Epistemological constructivism and its methodological consequences
The debate about constructivism and its methodological consequences has, on the one hand, confused ontological and epistemological constructivism, and, on the other, erroneously rejected conventional rules of method. This article seeks to unravel some of the main issues. In the first part of the article I analyse four constructivist positions on the basis of their ontological and epistemological premises, not to provide a thorough review, but to delimit epistemological constructivism. In the second part of the article, I argue that epistemological constructivism (with point of departure in Luhmann’s systems theory) doesn’t get entangled with some of the misunderstandings that constructivism generally is criticised for because it doesn’t mix ontology and epistemology. In the third part of the article, I attempt to show how general rules of method are congruent with epistemological constructivism. I attempt to show that it is possible to corroborate the rules of method without necessarily subscribing to correspondence criteria for truth, if one in stead is contented to assume that the ambition is to contribute to the scientific debate.
