subjected (strapped down onto the Bed), “the Bed is set in motion” and the Harrow, following the script of the Designer, descends in turn onto the body, moved by the Bed itself so as “to correspond very exactly to the movements of the Harrow [and, in turn, Designer].” The synchrony of movement between Harrow and Bed rotates the body and allows the Harrow to inscribe the sentence over and over again; “it keeps on writing deeper and deeper for the whole twelve hours,” explains the executor of the sentence in Kafka’s tale:

> The first six hours the condemned man stays alive almost as before, and suffers only pain. [...] But how quiet he grows at just about the sixth hour! Enlightenment comes to even the most dull-witted. It begins around the eyes. From there it radiates. [...] Nothing more happens than that the man begins to understand the inscription; he purses his mouth as if he were listening. You have seen how difficult it is to decipher the script with one’s eyes; but our man deciphers it with his wounds.

“This is the historical reality of this soul,” according to Foucault, “which, unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but rather is born out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint. This real, non-corporeal soul,” Foucault insists, is “the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power.” Subjected to the dominant paradigm, the undisciplined body which has been ‘ordered’ and ‘disciplined’ (‘regulated’) along the syntagmatic axis (strapped to the Bed of the apparatus), becomes, through the harrowing cut of the paradigmatic axis (the Design and Harrow of the apparatus as such) the “corpus of knowledge” that arises, indecently, from this double descent (the descent of the undisciplined onto the syntagmatic axis and the descent upon the now-‘disciplined’ body — strapped in place — of the paradigmatic ‘design’ or ideology of the apparatus). (Undisciplined) ‘flesh’ becomes (disciplined) ‘word’ and is made to ‘work’ (discursively) or follow the script of its systemic inscription; in other

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53 Kafka, ‘In the Penal Colony’, 144-145.
54 Kafka, ‘In the Penal Colony’, 143.
55 Kafka, ‘In the Penal Colony’, 143-144.
56 Kafka, ‘In the Penal Colony’, 149-150.
57 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 29.
words, the purely ‘somatic’ (‘impure’ and ‘abject’) becomes ‘psycho-somatic’: a ‘body and soul’ (psyche and soma), in sum. As strange as it might seem, ‘body and soul’ thus arise from a double descent: syntagmatic and paradigmatic.

III. Crossing Pathologies: The Body Double-Crossed

The undisciplined body undergoes a syntagmatic ‘going under’, to again use Nietzsche’s phrase, in order to be ‘ordered’ or ‘regulated’, and then regulates itself (becomes itself a subject, and subject to itself) once it embodies and thereby acknowledges/empowers its paradigmatic script. “Rather than see this soul as the remnants of an ideology,” explains Foucault, “one should see it as the present correlative of a certain technology over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised [upon it].”58

The (paradigmatic) ‘soul’ or psyche is inscribed upon the (syntagmatic) ‘body’ or soma through the process of subjection or subject-making that arises, again (indecently, atrociously, painfully, repressively and what’s more violently), from a double ‘descent’ or ‘descending’.

Genealogy, writes Foucault, is “an analysis of descent”59 and thus the analysis, precisely, of this ‘double descent’ — is an analysis both of ‘where things come from’ (generation, filiation) and of ‘what things are undergoing’ (degeneration, subjection).60 But in analyzing and coming to terms with these two axes (this double descent), genealogy also uncovers (archaeologically) what these two axes ‘cross out’ and ‘cross over’: the ‘pre-disciplined’ body, or the corpus prior to its syntagmatic-paradigmatic [ac]knowledge. The genealogical method taken up by Nietzsche (the ‘genealogy’ that precedes and projects Foucault’s own ‘archaeology’), should be understood as an “Entstehung and Herkunft” rather than as an “Ursprung,” as Foucault writes;61

58 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 29.
59 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 148.
60 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche explicitly links the descent of the body to the singular experience of ‘going under’ in the encounter with the eternal return — cf., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (The Portable Nietzsche, New York: Penguin Books, 1982), Part I. The experience of eternal return forms the genealogical thread that binds Nietzsche to his heirs, in particular Bataille, Klossowski, Deleuze and Foucault. What is revealed in the experience of the eternal return is that the multiplicity of the body is the starting point for subjectivity. For both Bataille and Klossowski, it is only in this experience that the temporary unity required by conscious social existence is ‘suspended’ so that ‘subjectivity’ is experienced corporeally rather than intellectually, and affirmed as a ‘multiplicity’ rather than as a ‘unity’.
61 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 145.
genealogy, then, should not be confused with a quest for origins (Ursprung), although it does reveal, beyond the vertical and horizontal lines of structural analysis, the ‘oblique’ and ‘obliterated’ line of what gets crossed out, indeed double-crossed (that which structural analysis elides but which post-structural analysis uncovers). Genealogy “will never confuse itself with a quest for […] ‘origins’, will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. On the contrary,” explains Foucault, “it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice” 62 — the malice the machine holds for the abject, agrammatical body.

Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the genealogist sets out to study the beginning — numberless beginnings whose faint traces and hints of colour are readily seen by an historical eye. The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events. 63

So we see then that the entire apparatus is a machine for the ordering and disciplining of an otherwise heterogeneous body. Whereas the apparatus would obliterate this unruly body, genealogical scrutiny follows the axes of this obliteration and uses them to pinpoint ‘the obliterated’. This is, in many ways, the return of the repressed, a ‘return’ and ‘retranslation’ of those instincts that are regulated and/or rejected by the apparatus in order for human beings to live in an ordered society.

IV. Agrammatical Freedom And The Spirit Of Foucault’s Nietzscheanism

In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues that man’s entry into society required a break with his animal past. The human being thus found himself in a new situation in which the continued existence of his civilized self was sustained by a “declaration of war again the old instincts, on which, up to that point, his power, joy, and ability to inspire fear had been based.” 64 Nietzsche recognizes that this suppression of the instincts both founds and fuels the social apparatus; it is in fact “the profound illness which human beings had to come down with, under the pressure of the most fundamental of all the changes which they experienced — that change when they found themselves locked within the confines of society and peace.” 65 Nietzsche calls this founding repression an ‘illness’ precisely because the subjugation required by socio-

62 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 145.
63 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 145-146.
political existence in the state (the ‘social contract’) leads to the devaluation of man’s natural instincts:

All instincts which are not discharged to the outside are turned back inside. This is what I call the internalization of man. From this first grows in man what people later call his ‘soul’. The entire inner world, originally as thin as if stretched between two layers of skin, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, width, and height to the extent that the discharge of human instinct out into the world was obstructed. Those frightening fortifications with which the organization of the state protected itself against the old instincts for freedom — punishment belongs above all to these fortifications — made all those instincts of the wild, free, roaming man turn backwards, against man himself. Enmity, cruelty, joy in pursuit, in attack, in change, in destruction — all those turned themselves against the possessors of such instincts. That is the origin of ‘bad conscience’.66

This Nietzschean account of the origin of bad conscience in which the soul is invented and the natural instincts are suppressed has parallels to our articulation of the bodily inscription of Kafka’s Foucaultian penal apparatus. The socio-political state apparatus as ‘disciplinary matrix’ — the punitive apparatus of society as such — is the mode of subjectivization which disciplines men by way of both suppression and production: the suppression of base instincts and the production of cultural types.67 Despite the “internalization” of this mechanism, and the resultant “bad conscience” of such subjectivization — such embodied inscription “stretched between two layers of skin” — Nietzsche maintains nonetheless that “freedom” (certain modes of self-overcoming) is possible.

This ‘freedom’ is not predominantly a political freedom (for example, not a Hobbesian definition of individual freedom from coercion — what Marx called ‘bourgeois’ notions of freedom), but rather a freedom of ‘spirit’, which Nietzsche links directly to the philosopher’s capacity to resist, disrupt and ‘cut through’ the values and virtues of the time and which he declares to be the philosopher’s ultimate social goal (see especially part two of Beyond Good and Evil). For Nietzsche, the more one is internally mutable and manifold — the more capable one is of acting with the natural instincts and against the various systems of authority present in everyday life — the more one can enhance the feeling of ‘commanding’ and ‘legislating’ in oneself, and thus “see with many different eyes and consciences, from a height and into every distance, from the depths into every height, from a nook into every expanse.”68 Freedom of spirit, for Nietzsche, is characterized not as a right,

67 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §260, 262.
68 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §211.
nor a (legal or political) duty, but primarily as a feeling and a longing, as an “instinct for the happiness and refinements of the feeling of freedom.” Yet all these are merely preconditions of the ultimate task of the free spirit: to create new values.

While Foucault is careful not to employ the liberal language of freedom, he does seem to share Nietzsche’s sentiment that resistance is possible: “points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network [...]. [T]he points, knots or focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments of life, certain types of behavior.” The ‘longing for freedom’ that necessitates “applying the knife vivisectionally to the chest” of current values functions as a mode of resistance that hinges on struggling against “forms of subjection — against the submission of subjectivity.” The task of the Nietzschean/Foucaultian genealogist emerges from this exigency: “rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies.”

When mapped onto the axes of the disciplinary matrix that emerges from Foucault’s theorization of the body (and exemplified in Kafka’s penal apparatus), we argue, the locus and possibility of this Nietzschean ‘free spirit’ is found not along the lines of the twin axes of socio-political existence, but rather along the imperceptible and unconceptualizable diagonal line which alone performs the kind of ‘vivisection’ of which Nietzsche spoke: the body

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69 Nietzsche uses the terms ‘freedom of spirit’ and ‘free spirit’ as well as the terms ‘freedom of will’ and ‘free will’. This freedom is fundamentally a feeling of commanding and obeying body, rather than a isolated feature of thinking or intellection. Commanding consists largely in the will’s ordering of the impulses that produces an effect or action that the ego feels as the exercise of volition. It is an “expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies with the executor of the order” Beyond Good and Evil, §19. The conventional usage of these terms may suggest the metaphysical grammar of ‘self-consciousness’ but Nietzsche repeatedly asserts throughout his corpus that ‘freedom of the will’ and ‘free will’ are illusions. Amy Mullin enumerates some of the functions of the illusion of ‘free will’: “Nietzsche suggests that belief in freedom of will has many causes: it flatters our vanity and gives us a feeling of power; it subjects us to the power of priests who encourage us in this belief; ...it is the result of our falsely translating a social or political experience into the metaphysical realm such that strength is taken to equate with freedom of will; and it reflects our misleading grammar” — ‘Nietzsche’s Free Spirit’ in the Journal of the History of Philosophy July 2000), 388-89

70 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §260.

71 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, § 211.

72 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 96.

73 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §212.

74 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 211.

75 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ 211.
‘crossed out’ and ‘double-crossed’ by the disciplinary axes of the apparatus is the body — if such a heterogeneous field of forces can indeed be called a ‘body’ — without grammar, without syntax. The agrammatical ‘body’ is the site of a spirited freedom: the site, functionally speaking (‘functionally speaking’ by dint of its being formless, or what Georges Bataille would call informe76), of an oblique or slantwise slope77 which slips between and/or seeps through78 the normalizing axes of the disciplinary apparatus, messing up the matrix which would manage and manipulate it, order and regulate it.

From the beginning of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche grounds his vision of philosophy in such a spirit: in the untoward ‘slipping’, the unseemly ‘seeping’, the undisciplined ‘drive’ or ‘impulse’ that is the “inherently untidy experience”79 of the body’s spirited, impulsive, affective dimension. The ‘body’ therefore does not simply designate the ‘body and soul’ of the syntagmatic and paradigmatic socio-political axes, but also and even more importantly the agrammatical ‘spirit’ which this ‘body and soul’ cross over, cross out, and double-cross. The ‘free spirit’ as opposed to the disciplined ‘body and soul’ is the force of will, the force of becoming, the pure — or rather: impure, indecent, untidy — potential inherent in an impulse, instinct, or longing for freedom.80 The state of being imposed upon this spirit of becoming culturally redirects the natural impulses, which are the impulsional forces of physis rather than of soma or psyche (i.e., of non-conscious ‘nature’ rather than the consciousness, subconscious, self-conscious body qua structural, grammatical, ‘socio-cultural’ unit). Nietzsche’s view of the history of philosophy as “an interpretation of

76 “A dictionary begins when it no longer gives the meaning of words, but their tasks,” wrote Nietzschean theorist Georges Bataille in 1929; “[t]hus ‘formless’ is not only an adjective having a given meaning, but a term that serves to bring things down in the world, generally requiring that each thing have its form. What it designates has no rights in any sense and gets itself squashed everywhere.” Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927-1939, trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 1985), 31.

77 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 138.

78 “Grammar and Style” — the axes of the Syntagmatic and the Paradigmatic, of Language and Speech: la Langue et l’Enoncé — are, with respect to this affective, agrammatical body (“be it something or nothing”), “[a] mask,” wrote Samuel Beckett in his oft-quoted letter to Axel Kaun. “Let us hope the time will come, thank God that in certain circles it has already come, when language is most efficiently used where it is being most efficiently misused. As we cannot eliminate language [and be free of it] all at once, we should at least leave nothing undone that might contribute to its falling into disrepute [and/or indecency]. To bore one hole after another in it, until what lurks behind it — be it something or nothing — begins to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher goal for a writer today.” Samuel Beckett, Disjecta, ed. Ruby Cohn (New York: Grove Press, 1984), 171-172; square brackets added.

79 Butler, Gender Trouble, 131.

80 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §260.
the body”

the body”
revolves around his claim that “that which becomes conscious is involved in causal relations that are entirely withheld from us”; consciousness is therefore not “the directing agent” but an “organ of the directing agent.”

“The subject,” Nietzsche insists, “is a multiplicity.”

Despite the differences between Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s respective ideas of freedom, through the linkage between bodily states and will to power forged by Nietzsche, Foucault recognizes the fundamentally Nietzschean idea that the base of collective existence is not ‘political sovereignty’ or a ‘common’, ‘united’, ‘political’ will — the politics of the state, of state-craft and the state apparatus — but rather “something altogether different”: “the site of a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost.”

82 Nietzsche The Will to Power, §524.
83 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §490.
84 Nietzsche’s vocabulary of ‘freedom of spirit’ may appear ‘volunteristic’ and as implicated in the liberal language of ‘choice’. But the affective Dionysian body in Nietzsche is not accessed by choice, but results in the metamorphosis of a rare type who travels the path of negative philosophy, only to encounter at its end, the abysmal experience of eternal return (see the existential trajectory of the Overman in the ‘Three Metamorphoses’, Part One of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra). Nonetheless, the importance of willing in the desire for freedom does distinguish Nietzsche from Foucault. In his comparison of Sartre and Foucault, John Rajchman argues that in Sartre (and in Nietzsche as we argue) freedom is a “philosophical problem,” whereas "Foucault’s commitment [is] to a nonvoluntaristic, nonhumanistic freedom within history” — John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 44, 45. Likewise, we argue that much in the same way, the freedom of spirit can be read as a “philosophical problem” in Nietzsche’s text. Here, the juxtaposition Rajchman makes between Sartre and Foucault could also characterize, in a superficial way, the contrast between Nietzsche and Foucault. Rajchman has characterized Foucault’s approach to freedom as “nominalist”, and Sartre’s “anthropological”: “[a]nthropology entails that we are free because we have a nature that is real or one we must realize; nominalist history assumes that our ‘nature’ in fact consists of those features of ourselves by reference to which we are sorted into polities and groups. Our real freedom is found in dissolving or changing the polities that embody our nature, and as such it is asocial and anarchical. No society or polity could be based on it, since it lies precisely in the possibility of constant change. Our real freedom is thus political, though it is never finalizable, legislatable, or rooted in our nature” — Rajchman 1985:123. Interestingly, Richard Schacht also characterizes Nietzsche’s philosophy as “anthropological”: “it is one of Nietzsche’s most fundamental contentions that the proper object of investigation here is not the ‘mind’ or ‘spirit,’ the ‘soul’ or ‘psyche,’ or the ‘ego’ or ‘consciousness,’ but rather man in the generic sense (der Mensch) – a kind of creature whose existence is animate, bodily, active, social and historical, and involves a variety of forms of experience and processes.” Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 267-8.
85 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 142.
86 Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 143.
V. Larvatus Prodeo (Conclusion): The Nietzschean Face Of Foucault

The free spirit, here understood in terms of the affective dimension of the agrammatical body, is in many senses a marker for the possibility of new value-creation. The notion of an ‘untidy bodily experience’, in its affinity to Nietzsche’s ‘free spirit’, provides both Nietzsche and Foucault with a momentary opening for resistance, albeit a risky and provisional one, given the persistence of [re]signification. “The risk of renormalization is persistently there,” writes Butler in her discussion of Nietzsche and Foucault, but so is “the possibility of a reversal of signification.” 87 “[P]olitically mobilizing what Nietzsche, in the Genealogy of Morals, called the ‘sign chain’,” Foucault “opens the way for an inauguration of signifying possibilities that exceed those to which the term has been previously bound,” explains Butler. 88 But just as we noted at the beginning of our study that the agrammatical or affective body is neither “stable and self identical” nor “a body prior to [...] inscription” (but rather, an “inherently untidy” body inextricably bound to – double-bound, indeed double-crossed by – the ‘body proper’), so in this case, in this conclusion, must we note that the possibilities inherent in and afforded by this ‘abjected’, ‘abnormal’, ‘agrammatical’ body exceed signification itself: they are, as such, an inauguration not of “signifying possibilities” but of insignificant ones, of possibilities beyond signification, possibilities not yet significant. The implication here is, nonetheless, significant. If the agrammatical body, which is neither perceptible nor conceptualizable, is the only locus of freedom of spirit, then this freedom is essentially anarchical, that is, it has no definable arche within the disciplinary matrix, and therefore cannot sustain the conventional instruments of resistance known to human beings:

if Foucault considers power a “dense web”, a network of coordinated functions, he describes resistance as a “swarm of points,” a field of erratic, capricious, irregularly-behaving functions. The point here is not that power suppresses some primordial, rebellious, “plebeian” instinct [...]. Rather, Foucault appears to be suggesting that the functions out of which resistance is constituted are “nomadic,” they refuse subsumption within all regularly organized systems. In short, the only distinguishing property of the functions which compose resistance in Foucault’s account is their “dysfunctional” consequences on the dominant power dispositif. 89

88 Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 94.
The question that remains, and with which we close here, is whether Foucault’s theorization of resistance is compatible with his own anti-foundationalist, anti-romanticist methodological premises. Although Foucault acknowledges his Nietzscheanism, he took great pains (most explicitly in his ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’) to outline and circumscribe precisely where he was following Nietzschean principles. The implication of what we have called “double descent upon the indecent” (our “inde[s]cent proposal” that there is a non-discursive and hence indecent body that functions as the site of resistance for Foucault) reveals, ironically and even shockingly, an aspect of Foucaultian theory where Foucault is at his most Nietzschean and, ultimately, least like himself. Where Foucault’s cold, clinical gaze falters — at the point not of the percept and the concept but of the agonizing affect, the diagonal disruption — we find a remarkably romantic and utterly Nietzschean notion which seems to be at odds with the rigorously clinical gaze of a Foucaultian diagnostician: the notion and/or suggestion of an altogether affective, instinctive, sovereignly heterogeneous body — the body in its agrammatical, and thoroughly indecent, aspect.